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Summary 
In this book Dr Moynagh provides the first compre­
hensive history of Fiji's sugar industry, which has been the 
mainstay of the country's economy for the past hundred years. 
He- examines the circumstances in whi�h the industry was set 
up, the development of plantation agriculture before World 
War I, the evolution of the unique smallfarm system of sugar 
production, the conflict of interest between the mostly 
Indian-growers and the Australian based millers, and the 
withdrawal in 1973 of the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd 
which had dominated the industry since the 1880s. 
Using company records not previously open to scholars, 
Dr Moynagh provides insight into the formation and imple­
mentation of policy by a multinational company, CSR Ltd. He 
provides a case study of private company-government relations, 
he estimates the size of company prof its and compares that 
with the. estimated capital invested by the company in Fiji, 
and he assesses the company's contribution or otherwise to 
Fiji's economic development. Though the approach is histor­
ical, the book presents material of interest to economists 
and political scientists alike. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
For nearly a hundred years sugar has been the mainstay 
of Fiji's economy. It has accounted for over - usually well 
over - half the total exports each year. It has provided 
direct employment for large numbers of people - about 30 per 
cent of the economically active population outside subsist­
ence agriculture in 1966  to which must be added the indirect 
effects on employment.1 Between 1950 and 1965  on average 
sugar represented one-fifth of gross domestic product each 
year.2 The industry has played a central part in shaping 
the history of Fiji. The size of the Indian population 
today, and the resultant competition between Fijians and 
Indians for political and economic gains, stems largely from 
the introduction before 1916 of indentured labour to work on 
sugar plantations and in the mills. 
Not only has sugar been of immense importance to Fiji. 
Its historical development contains features of singular 
interest to those outside the country. No other sugar 
industry in the world has virtually all its cane grown by 
such a large number of small growers - now numbering over 
16 , 000 . Nor can there be many which for almost their whole 
history have been so dominated by one company, the Australian­
based CSR Ltd, formerly known as the Colonial Sugar Refining 
Co. Ltd. From 1924 to 1 9 7 3  it was the sole miller of sugar 
in Fiji, buying -cane from (mostly) Indian smallfarmers, 
processing it into raw- sugar and exporting it for reftning 
overseas. Before 1924 it organized the cultivation of cane 
on estates, and of the six mills in the colony after 1902 
it owned the four largest. The company has a remarkably 
complete set of records dating from the 1880s when it started 
in Fiji. Together with official and other sources, they 
provide insight into the effects of private enterprise on 
the economy of a less developed country. The question of 
who benefited from the sugar industry - white capital or 
brown labour - will form an important part of this study. 
1 
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Ano ther question will be  the extent to which the 
industry has contributed to Fij i ' s  economic development 
def ined as the growth of real per capita incomes of the mass 
of  the populat ion . By world standards Fij i is  no t poor . 
Gro s s  domestic product per head of the populat ion is higher 
than that of nearly all the African and Asian countries . 
Yet it is  lower than several o ther members of  the Third 
World such as Singapore , and is  far below that o f  the devel­
oped nat ions . 3 Fij i is a small country , phys ically isolated 
from the main centres of  world trade . The land area totals 
about 7,000 square miles , mostly steep and mountainous . 
Eighty-seven per cent o f  the land and over 90 per cent o f  the 
populat ion ar e conc entrated on the two largest islands of  
Viti Levu and Vanua Levu . The populat ion is over half a 
million , of which the Indian component is the largest , 
followed quite closely by the Fij ians ; Chinese ,  Europeans 
and o ther ethnic groups compr ise under 10 per cent of the 
to tal . Population trends s ince 1881 are shown in Table 1.1. 
The subsistence sector , which is mainly Fij ian , is  s t ill an 
important part o f  the economy , accounting for an estimated 
9.4 per cent of  GDP in 1975.4 
Table 1.1 
Com2onent EOEulat ions , 1881 to 1976 
Year Fij ian Indian Other To tal 
1881 114,748 588 12,150 127,486 
1891 105,800 7,468 7,912 121,180 
1901 94,397 17,105 8,622 120,124 
1911 87 ,096 40,286 12,159 139,541 
1921 84,475 60,634 12,157 157,266 
1936 97,651 85,002 15 '726 198,379 
1946 118,070 120,414 21,154 259,638 
1956 148,134 169,403 28,200 345,737 
1966 202,176 240,960 33,591 476,727 
1976 259,932 292,896 35 '240 588,068 
Sources : Census report for 1966; preliminary f igures from 
the 1976 census , Bureau of S tatis t ic s , Suva . 
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The monetary sector depends heavily on the inter­
national economy . Despite an increas ing amount of  import 
subst itut ion , the import bill has represented a s teadily 
rising proport ion of GDP.  From 39 per cent in 1950  it  rose  
to  5 0  per cent in  the mid-1960s and to  7 3  per  cent in  19 74 . 5 
Much o f  the increas e  is due to  the import o f  inves tment 
goods . Yet foo d imports  are s t ill important , representing 
around about 25 per cent of al l import s by value in 1973 , and 
about 45  per c ent of  total vis ible export s .  This import 
dependence has forced government to g ive priority to  boosting 
the earnings of foreign exchange .  Apart from sugar , which 
account ed for 6 6 . 9  per cent of visible expor t s  in 1 9 7 3  and 
provides employment mainly for Ind ians , the other principal 
export s are coconut product s  (1 1 . 7  per cent of  the 1 9 7 3  total ) 
and gold (al so 11 . 7  per cent ) , both of  which emp loy mo s tly 
Fij ians . S inc e the 1960s receipt s from t our ism have been 
important , and in 1 9 7 3  compri sed 3 2 . 7  per cent of total 
fore ign earnings . 6 Because these act ivit ies have been devel ­
oped largely as the result of  overseas investment , fore ign­
controlled f irms dominat e importan t  sec t or s  of the economy , 
though the sugar mills were acquired by government in 1 97 3 . 
The country ' s  dependence on overseas trade and foreign 
capital has invo lved an histor ical alliance between private 
cap ital , government and Fij ian chiefs . When the islands 
were ceded to Bri tain in 1874 , the colonial adminis tration 
was faced with the task of maintaining political control . 
Without a large armed force at  i t s  immed iate disposal , 
government had to rule with the consent of  the chiefs . This 
required compromise , including a willingness  by government 
to limit the spread of p lantation enterprise which was s een 
by the chiefs  as a threat to Fij ian int eres t s . The aliena­
t ion of native lands was checked , and Fij ians were discouraged 
from working on plantations . Yet at the same t ime ,  though 
reluctantly , government had to encourage private enterprise , 
no t leas t to raise revenue to pay for adminis tration . A 
large par t  o f  the best  land in the colony was made available 
to planters b ecause a government commis sion conf irmed the 
alienation of about half of what  had b een sold to  Europeans 
before Cession , while at t imes offic ials encouraged Fij ians 
to lease other areas . On this basis , cap i talists  were 
persuaded to inves t  in the co lony . Much later , when Indians 
became s torekeepers , set up impor t / export firms and so on , 
Indian bus inessmen would j o in hands with overseas cap ital . 
The result was an identity of interest  between cap i tal , 
government and chiefs which was to las t throughout the 
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s ub sequent history of the islands . Each party dep ended on 
the o thers . Bus iness needed chiefly suppor t for the exis t ing 
order , thereby ensur ing po lit ical s tab ility wh ich was a 
prerequisite for trade ; it  also relied on government for 
o ther forms of  ass is tance where needed . To maintain polit­
ical order, government required the support of  the chiefs  and 
the inflow o f  private cap ital which would lead to economic 
growth and increase public revenue . The Fij ians wanted 
government to protect them agains t  the expans ive t endencies 
of  private enterpr ise and later the Indians ; yet tho se who 
could lease land also benefited  from the receip t o f  rents 
when commercial agriculture developed . Of co urse within the 
alliance there were t ens ions , particularly between busines s 
and the chiefs . Especially a t  the beginning , nei ther party 
fully real ized the extent to which their interes ts co incided . 
There was compet ition , too , for factors o f  produc tion , 
notably land , and to some degree over the share o f  the re­
turns from agriculture o btained through rent . Even wi thin 
the bus ines s  conununity there were dif ferences . The Colonial 
Sugar Refining Co . Ltd wanted to maximiz e  its returns by 
paying as low wages or as low a price for cane as it could ; 
but s ince rec ipient s  then would have had les s  to spend on 
consumer goods , this was aga inst  the interes ts  of merchants . 
There were also disputes between the company and government 
over what share of the profits  from s ugar each should ob tain , 
and over some of the methods used by the company to make 
profits . Yet whatever the dif ferences , and to contemporaries 
they of ten loomed large , each party in the alliance depended 
on the tacit support of the o thers . Though they migh t j o s tle 
among themselves for a sho rt-term advantage , no ne dared 
threaten the long-term exis tence of the alliance itself . 
Agains t the alliance were the economic interes ts  o f  
the Fij ian commoners and the bulk of  the Indian populat ion . 
Among Fij ians wealth was , and s till is , concentrated in the 
hands of the chief s , who are ent itled to a large proportion 
of the income from rents - 30 per cent s ince World War II  -
and who can extract labour services from those under their 
authority . Though the commoner s benef it from the distribu­
t ion of the chief s '  wealth , in terms of  its  ownership the 
interes t s  of the two parties differ. The support of Apolosi 
Nawai ' s  short -lived Viti Company , founded during World War I 
with the aim of reducing European economic influence over the 
Fij ians , highl ighted the conf lict o f  int erest  that has also 
exi s ted between the commoner s and European owners of cap ital . 7 
Interes t s  have differed , too , between the Indians - whether 
as indentured labourers  or smallf armers - who have wanted 
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to secure a larger share of  the proceeds from sugar , and 
plantation and mill owners  who se concern has been to res i s t  
such demands .  O n  to the contradict ions between capital , 
chiefs and government on the one s ide , and connnoner s , Ind ian 
labourer s and Indian smallfarmer s on the o ther , have been 
superimposed ethnic , religious and per sonal differenc es . 
These  have often bit terly divided the Indian community . 
Further , Indian smallfarmers frequently tend to feel that  
their interests  are threatened mor e  by  Fij ians , especially 
over land tenure , than by pr ivat e  cap ital , while commoners  
and chief s have uni ted to  protect  themselves against the 
Indians . Nevertheless , the basic economic contradictions 
s t ill remain . 
The pr incipal links forged by Fij i with the inter­
nat ional economy have been through the sugar indus try . The 
small size of the country ' s  domes t ic market means that sugar 
has had to be produced almo s t  entirely for expor t .  At f irst  
it  was sold mainly to New Zealand and Aus tralia , but  by 1914  
the volume go ing to Australia was relat ively small , whi le 
Canada had become the second mos t  important market after New 
Zealand . In the lat e  19 20s Britain replaced New Zealand as 
the princ ipal outlet , with Canada s till in second plac i. 
This has remained the pos i tion s ince World War II , though 
s ignif icant quanti t ies have also been shipped to  New Zealand , 
Malays ia , S ingapore and the Uni ted S tates . Apart from a 
brief period at the end of the las t century , molasses , an 
important by-produc t  of  sugar milling , has b een sold to 
Australia where i t  has been used in the manufacture o f  
industrial alcohol . The volume of  Fij i ' s  export s  are minute 
in terms o f  the world sugar trade , so that  she has been 
unable to influence the price signif icantly . Demand in high 
income countries , to which mos t  o f  Fij i ' s  s ugar is  sold , 
t ends to be r elat ively inelast ic to changes in income , while 
the expans ion of  beet product ion in the nineteenth century 
and the more recent development of art if icial sweeteners 
mean that sub s t itutes for cane sugar have become readily 
available . Thi s , together w ith Fij i ' s  remot enes s  from the 
world ' s  principal markets , limit s  the s cope for increasing 
the price . 
Produced largely for sale on dome s t ic markets , the 
bulk o f  world sugar output - b o th beet and cane - does  no t 
enter internat ional trade . Of the proportion which does , 
s ince the 1 9 30s about half has been marketed under s pec ial 
arrangements and at prices which have d iverged from the world 
free price . 8 The lat t er is the price o f  that small percentage 
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o f  world sugar produc tion whi ch is sold on the int ernat ional 
market at pric es freely determined by s upply and demand . 
Because this is es sentially a residual market , prices have 
tended to f luctuate widely . High prices have encouraged 
new suppliers to enter the market , and this has a long-term 
depressive effect on price s ince the large amount of  capital 
required for sugar product ion and the specificity of capital 
to the particular crop make supply comparatively unresponsive 
to a fall in price . When prices have dropped , government s 
have frequently sub s idized indust r ie s  which o therwis e  would 
have been uncompetitive . Up to 1939 Fij i sold sugar at 
prices related to the world free price , though she b enefited 
from preferent ial tarif f s  on imperial sugar introduced by 
Canada before World War I and by Britain in 1919 . During 
the 194 0s all Fij i ' s  crop was purchased by the British _ 
Minis try of  Food at pr ices which were remunerative to the 
higher cos t  Wes t  Indian suppliers , but subsequent ly under 
the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement ( 1950-74)  and the Lame 
Convent ion which superseded it , only part o f  Fij i ' s crop 
(about 60 per cent) has b een sold at prices unrelated to 
the world free price . Though these nego tiated prices have 
generally been higher than the world price , they have been 
f ixed mainly with consumer interes ts  in mind and in the 
knowledge that very high prices would encourage the produc­
tion of  sub s titutes . The res t of F ij i ' s  sugar has been sold 
mos tly in preferential markets  where the p r ice has been 
based on the world free price p lus the value o f  the tarif f . 
Clearly , returns from sugar have dep ended very much on pr ice 
movements  b eyond the country ' s  control . 
For Fij i to compete on the world marke t ,  sizeable 
quantities of  cap ital have been required . Early entrepren­
eurs in the colony had to provide no t only mills , p lantat ion 
equipment and so on , but also infras tructure in the form 
of  roads , traml ines , power supplies , etc . S ince the late 
nineteenth century the world ' s  chief exporters of s ugar have 
generally favoured large , cap ital intens ive mills in order 
to take advantage of technical innovat ions and economies o f  
scale . Nowadays , except in a f ew countries like India , a 
mill with a capacity to produce 20 , 000 tons o f  raw s ugar a 
season would be considered small .  In simp les t terms , a sugar 
mill breaks up cane s talks , squeezes o ut sweet j uice and 
recovers the sucrose as crys tals of raw sugar containing 
ab out 9 8  per cent sucrose . Though this can be done in very 
small and technically unsophis ticated mills , the quali ty o f  
sugar tends t o  be lower and returns o n  investment less than 
for sugar produced in larger mills . An efficient transport 
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sys tem is par ticularly important for sugar production . 
S ince cane begins to lose it s sucrose content immediately 
after harve sting , it _is essent ial that the crop be taken 
quickly from the fiel d  to the factory . This means that cane 
should be grown as close to the mill as pos sible . But in 
Fij i the topography of the land has caused sugar to be 
cult ivated at greater dis tances from the mills than , say , 
in Queensland . This in turn has resulted in a larger 
expenditure per ton of  sugar on transport than is usual in 
mos t  sugar countries . On a per ton of  sugar bas is , Fij i ' s  
tramline system is reputed t o  be  the mo s t  extensive in the 
world . With raw sugar requiring larger quantit ies of  
capital than other food indus tries , excep t  perhaps tea , and 
in the absence of subs tantial savings within the economy , 
the cap ital to develop sugar product ion in Fij i has had to 
come from abroad . 
The Fij i industry has also depended on a big labour 
force for , desp ite the introduction of tractors since World 
War II, the cult ivat ion of cane in Fij i is labour int ensive . 
The demand for l abour peaks at certain t imes of  the year 
according to the crop cycle . As soon as the weather is 
right , between February and Apr il of each year , within a 
week or two the land is ploughed and the cane planted , the 
crop being reaped the following year . Harvest ing lasts  
from June/July to December /January , and is performed by 
gangs of cut ters working on a co-operat ive basis . After 
harvesting , the cane stools  remain and from these grow new 
shoot s , known as ratoons , which can be harves ted the next 
season . Till the late 1950s i t  was usual for the same stool 
to produce ratoons for one or two years before being ploughed 
out , the land being fallowed t ill new plants were sowed . 
With the introduct ion of  bet ter variet ies , however , ' mult iple ' 
ratooning became common , ratoons often being grown for eight 
years or more . This reduces the amount o f  labour needed 
for planting . At times of p eak labour demand it is essential 
for the miller to ensure , where pos s ible , the minimum compet i­
t ion for labour , in order to pr event the crop being neglected 
and wage increase s  pushing up the co s t  o f  cane . The larger 
the crop and the higher the s ugar content of cane - factors 
partly dependent on good cultivat ion work and proper harvest­
ing - the lower will b e  the unit co s t s  o f  milling . Mechaniza­
t ion might have made it possible for the indus try to develop 
on lines which would have great ly reduced the demand for 
labour ; but in Fij i there was lit tle incentive to do so . 
Because the supply of  Fij ian and Pacific Island labour was 
limited , Indians were made available under a system o f  
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indenture which last ed t ill 1916 . The labour shortage 
which followed the end of indenture was solved not by ex­
tens ive mechanizat ion but by encouraging Ind ian smallfarmers 
to grow cane . So it is  that histor ically the indus try has 
depended on overseas markets , overseas capital and ,  up to 
1916 , overseas labour . 
The history o f  the indus t ry can be divided into three 
phases . The f irs t , the European plant er phase , lasted from 
about 1870  to 191 6 . Dur ing this perio d  the Colonial Sugar 
Ref ining Co . acquired it s dominant po s it ion in the industry , 
build ing the Nausor i ,  Rarawai ,  Labasa and Laut oka mills . Of 
the other mills in the colony , only two - at Penang and 
Navua - survived the fall in raw sugar pr ices in the 1880s 
and 1890s . Cane was grown either by European plant er s  for 
sale to the mills or by the mill owner s thems elves .  In the 
1890s the Colonial Sugar Ref in ing Co . began t o  lease its  
estates to overseers of the company , and af t er 1 905 the pro­
cess of leas ing was accelerated , so  that by 1916  the bulk of 
the company ' s  cane was obtained from European planters .  
Estates were worked mostly by Ind ian indentured labourers , 
who after serving their ind entures began t o  set tle on the 
land , often as cane farmer s .  The second phase started in 
1916 , when the end of the indenture system put upward pres sure 
on wage rates . In 1920 effort s by employers t o  prevent a 
sharp and permanent r is e  in wages resul ted in a str ike by 
labourers on the southeast of Vit i Levu . The following year 
there was a str ike by Ind ian cane growers on the west of  the 
same is land . The shortage of labour was solved by set t l ing 
Indians on land formerly cul t ivated as es tates , so that they 
would grow cane on plo t s  averaging about ten acres each . 
By 1 9 39 nearly all the cane was produced by smallfarmers , 
and the Co lonial Sugar Re fining Co . had b ecome the sole 
miller in Fij i :  it had pur chased the Penang mill and the 
mill at Navua had closed in 192 2 . The third phase las ted 
from about 1940 to 19 73 . I t  was a per io d  o f  intermit tent 
conflict between growers and the company . There was a 
s tr ike in 1943 followed by an inquiry into the indus try by 
Professor C . Y .  Shephard . Ano ther s trike occurred in 1960 , 
af ter which there was a commis s ion of  inquiry headed by S ir 
Malcolm Trus tam Eve . A third d ispute in 1969 did no t result  
in  a str ike , but the arbitrator , Lord Denning , found mos tly 
in favour of the growers ,  with the result the company with­
drew on the grounds that it could no longer operate  pro fit­
ably in Fij i .  
A traditio nal account o f  the forego ing would s tress 
the benef its  to Fij i from the development of  the sugar 
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industry , highlight ing , for examp le ,  the ga ins from the 
supply of cap it al and skills , the earn ings of fore ign exchange 
and t he general stimulu s to economic act ivity provided by the 
indust ry . And it  might at t r ibut e negat ive cont r ibut ions to 
economic development t o  the Colonial Sugar Ref ining Co. ' s  
monopsonic po sit ion in the economy , which enabled the company 
to keep down wages and the price of cane and so l imit t he 
spread effect s of it s act ivit ies . Fo llowing writers l ike 
P.T .  Bauer and B . S .  Yamey , 9 the account might st ress the need 
to attract further pr ivat e investment so t hat , with other 
f irms compet ing in the labour market , the effect s of monopsony 
could be reduc ed . It might also  emphasize the role of  trade 
unions in raising wage levels . Finally , it might suggest 
ways - perhaps through government intervent ion - to  increas e 
t he benefits  of sugar product ion . 
Experience has shown however ,  t hat gains from inter­
nat ional t rade t o  develop ing c ountries are less than was once 
suppo sed . A whole ho st of wr it ers has t r ied to exp lain why . 10 
Among t hem are a number from the Commonwealth Car ibbean , 
notab ly Lloyd Best and George Beckford . 1 1  Their analyses 
focus on the ' p lantat ion economy ' , where the plant at ion form 
of product ion is dominan t  and is seen as a spec ial case of 
export-led growth under expans ive capitalism .  Espec ially in 
the twent ieth century , plant at ions have been charact er iz ed 
by t he product ion of  commod it ies for export , the use of  a 
large unskilled labour f orce under as few skilled managers as 
pos s ible , and by for eign owner ship . Usually the lat t er is 
corporat e ,  and with a relat ively high degree of vert ical 
int egrat ion . The operat ion of plantat ion compan ies is taken 
as the key var iable inf luenc ing t he polit ical , soc ial and 
economic his tory of  plantat ion societ ies . 
Beckford al lows t hat companies make a sub stant ial 
contribut ion to income growth t hrough t heir development of 
soc ial and overhead infrastructure , t he ir expans ion of  
product ion , the ir contr ibut ion to t echnology and the ir demon­
st rat ion ef fect on peasant s ,  many of  whom turn t o  cash crop s  
formerly produced on plantations alone . Yet he emphasizes 
that the very nature of  plantat ion ent erprise l imit s  it s 
development impact . Thus  the vert ical int egrat ion o f  plant a­
t ions , mills , shipp ing and f inal proces sing enables one f irm 
to make prof it s at every stage . Although in one way this 
increases a company ' s risks b ecause capital is t ied to 
a part icular crop rather t han spr ead over several commod­
it ies , in another way r isks are reduced s ince the ref iner , 
for example , no longer depends on other f irms for t he supply 
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or transport  of raw sugar . One of  the r esults  of  vertical 
integration is that f orward and backward linkages are en­
closed largely wi thin the firm ,  so limiting the ir s pread 
effects in the plantation economy . Much of the s pread o ccurs 
in the metropole , where the bulk o f  the value is  added to 
the f inal product . The size o f  inves tment in a part icular 
crop impos es s tructural rigidit ies on the plantation society . 
Because of the large quantity of capital t i ed up in , say , 
sugar , it is difficult to swit ch to  another more r emunerat ive 
crop if  a chang e in the market occurs . This capital specif­
icity res tricts the po tential for s truc tural change in less 
developed countries . ·  
B eckford no tes , too , tha t plantat ion enterpr ise is 
f requently as so ciated wi th the under-utiliza t ion of land . 
The firm often holds for speculat ive purposes more land 
than it needs for its  immediat e  us e, so p reventing the land 
being used for alt ernat ive crop s . It may actively discourage 
the diver s if icat ion of  agr iculture in order to minimize 
competition for labour . The need to keep down labour co s t s  
and so maximiz e  prof its  is s een as a sp ec ially impo rtant 
charac ter istic of plantation compani es , for whom labour is 
frequently the largest s ingl e  i t em o f  cos t . The dominant 
position in the labour market of one or s everal companies 
(usually the case in p lantation economies ) enabl es employers  
to  keep wages below the level which might have preva iled had 
there been greater competition , though to an extent this 
has been counteracted by trade unions . The import of  cheap 
labour in many instances has had a profound effect on the 
demographic composition of plantation societ ies . Usually 
ther e is t ens ion between the descendants o f  immigrants and 
o ther ethnic group s , and this impedes economic development 
s ince the r esul tant ins tab ility (or  prospect of ins tability) 
deters inves tment . The unequal distrib ution o f  wealth - low 
wages for lab our ers  and high salar ies for tho se from the 
metropole, limits the size o f  the domestic market for goo ds 
produced locally . Accus tomed to overs eas products ,  thos e  on 
high incomes tend to import many of their supplies ; while the 
marke t among tho se on low incomes is relatively small . 
Consequently , plantation economies b ecome heavily dep endent 
on imports  and many have only recently b egun to pro duce 
import subst itutes . 
To the leakag e o f  earnings abroad through the purchas e  
o f  impor ts mus t be added the repatriation of  pro f it s . 
Normally , for sound co s t  reas ons , a firm will reinvest its  
pro fits  in proces sing fac ilities in the me tropole , o r  it  
will inves t  in o ther less developed count ries in order to 
reduce its dependence on one geographical area . Or else 
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it will diver sify into new products . Thus mo st  of its  
pro fi t s  are not available for investment in , and so s t imula­
t ion of , the economy where they were earne d .  Finally , i t  
is  argued that gains from expor t s  are limited because over 
long per iods the terms of  trade tend to move agains t primary 
producers . In the long run improved productivity may no t 
benef it the producer , since technological advances are likely 
to be adop ted by o thers , thereby increas ing to tal supply 
which , all things being equal , will reduce the price . The 
demand for many commoditie s  produced in developing countr ies 
is  restricted by its inelastic ity to income changes in high 
income countr ies . In these ways , then , Beckford claims that 
the development effect  of plantat ion enterpr ise is limited . 
There is l it tle that f irms can do about this . To survive 
they have to act in an economically rational way - that is , 
they have to maximize profits  - and this has the unavoidable 
resul t  of reducing the benefit s they can br ing to less 
developed economies . 
Now there are great dangers in transport ing acro s s  the 
Pacific a model which , despite claims that it is widely 
applicab le , was construc ted with the Caribbean very much in 
mind . Some would argue that the existence o f  a large indig­
enous populat ion mos tly outside the s cope of p lantation 
enterprise distinguishes Fij i from Beckford ' s  category of 
plantation economies . They would contes t ,  too , the view 
that plantation enterprise has b een the main - almo s t  the 
sole - determinant of Fij i ' s  social , political and economic 
development . In contras t o ther s , pointing t o  the encroach­
ment of commercial agriculture on Fij ian land , to the use 
of Fij ian labour by such enterprise , and to the p enetrat ion 
of  the indigenous economy by merchant capital (a  special 
form of plantation enterprise in Beckford ' s  view) , would 
argue that the indigenous population has b een very greatly 
af fected by p lantation ent erpr ise . Whether or no t Beckford ' s  
model is app licable to the Fij i economy as a whole is  
beyond the scope o f  this  study . What is undeniable , however , 
is  that drawing as i t  do es on the exper ience of the Wes t  
Indian sugar i slands , the model contains many ins ights of 
value in explaining the hi story of  sugar production in o ther 
countries . Making use of  these insights ,  this  s tudy will 
examine the history of  the Fij i sugar indus try , and conclude 
by assessing the indus try ' s  contr ibution to the country ' s  
economic development . 
Chapt er 2 
The beginnings 
The co tton boom 
Plantat ion agriculture first  f lo ur ished in Fij i during 
the co t ton boom of the late 1860s . The American Civil War 
disrup ted the world ' s  -main supply o f  co t ton , so that the 
price ro se and Fij i ' s  output grew . Planters favoured the 
Sea I sland variety which was used by French fac tories in the 
manufacture of cer tain clas ses o f  silk . 1 They settled 
init ial ly in Lau , Taveuni , south Vanua Levu and the mouth 
of the Rewa river , and later further up the Rewa and along 
o ther maj or rivers in Vit i Levu .z In di stricts s carcely 
touched by European settlement land co uld b e  bought cheaply , 
in exchange for goods o f  relatively small value to set tlers , 
but as the number o f  Europeans increased from 400 in 186 6 to 
2 , 000 in 18 70 3 there was a rise in the value of  land in 
set tled areas . 4 Though at first  Fij ians were employed , 
plantations were increasingly worked by labour impor ted from 
o ther Pacific islands and f ound to be more reliable ,  if more 
expensive . 5 Capital was provided by ' beachcomb er speculators ' 6 
who self-f inanced many of  their land purchases in the early 
1860s , by thos e  like the Ryder brothers who arr ived wi th 
sub stantial means and co uld par tly finance themselves , 7 and 
above all by creditor s like F .  & W .  Hennings who liberally 
financed the many Europ eans with lit tle or no weal th . The 
Hennings ,  in turn , were in deb t t ill 1867  to J . C .  Godeffroy 
& Son of Hamburg and Apia , and thereafter to the Sydney f irm 
o f  Rabone , Feez & Co . 8 
The result was that a portion of  the prof its from 
co t ton was remitted abroad as interest .  Others also bene­
fited - those engaged in the labo ur trade , for example , or 
those hired as overseers while their employers stayed in 
Levuka , 9 the then commercial and soc ial centre of Fij i .  
Mo s t  planters , t oo , relied on others t o  do the ir ginning for 
them and to transpor t  their crops to one of the entrep ots  
in the group for  export , via  Sydney o r  Auckland , to  Europe . 
The crop was handled many t imes in the process , each s tage 
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yielding i t s  prof i t , s o  that t ransport accounted f o r  an 
es t imated 16 per cent of  i ts f inal value . 1 0 So many were 
involved that  it  was dif f icul t for individuals to make large 
pro f it s  quickly . A vis i tor to Fij i in 1872 , Richard Philp , 
could f ind only two planters who had made a prof it f rom 
cot ton - Ruper t Ryder o f  Mango island and Peckham o f  
Taveuni . 1 1 . Planters l ived o n  credit and spent heavily on 
consumer import s ,  notably drink . 1 2  Thus there were few 
savings to provide an income for set tlers and the means to 
develop alterna�ive crops , should the boom cease . 
And the boom did end, in 1870 , when the Franco-Prus s ian 
war dislo cated the French market for co t ton and caused a fall 
in the London ( s terling) price f rom 4s  4d a pound in 186 9 to 
ls 4 d  in late 1870 . 1 3  Planters , the ir land mo rtgaged , were 
unable to meet their deb t s , whi le their mor tgagees , with 
debt s  secured , found their sec urity incapable of earning the 
amount s  owed . Though F .  & W .  Hennings had filed fourteen 
suits  for the re covery o f  deb t s  by October 18 7 3 ,  some of  
their debtors had already lef t  Fij i , 1 4  while o thers were 
expected to make the mos t  o f  the lands in t heir po ssession . 1 5  
Few p lanters l ived more  than a hand-to-mouth ex istence . 
They pinned their hopes on new crops such as copra , sugar , 
co ffee and cinchona , and to a l esser ex tent on livesto ck . 1 6  
Thus co t ton monoculture gave way to diversified , experimental 
agriculture , and the appearance of wealth , for many , to the 
real ity of pover ty . 
Among the new crops sugar was thought to o f f  er the 
best  prospect of commercial success . An attempt to pro duce 
sugar on Wakaya Island in 1862 had been a f inancial failure , 1 7 
and with the subsequent rise in cot ton pr ices there had been 
lit tle incentive to try again with a crop the capital co s ts 
o f  which were  higher than that o f  cotton b ecause machinery 
had to be provided to crush the cane . But af ter the slump 
in co t ton prices many settlers turned to sugar . The o f fer 
bv the Cakobau government in December 1871 of a £ 5 00 reward 
for ' the f irst  and best crop ' 1 8 of  twenty t ons of  sugar from 
canes plant ed before January 1873 may have been some induce­
ment , though there is no record of  anyone having won the 
prize . More important was evidence that  cane could b e  grown 
very eas ily in Fij i ,  and without much exper t ise . I t  frew 
wild and was used by F ij ians on their bux>e as thatch . 9 
A t  the end of  187 2  the Fiji Times report ed that ' large 
tract s  of land are being put under cane ' , and ' a  highly 
remunerative return may be expected from the indus try ' . 2 0 
S ix years later John Horne , the Director o f  the Bo tanical 
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Gardens in  Mauritius , confirmed what settler s had already 
discovered - that good cane land could be found in almos t  
all parts  of  the group . 2 1  By the end o f  the decade i t  was 
hoped that sugar would become a maj or , if no t the principal , 
expor t  o f  Fij i . 2 2  There was good reason fo r believing this 
might happen . Not only did cane grow well , b ut there was 
also an expanding market for sugar in Aus tralia , where in 
1878 the average per capita consumption o f  raw s ugar ranged 
from 71 . 31 lb in South Aus tral ia to 9 2 . 1 3 lb in Queensland . 
The Australian average was the highest  in the world , 16 lb 
a head greater than in England , the next highes t .  This was 
partly due to the cus tom o f  g iving rations , which always 
included sugar , as par t payment o f  wages . 2 3  Aus tralia 
imported a s ignificant portion o f  her s ugar requirements ,  
and continued to do so unt il World War I .  There was also , 
of  course , a growing market in New Zealand , which has tradi­
tionally impor ted sugar in pre ference to developing a domes­
t ic beet industry . 
Plant ers  hoped t o  sell s ugar in these marke ts  as well 
as in Fij i .  Following a ' mania ' of p lanting , as the Fiji 
Tiines described it , 2 4  by S eptember 1874  there were reports  
o f  5 9 7  acres o f  cane being grown on eighteen plantations on 
the Rewa . 2 5  As a maj o r  area of settlement the Rewa remained 
a centre of cane cul t ivation in following year s , though cane 
was also grown in Navua , S igatoka , Tavua and Ra in Viti Levu , 
in Savu Savu and Taveuni as well as in o ther par ts  o f  the 
group . 2 6  The great problem f o r  planters was to find mills  
to crush their cane . In December 1874 a mill capable o f  
crushing seven tons o f  sguar a week , working ten hours a 
day , was for sale at £2 , 000 , excluding the cost o f  trans­
porting it  to Fij i . 2 7  Two and a half years later a mill 
of  ten to twelve tons capacity would have cos t  £14 , 000 . 2 8  
Settlers lacked the cap ital t o  erect either a few large mills 
or plenty of  smaller ones . Nor , with their lands mor tgaged , 
did they have the security on which to obtain loans . The 
resul t  was a shor tage of crushing capacity throughout the 
1870s . I t  is impo ssible to list  accurately the number of  
mills in  operation and their size , as some were too  small 
ever to be recorded . The Fiji Times ment ions a mill being 
opened in Suva by Brewer and Joske in 18 7 2 ,  and this was 
probably the firs t to be built  in the 1870s . By the end of 
1874 there were at least  three in operat ion , a y ear later 
six ,  and by the end of 1878 perhaps ten . 2 9 Several , like 
the one at Suva , crushed fo r only a couple' of y ears or fewer . 
All were t iny - planters could af ford no more . One o f  the 
larger mills , built by D .  Waterson in 1878 on his Koroqaqa 
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p lantation by the Rewa , had a capacity of  only twelve to 
f ifteen tons of sugar per week . 3 0 Their small capacity meant 
that mills had to crush all the year round , so that some cane 
had to be cut when its densi ty o f  j uice , and hence yields of  
s ugar , were at their lowes t .  Moreover , 
When cut in March , or April , the ratoon canes are made 
to grow in co ld dry weather , when they will grow leas t , 
and to r ipen during the ho t mo is t weather o f  December , 
January , February and March , when they will naturally 
grow mos t  and ripen leas t . 3 1  
Far worse was tha t  many planters could no t get their cane 
crushed at all . In Novemb er 1878  the Fiji Times lamented 
the hundreds o f  acres go ing to was te on the Rewa because 
existing mills could crush only half the cane grown . 3 2  
This situation , combined with the failure of  o ther 
connnercial crops to produce quick prosperity , encouraged 
mounting criticism o f  S ir Arthur Gordon , the firs t s ubs tantive 
governor of Fij i af ter the islands were ceded to Bri tain in 
S ep tember 1874 . Planters had hop ed tha t  Cession wo uld herald 
a government which , unlike its  predecessors in Fij i ,  would 
champ ion their interes ts if need be against  those of the 
Fij ians . 3 3  But within a short  t ime settlers had become 
convinced tha t  Gordon was more interested in native welfare 
than in the economic development of  the colony . Alec Ivimey , 
a Melbourne j ournalist who vis ited Fij i in the early 1880s 
when cri ticism o f  Gordon reached its p eak ( though he had lef t 
the colony by then) , sugges ted that Gordon had been pos it ively 
ho stile to the influx of  Aus tralian capital . 34  No thing , in 
fac t ,  could have been further f rom the truth . 
Effor ts  to at trac t private inves tment 
The f irs t priority of the new government was to main­
tain law and order ; the islands had b een ceded to Britain 
because o f  the threat to order posed by the early set t lers . 
To e s tab lish i t s  legi t imacy with the small force o f  arms 
innnediately available , government needed to rule with the 
consent of the Fij ian chief s .  As Gor don pointed out , 
• . .  the quest ion how a large native populat ion should 
be governed by a handful of whi te aliens - a que s t ion 
of ten raised , but seldom satisfac torily answered -
had once more to be dealt with . 
1 6  
For tunately , o n  this  occas ion , po licy , and indeed 
necessity , pointed in the same d irection as right and 
j us t ice . 3 5  
The result was Gordon ' s  now famo us native policy , the 
essentials of which are well known - so-called ' indirect 
rule ' through Fij ian chief s , 3 6 the ent renchment o f  native 
rights  to the land , the pro tect ion o f  Fij ians agains t ex­
ploitative labour recrui ters , and the promo tion o f  indigenous 
cash cropping through a sys tem of nat ive tax payments in 
kind . The policy could be - and was - j us tified in moral 
t erms , but it also hel�ed solve the problem of polit ical 
contro l in the colony . 7 Thereby it created the s tab ility 
that was a prerequisite for overseas inves tment . This was 
well under s tood by Gordon , who in 1879  exaggera ted to 
planters the fears of po tent ial English inves tors that 
cap ital might be lost in Fij i because  of  racial conflict . 3 8  
Two years earlier John Thur s ton,  who was clo sely involved 
in the implementat ion o f  the native policy , had a t tr ib uted 
the lack of commercial development between 1 8 7 1  and 1874  to 
polit ical unrest  before Ces s ion . 3 9 
Along with reconciling F ij ians to Bri tish rule the 
at traction of new capi tal was a maj or obj ect  of government 
policy . In 1874 Thurs ton was accused in the Fiji Times of 
believing ' that Fij i can ' t  go a-head t ill the present 
set tlers clear out , and the rich sugar men come from the 
colonies ' . 4 0 Soon af ter his arr ival Gordon expres sed a 
s imilar view : 
I t  will require a new set  of men to come in before 
there is  any real pro sperity in the co lony . Mo s t  of  
the present holders of land will sel l ,  and as  is usual 
in all new settlements ,  the f irs t-comers will be ruined 
and go to the wall . 4 1  
He repeated this a year later . 4 2  In the short term , however , 
by help ing to res tore pro sperity , overseas inves tment could 
be expected to reduce European oppos ition to government . 
This was of  some importance . Several of ficials at the 
Colonial Off ice were inclined to disagree with Gor don ' s  
emphasis on pro tecting native int eres t s ; they sympa thized 
more wi th plan ters who , for their par t , resented res tric­
t ions placed on their recruitment of  nat ive labo ur and found 
their trade wi th Fij ians disrup ted by the sale of nat ive tax 
produce through government . 4 3  Since it would have shown 
that the nat ive pol icy was no t incompatible with economic 
1 7  
development , the at trac tion of  large-scale inves tment wo uld 
have helped Gordon to overcome opposi tion in London . The 
decision in 1880 of the Co lonial Sugar Ref ining Co . to inves t  
in Fij i was seen b y  Thurs ton a s  a n  excellent answer t o  those 
who criticized the colony . 44  
In par ticular , to make such aspects of  his nat ive 
policy as the tax s cheme palat able t o  the business cormnunity , 
Gordon wanted the support o f  the firs t  unofficial memb ers 
of the Legislative Council - Gus tave Hennings ,  Ruper t Ryder 
and J . C .  Smi th . 4 5  Their suppor t  would have been valuab le in 
later years as well , following the growth of European opposi­
tion as hopes o f  early prosper ity af ter Cession fel l . Though 
Gordon and Thurs ton claimed to be unmoved by the opposition , 
it would have been difficul t to ignore it . Officials were 
in daily contact wi th settlers . At one s tage Thurs ton him­
s elf had been in deb t to Smi th , 4 6  and the plight o f  leading 
planters was well known . The Hennings brothers , owed large 
s ums ,  were in deb t to over £ 50 , 00 0  and had gone into liquida­
tion in March 1874 . Smi th had b een more discriminate  in his 
advances , but in 1872  he ·was owed at l eas t £ 1 2 , 00 0 , much of 
which , presumably , was s till o uts tanding a few years later . 4 7  
A return to pro sperity caused b y  an inflow o f  capi tal would 
benefit these and o ther planters in the co lony . Government 
might also have want ed overseas inves tment in the hope that 
suppor t would be  more forthcoming from a few large companies , 
which had inves ted when the adminis tra t ion ' s  obj ectives had 
become clear , than from the numerous plan ters who saw the 
na tive pol icy as the ant ithesis of all that they had hoped 
for from British rule . More exp erienced b us ines smen might 
ident ify their interests  wi th the na tive policy , since it 
provided a means of  preserving l aw and order . 
Apar t  from these political factors , th ere was also a 
pres s ing f inanc ial consideration . The admini strat ion had 
to balance its  budget , for Britain was no t prepared to 
subs idize her new colony for long . Fij i had b een given a 
grant- in-aid of  only £100 , 000 , to be repaid as soon as 
possible . 48 Gordon was frequently reminded of the need for 
economy , and with this in mind he did no t draw his full 
salary of  £5 , 000 a y ear until 1877 . 4 9  Yet , despite efforts 
to economiz e ,  the budget was in def icit throughout his 
adminis tration and for a number of  y ears thereaf ter . 5 0 One 
way to solve the problem was to increase revenue by expand­
ing trade . ' One or two goo d inves tments  here ' ,  Thurs ton 
told Gordon in 1878 , 'would soon make an appre ciable 
alteration in our cus toms re ce ip ts . ' 51 This  was espe cially 
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desirable if government was to meet the co st of certain 
welfare measur es involved in it s nat ive policy . By September 
18 7 6  Gordon had forbidden the sale of ' ardent sp ir it s ' to  
Fij ians , with consequent loss o f  revenue , and had imposed a 
strict observat ion o f  quarant ine regul ations , enta iling an 
increase in government expenditure . 5 2 True , the burden o f  
this  was eased b y  the taxat ion of Fij ians , who were required 
to  pay tax in kind by growing crops which government could 
sell . Thurston , who saw this as  a way slowly to promote  
commerc ial agricul ture among Fij ians for their own benef it 
as well as government ' s ,  wanted to encourage them to grow 
cane as a tax crop . Yet he knew that this would depend on 
sugar mills large enough to crush the cane , and wanted to 
attract overseas capital for t his purpos e . s 3  
For these reasons , government impl emented pol ic ies 
which were designed to encourage large-scale investment . In 
a speech to settlers after his arrival in 18 7 5 , Gordon said : 
Now , as  to capital , it is  clear that will not be 
invest ed in the colony unt il there is goo d  security for 
it s investment , that is t o  say , until  the land t i t le s  
are settled , and a steady supply of  labour provided 
for . 54  
Under t he Deed of Cession , set t lers who had acquir ed land 
before September 1874 had to prove the bona f ide nature 
of  their claims . A commis s ion was appo int ed to examine the 
claims , the Governor-in-Council issuing cer t if icates of  
t it le based on its  report s . S S  Gordon gave the  mat t er high 
priority , no ting in the cont ext o f  his propo sal to g ive 
f inancial aid to planters who imported Pac if ic island labour 
in 187 7 that ' No money can be raised from them unt il they 
have received the ir land t itles . • S G  Thurston remarked in 
the same year that , wi thout these ti tles , settler s  could no t 
meet their deb t s  by selling their partly improved lands for 
a prof it . 5 7  There could be no overseas investment t il l  land 
claims had been resolved . So , despit e al l the problems 
involved in handling the land quest ion , the maj ority of  
European claims were decided by the t ime Gordon left Fij i 
for New Zealand in 1880 . 58 
It was ,  however , polit ically impo s s ible for government 
to grant all the settler s ' claims , which to tal led around 
854 , 000 acres - about a fifth of the co lony ' s  area and a 
large part of its  mos t  f ert ile land . 5 9 Af ter only a short 
t ime in Fij i ,  Gordon had no doub t  that ' the associat ion of 
19 
the enforcement of these claims with the establislunent o f  
British rule would pr ec lude a l l  hope of conc iliat ing o r  
benef it ing the nat ive race ' . 6 0 A s imilar cons iderat ion , 
ar ising from the attachment of  Fij ians t o  the land , was one 
of the factors behind Ordinances 6 of 1875  and 21 of 1880 
which prohib ited the sale of  nat ive l and and , in the 1880 
ordinance , set a maximum term o f  twenty-five years for leases 
of Fij ian land . 6 1  Yet Gordon was det ermined that his land 
po licy should no t prevent the inflow of new capital , and 
that suf ficient freehold land for p lantat ion agriculture 
should be left in the colony so that the shor t terms of 
nat ive leases would no t deter investors . Having been asked 
by Gordon to exp lain the nature of cus tomary land tenure in 
Fij i , the Counc il of Chief s declared in 18 7 9  that by tradi­
t ion land had been inalienable . A s trict appl icat ion of this 
view would have meant that all land purchased by Europ eans 
before Cession had been ob tained illegally . 6 2  This was s o  
contrary to the interests  of p lanters and of  overseas invest­
ors who in future might want to buy land in Fij i - as well 
as to the practic e  of the chief s - that the chief s '  s tate­
ment was ignored by the Land Claims Connnission and by the 
Governor-in-Council when issuing land t it les . Of the 1 , 683  
claims , 517  were granted as claimed . Of . the res t  not proved 
to have been bona f ide , 390  were granted ex gPatia either 
wholly or in par t 6 3 - so provid ing enough freeho ld land for 
the initial development of European plantations . Despit e 
settler s ' complaints about Gor don ' s  land policy , about half 
the total area claimed - mos t  of  it lying idle 6 4  - was 
granted to them . Furthermore , when in 187 9-80 Thurs ton 
agreed terms with overseas companies that would ent ice them 
to Fij i ,  he arranged t o  sell 5 00 acres to S tanlake Lee & Co . 
Ltd6 5 and 1 , 000 acres to the Colonial Sugar Ref ining Co . 6 6  
These sales violated the po licy o f  making nat ive land inal ien­
able ; their approval by Gordon perhaps ref lected a sympathy 
for big bus iness , which enabled him at the turn of  the . 
century to press for the large-s cale alienat ion of  land in 
the Solomon I slands for the benef it of  t he Pacif ic Islands 
Co . ,  and to advance the int erests  of the Pacific Phosphat e  
Co . agains t thos e  of the inhabi tants of Ocean Island . 6 7  
Beside the availab il ity of  land , Gordon knew that a 
regular supply o f  cheap labour was es sent ial for the develop­
ment of plantat ion agriculture . The wages offered by settlers 
were not normally enough to attract Fij ians into paid labour 
for long p eriods , particularly after the 1875  meas les epi­
demic which reduced the s ize of the F ij ian population by 
one-f ifth or more . 6 8  In 18 7 6 , £ 2  1 0s Od a year was paid to 
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Fij ian men i n  Taveuni , but as A . P .  Maudslay , Ac ting Co lonial 
S ecretary at the t ime , wrote : 
Any Fij ian indus trious ly d isposed , might , wi thout 
abandoning his family , his home , his garden , and his 
district , ob tain far more than this by rais ing produce 
on his own account . So long , therefo re , as this low 
rate of remunerat ion is maintained , his Excellency 
canno t share the sanguine ant ic ipat ion of tho se who 
expect large numb ers  of  the popul at ion voluntarily to 
engage in plantation labour . 6 9  
The alterna t ive - of obtaining a large supply o f  Fij ian 
labour against its  will and in the face of opposit ion from 
the chiefs 7 0 - would have required a degree of compulsion 
that the colony ' s  meagre financial resources would have found 
hard to support .  So , in stead o f  meet ing settler demand s 
that a plent iful supply of Fij ian labour be made available , 
government enacted Ordinances 15 of 1876 and 10 o f  1 8 7 7 , 
which were des igned to regulate labour recruiting and prevent 
an enforced mas s  exodus from native villages . As a resul t , 
planters had to rely mainly on labour from overseas . The 
import of (misnamed) ' Polynes ian ' labour from o ther Pacif ic 
islands had started in the 1860s , 7 1  but from the mid-1870s 
it was becoming clear to more percept ive observers , like 
Thurs ton , 7 2  that the future of this supply was uncertain . 
The end of  the co t ton boom had left settlers  unab le to match 
the increase in wages  and the improvement in condi tions which 
occurred in Queensland during the 18 70s . By the earl� 1880s 
wages in Queensland were almos t  double tho se in Fij i ,  3 
making the former far more at tractive to is landers .  The 
t ime was coming when Fij i would no longer be able to meet 
her labour requirements from wi thin the Pac ific . 
Drawing on his exp er ience in Trinidad and Maurit ius , 
in 18 75 Gordon proposed that Indians be  imported under 
f ive-year indentures . He e s t imated the total cos t  to the 
planter of wages , transport ,  etc . at around £14 per head 
per year . 7 4  A number of  sett lers , like Rupert Ryder , 7 5 
init ial ly favoured the idea , b ut mos t  Europ eans eventually 
oppo sed it . 7 6  This was not surpr i s ing s inc e E . L .  Layard 
had estimated in 1874 that the annual co s t  o f  ' Polynes ians ' 
was � 7  a head . 7 7  Settlers wer e  understandably appalled by 
the prospe ct of a 100 per cent increase in their immediate 
labour co sts , even though Indians were likely to be  cheaper 
in the long run , especially s ince they would remain in the 
colony for ten years whereas ' Polynes ians ' usually s tayed 
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for only three . Trying to stave off  bankruptcy in the 
present , planters had little inc linat ion to plan for a labour 
supply in the future . Yet it was the future of large-scale 
investment that concerned Gordon,  and accordingly he arranged 
for Indian labour to be imported from 1879  onwards . Labour­
ers were to be indentured for f ive years and to have the 
right of a free return pas sage to India after ten . Emp loyers 
were to pay two-thirds of the co s t  of the passage to and from 
Fij i ,  and government one-third . Wages were t_o be one shill ing 
a day and f ive and a half days were to be wo rked . 7 8  By 1916 , 
when the sys tem came to an end , 60 , 553 immigrants had been 
imported under indenture . 7 9 
Condit ions were appalling - they have been aptly des­
cribed as 'A new system of slavery ' 8 0 - yet they did no t 
provoke massive slave revolts . Indians were divided by 
deep-seated religious , language and cul tural d ifferences 
which overseers could explo it  for their own purpo ses , 8 1  while 
the hierarchical nature of the society they had left  incl ined 
in immigrants a relat ively pas s ive accep tance of their new 
world . Pro test took the form o f  suicide rather than revolt . 8 2  
Further , for many labourers  plantation life may have been 
rather bet ter than the circumstances they had known in India . 
Provis ional findings of  new research s uggest  that indentured 
labourers were drawn primarily from landless clas ses living 
in the vic inity of towns and mo s tly unemployed ; they were 
likely to have been on the verge of starvation . For tho se 
lucky enough to f ind work , wages s eem to have b een even lower 
than they were in Fij i . 8 3 Consequently , hard though it is 
to believe , for many Indians migrat ion led to an improvement 
in their economic pos ition - a reprieve from hell in favour 
of  purgatory . And they used the t ime on plantat ions to look 
forward to a heaven b eyond , when af ter s erving their terms 
and af ter earning higher wages as free labourers ,  they could 
return to India more wealthy than when they had left . 8 4  It 
is unl ikely that cap ital would have been at trac ted to Fij i 
without this as sured supply o f  apparently docile labour , 
especially s ince Gordon ' s  belief that is landers would not 
meet plantation needs for long proved correct . 8 5  By 1885 
the number of ' Polynes ians ' imported had fallen , those leaving 
Fij i exceeding newcomers by almost  400 per cent . 8 6  Because 
of their lower mortality rate (which was nevertheles s high) 
and the growing d iff iculty in ob taining ' Po lynes ians ' ,  
Indians were pref erred to is landers b� sugar companies which 
by then had begun to invest in Fij i . 8 
Govermnent - in part icular Thurs ton - had made a 
specia l  effort to at trac t these companies . Thurs ton had 
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b een i n  contact with the Colonial Sugar Ref ining Co . ,  known 
as the CSR , in 1874 when its  directors had considered build­
ing a central mil l  in Fij i to be  suppl ied with cane by out­
s ide contractors . 8 8  No detail s  o f  the discus sions have 
survived , but evidently CSR was no t impres sed by condi tions 
there for instead it erect ed a mill at Harwood , in north 
New South Wales . 8 9  It was s everal years before CSR once 
more took an interest  in Fij i ,  by whi ch t ime the polit ical 
environment was more favourable . Meanwhile , Thur s ton had 
again tried to persuade sugar companies to inves t  in the 
colony . In 18 7 7  he propo sed that government rais� a 
£100 , 000 loan , of  which £3 , 6 00 would be used to guarantee 
for three years a 3 per cent return on £ 40 , 000 priva tely 
inves ted in two central mills . The proj ect was ' to star t , 
in fac t , sugar making upon such a s cale and in such a manner 
that settlers may benefit by i t ' .  But the Colonial Office 
oppo sed the loan , mainly on the grounds tha t Fij i could not 
afford to service it . 9 0 
Despite this , by the end of the f ollowing year there 
had been a s ignificant increase in the number of inves tors 
interes ted in the colony . Among them were Edwardes and 
Hoerder , Dr C . B .  Chalmers ,  the CSR and Spence B ras , all o f  
whom were thinking o f  building central mills t o  crush cane 
supplied largely by Fij ians and European planters . But , 
Thur ston told Gordon , 
they all s tand out for conditions - viz . Government 
to guarantee so many tons of cane p er annum ; contract 
to las t for f ive or ten years ; Government to ' as s i s t ' 
in f inding ' labour ' for the mill ; Government to f ind 
.fuel ! or to assist  in f inding fuel ; the · 'miller and 
his men ' to be p laced beyond the limits  o f  nat ive 
j ur isdiction ; no Roko or Buli  to interf ere with any 
man wanting to work at the mill , e tc . , e tc . ; and above 
all , Government to give a block of land as an ' induce­
ment ' ! !  9 1 
These were almo s t  impos s ib le demands to meet . Government 
could no t guarantee a supply of  cane , s ince this would 
have required either a degree of contro l  over cult ivat ion 
that government , wit h it s limited resou rces . could not 
pos s ib ly exercise , or a financial guarantee that government 
was in no po sition to make . Nor could government breach 
with equanimity its  nat ive policy by placing outside nat ive 
j urisdiction Fij ians employed , or wishing to be emp loyed , 
in the mill , s ince this would have aroused oppos i t ion from 
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the chief s .  Nor would its  l imit ed f inanc ial resources have 
made it easy for government to help in f ind ing labour and 
fuel , or to purchase land as a gif t to the miller . Together 
with his moral commitment to the nat ive pol icy , such prac­
tical cons iderat ions l imit ed the concess ions Thur ston was 
able to make . Mor eover , his negot iat ing position was 
strengthened by the number of people - co ffee planters  from 
Ceylon as wel l  as sugar interes t s  - who in 1878-79  were 
thinking of inves t ing in Fij i . 9 2  Perhap s there would be no 
great need to make concess ions . 
On the o ther _hand , government could no t adopt too 
r igid an at t itude in talks with potential sugar millers . In 
1878 Rabone , Feez and Co . had taken over nearly all the land 
owned by F .  & W .  Hennings in settlement of the latter ' s  debts . 
The company was now the largest landowner (or claimant ) in 
the colony and its  agent , Carl Sahl , was eager ' to go in 
heavily ' for sugar . 9 3  J . C .  Smith , ano ther maj or landholder 
as well as creditor , had for some t ime want ed to see prof it­
able mills set up in the colony . He , himself , had exp eri­
ment ed with one in 1874-76 94 and it was probably he , a long 
with Sahl , who in 1878  asked C SR to build a mill on the 
Rewa . 9 5  Faced wi th growing European oppo sition to its  
nat ive policy , and not yet  having balanced i ts budget , 
government could hardly ignore an opportunity to revive the 
fortunes of plantation agriculture . So Thur ston was prepared 
to of fer conces s ions even if they contravened the nat ive 
pol icy , but was determined to keep them to a minimum . He 
found that in some cases incentives were no t even necessary . 
With his bro ther Nathaniel , Dr Chalmer s built a mill at 
Penang in 1880 9 6  without , apparent ly , having o btained any 
inducement from government .  In o ther cases , minimal con­
ces sions were not enough to p er suade investor s  to risk their 
capital in Fij i .  Edwardes and Hoerder built no mil ls in 
the colony . CSR sent an off icer , James Murray , to the 
island s  but , f ind ing that plant er s demanded a higher price 
for their cane than the company was willing to pay , refused 
to invest on the terms offered in 18 7 9 . 9 7  Government held 
more fruitful d iscussions with Spence Bros , a Melbourne 
company which , through the Rewa Plantat ion Co . Ltd , had 
operated a mill in Fij i s ince 18 7 5 .  Spence Bros agreed to 
build a second mill on the Rewa co st ing £20 , 000 to £ 25 , 000 , 
to buy all the cane grown by F ij ians on 500 acres at the 
current price or at a price to be nego t iated annually , and 
to crush nat ive cane whenever it was delivered , if neces sary 
before cane grown by Europeans . Government ' s  sole concession 
was an of fer to sell the company 400 to 500 acres of land 
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at £3 an acre . It  gave no guarant ee on a supply of cane and 
it offered no help in mat t er s  l ike the employment of Fij ian 
labour . The terms wer e hardly generous to Spence Bros who 
within a f ew months pulled out of the deal so as to invest 
in Queensland , wher e government inducement s s eemed greater . 
I t s  agreement with the Fij i government was taken over in 
November 1879  by the Br istol f irm , S tanlake Lee and Co . ,  
which promised that the mill would have a capacity of at 
leas t f ive - perhap s even ten - tons o f  raw sugar a day . 9 8  
Since a mill of that s iz e ,  giving prior ity to  Fij ian 
suppl ies , could not have crushed all the cane Europeans 
want ed to grow on the Rewa , plant ers were persuaded t o  
accept a lower pr ice f o r  cane than they had f irst  demanded . 9 9  
They then asked CSR t o  recons ider it s decision not t o  invest 
in Fij i .  Sahl and Smith also promi sed to grow 500 acres of  
cane each for  ten year s , to ensur e for  the  company an adequate  
supply . 1 Their approach was supported by Thurs ton , who was 
in Sydney in early 1880 and was prepared to  nego t iate 
sl ightly greater concessions than the year before . No doubt 
his more flexible at t itude owed something to t he belief that 
the recent outbreak of coff ee leaf disease had deprived 
planters  and Fij ians of an opportunity to grow an alterna­
t ive crop to cane . It  certainly owed much to the fa ilur e 
of  government to f ind employment for the f irst  Ind ians 
brought to the colony - in 18 7 9  - and who s e  transpor t and 
maint enance costs seemed l ikely to fall on the publ ic 
purse . 2 Consequent ly , an agreement was reached wit h  CSR 
in 1880 . Government promis ed to sell the company one 
thousand acres of land on the Rewa at £2 an acre ( inst ead 
of f ive hundred acres at £3  to S tanlake Lee and Co . ) , and 
to reserve ano ther one thousand acres in Savu Savu Bay till  
31  December 1882 , by which dat e CSR was to have dec ided 
if it wi shed to er ect a mill in the vicinity of the land 
reserved for it . Unlike Stanlake Lee and Co . ,  no obligat ion 
was p laced on CSR with regard to nat ive cane . The only 
commitment made by the company was to have buil t on the 
Rewa , by the s tar t of the 1882 crushing season , a mill 
capable of  producing 500 t ons of sugar a month . In re turn 
for Thurs ton ' s  help in per suad ing CSR to invest in the 
district , Sahl and Smith promis ed to employ 2 0 0  Ind ians s t ill 
held by government . 3 Later , at the turn of t he century 
when CSR was thinking of ext end ing its  operations in Fij i ,  
government was again to offer the company incent ives . The 
dec ision to build a mill at Laut oka , in wes t ern Vit i Levu , 
followed a strong of f ic ial ind icat ion ,  des igned to allay 
CSR fears on the mat t er , that export dut ies on sugar were 
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unlikely to be levied in the foreseeable future . The 
company was al so permit ted to import for the mill , acro ss a 
wharf to be erec t ed at Laut oka , supplies whi ch would be 
exempt from government wharf age duties - a conces sion which 
from 1901 to 1912 saved the company £26 , 4 93  3s Sd . 4 What 
characterized the nego t iat ion o f  this arrangement ,  as also 
discussions prior to the const ruct ion of  a mill at Nausori , 
was that neither s ide was able to dictate terms . The agree­
ments  were the resul t  of compromise by both par t ies - com­
promises made possible by the id entity of interest between 
company and government . The lat ter needed CSR to boo st the 
revenue of , and promo te economic development in , the colony : 
CSR wanted government as s istance to help ensure that its  
inves tment s would be prof itable .  
Beside incentives offered by government - in it s 
general policy which creat ed conditions r easonably favourab le 
to fairly large companies , as well as in the par t icular con­
cessions nego t iat ed by off icial s - there was a second induce­
ment for CSR to invest in Fij i ,  and that was the abs ence of 
successful alternat ive plantat ion crops in ar eas suit ed to 
cane . S ince the early 1870s p lant ers  had experimented with 
various forms of agricultural ac tivity . Along the south 
coast  of Vanua Levu , in Taveuni and in some of the out er 
islands copra was produc ed . But down the Rewa and around 
the coast  of Vit i Levu no crop had acquir ed a dominant po s i­
t ion by the early 1880s . 5 Thi s  was par tly because little 
encouragement was given to tho s e  who tr ied meat , poultry 
or dairy farming , which some contemporaries bel ieved could 
be developed prof itably in Fij i . 6 Importers  and f inanciers 
like the Hennings ,  who were connected with Aus tralian mer­
chants through their ind ebt edness to Rabone , Feez and Co . ,  
natural ly had no desir e  to help their mortgagors  supply 
produce which might compete wit h  impor t s  from Aus tralia . 
Efforts by government to attract overseas investment were 
d irected toward export crops which the lo cat ion of Fij i made 
extremely d iff icult to develop . Ther e were better opportun­
it ies for investment in the nearby Aus tralian colonies where 
land could be obtained mor e eas ily . Australian mer chants 
with access to s ignif icant supplies of capital normally had 
no experience in cul t ivat ing the trop ical crop s that were 
thought to grow well in Fij i - cof fee , cocoa , t ea and o thers . 
Fij i ' s  appeal to inves tors in Britain was limit ed because 
the co lony was almos t unknown and was a long way from the 
princ ipal commodity markets . 7 Crops l ike t ea ,  which were 
thought suited to F ij i , 8 were already grown in more es tab­
lished areas c loser to Europe . There was lit t le incentive to 
risk capital in the new colony . 
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Coffee was an except ion ; with sugar i t  was thought 
in the 18 70s to of fer the best prospect of commerc ial success . 
The leaf rus t di sease , Hemi leia Vastatrix , des troyed in the 
18 70s much of the cof fee grown in Ceylon , so that several 
planters turned to Fij i in the hope that cof fee could be 
grown more suc cessfully there . The attitude of  these planters 
to Fij ians aroused government f ears that an influx of  
settlers from Ceylon would damage race relat ions in  the 
colony . ' These Ceylon people are t errible among Fij ians and 
would cause much trouble ' ,  W . S .  Carew , t he S tipendiary Mag­
is trate on the Rewa , told Gordon in 1878 . 9 It  s eems that 
as a resul t  cof fee planters were offered no s pecial induce­
ments by government . Then , in 18 7 9 , the same leaf disease 
that had dest royed much o f  the crop in Ceylon affected cof fee 
in Fij i ,  thereby deterring investors who were thinking o f  
coming t o  the colony . 1 0 But t he disease was _only partly 
to blame for the failure of  experiment s with coffee . W . J .  
Thisel ton Dyer , Direct or of Kew Gardens , told the Colonial 
Office in December 18 7 9  that planters should grapple with 
the disease and learn to grow co f fee pro f itably des pite  
it . 1 1  An At torney-General in Fij i from a plant er family 
in the Wes t  Indies , H . S . Berkeley , argued in 1886 that 
coffee had never been given a fair trial in the colony as it  
had usually been grown at too  low an altitude . He  ur ged 
planters to exper iment with Liberian coffee , which was 
grown successfully elsewhere . 1 2  Had planters heeded this 
advice , they might have discovered what eventually b ecame 
known in Java - that Arab ica co ffee could be grown despite 
leaf disease at higher alt itudes , and that certain robusta 
and Liberian spec ies were resis tant t o  the diseas e . 1 3  But 
there was little incent ive for planters to p ersist  with 
coffee . There was a s teady fall in the world ( s terling) 
price from 6 5s Od per cwt in 187 7-78 to 39s Od in 188 1-82 ; 2 ; 
whereas up to 1884 the price o f  sugar export s from Fij i 
remained f irm . 1 4  Cane was a more attractive crop , and in 
the early 188 0 s  co ffee planters like W . F . Parr turned to 
it when an opportunity arose . 
The po ssib il ity that C SR would face compet it ion not 
from alternative crops but from the small mills already 
established in the colony was no t one that worried the 
company . ' I  do no t think there is anything to be f eared 
from them ' , E . W .  Knox wrot e  in 188 0 . 1 5  Some mills were 
s ituated far from where CSR planned to invest : o thers , 
with one or two excep t ions on the Rewa , were so small that 
they po sed no danger . Nearly all had been closed by 1900 . 
The lack of serious competition from large sugar mills 
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and from other p lantat ion crop s encouraged CSR to build a 
mill at Nausori . With no o ther sour ce of income comparable 
to cane , planters had little cho ice but to sell their crops 
to the company , not for the pr ice they wanted but for one 
that was more acceptable to CSR . The company needed this 
supply to help it economiz e  on the capital cost of preparing 
mos t ly uncleared land for cane . In 188 3 CSR dec ided t o  
build a second mill - the Rarawai mill at B a  i n  western Viti 
Levu . The decision was influenced by the availability of 
substant ial areas of freeho ld land which , for the mo st part 
lying idle , could be bought relatively cheaply . The lack 
of alternative wage employment for Fij ians in the district 
was also important , as i t  enabled CSR to rely on casual 
Fij ian worker s  t ill it had ob tained an adequate supply of 
Indians . 1 6  It is mo st unlikely that CSR would have opened 
Rarawai if planters growing o ther crop s , or supp lying cane 
at o ther mills , had been vigorously comp et ing for land and 
labour in the ar ea . The same probably applied to the 
decision in 1891 to build a mill at Labasa on Vanua Levu , 
and to the construct ion o f  a mill at Lautoka about t en years 
lat er . The at tract ion of  Fij i to CSR,  then , lay part ly in 
the absence of int ense competition for scarce factors o f  
produc t ion . 
The importance of Fij i to CSR 
Apart from this , the extens ion of CSR ' s  operations to , 
and then within Fij i was an out come of the company ' s  need 
to consolidate its  pos i t ion in Australas ia . CSR had been 
established in 1855 by Edward Knox , the son of  a Sco t sman , 
George Knox , who had been a merchant in the seaport of 
Els inor , Denmark . Drawn toward the commercial wor ld , like 
his father , Edward had f irst worked as  a j unior c lerk in 
his uncle ' s  merchant house , the London f irm of Perkins , 
Schlilsser and Mullens which traded in the Balt ic . However , 
not being sat isf ied 'with being a j unior clerk for the 
present ' and want ing ' to j ump from j unior clerk to partner ' 
almo st  straight away , the young Edward had quarrelled with 
his uncle , had been dismis sed and had subsequent ly lef t for 
Austral ia . He arrived at Port Jackson in 1840 aged 20 , 
and over the next fifteen year s acquir ed both a high reputa­
t ion among Sydney merchants  and a considerable personal 
fortune which in 1855 he invested , as founder , in the 
Colonial Sugar Ref ining Co . He and his son , Edward William ,  
who became general manager in 1880 and remained in that 
po s it ion for forty year s , devo t ed their lives to the 
company . 1 7 They wer e  aust ere , s ingle-minded men , apparently 
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lacking in humour and having few out s ide interests  - excep t 
yacht iny , a rich man ' s  sport in which Edward William in­
dulged . 8 They demanded o f  their subordinates hard work , 
honesty and , above all , dedicat ion to the company . Loyalty , 
indeed , has been a dist inc t ive f eature o f  CSR Ltd . Even 
now , there are many on the staff who se fathers and grand­
fathers worked for the company . Family connec t ions have 
bred a remarkable esprit de corps which has helped the company 
achieve it s obj ectives . From the sense of loyalty has come , 
t il l  recently , a great emphas is on experienc e . The length 
of t ime in the company ' s  serv ice used to be a pr ime qualif ica­
t ion for advancement ,  produc ing mill managers who , though 
competent in technical mat ters , were seen by o thers in Fij i 
as unimaginat ive and conservat ive in general outlook . When 
it wi thdrew from Fij i in 1 9 7 3 , one of the legac ies of CSR 
was the cont inued stress on experience by many in , or those 
connected with the sugar indus try , making change and adapta­
t ion to new circums tances more dif f icult to achieve . 1 9  
Edward Knox had original ly built refiner ies , the f ir s t  
in Sydney followed two year s later , i n  1 8 5 7 , by a second in 
Melbourne controlled by the Victor ia Sugar Co . From 1 8 7 5  
to  1 8 8 3  these were replaced by two larger ones , to which was 
added a third in Auckland , run by the New Zealand Sugar Co . 
In 1887 all three companies were amalgamated into a limit ed 
liability company , the Colonial Sugar Ref ining Co . Ltd . It  
was intended that this new company should be distinc t ly 
Aus tralian in ownership . Since CSR depended on protective 
tarif f s  to maintain - and increase - its sales of  ref ined 
sugar in the Aus tralian colonies the Board f eared that , if 
the company was foreign owned , there would be demands for 
the removal of  t he dut ies on the ground that they benefited 
capitalists  abroad . Consequently , the Board tried to increase 
the number of shareholders in Australas ia and discourage 
the sale of shares  to people elsewhere . 2 0  The tariffs 
remained , enabling this bas ically Aus tralian company to con­
sol idate its business in the 1 8 9 0 s  and open two more ref in­
eries in Adelaide and Brisbane . 
As well as increasing i ts ref ining capac ity , CSR 
b egan to produce raw sugar . In 1 8 6 9  it built in north New 
South Wales three large mills which made subs tant ial 
profit s . 2 1  Ten year s later the quest ion arose  of whether 
CSR should increase the number of mills  it had in New South 
Wales or move into Queens land and Fij i .  E .W .  Knox wro t e  in 
1 8 7 9 , the year before he became general manager of CSR : 
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Personally I should wish our operat ions could be  
restricted to New South Wales , but as  sugar will be 
produced in Fij i sooner or later wh ich will come into 
competition with o urs , it is a ques tion whether it will 
no t be bet ter for us to take a share in the develop­
ment of the indus try and in the prof its . 2 2  
The same could have been wr it ten o f  Queensland . 2 3 
Po ssibly the expec tat ion of  large profit s was the main reason 
CSR had ori�inally diversif ied into milling . Yet also im­
por tant , perhaps , were the big f luctuat ions in the price of 
raw sugar - f luctuat ions that were cons iderably larger than 
in the price of ref ined sugar . This meant that annual prof it s 
from ref ining were liable to vary subs tant ial ly . Were CSR 
to be involved in mil ling , then should the pr ice of raw 
sugar rise , so increasing input prices at the r ef inery , the 
smaller returns from ref ining could be off  set by higher 
prof its at the mill - or vice ver sa . Thus the company ' s  
annual profits  overall would f luctuate less widely . The 
advantage of reducing risks in this way could be  set against 
the disadvantage of becoming more dependent on a single 
conunodity than if CSR had moved into a field unrelated to 
sugar . 
There was a lso the danger that if raw sugar was pro fit­
able in Queensland and Fij i ,  successful miller s might inves t  
in the r ef ining trade to even out f luctuat ions in their 
prof it s . Already CSR had to contend wi th imports of refined 
sugar , but was at an advantage becaus e its transport cos ts  
were lower and because there were protective tariffs in 
New South Wales , Queensland and Victoria . If it allowed 
several Aus tralian refineries to enter the market ,  it was 
likely that competitive price reduct ions would fo llow and 
that these would erode the company ' s  co s t  advantage aga ins t 
overseas suppl ies . To avo id this , it would help if CSR 
established mills in Queensland and Fij i ,  especially s ince , 
as Knox suspect ed of  Fij i ,  cane could b e  grown more cheaply 
there than it could in New South Wales .  If the company 
obtained a commanding po si tion in the Queensland and Fij i 
industries , say by erect ing mills on t he mos t  favourable s ites 
and meeting the bulk of Aus tralian demand for raw sugar , 
it would be harder for o thers  to enter the bus ine ss and later 
to diver sify into ref ining . Moreover , prof its from milling 
co uld be invested in ref iner ies , thereby help ing CSR to 
dominate the market for refined sugar ; its dominant po sition 
could be used to defeat potential Australian competitors . 
So it is l ikely that CSR ' s  interes t in Fij i was mo tivated by 
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more than j us t  the desire to make profits  from milling : the 
production of raw sugar would reduce the po tential variabil­
ity of  its  prof its , and would help t o  strengthen its  ref ining 
busines s in Australia and New Zealand . 
The decision of  CSR to invest  in Fij i was decisive for 
the development of  the sugar indus try in the colony , for 
the company ' s  mills proved far more competitive than o thers 
which had been , or would be , established . Few mills survived 
the world-wide fall in raw sugar prices during the mid-1880s 
and mid-1890s , caused largely by competit ion from European 
beet supplies . Yet , as Table 2 . 1  shows , ther e  was no close  
correla tion between actual changes in  price  levels and the 
collapse of sugar mill s . Of the f ift een mills that were 
shut down from 1880 to 189 7 ,  only five were clo sed wi thin 
three years of a decline in price . Nevertheles s , lower 
prices were important becaus e they made it more difficult for 
les s eff icient mills to compete . They accentuated , for 
example , entrepreneurial shortcomings which wer e  an important 
reason for failure . Wilson and Murchie , who were originally 
timb er merchants and b uilt a mill at Deuba in 1883 , 24 were 
typ ical of  many millers in not having had much , if any , 
previous exper ience in making s ugar . This inexperience was 
evident in the frequent locat ion o f  mills in the wet t er par ts  
o f  Fij i which , by hindering the r ipening o f  cane , reduced its 
sugar content . The ab ility of  mills to survive the combined 
disadvantage of cl imate and lower prices was l imit ed by the 
nature of their ownership . They were controlled either by 
proprietors whose f inancial resources were very small , or by 
larger firms ( usually f inancial ins t itutions ) for whom sugar 
was only a small part of their total portfolio . Smaller 
concerns had no t the funds to increase milling capacity , while 
larger companies with diversif ied interests  did no t concen­
trate resources on their sugar investments .  The result was 
that mills were denied the economic benef i t s , especially in 
the development of  expertise , of  large-scale inves tment in 
sugar . Several had to close  in the mid-1890s when the 
economic depres sion in Austral ia and New Zealand cut off  
their sources of  f inance . The Taveuni Sugar Co . ,  for  
example , was taken over by the Bank of New Zealand Estates 
Co . Ltd which clo sed the mill in 1 89 6 , and i t self went into 
liquidation the same year . 2 5  
In contrast were the great er financial resources o f  
CSR . Ever since it had been nearly ruined by paying a 50  
per  cent dividend in 1856  that had lef t almo st no reserves 
with which to weather a cris is that befell the company in 
3 1  
Table 2 . 1  
Mills known t o  have opened and closed in Fij i ,  1 8 7 3-190 3 
Year Price of raw sugar 
(£ per ton) 
Mills opened 
(no . )  
Hills closed 
(no . )  
1 8 7 3  
1874 
1875 
1876 
18 7 7  
1878 
1879 
1 880 
1881 
1882 
1883 
1884 
1885 
1886 
1887 
1888 
1889 
1890 
1 891 
1892 
1893 
1894 
1895 
1896 
189 7 
1898 
1899 
1900 
1901 
1902 
1903 
34 
39 
34 
34 
34 
40 
34 
34 
34 
25 
20 
16 
16 
16 
20 
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
9 
1 2  
1 2  
1 2  
1 2  
1 2  
1 2  
1 0  
9 
1 
3 
3 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
3 
2 
2 
Source : J . C .  Pot t s ,  ' The Sugar Indus try in Fij i :  Its Beginnings and 
Development ' ,  Transaations and Proaeedings of the Fiji Soaiety , 7 
( 1958-5 9 ) , 104-30 . 
No tes 
1 .  Five mills have been excluded because of insuf f icient data regarding 
the s tart and closure of their operations . 
2 .  Includes only those mills that ac t ually operated . One or two were 
built but never used . 
3 .  Where a mill is moved from one location to another , it is treated as 
having been c losed and then opened as a new mill . 
4 .  Where the informat ion is that a mill was closed af ter a particular 
year ' s  crushing season , the f ollowing year has been given as date of 
closure . 
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the following y ear , CSR had adop ted a conservative policy in 
financ ial management . 2 6 I t  had given priority to a speedy 
repayment of funds borrowed to overcome the cris is of the 
late 1850s and , preferr ing to accumulate reserves out of 
which future investments co uld be made , it never again paid 
dividends remo tely comparable to those o f  1 85 6 . Yet the 
mills and ref ineries buil t in the early 1880s could no t b e  
completely self-f inanced and loans were again made , leading 
to renewed emphasis a t  the end of  the decade on keeping 
dividends low so that debentures co uld b e  quickly repaid . 
In 1891 the company had accumulated the equivalent of two 
years ' divid end s as surplus profit . 2 7 The resul t of  this 
caut ious approach was that C SR was in a better posit ion than 
many companies no t only to survive the depres s ion of the 
1890s but to fur ther increase its inves tments in Fij i .  I t  
had the capital t o  reduce unit cos t s  by build ing larger mills 
than others in the co lony - the Lautoka mil l  was reputed to 
be the larges t  in the southern hemisphere when it was opened 
and i t  also had the resources to ' carry ' the Nausori mill , 
which was unprof itable at first , till b et ter manufacturing 
techniques and improved cult ivation methods enabled the mill 
to yield a re turn .2 8 
Moreover , CSR ' s Fij i operat ions great ly benefit ed from 
the ext ent of  the company ' s  mill ing int erest s in Austral ia 
and Fij i .  It had fifteen mills by 190 3 .2 9 With such a 
heavy inves tment in mill ing CSR had a strong incentive to 
increase its expertise in the manufacture of sugar , and it  
was more able to f inance the required resear ch than propri­
etors with fewer mills over which to spread the cos t . The 
result was that CSR developed skills that far surpas sed 
those of  o ther millers in the co lony .3 0 It could also 
reduce co sts  by purchas ing in bulk for al l its  mills , in­
cluding those  in Aus tralia , ins t ead o f  obtaining supplies in 
Fij i thro ugh merchant s who were found to be  more expensive .3 1  
Fur thermore , t he vert ical int egrat ion o f  its  operations from 
plantation ( in many cases)  to mill to refinery enabled CSR 
to profit  at every s tage , thereby increas ing funds availab le 
for inves tment . 
CSR built f ive mills in Fij i between 1880 and 1 9 0 3 . 
One , at Viria on the upper Rewa , crushed for only ten years 
from 1886 to 1895 when ,  apparently too small to be viab le , it 
was clo sed . 3 2 The o ther four were more succes s ful , though 
it took longer than expected for the Nausori and Labasa mills 
to yield a re turn . The unfavourable climate at Nausori was 
a difficul ty , while at Labasa CSR was plagued for many years 
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by the higher cos t of  preparing the land than at o ther 
mills - drainage was a par ticular problem - and by being 
unable to get enough cane to work the mill at full capac­
ity . 3 3  In addit ion to CSR there was the Penang mill , which 
af ter the death of  D . C .  Chalmers pas sed into the hands of  
Fraser and Co . L t d , represent ing his es tate , and was then 
sold to the Melbourne Trus t Co . in 1896 . In the same year 
the capacity of the mill was enlarged with machinery f rom 
Mago island , where a small mil l had c losed after the 189 5 
season . 3 4  Its  increased capacity , coup led with i t s  locat ion 
in an area well suited to cane , helped Penang to survive 
the depres s ion and operate independently o f  CSR till 19 26 . 
The o ther maj or non-CSR mill , at  Tamanua on the Navua River , 
was built by S tanlake Lee in 1884 . Fearing tha t  he would 
be unable to compete for cane supplies with Nausori two miles 
away , and being unwilling to lease addi tional land so that 
his company could grow cane itself , Lee had sold his Rewa 
mill to CSR in 1882 , when it was closed . 3 S From the pro­
ceeds of  the sale , under the name of  the Fij i Sugar Co . Ltd , 
he built ano ther mill at Navua on land he had leased some 
years earlier . The mill was not a f inanc ial succes s , largely 
for reasons of  climate , and soon depended on CSR suppor t .  
It was managed by James Murray , who had b een CSR ' s f irst  
manager at Nausori ,  and who in his  new po sition was given 
advice by CSR on how to make the mill pay . 3 6 CSR also 
became a maj or , though no t the only , source of finance for 
Tamanua by regularly making advances on security of the 
crop . 3 7 Al though it  was no t willing to take a direct  
interest  in the mill , perhaps b ecause of  doub ts about its  
pro f i tab ility , CSR was anxious that Tamanua should no t clo se . 
I t  wanted o ther millers in the colony , so that they could 
j o intly approach government over tax concess ions and the 
like . Government , Knox thought , would be more inclined to 
listen to several mill owners than to one who had a monopoly 
in the colony . 3 8 I t  was this , among other cons iderat ions , 
which decided CSR agains t buying Tamanua when it  was up for 
sale in 1905 . 3 9 Eventually i t  was bought by the British 
Columb ia Sugar Refining Co . Ltd which , having completely 
rebuilt the mill , re-opened i t  in 1906 as the Vancouver-Fij i 
Sugar Co . With f inance available  from Canada the mill was 
no longer s upported by CSR . Yet it s t ill failed to make 
satisfac tory profits . An unsuccessful at temp t was made to 
sell it in 1911 , 4 0 and it  was f inally c losed in 192 3 . 
In 1903  then , the y ear Lautoka fir s t  crushed , four 
of the s ix mills in the colony were owned by CSR , and of the 
o ther two only one - Penang - was independent of the 
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company ' s  control . CSR ' s inves tment , no t only in its  mills 
but also in the infras tructure associated wi th them , was 
considerable . It  laid out an extensive netwo rk of  tramlines 
on which to transport cane to the mills ; it  b uil t houses for 
its  o f f icers , who se pleasant accommodat ion s tood in marked 
contrast  to the ' lines ' provided for Indian labour ; and i t  
provided dairies and butcherie s t o  mee t the needs o f  i t s  
European employees .  By 1902 CSR had inves ted £ 1 , 3 7 3 , 000 in 
the colony , a vas t  sum in relation to the s ize of the econ­
omy . 4 1 It  had helped sugar to become Fij i ' s  principal ex­
port . From 7 November 18 7 3 ,  when sugar was fir s t  exported , 
shipped in the s chooner NiZ Desperandum , 4 2  exports ( destined 
mainly for New Zealand) had increased to 46 , 4 38 tons in 190 3 . 
The value o f  the sugar was £ 4 03 , 318 : o f  copra , the next mos t  
important export , £ 91 , 051 . The sugar f rom CSR ' s  four mills 
alone was worth wel l  over half the colony ' s  to tal exports 
and re-expor ts , put at  £ 5 54 , 70 7 . 4 3 CSR had no t only b ecome 
dominant in the Fij i sugar industry : i t  had a t ta ined a 
commanding position in the economy as a whole . 
The Fij ians as an inadequate source of cane 
When sugar mills were b eing set  up in the 18 70s and 
1880s , it  was hoped that a large propor tion o f  their cane 
would be supplied by the Fij ians . Sir William Des Voeux , 
Gordon ' s  s uccessor as governor , expec ted cane cult ivation 
to b ecome increas ingly popular wi th Fij ians . 4� And , indeed , 
by the turn of  the century they were growing i t  as  a tax 
crop under the supervision of government in Tailevu , Rewa , 
Naitasiri , Ba , Ra , Namo s i  and Serua . Each province was 
as sessed for tax , and if  the value of  the crop handed to 
government exceeded the assessment a refund was paid to the 
province concerned . In 1884 F ij ians produced 8 , 884 tons , 
about 12 per cent o f  the to tal cane crushed that year . In 
1900 their output had risen to 15 , 44 7  tons , but as a propor­
t ion o f  the colony ' s  total it  had fallen to under 6 p er 
cent . 4 5 In the next ten years output was to decline so 
that the percentage was to fall even fur ther , with the resul t  
that o n  the eve of  World War I Fij ian cane was making a 
negligible  contrib ut ion to sugar produc tion in the colony . 
The reason was that Fij ians hated growing cane , as was dis­
covered by officials l ike W . L . Allardyce , who in 189 6  des­
crib ed his earlier experiences with the Namos i  people : 
They cer tainly were a mos t  unreasonable , uncouth , and 
untrac table lo t ,  they smashed the trucks and they b ent 
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the tramline , they skulked , they pract ised every known 
nat ive wil e  and a good many o thers which they had 
learnt from the European , but I was qui te as determined 
that they should produce cane as they wer e  determined 
to make the attempt a failur e . 4 6  
I t  was suggested by some off icial s , as well a s  by o thers , 
that Fij ians be allowed to pay tax in cash rather than kind . 
In 1887 government reluctant ly permit t ed Bauans t o  meet par t  
of their tax assessment f o r  that year b y  cut t ing cane a t  one 
shill ing a ton on CSR ' s  Nausori and Vuci Maca plantat ions , 
but Thurs ton ( governor ,  1888-97) refused to treat thi s  as a 
precedent and a propo sal in 1896 that Fij ians at Labasa be  
allowed to do  likewise  was rej ected . 4 7  Thurston ' s  suc cess­
ors were , however , less sympathetic to the nat ive tax system 
and in 1902, desp ite oppo sition from Allardyce as Colonial 
Secretary , the governor ( Sir Henry Jackson , 1902-04) began 
a process of commutat ion for cash which was to kill the 
syst em for good . 4 8  
The trouble with cane was not j ust that Fij ians , l ike 
most  peopl e , obj ected to paying tax : it was that the at trac­
t ion of a refund by producing more than was due to government 
did not generally appeal to them . This was part ly for 
cul tural reasons . It  was also b ecause a relatively small 
amount of labour was requir ed t o  grow subsistence crop s . 
' How easily they can supply their own simpl e  needs in their 
own homes ' ,  Mis s  Gordon Cumming remarked in 1885 . 4 9  Income 
from cash crops would have had to be  high to induce Fij ians 
to switch from their tradit ional subsistence crops to crops 
which required more work . If  returns were no t high , it was 
l ikely that the willingnes s  to earn cash would par t ly depend 
on the amount of surplus labour available . I f  Fij ians had 
plenty of spare time , the opportunity cost of involvement 
in the money economy would be low . Now the comparat ively 
small labour input s needed for subsistence crops meant that 
of ten there was a certain quantity of labour to spare , but 
this was reduced 1n the lat e ninet eenth century by a dec line 
in the Fij ian populat ion from p erhap s 1 40 ,000 before Cession 
to 105 ,800 in 1891, and 94,397 t en y ears later . S O Though 
there were f ewer mouths t o  feed , the amount of labour 
requir ed for communal tasks ( church building , etc . )  was 
likely to have remained fairly constant , so that the amount 
of  surplus labour would have fal len and with it the des ire 
to produce crops for sale . 
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The desire was reduced st ill fur ther b y  the nat ure o f  
European capit al ism in Fij i .  Fij ians had been exposed to  
the cash economy for  a relat ively shor t t ime , and what they 
had seen had been goods which were comparat ively expensive 
largely because of  transport cost s , and the practice of charg­
ing in the stores  a higher price to  Fij ians than to  Europeans . S I 
High prices wou ld have had less  ef fect on the willingness of 
Fij ians to earn cash if they could have expected high money 
returns as a result of their labour . The larger the returns , 
the fewer hour s they would have had to work t o  buy goods that 
appealed to them .  But cane was a crop which did not give 
Fij ians a high income . It was sugges t ed in 1902 that on the 
Rewa the equ ivalent of thirty days ' work at cane earned a 
Fij ian only 2 5 s  8d . Returns in Ba , where the climat e  was 
better , were much higher , but nowhere near as good as the 
2 7 s  Od that could be earned in only threee days by produc ing 
three hundredweight of copra . It was not surpris ing that o f  
an est imat ed £100 , 282 received in cash b y  Fij ians in 1901 , 
£42 , 880 was thought to have derived from copra produced for 
non-tax purposes , whe reas the amount from cane which was grown 
in areas unsuit ed to copra - was nil . The income from cane 
was also lower than from t rad it ional sub s is t ence crops . 5 2 
Though at first government d id try , the re luc tance of  
Fij ians to grow cane discouraged offic ials from improving 
cult ivat ion methods such as applying manure , which would 
have required add it ional expenditure and so reduced the 
size  of the refund in the short term and made it even more 
diff icult to obtain Fij ian co-operat ion . 5 3  Yet since in the 
long run the absence o f  manure meant that the soil was more 
eas ily exhausted , the ret urn s from land and labour were 
reduced by lower yields and the ext ra work involved in 
prepar ing new ground . Another prob lem was that tax farms 
were of t en located some distance from the village - twenty 
mil es was not uncommon . Somet imes bure had t o  be built 
and food gard ens plant ed adj acent to the cane plot to 
eliminate the need for daily travel . All this added t o  the 
t ime required for growing cane and inc reased the opportunity 
cost involved . There were frequent complaint s that the 
t ime could have been spent on work in the village . In 1902 
it was al so reported that some Fij ians were obj ect ing 
because cane ent ailed work between July and December when , 
under the village ' Programme of Work ' , they would have been 
free to find employment in Suva at wages up to £3 or £4 for 
ten days ' work . Even without the problems of  yields and 
trave l ,  it is most unlikely that the opportunity cost of  
growing cane would have been so low to  make it att ract ive 
to Fij ians - except occas ionally in the west of Vit i Levu 
where the climat e artd soil were more suited t o  cane . 54  
37 
The bas ic problem was the miller ' s  need for cheap cane . 
This meant that under labour intensive methods of  cultivat ion , 
which were characteris t ic of sugar plantations in Fij i ,  what 
was required was a cheap supply of  labour . In a situat ion 
of ' subsistence affluence ' and wi th low money asp irat ions , 
j us t  as they had been reluctant to become plantat ion labourers 
for long p er iods of  time , so Fij ians hat ed working for a low 
income by growing cane themselves . S S  Inst ead , they often 
pref erred to lease surplus land so that cane c ould be grown 
by o thers . The t erms on which they co uld do this were made 
more attractive to would-be tenant s in 18 96 when , to overcome 
the disadvantage of twenty-f ive year leases embodied in 
Ord inance 21 of 1880 ,  government began to l ease for ninety­
nine year s nat ive land whi ch was sub-let to Europ eans on 
f ifty-year terms . Ordinance 4 of 1905 permit t ed set t lers  
to obtain these long-term leases direct from Fij ians , and 
al so for the f irst  t ime legal ized the al ienat ion of nat ive 
land . Between May 1905 and Apr il 1 908 , 104 , 142 acres were 
sold to a var iety of purchaser s  when , following pr essure 
from Lord Stanmor e  ( fo rmerly S ir Art hur Gordon) , the Colonial 
Offic e  put an end to the sales . S 6 
With fewer Fij ians after the 1890s working for planter s  
a s  casual labourers ,  rent became the pr incipal way in which 
they shared the profit s from sugar . Yet their share was 
small .  At £5 , 989 , rent from all leas es ( includ ing those  out ­
s ide  cane distric t s )  was only about 6 per cent o f  the esti­
mat ed total cash income r eceived by Fij ians in 1901 . S 7  
Mor eover , though income from r ent would increase wi th the 
subsequent expansion of sugar product ion (Lautoka had not 
yet opened )  and the settlement of Ind ians , before 1915 the 
t erms on which many large blocks were leased to Europeans 
contained no provision for t he frequent reassessment of 
rent . S B Consequently , as land values rose r ents fell 
below - often way below - the free market value of the land . 
The commoner s '  income from rent was part icularly small , sinc e 
chief s were ent itled to 30 p er cent of the r ent s in areas 
under their authority . On a per capita basis , this left 
relat ively l it tle for distribut ion to those who were no t 
chief s . Usually i t  was land o f  the best quality that was 
leased . The r esul t was that when the Fij ian population 
began to grow af t er World War I ,  villager s incr eas ingly had 
to plant food on less fert il e  soil , so reduc ing the surplus 
labour available and with it , p erhaps , the incentive to 
play a greater role in the cash economy . Thus , altho ugh 
their willingness to leave the cane supply to o thers was 
not the only factor influenc ing the development of  planta­
t ions , the extent of European landhold ings and the number 
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of Indians imported did owe some thing to the t endency of 
Fij ians to become s pectators o f , rather than partic ipant s in , 
the cult ivat ion of cane . 
So it  was that a planta t ion enclave develop ed in the 
economy , thereby benefiting members of the uneasy alliance 
forged af t er Cession between government , the chiefs and 
European capital . The chiefs  gained from government ' s  
restraint on the act ivities of  early sett lers and from a 
large share in the rents obtained from cane lands . 5 9  Govern­
ment to a great extent had established o rder , and saw its  
revenue increase through the s t imulus to trade provided by  
overseas capital , notably CSR . And CSR used Fij i to supply 
its r ef ineries with raw sugar . The development impac t  o f  
the industry thro ugh the creation of soc ial and overhead 
capital , the br inging of idle land into product ive use , et c . , 
created j ob s  which enabled many immigrant s t o  escape f rom 
des titut ion in India . To a limited degree commoners b ene­
fited from the receipt o f  rent . Along with Indians , they 
also gained from government transf ers  (made pos s ible by 
increased revenue ) , though thes e  were small . 
Yet constraints imposed by overseas markets  and by 
the s tate of sugar technology meant that the indus try could 
survive only if it was supplied with cheap labour . This  
restricted sugar ' s  contribut ion to economic development . In 
contrast to o ther par t s  of  the world where the spread ef fect 
of  plantations was limited because members of  the indigenous 
population were employed at low wages , the effec t  on Fij ians 
was small because they disliked any involvement ( except as 
recipients  of  rent ) in the cultivation o f  cane . Though , in 
explaining this , account has to be taken of  factors like 
' sub sist ence affluenc e ' which influenced the Fij ian response , 
the lack of  incentive caused by sugar ' s  dep endence on cheap 
labour was crucial . I t  is also important tha t , by o ccupying 
large areas of top quality land , plantations probab ly dis­
couraged Fij ians from developing commercial agriculture them­
selves . Instead of  employing F ij ians as cheap labour , o r  
cheap suppliers of  cane , the Indians were import ed . Although 
many might have been materially bet t er o f f  than if they had 
s tayed in India , innnigrant s were certainly cheap as far as 
Fij i was concerned . The tendency for wages of  free Indians 
to exceed one shilling a day indicates that the s tatutory 
minimum wage of  indentured labourers was b elow what would 
have prevailed had there been a free market in labour ; and 
even the free wage was no t enough to induce immigrants who 
eventually settled on the land to seek wage employment for 
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more than short per iods at a time . 6 0 S t ill wo rse , during 
the 1880s and 1890s plantation wages were usually less than 
the statutory minimum . 6 1  On top of  this was the high mor tal­
ity rate on plantat ions , at  leas t before the t urn of the 
century , and the humiliation suf f ered by Indians under the 
indenture sys tem . The harsh treatment of indentured labour­
ers in a whole hos t  of ways led them to descr ibe life on 
plantations as 'narak ' - hell . 6 2  
Within a few years o f  Nausori op ening , acute ob servers 
in Fij i recognized a conflic t  of  inter es t between the colony 
which grew the cane and CSR,  which was mainly concerned wi th 
proces sing and market ing it . Dr T . P . Lucas , a visit ing 
botanist in the 1880s , reported the views of almo s t  certainly 
Thurs ton , with whom he agreed : 
I was informed for a pos it ive fac t that a high govern­
ment official , who had b een largely instrumental in 
secur ing the es tab lishment of colossal sugar companies , 
had acknowl edged that , ins tead of  a benefit , they had 
brought a bear into the country . 6 3  
CSR ,  more than all the res t , was the typ e of investor Gordon 
and Thurston had wanted to at tract to Fij i ,  but it soon 
b ecame clear that many in the colony would be far from 
attracted to the inves tor . 
Chap ter 3 
The plantation sys tem , 1880-1914 
CSR had or iginally hoped to buy cane , as i t  had in 
New South Wales , from planters already l iving in the vicinity 
of its mills ,  the company itself growing enough only for 
experimental purposes and to even out fluctuat ions in s upply . I 
This obj ective was never abandoned , even though to ob tain 
sufficient cane CSR had to develop plantations on a far larger 
s cale than intended . By 1914 , however , mos t  of  these had 
been leased to over seers who , instead of working for the 
company , farmed on their own behal f . Because CSR ' s  mill s  
were much bigger than those  a t  Penang and Tamanua ( Table 3 . 1 ) , 
this decentralizat ion of  the p lantation sys tem became 
charac teris t ic o f  the Fij i indus try as a whol e  - a character­
i s t ic of  great importance no t only for CSR-government rela­
t ions , but because it increased the profitab ility of the 
company ' s  investment s in the c olony . In the long run it also 
reinforced CSR ' s pos ition as a miller rather than grower o f  
cane , making i t  eas ier f o r  the company t o  turn t o  Indians 
for supplies af ter World War I .  To s ome ext ent , the planta­
t ion sys t em devised before 1914 was a prerequisite  for what 
would come later . 
Table 3 . 1 
Maximum da ily output of s ugar mill s  in F ij i ,  1914 
Penang 40 tons raw sugar 
Tamanua 6 0  
Labasa 100 
Nausori 
Rarawai 
Lautoka 
105 tons raw sugar 
1 25 
142  
Source : Escott  to C . O . , 4 6 7 , 30 Dec . 1914 , C . O .  8 3/ 12 3 . 
CSR ' s  preference for the central mill sys tem ,  whereby 
cane was purchased from outside suppliers , owed much to the 
attitude of politicians to the company , aptly expressed by 
Thurs ton in 1880 . ' It would be a good  thing if they inves ted , 
4 0  
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but no t if they got all they want . ' 2 This remained the 
of ficial view in Fij i till the company f inally wi thdrew 
nine t y  y e ar s la ter . As CSR ' s impor tance to the e c onomy g r ew , 
government ' s  des ire that the company should rema in increased . 
Whenever off icials felt that CSR might be  forced to wi thdraw 
they would intervene - however reluc tantly - to provide it 
with support . On the other hand , government never wanted 
CSR ' s  interests to be paramount . There were those of  the 
Fij ians to be  considered as wel l , and of  the European 
connnunity apart from CSR . So long as the company remained , 
goverrnnent was willing to act - over taxat ion , for examp le -
in ways that would reduce the prof itability o f  sugar milling 
but benef it others in the colony . Of course CSR could -
and did - threaten withdrawal on such occasions , but threats 
alone were not very effective , especially if the company had 
failed to act  on them b efore . Would CSR really sell its  
investments in Fij i ,  and r isk the los s  of cap ital as a result 
if , say , goverrnnent increased taxes by only a small amount?  
Clearly i t  would no t ,  unl ess the increase made the mills 
unprofitable . In its relat ions with CSR , then , it  seemed 
that government might have had cons iderable room for 
manoeuvre .  
From early days CSR was well aware of the danger that 
o f f icials might act  in ways which would b e  contrary to the 
interests  of the company . In the late 1880s the Queensland 
government had proposed discr iminatory taxation of CSR , and 
had levied heavy duties on machinery for the mills . 3 There­
af ter , the company fel t vulnerable b ecaus e  of  its dominant 
posit ion in the Queensland and Fij i sugar indus trie s .  I t  
was an easy target for those  who resented i t s  influence , and 
a cons tant temp tation for politicians who wanted to raise 
taxation . The company needed to s trengthen its  position by 
spreading r isks - in an economic sense by reducing its  inves t­
ment in  plantat ion work , and in  a po lit ical sense by  in­
creasing the number o f  p lanters engaged in the indus try in 
order to enhance the lat ter ' s  influence with government . As 
Knox exp lained in 1899 : 
This system of  purchase from growers ,  we have only 
b een able to adop t to a very small extent in Fij i ,  
and i t  has many advantages . I t  reduces by one-half 
the amount of  capital which the mill-owner has to 
f ind ; it places b etween the manufac turer and the l egis­
lature a large numb er of permanent settlers , each of 
whom has a direct per sonal interes t  in securing fair 
and reasonable treatment for the indus try wi th which 
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h e  i s  connec ted ; and i t  thus gives the bus iness a 
s tab ility which would o therwis e  b e  wanting , and 
furni shes to the inves to r  some security that the 
capital he sinks in plant and buildings shall no t be  
made unremunerat ive by undue taxat ion . 4 
There was a s trong polit ical motive behind CSR ' s  preference 
for the c entral mill system . 
To this was added a second factor - the need to 
minimize labour costs in growing cane . Sugar plantations 
have t radit ionally employed a labour int ens ive form o f  
produc tion , s o  that labour expenses form a large proport ion 
of to tal costs . When dis counted over the life of a planta­
t ion , land , the other maj or cost , was much smaller than 
labour . Now where ,  as in Brit ish Guiana , the main s ource 
of prof i t  from raw sugar derived f rom growing rather than 
milling cane , companies spec ialized in maximiz ing returns 
from l abour in the f ield . For CSR , its  background as a 
r ef iner turned miller meant that �nitially , except from 
refining , it earned prof its so lely from the manufacture o f  
raw sugar , because when it f ir s t  opened mills i n  New South 
Wales , the company tried to reduce the r isk of  embarking on 
a to tally new venture by obtaining cane from outs ide 
suppliers , instead of developing plantations itsel f . The 
result was that E . W .  Knox,  who was responsible for the mills , 
concentrated on acquiring an exper t is e  in the manufac turing 
process .  Though he was also interes ted in cul t ivat ion 
methods , when he travel led to the Wes t  Indies in 18 76 Knox ' s  
chief concern was to l earn how to increase efficiency in the 
mills , and this preo ccupation cont inued af ter he b ecame 
general manager . The company made great advances in the 
application of chemical research to the crushing process , 
so that by the 1890s i t  had developed t echniques in milling 
that were , perhaps , almo s t  unrivalled in the res t o f  the 
world . Chemists  became some o f  the mos t  influential people 
in the company , and in the f uture mil l  managers were to be 
frequently drawn from their mids t . 5 This early specializa­
t ion in milling meant that CSR knew relatively little about 
cultivat ion when , fo llowing its expansion to Fij i and Queens­
land , the company itself  began to grow cane in large 
quant it ies . The fall in sugar prices in the 1880s and 1890s 
intens ified company efforts to improve the qual ity of  
cultivat ion , and hence returns to  l abour , both on its own 
es tates  and tho se of  independent planters . Ye t ,  as head 
of fice acknowledged in 1902 , the achievements in milling 
were not matched by comparable successes  on the plantat ions . 6 
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S o  when faced wi th difficultie s  in reducing field expenses , 
the company ' s  react ion was to l ease es tates in the hope that 
tenant plant ers wo uld have mor e  success . 7 
Experience showed that planters were , indeed , better 
able than CSR to control lab our co s t s . It  was found that 
they worked labour more effic iently than did over seer s 
employed by the company . In 1908 one CSR tenant was quo ted 
by Knox as working with eighty-five to ninety men an es tate 
on which CSR had had to employ up to 1 30 . Though par t of  
the reduc t ion was said to have been due to the planting of 
Badilla , a better variety of  cane , mos t  was due to ' mo re 
interested supervis ion ' - planters were more prof it cons cious 
than overseers . Ano ther saving - of  up to £ 150  a year - was 
to hire Indians as ploughmen ins tead of using Europ eans as 
did CSR , or for the planter to do the p loughing himself . 8 On 
top of this was the point that if CSR ran a planta t ion i t  
expected t o  make a return o n  inves tment over and above the 
cos ts of  labour and supervision . For a s el f-employed planter 
though, the co s t  of  supervision and return on capital were 
indivis ible . He was mor e  willing to comb ine a good yield 
from inves tment with a low salary ( or an accep table salary 
with a low capital return) in exchange for the advantage 
he p erceived from b e ing self-employed . In effect , supervision 
costs  could be reduced , enabling the cane to be  bought s till 
more cheaply than if i t  had been grown by the company itself . 
The task for CSR,  then , was to find an outside source of 
s upply . 
European contrac tors 
One pos s ibility was that planters on non-CSR land , 
known as contractors , would become important producers o f  
cane . In 1880 set tlers on the Rewa had agreed to grow cane 
for the company till 1892 at 10s Od a ton but , as CSR 
privately acknowledged , this pr ice proved to be well below 
the actual co s t  of growing cane . Even with a bonus of 2s 6d 
in 1884 and 1885 , planters like J . C .  Smith and W .  Orr were 
unable to eke from their esta te s  more than a nominal return . 9 
The reason was largely the inf lation tha t  followed the 
expans ion o f  CSR in the early 1880s . With a shortage of  
Indian labour because of  delays in  organiz ing a regular 
supply , initially p lant ers  and CSR had to rely heavily on 
Fij ians and ' Polynes ians ' .  The price of the lat t er had 
risen sharply by the mid-1880s ,  in part b ecause CSR ' s  move 
into Fij i and Queensland had helped generat e  a greater demand . 
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The cos t of feeding the labour in Fij i with lo cally grown 
subsistence crops had also increased because  of  the larger 
numb er involved . 1 0 On top o f  higher labo ur co sts , planter s 
were required by C SR to reduce the numb er o f  crops taken 
from the land each year . The practice had b een to harves t  
cane in Fij i three t imes in two years , b ut CSR insisted on 
only one crop a y ear in order to allow the cane longer to 
mature . The miller benef ited from sweeter cane while planters 
were faced with a lower income than expected . 1 1  They were 
not compensated wi th a demons tration by CSR of cultiva tion 
t echniques  which would have enabled them to farm profi tably 
despite higher costs and fewer crops . Draught animals , for 
example , wer e  no t us ed on CSR ' s  plantations at Nausori t ill 
the early 1 89 0s , so that labour co sts  b efore then were 
part icularly high . 1 2  The only way that cane could have 
been made profitable for planters in the 1880s would have 
been for C SR to pay a price sub s tantially higher than 12s 6d . 
Planters asked for 15s  Od , and this was probab ly no t much 
more than was needed to earn a reasonable return . Yet the 
fall in raw sugar pr ices from the mid-1 880s , coup led with 
early diff iculties in making C SR ' s  plantations economical , 
prevented the company from rais ing the price . Ins tead , the 
2s 6d bonus was withdrawn in 1886 and 1887 , and was only 
par tly res tored from 1888 to 1 891 to b r ing the pr ice up to 
lls Od . 1 3  
It  was hardly surprising that planters found themselves 
growing cane no t out of choice but because  they were bound 
by contracts s igned in 1880 . They were reluctant farmer s ,  
eager only to dispo se of their land . Indeed , as Knox real­
ized , originally the big landowners had had no intention of 
growing cane for long . They had wanted to attrac t sugar 
mills  s imply b ecaus e they had expected a rise  in land values 
to resul t . 1 4 So it  was quite na tural in 1882 for Sahl to 
exploit CSR ' s  need of his co-operation by borrowing from the 
company funds with which to buy out Rabone , Feez & Co . ' s 
interest in the land o f  F .  & W .  Hennings , and the next year 
to j o in J . C .  Smith in trying to s ell his proper t ies on the 
Rewa . 1 5  But these would-be speculators had lit tle suc ces s ,  
for o ther Europeans , if not in the market as sellers them­
selves , e ither lacked the desire to b uy becaus e cane was 
unremunerative , or the means to buy becaus e CSR , which 
f inanced those  who grew sugar , made advances only for cultiva­
t ion . 1 6  Enquiries were made by some Melbourne cap italis ts  
about buying land so  that another mill on the  Rewa could be 
buil t , but CSR prevented its contractors  from selling for 
s uch purposes , and interest  from Melbourne waned af ter the 
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price o f  sugar fell in the mid-188 0s . 1 7 C SR it self did not 
want to buy propert ies that were already under cane becaus e 
the cap ital out lay would have done li t t le to increase 
supplies , but it was eventually forced - much against its 
will - to take over such land . Contrac t s  were due to exp ire 
at the end of 1891 , and it was clear that with little pro s­
pect of being able to repay what they owed CSR,  or of being 
able to sell at a pro f it to anyone else , plant ers would 
insist that the company take possession of their property 
as sett lement of the loans secured by it . To ensur e  that a 
crop would be prepared for the 1892  season , CSR began to 
take over planters ' land in 1 88 9 , though it refus ed to 
acquir e that belonging to Sahl who , owing £2 7 , 500 in October 
188 7 , had borrowed more than his proper t ies were worth . 
Sahl cont inued to  grow cane for the company t ill able to 
s ell . his land in the 1890s , when values began to rise slowly 
as free Ind ians start ed to sett le around plantat ions , and 
as the cul tivat ion of cane became more ef f icient . 1 8  Failure 
of the o riginal contractors on the Rewa to meet  CSR ' s  needs 
was matched by the refusal of several European landowner s 
to grow cane for the company ' s  mills at Rarawai , Labasa and 
Lautoka . Having bought land for sp eculat ive purpo ses , or 
in the case o f  f inancial institutions having foreclosed on 
the original purchaser , owners - often living abroad - were 
content merely to await the benef it  of  ris ing land values 
following the cons truct ion of C SR ' s  mills , and to for ce the 
company it self to buy land it wanted put under cane . 1 9  
Thus C SR acquired land on which to grow cane i tself , 
and once it  started to do this the company found that the 
very nature of plantat ion ent erprise encouraged it to 
increase the area of land in it s po ssession . By incr eas ing 
the supply of cane C SR could r educe the unit cos t s  of mill ing , 
and this was important on several occasions in per suading 
the company to s ecure additional land at each of its  mills . 2 0 
Moreover , once C SR had dec ided to grow cane i t  had to employ 
a large labour force to prepare the land for plant ing . Yet 
apar t from seasonal period s of high demand for cul tivat ion 
and harvest ing , af ter t he land had been c leared the number s 
needed on an estate for mo s t  of  the year were much reduced . 
Thus the problem aro se of how to  employ men during slack 
per iod s . Not ing ' a  plethora of labour ' at Nausor i in 188 6 ,  
CSR ' s head of f ice urged that more land be leas ed from Fij ians 
to provide employment opportunit ies dur ing the slack season . 2 1  
To this was added , especially af ter 1900 , an incent ive to 
acquire land for speculat ive purposes . Rising values en­
couraged CSR to ob tain mor e  than was needed for it s immediat e 
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requirement s ,  s o  that b y  1914 the to tal area under the 
company ' s  contro l was over 100 , 000 acres . 22  The acquis ition 
of land by CSR helped br ing about a soc ial transformat ion 
in distric t s  where sugar was produced . The company was 
prominent among a new set of  landholders who were replac ing 
original settlers  in much of the colony . 2 3  Many of these  
new men , if  they did no t farm themselves ,  l eased their land 
to those  who took advantage of improved cul tivation methods 
and grew cane for C SR .  These contractors became an important 
out s ide source of cane for the company . Yet becaus e o f  the 
ext ent of the company ' s  landho ldings they were no t- so im­
por tant as the tenants who o ccupied most  of CSR ' s  plantat ions 
on the eve of World War I .  The l easing o f  CSR ' s  estat es , 
in fact , enabled the company to realiz e it s original aim of 
relying on out s ide growers for the bulk of  its  suppl ies . 
The leasing of C SR ' s  plantat ions 
The process of l easing es tates , mainly to plantation 
manager s but also to ' others posses sed of  some lit tle 
capital ' , 24  began in 1890 and , though initially slow , pro­
ceeded more quickly aft er 1900 as the demand to l ease grew .  
Given the fa ilur e of  contrac tors to grow cane profitably on 
the Rewa in the 1880s , the des ir e  to l ease company planta­
t ions appears , perhap s , a little  surpr ising . It was due , 
however , to a convic t ion that improved c ircumstances  had 
made the cultivat ion of cane economically v iable . Now 
this improvement was not the r esult o f  an increase in raw 
sugar prices for , in fac t , Table 3 . 2  shows that the exact 
opposite had o ccurred . Nor did i t  ar ise from advances 
made in mill ing t echniques which might have allowed CSR to 
pay more for cane despite low pr ices , for on the contrary , 
what ever the developments in mill ing , af t er 189 7  the price 
of cane was reduced ( Table 3 . 3) . Nor was it due to the 
cons truct ion of mills  at Rarawai ,  Labasa and Lautoka where 
the climate was more suited t o  cane than on the Rewa , for as 
far as plant er s were concerned the benef it of this was off set 
when , in 1898 , the other three mills began to pay a lower 
price than Nausori for cane of equal quality . Rather , con­
fidence in the prof itabil i ty o f  cane incr eas ed because 
cult ivation methods were be ing improved . In the early 1890s 
labour saving devices , such as the use of draught animals , 
were introduced ; the soil was allowed to rest longer af ter 
cropping ; green manure was applied before re-plant ing ; and 
to help the soil , trash was saved instead o f  burnt . Improve­
ment s l ike the earlier planting of cane to give higher 
Year Tons 
export ed 
1882 1 , 731 
1883 5 , 163  
1884 8 , 7 29 
1885 10 , 586  
1886 11 , 716 
188 7 12 , 831 
1888 16 , 916 
1889 1 3 , 1 7 8  
1890 15 , 291 
1891 20 , 4 7 0  
1892 18 , 88 3  
18 9 3  15 , 389 
1894 2 7 , 265 
1895 23 , 210 
1896 2 7 , 334 
1897  2 6 , 991 
1898 34 , 15 6  
Source : J . C .  Potts , 
aA . pprox1mate f igur e 
Table 3 . 2  
Quant itl: and value of su�ar exports , 1882-1914 
( f . o . b . )  
Value Year Tons 
Total Per ton a exported 
( £) ( £) 
58 , 85 7  34 1899 28 , 40 3  
1 7 5 , 555  34  1900 32 , 961 
218 , 224 25 1901 31 , 751 
211 , 729 20 1902 35 , 905 
187 , 45 6  1 6  1903 4 6 , 438 
205 , 294 16 1904 5 2 , 138 
2 7 0 , 649 16 1905 58 , 488 
263 , 554 20 1906 38 , 5 23  
244 , 65 5  1 6  190 7 66 , 59 7  
327 , 526 16  1908 66 , 14 9  
302 , 13 3  16  1909 60 , 825 
246 , 2 31 16 1910 61 , 761  
4 36 , 24 5  1 6  1911 72 , 834 
208 , 889 9 1912 61 , 7 18 
336 , 9 29 12  1 91 3  94 , 710 
323 , 830 12 1914 9 3 , 7 7  3 
409 , 884 12 
' The sugar indus try in Fij i ' ,  Appendix 1 .  
per calendar year , no t per crushing season . 
Value 
To tal Per ton a 
( £) ( £) 
340 , 6 03 12 
393 , 98 7  12 
380 , 155 12 
34 7 , 691 10 
406 , 318 9 
469 , 391 9 
539 , 594 9 
34 7 , 19 8  9 
6 02 , 820 9 
6 4 7 , 306 10 
60 7 , 969  10 
669 , 4 32 11 
79 7 , 274  11 
6 7 1 , 712  11  
1 , 041 , 9 2 7  11 
1 , 02 3 , 914 11 
� 
'-I 
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Table 3 . 3  
Pr ice of cane bought from Europeans on the Rewa , 1882-1914 
Year 
1882-3 
1884-5 
1886-7 
1888-91 
1892-7 
18 98-1 901 
1 902-14 
Price ( including bonus ) 
10s Od 
12s  6d 
10s Od 
lls Od 
12 s 6d 
12 s 6d for cane of 11 per 
10s Od " " " " " 
cent P . O . C . S .  
" " 
Sources : Knox t o  Tucker and Orr ,  13 May 188 6 , Fij i Out 1880-
92 , 3 ( 1885-8 7 ) , 2 1 7 -18 ; H . O . t o  Nausori 6 June 
1888 , Fij i Out 1880-92 , 4 (1887-8 8 ) ,  2 95-300 ; H . O .  
t o  Nausori , 6 June 1889 , Fij i Out 1880-92 , 5 ( 1888-
8 9 ) , 340-44 . H . O .  to Nausori , 14 Nov . 189 0 , Fij i 
Out 1880-92 , 7 (18 90-91 ) , 4 9-50 ; H . O .  t o  Nausori , 
5 Aug .  1891 , Fij i Out 1880-92 , 7 ( 1890-91 ) , 469-7 0 ;  
H .  0 .  t o  Nausori , 5 Nov . 189-8 ,  Nausori Out , 7 ( 1897 -
9 9 ) , 438 ; Knox to  Escott , 1912 , Nau sori t o  H . O . , 
Private let ters May to  Dec . 1912 . 
Note s : 1 .  Before 18 98 no standard was specif ied , the same 
pric e being paid for all cane regardless o f  quality , 
though cane below 8 p er cent P . O . C . S .  was rej ected . 
P . O . C . S .  (Pure Obtainable Cane Sugar ) is  calculated 
from the analy sis of  cane and f orms a bas is for 
assessment of the percent age of  cane sugar recover­
able under spec ific cond it ions o f  manufacture . The 
price was reduced or increased accord ing to whether 
the P . O . C . S .  measurementof a farmer ' s  cane was below 
or above the standard . At Nausori the standard was 
fixed at 11 per cent , but it was 13 per cent at the 
other Fij i mills where cane was normally of a higher 
quality ( see Table 3 . 4 ) . The introduct ion of pay­
ment by qual ity in 18 98 represent ed a fall in price 
for most Rewa plant ers , who were accustomed to  pro­
duc ing cane of below 11 per cent P . O . C . S .  
2 .  Before 1892 , 4d a ton was deducted for t ramway 
hire . Af t er 18 92 no deduct ion was made . 
3 .  From 1898 to 1901 a var iety of prices ruled . 
Mos t  plant ers received 12 s 6d per standard t on ,  
but some received les s .  
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quality cont inued to  be made , and new varie t ies were tried . 
Malabar , a superior cane to that grown hitherto in Fij i ,  was 
being widely planted in 1 901 . Within a few years it was 
rep laced by the even better variety , Badilla . By the late 
1890s advance s  in cultivat ion methods , though no t as spec­
tacular as achievements in the mil l , had transformed the 
economic s of growing cane in F ij i .  Even on the Rewa cane 
could yield a profit to t ho se who were reasonably ef f icient . 2 5  
Moreover , CSR tenants f ound they had a par ticular 
advantage over cont ractors : they often had to pay less in 
r ent . This was because many contractors occupied land leased 
from o ther Europ eans , who wer e  det ermined to maximiz e  their 
income from r ent . In the 188 0s , for example , Sahl leased 
some of  his Rewa proper ty , at a rent tha t  CSR thought was 
more than the land was worth , to W .  Orr , who was t ied to the 
land at an excessive r ent and with an unprof itable crop 
presumably because he had financ ial obligat ions to his land­
lord . 2 6  Though men l ike Sahl were replac ed in the 1890s 
by a new set of  property owners , the lat t er behaved no 
differ ently . There was J . B .  Turner , who originally grew cane 
for CSR but found that it was more pro f itable to lease his 
land inst ead . In 1910 it was alleged that on one of his 
Rewa propert ies , bought for between £1 , 300 and £1 , 500 , Turner 
was charging r ent of £4 20 a year . 2 7  In Knox ' s  view ,  land­
lords were charging ' exceedingly high rents ' at the o ther 
mills  as well . 28 The r esult was to raise cult iva tion expenses 
so that in one or two cases rent became the mo st  important 
s ingle i tem of co st . 2 9 C SR on the o ther hand , perhap s hoping 
this would keep down r ent s on non-company land and want ing 
to minimiz e the cost of cane , charged lower rents than were 
paid by contractors . I t  hoped that eventually the subs idiz ed 
r ent could be recouped in lower cane pr ices . 3 0 On top o f  
this was the advantage to tenants of  being self-employed , 
of not being absentee owner s as were some of  the early con­
tractors and , therefor e ,  of no t needing to share the proceeds 
from cane with agents appoint ed to look af ter their farms . 
Thus over seer s  became increas ingly attracted to the idea of 
leas ing plantat ions from CSR . 
For the company , there was the hope  of cheaper cane . 
Indeed , its  decision to part with some of it s estates was 
an ext ension of measures taken to r educe plantat ion co s t s  in 
the lat e  1880s . Following a vis it to Fij i in 1886 , Knox 
suggested t o  the Board that staff should receive a propor t ion 
of any co st reduct ions that were made - ' Personal interest 
will always ensure personal supervis ion . ' 3 1  For the Nausori 
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plantations nin e shillings was taken as the standard cos t 
of produc ing a ton of cane : plantat ion staff were to benefit  
if expenses fell below it . But nine shillings was much less 
than the existing co st  of growing cane on the Rewa , and no 
bonuses were paid to tho se outside the mill . 3 2  The incentive 
to earn a bonus fell as the frustrat ion of trying to limit 
co sts  below an unrealistic standard grew . The leas ing o f  
plantat ions , however , increased the incent ive t o  r educe 
cos t s . In effect the standard was raised to 12s  6d - the 
price of cane from 1892 to 1897  - and inst.ead of being able 
to keep only part of t he savings made below the standard , 
farming leased estates on their own account , planters could 
retain the whole of the reduct ion as prof it . In keeping 
with it s overall obj ect ive , the f irst plantat ions CSR tried 
to dispo se of were the ones  it found leas t prof itable to 
farm . On the Rewa , for instance , there was Bau Levu on which 
the company expec ted to grow cane at 1 7 s  Od a ton in 189 3 , 
but where the actual cos t  proved to be  £1  13s  2d . 3 3  With 
the company willing to pay only 12s  6d a ton it was , perhap s , 
amaz ing that aft er several years o f  t rying CSR found someone 
to take over the plantation . Mr John Rennie leased it in 
1894 and , benefit ing from improved cul t ivat ion t echniques , 
made some profit from it . But the prof it was no t large 
enough to induce him to re-leas e  the land on t erms acceptable 
to the c ompany , and he was replaced by ano �her t enant in 
1899 . 3 4  As cul t ivat ion cos t s  f ell the number of overseers 
want ing to l ease plantat ions increased and , despite  the 
lowering o f  cane prices in 1902 , this demand cont inued to 
grow . By 1904 , 6 5  per cent o f  the cane crushed at Nausori 
was suppl ied by Europ eans ( including c ontractor s ) , 20 per 
c ent by Indian growers and only 15 per cent by CSR . 3 5  
Since the company had always found it  diff icult to 
grow cane economically at Nausor i , it was not surpris ing 
that the leas ing of estates pro ceeded faster there than at 
its other mills . For example at Rarawai ,  where mor e  planta­
t ions had been let than at Labasa and Lautoka , in 1906 j us t  
under 4 0  per cent of  the cane was drawn from outs ide sup­
pliers . 36 There ,  as at Nausori ,  the leas t pro f itable planta­
t ions had been leased - the ones furthest away from the mill 
and so more diff icult to supervise , or tho s e  on l es s  fert ile 
land where returns were comparatively low . The result was 
that working the mos t  prof itable land i ts elf , CSR found in 
1904 that it could grow cane at Rarawai for less than the 
co st  of purchased supplies . 3 7 Consequently W . A .  Farquhar , 
the company ' s  roving Inspector , opposed the further leas ing 
of a large number of plantat ions in case the overall co s t  
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of cane should rise . Because C SR would have to ensure that 
cane was remunerat ive to the ' average ' producer , it wo uld 
need to pay a price that was higher than the co st  to the 
company of growing cane on it s mo st  prof itable estates . 
Furthermore , since in the allocation of p lantat ions priority 
would have to be given to overseer s  who had been longest in 
the company ' s  servic e ,  CSR would be left with less exp erienced 
men who would be likely to work the remaining p lant at ion s 
less effQciently . 3 8  
Yet from about 1905 CSR came under in creasing pres sure 
to part with a larger proportion of its e s tates . This was 
not j ust because it needed the benefit ' of s tr eng thening 
our posit ion with the government ' as Farquhar put it , though 
Knox later recalled that this was a factor . 3 9 Rather , the 
leasing of a great er number of plantations was seen as 
es sential if the company was to retain contro l over its  
labour , and thereby stabilize cost s .  The problem was two­
fold . First , there was growing discontent among over seers 
who , seeing ' small fortunes '  being made by planters l ike 
M . C .  Carr at Nadi , wanted CSR to give more opportunit ies for 
off icers to star t  on their own . Unres t among overseer s was 
so great that in 1907  Farquhar was forced to recommend the 
l ease of  three plantat ions at Nadi t o  s ix over seers . Several 
estat es were also leased at the other mil l s . 4 0 The r esult , 
however ,  was to increase dissat isfaction among those  who 
remained with the company . T enant s who had l eased CSR land 
in 1907 were very succes sful , f or c ing Knox to admit : ' It 
is true that we parted with our Nad i land too cheap ly ,  and 
that the blocks were t oo large . • 4 1  This had enabled the 
tenant s to make substant ial pro f it s  so that , wi th those who 
had been doing well over a longer p er iod , they had become 
the envy of men s till in the c ompany ' s  employ . Though Knox 
purported to be unmoved by pres sure from overseers t o  lease 
p lantat ions , the danger for the company was real . Frustra­
t ion was likely to be expres sed in slack sup ervis ion of 
labour , or in a t endency to ' take it  out ' on tho se being 
supervised . Either way , labour wou ld become more diff icul t 
t o  handle , the quality of  work would f all and the cost of 
cane r ise . 
Fear of this happening would have been part icular ly 
acute in 1908 , when trouble  wi th labour caused a scare among 
company staff in Fij i .  CSR attribut ed the problem t o  the 
working of new Ind ians by inexp erienced overseers  - the 
inevitable resul t  of recent expansion by C SR and the leas ing 
of it s estates to more exper ienced men - and f el t  that the 
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solut ion would be for government to d iscipline more severely 
labourers who broke the law . Government ' s  vi ew on the other 
hand , as reported by Farquhar , was that the problem was 
largely ' our own competit ive sys tem of  working one plantat ion 
against another ' ,  and that ' the troubl e  with the coo l ie s  
was mainly due t o  u s  squeezing the la st  drop out o f  them ,  
whereas the truth i s  the contractors always get more work 
done than we do ' . 4 2 No t ing that relat ionships between t enants 
and their labourer s were better than between over seers and 
Ind ians , presumably because t enants took great er care of 
labour in order to increase its product ivity , Knox sugges ted 
in 1 9 08 that the answer wo uld be to leas e nearly all the 
company ' s  plantations . The l at ter were rap idly d ivided into 
estat es of 400 to 1 000 acres , preference being given to tho se 
who had been longest in the company ' s  service and who had 
lit tle hop e of further promo t ion . 4 3 By World War I the bulk 
of C SR ' s  cane was bought from these tenant s .  The problem now 
was to prevent the realizat ion of f ear s by Farquhar and others  
that the widespread leasing o f  estates would cause a rise  
in the cost of cane to the company . In fact , what inst ru­
ment s of cost control over planters did C SR have ? 
Control over plant ers 
Tradit ionally , the company had regulat ed the cost o f  
out side  cane b y  alt ering the p rice paid f o r  it . Though i t  
had want ed to s e e  o ther mills established i n  the colony , 
CSR had opposed their location in the vicinity of  its  own 
mill s ,  lest by competing for cane supplies they limited the 
company ' s  ability to det ermine the pr ic e  it would pay . 
C SR had fought part icularly hard to obtain a monopoly o f  
milling o n  the Rewa . It had acquir ed land with the obj ect 
of prevent ing a rival mill from being es tab lished , 4 4  it 
had purchased Stanlake Lee ' s  mill in 1882 knowing tha t this 
would t end ' to c lub compet ition ' on the r iver and enable 
CSR to offer a lower erice for Fij ian tax cane than that 
current ly being paid , 5 and the fo llowing year it had blocked 
an at t empt by Sahl ' s  partners to sell one of his proper ties 
to prospective investors in a mill that would have competed 
with Nausori . 4 6  The biggest challenge to CSR ' s  po sition had 
come in 1884 when the Rewa Plantat ion Co . Ltd , having changed 
it s name to the Rewa Sugar Co . Ltd , transf erred its mil l to 
Koronivia and increased its capacity . Need ing a larger 
supply of cane it  had planned to acquire a proper ty belonging 
to Henry Eastgate ,  who had cont rac ted to grow cane on it for 
CSR . The latt er had taken Eastgate to court in defence of 
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it s contract and as a deterrent to others , but the Chief 
Just ice had found partly against the company . The ma tter 
was so important that CSR had considered an app eal to the 
Pr ivy Counc il , but had been spared this by the int ervent ion 
of a shareholder in the Rewa Sugar Co . ,  which had conse­
quently agreed to do nothing that  might damage the interests 
of C SR . 4 7  The c ompany ' s  pos it ion was not fully secured , 
however ,  t ill 1894 -when the Rewa Sugar Co . closed , leaving 
Nausori with a monopoly of milling on the Rewa - a po si tion 
s imilar to  C SR ' s  other mills in Fij i .  The r esul t was that 
the company had sub stant ial control over the price of cane 
and could use this to regulat e  the co s t  of out side supplies . 
But price was a relat ive ly blunt ins trument for this 
purpose . I t  c ould not be  used to discriminat e between 
planters  on unusually fertile land and those  who were not . 
Different prices for dif f erent plant ers would have caused 
unrest , while a uniform pr ice had to be f ixed at a l evel that 
would enable the average farmer to cover his cos t s . Thus 
when CSR leased p lantat ions af t er 1908 , i t  was unable to 
reduce the pr ic� of cane grown on what used to be it s mos t  
profitable estat es . Yet , as Farquhar had stressed , i f  CSR 
bought cane from these excep t ional plantat ions at the pre­
vailing pr ice , it would be paying t�v re than it  would have 
cost the company t o  grow the crop it self , and the total cost 
of  cane would rise . The answer was for CSR t o  regulat e  
the incomes of  i ts t enant s in line with the profitability 
of each estate by varying t he rents that were charged . 
Aft er deduct ing its  own outgo ings for land held on lease , 
the company could set the balance the proceeds from rent 
against the price of cane and so reduce the overall cost 
of supplies . This had b een company pract ice for a number 
of years , making it natural in 1908 for Farquhar to suggest 
that if estates were leased , rents  should be f ixed ' suffi­
cient ly high to  safeguard our int erest s ,  for we can - as 
has of ten been done - always lower a rental if it proved 
too high , but we can never raise i t ' . 4 ti  His advice was 
taken : high rent s were charged , and in addit ion high valua­
t ions were put on improvement s  taken over by incoming tenant s .  
S ince mos t  overs eers had little capital , these valuat ions 
were treated as an advance ,  t enants being exp ected to reduce 
their indebtednes s  to CSR at the rat e of £500 a year , but it 
soon became clear that rents were too high t o  enable them 
to do this . At the end of 1912 CSR wro te off arrears , amount­
ing to £35 , 000 at Labasa , and allowed tho se who had become 
t enant s s ince 1 908 to start afresh with lower initial valua­
t ions and much r educed rent s . 4 9 In effect , CSR had dec ided 
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to accep t  an overall increase in the cost of cane , but it  
had limit ed the rise by no t having to  pay more for cane from 
contractors or t enant s who had leased c ompany land before 
1908 . Beside having more sat isf ied t enant s ,  in the short 
term the company could expec t compensat ion for the higher 
cost of cane from the enhanced ab ility of t enants to repay 
at least part of what had been spent on improving the land : 
in the long run , as t enant s  bettered the ir position , C SR 
could hop e  to reduce the scale of its  advances and employ 
more pro fitably the funds thereby released . It  was in the 
company ' s  interest that t enant s  should do well - but no t 
too well . Variat ions in rent were the means to achieve 
this . 
The amount of rent CSR could charge , or the extent 
to which it could reduce the price of cane , largely depended 
on the company ' s  ab il ity to contro l  methods of cul t ivat ion 
by tenant s and contractors . The lower the co s t  of growing 
cane , the lower the price that need be paid for it . But 
gaining control over growers '  cul t ivat ion pract ices had 
been very diff icul t in the 1880s and 1890s , when p lanters 
had t ried to increase the quant ity of  cane regardless of 
its quality . CSR , on the o ther hand , with a miller ' s  
inter est in sugar content , had wanted t o  control the cul t iva­
t ion methods of plant ers to ensure not only maximum yield s  
per acre , but opt imum sweetness i n  cane . Among other point s , 
in the cont racts it f irst  made with planters CSR st ipulat ed 
that it should have control over harvest ing t o  ensure that 
cane was cut when mos t  ripe , and control over varieties 
for ' without it any plant er could cultivate a gro ss  and 
watery cane , which would give him a good return , and our­
selves nothing ' . 5 0 Yet even though contract s  and t enancy 
agreements were designed to be l egally enforceable , the 
company had great diff iculty controlling the quality of 
cane delivered on the Rewa . In the mid-1890s Knox frequently 
complained about the low quality of cane being s old to CSR . 5 1  
In an at t emp t to raise quality and produc e  an identity of 
interest between planter and c ompany , in 1898 CSR adop ted 
a new sys t em of payment for cane . Rates were based on a 
sliding scale according to quality (Table 3 . 4 ) . Despite 
opposit ion from growers , CSR was able to impose the new 
scale by exploiting differenc es among them . I t  first  
reached agreement with its  t enants , and then used this to 
get the acquiescence of contractors . 5 2  The r esult  was that 
planter s came to share CSR ' s  int er est  in rais ing the quality 
of  cane , thus making it easier for the company to supervise 
their methods of cult ivat ion . 
55 
Table 3 . 4 
CSR sliding scales for payment of cane by quality 
(maximum price) 
P.o. c.s. 
% 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
Source : 
Note : 
Nausori Other Fij i Mill s 
1898 1902 1898 19 02 
s d s d s d s d 
7 6 5 0 4 2 1 8 
9 2 6 8 5 10 3 4 
10  10  8 4 7 6 5 0 
1 2  6 10  0 9 2 6 8 
1 3  9 11 3 10 10 8 4 
15 0 12 6 12  6 10 0 
16  3 13 9 1 3  9 11 3 
1 7  6 1 5  0 15 0 12 6 
18 9 1 6  3 16  3 13 9 
H . O .  to Nausor i , 5 Nov . 189 8 ,  Nausori Out , 7 ( 18 9 7-
99 ) , 4 38 ; Knox to May , 1912 , Nausori to H . O .  Privat e 
letters May to Dec . 1912 . 
It  was very unusual for the quality o f  cane at 
Nausori to exceed 13 p er cent P . O . C . S . , or for that 
at the o ther mills  to fall much below 10 per cent . 
The ins trument of supervis ion was the credit extended 
to planters by CSR. The poverty of the early sett lers had 
forced the company to make advances to cover their cultiva­
t ion and living expenses , and this pract ice was cont inued 
when CSR leased its plantations . Advances were made on 
security of the land or the crop , and interest of 6 per cent 
a year was charged . s 3  The supply of credit gave the company 
great inf luence over planter s , for it kep t a close watch on 
the way its money was spent . It  could refuse fur ther 
advances unless spec ific cul t ivat ion t echniques were adop ted , 
it could threat en t o  cut o f f  credit if the planter was no t 
more diligent in his work , and it could use company loans 
to ensure that land capab le of suppor ting cane was no t used 
for o ther purposes . s4 The hous ehold expend itur e  of  plant ers 
could al so be  contro lled . With characteris t ic at t ention to 
detail , in 1915 head office complained of  the ' extravagance ' 
of C . W .  Southey in buying a motor car . The offending tenant 
was t old that CSR would no t cont inue to f inance him if he 
kep t the car . S S  The issue of new leases on easier terms in 
191 3  was accompanied by instruct ions from Knox that f uture 
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advances t o  tenant s were to be made in a mor e  discr iminating 
way . Greater attention should be paid to the qual ity of  
work . 
The Board thinks that the - system of  guaranteeing to 
the tenant s a comfor table l if e , what ever the r es ults  
of  their work , has been an  important factor in  bringing 
about the failure o f  so large a proportion o f  the 
occupants of the plantat ions to make them pay , for it  
is evident that once a man begins to lose ground his 
easiest course is to let things go and live on his 
allowance . 5 6  
The pract ice o f  making separat e advances for living and 
cultivat ion exp enses was s topped . A s ingle advance was made 
in the hope that if t enants fa iled to work their land ef f i­
ciently , the reduct ion in the balance left for living ex­
penses would encourage improvement s to be  made . Credit was 
seen as a lever with which to lower the co s t  of c ul t ivat ion 
by increas ing ef f iciency on plantat ions . At the back of 
Knox ' s  mind was the hope that the company would eventually 
be able to reduce the price of cane . 57  
CSR ' s  control over planters was cons id erable but  no t 
ab solute ,  and was greater over tenants whose  land i t  could 
resume than over contractors who could sell their property , 
or perhaps switch to ano ther crop . Around 1912 there were 
examples of planters us ing C SR advances for purposes o ther 
than they were int ended , such as the development of profit­
able side-lines in dairying or growing r ice . There were 
instances , too , o f  CSR failing to prevent planters accumulat­
ing debts  of a size they could never repay . By 1911 the 
company had had to write off  £2 , 00 0  to £3 , 000 advanced to 
Waring , a planter on the Rewa , and there were fears that 
the amount los t  could rise to twice that . 5 8  Yet these were 
the except ions , and when mat ters did get out of hand the 
company could always resume land or take over the crop 
agains t which a loan had been made . However , CSR had less 
control over the political act ivit ies of  planters . Though 
it threat ened to withhold advances if they publicly crit­
icized the company , 5 9  it could no t prevent them vo t ing f o r  
J . B .  Turner , a long-s tanding critic of CSR , in elec t ions 
for the Legislat ive Council aft er 1908 . Sir Everard im 
Thurn ( governor , 19 04-10)  believed that the company had 
great diff iculty controlling the views of i ts t enants ' in 
any matter outside sugar growing ' • 6 0 Nevertheless , taken 
over all , CSR ' s  control of plant ers was so great that Turner , 
representing the Rewa , had goo d cause to complain in 1 911 
that tenants were lit tle better than employees of the com­
pany . 6 1  
5 7  
The result o f  this t ight cont rol was that CSR realized 
its aim of get t ing cheaper supplies than if it had grown the 
cane it self . Tho ugh it is impo ssible to quantify this because 
the necessary figures are no t extant , it is clear from CSR 
correspondence that the co st  of company grown cane at Nausori 
in the 1880s and 1890s was sub s tantially higher than pur­
chased supplies . In 1895 Farquhar t old Knox that he thought 
CSR could eventually grow cane on the Rewa for 12s 6d a t on ,  
the price paid t o  planters , but that i t  was impossible t o  
do this a t  present . 6 2  And , o f  course ,  the only plantat ions 
to be leased elsewhere at first  were tho se that were un­
economic for CSR to farm . I t  seems , too , that labourers 
were better treat ed af ter 1908 when the rap id leas ing of 
plantat ions began . 6 3  Thi s averted the rise in labour co sts  
which could have been expected following unrest among immi­
grants on C SR es tates . Table 3 . 5  shows that there was no 
s ignif icant increase in the cos t  of cane to the company af ter 
1908 . At Labasa costs seem to have been actually reduced . 6 4  
S o  i t  seems that one of  the company ' s  obj ectives in leas ing 
estates had been achieved . 
Cos t  of 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1 909 
Source : 
Note : 
Table 3 . 5 
cane (Eer ton) to  CSR at the mill : 
(average for all Fij i ) 
£ s d £ s d 
4 16 9 1910 4 7 2 
5 5 3 1911 4 10 6 
4 2 9 1912  4 15 4 
4 9 0 1913 4 10 7 
4 9 7 1914 4 4 11 
CSR S . 2 . 0 / 2 / - . 
Includes the co s t  of  purchased supplies 
as well as the co s t  of cane grown by 
CSR . 
C SR ' s political influence 
CSR also realized the hop e  that planters could be  
used to increase its  influence with government . I t  believed 
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that the economic viab il ity of theindustry largely hinged on 
government adopt ing favourable pol ic ies on taxat ion , lab our , 
land and so on . The company t ri ed to ensure this - but not 
mainly by working through the Leg islat ive Council , though in 
1884 when members were al l appo inted by the governor it d id 
welcome the nominat ion of its  Nausori manager , Mr R .  Robert­
son , on the grounds that he would be  able t o  prot est  against 
act s of inj ustice and obtain ear lier and mo re rel iable 
informat ion about innnigrat ion and the like . 6 5  However , 
when elected European representation intro duced in 1903 and 
Sir Henry Jackson suggested tha t  one member o f  the Council 
might be elected by the sugar companies , the opposit ion from 
C SR was so great that the id ea of separate representation 
for the indus try was dropped . Knox feared that the member 
might be  regarded as a delegate rather than a representa t ive , 
while ' the separat ion o f  the par t icular indus try in the way 
propo sed would be held to warrant the assump t ion that the 
wel fare of the Colony and of the two companies concerned was 
no t interdependent ' . 6 6  Thereaf ter , CSR ' s  int ervent ion in 
affairs of the legislature was so s ligh t  tha t  im Thurn co uld 
write in 1909 ' that the inf luence o f  the Company as a body 
in the Legislat ive Council is less than that of  many individ­
uals o ther than sugar producer s ' . 6 7  Ins tead , CSR preferred 
to exer t influence by dealing with off icials direct . Af t er 
all , it was they who made the f inal decisions . With i ts 
automatic maj ority in the Legis lative Counc il , government 
could enact any measures it had decided upon . To try to 
alter policies af ter they had been agreed and placed before 
the Council was much less effec t ive than lobbying quietly 
while they were still in pr eparation . And CSR could lobby 
with great ef fect . I t  could argue that help for the indust ry 
would no t merely benef it the sugar companies but would ass ist 
t-he numerous planters dep endent on cane for their l ivelihoods . 
One example o f  the polit ical advantage to CSR of  having 
o ther planters interested in sugar o ccurred in the 1880s 
and 1890s . Though cheap labour was always important , in 
years of  falling prices and high cul t ivat ion cos t s  the need 
to reduce labour expenses was part icular ly great . Planters ,  
as well as plantation managers under pressure from head 
office , wer e desperate to make economies , and f o und that 
they could do this mo st  easily by increas ing the work-load 
of their labour and minimiz ing expenditure on coolie l ines , 
medical facilities  for innnigrants , e tc . In the 1880s CSR 
repeatedly asked offic ials to assist  in this by amending 
legislat ion governing the conditions of indentured Indians , 
the company always put t ing its  case in terms of  the economic 
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disas ter that wo uld befall planters if labour cos ts were 
not reduced . 6 8  Though it is unclear how far government was 
influenced by the company ' s  appeals , there is no doubt tha t 
o fficials were very worried about the plight of the small 
planter . Their concern was increased by fears tha t CSR 
would obtain a monopoly of milling , which would enable it 
to dictate the t erms on which it  bought cane . 6 9  In 1885 
a scheme of  deferred payment s  for inunigrant labour was intro­
duced specif ically to help farmers wi th little capital , but 
they were unable to take advantage o f  it and only the large 
sugar companies b enefited . 7 °  Concess ions by government on 
labour quest ions would be made mor e  in the interes t of the 
small planter than of CSR . 
So it  was natural that a t  one s tage the Agent-General 
of Immigration , Henry Anson , should consider reducing the 
statutory minimum wage of indentured labour , set  at one 
shill ing a day , because he found that planters could hardly 
afford to pay more than about eight pence . 7 1  In the event , 
probably from fear that India would react by halting the 
labour supply , the minimlllll wage was no t lowered ; but at the 
same time - part ly because of a shortage of s taf f as well as 
the economic position of  p lanters - it was rarely enforced . 
Moreover , the tasks set for labo urers were permit ted to 
exceed the legal l imit of six hours ' s t eady work fo r an able­
bodied adult male ( three-quarters of this for a woman) . The 
tasks became so heavy that in 1886 a series of labour dis­
turbances broke out , caus ing government to pass legislat ion 
which curtailed the ab ility of immigrants to protest in 
support of grievances . The harsh treatment of Indians was 
reflected in high mortality rates , which in the mid-1890s 
produced fears that the supply of immigrants might be 
s topped . Having b een warned o f  this in 1896 by government , 
the sugar companies made improvements in the rat ion s cale , 
medical care and the like 7 though average wages remained below one shill ing a day . 2 S t ill , during the 1880s and 
1890s when it was very difficult to make pro f it s  from sugar , 
CSR had been able to rely on government not to check the 
illegal effor t s  of planters and its  overseer s to reduce the 
co s t s  of labour . At a mos t  critical time , the existence of  
many planters in the industry had brought a b ig polit ical 
advantage . 
Another important gain t o  CSR was over the quest ion of  
taxation . Government ' s  concern for  the  well-b eing of planters 
in the 1880s was reflected in it s t ax pol icy . I t  was normal 
for co lonial adminis trat ions to raise much of their revenue 
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through customs duties which , because the bulk of trade was 
conducted by Europ eans , fell heavies� upon them .  I n  1890 
Fij i ' s  revenue totalled £66 , 81 7 . Almos t  a third of  this 
came from Fij ian taxes , which reduced the amount that had 
to be found f rom other (mainly European) sources . Customs 
dut ies rai sed £26 , 15 9 , and though most  of  th is fel i on 
Europeans , government minimized its  impact by shi f t ing par t  
of the burden on t o  others . Thus breadstuffs  a t  £10 , 331 
in value and meat s at £ 9 , 17 0  were two of  the most important 
foodstuf f s  impor ted by the colony , but s ince they were con­
sumed by Europeans they were admi tted duty free . An equal ly 
valuable food item was rice , worth £10 , 1 93 , but as this was 
imported by Ind ians it was taxed at 2 0  per cent . 7 3  The 
advantage to CSR was that by keep ing down the cost of  certain 
key imports consumed by Europeans , government reduced - if 
only sl ight ly - the need to increase the price of  cane from 
planters and the salarie s of European staff . 74  Lat er , in 
1898 when the economic circumstances of plant ers were beg in­
ning to improve , dut ies on bread stuffs  and meat s were int ro­
duced , 75  and in 1901 the duty on rice was reduced . But by 
then the lat ter was to the advantage of CSR , since with the 
lower cost of import s Indian r ice growers would find it 
harder to compet e with over seas supplies , and might sell cane 
to the company instead . 7 6  
More sign if icant was the fact that the new cane con­
tract s issued by CSR in 1898 and 189 9  st ipulat ed that any 
fresh t axat ion imposed on the industry would have t o  be 
borne , at least in part , by suppl iers of  cane . 7 7  CSR 
used this to great ef fect in 1911 , when government was 
being pressed by non-o ff icial s in the Legislat ive Council to 
introduce an expor t tax on sugar . S ir Henry May (governor , 
1911-12 ) told the Colon ial O f f ice that though CSR made large 
profits and was lightly taxed , he was reluctant to impose 
export dut ies lest they be transferred from the company to 
those who grew cane . Never theles s , to raise the required 
revenue government quadrupled t he tar iff on sugar sacks and 
introduced a Bu ildings and Hut Tax . 7 8  CSR est imated that 
these measures comb ined represented a loss of one shilling 
in the pound on its net pro f it s .  I t  warned that though 
they would not be pas sed on to it s suppl ier s , in future any 
extra tax on the industry would . 7 9 In fact , the company 
had been rather fortunat e .  Instead of rai s ing add it ional 
revenue with a select ive tax increase on sugar companies , 
government had spread the burden mo re widely . General ad 
vaZorem dut ies were increased from 12� to 15 per cent , 
while under the Buildings and Hut Tax , Ind ian householders 
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had to �ay a dire ct  tax for the first time - ten shil l ings 
a year . D In effec t ,  CSR had been spare d the poli tical 
embarrassment of trans ferring part of an export tax o n  s ugar 
to cane growers . 
Af ter 1908 the company ' s  ab il ity to use planters to 
s trengthen its  pos i t ion with government b ecame increas ingly 
important . Of fic ials felt tha t CSR was ob s truc ting the 
development of the colony . For example , in 1912 CSR refused 
to make land available for a township between its Lautoka 
wharf and the mill . It would only provide land at Namoli 
which was fur ther away from the mill , and which the company 
pref erred becaus e a settlement there might 
la ter on clamour foF better shipping facilities than 
are available at our wharf ,  and a second wharf may 
then be provided ,  ridding us of our ob ligations to 
accommodate the public , which is the main obj ect  we 
desire . 8 1  
Despite opposition from government at  f irs t ,  CSR had its  
way . A township was s tar ted a t  Namoli , 8 2  now the centre o f  
Lautoka , and many years later a separate wharf was built  to 
handle non-CSR traf fic . The large bulk s ugar s tore to day 
s tands on the s i te which government had wanted fo r this town­
ship . At the same t ime the company was busy oppos ing govern­
ment plans , which never materialized , for a railway to be  
built from the upper Rewa to  S uva . Officials saw the rail as 
a means to develop new crops in the dis tr ic t  and bring 
additional trade to the port o f  Suva : CSR feared the scheme 
would be a f inancial disaster . The rail wo uld either have 
to b e  subs idized from public f unds which migh t mean higher 
taxes on producers ,  or e lse  to make it economically viable 
government migh t  have to f orce the company to us e i t ,  making 
redundant the latter ' s  inves tment in tramlines , punts and 
shipp ing facilities  a t  Laucala Bay . 8 3  
There were disagreements ,  too , ab out public r igh ts on 
CSR' s tramways . In 1 9 1 3  the company propos ed to s top carry­
ing seed cotton on it s t ramline from Nacob i to the Govern­
ment Experimental S tation at Lautoka . The lo cal mill 
manager explained that s ince the cane area had proved to b e  
smaller than expect ed , t h e  company d i d  no t want o ther 
crops grown on land which was available . 8 4  S inc e CSR ' s 
l ines were virtually the only means of  communicat ion in 
areas served by its mills ,  offic ials were angered by what 
they saw as an unreasonable ob struc t ion o f  efforts to  
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diversify agr iculture . This aggravated disputes about the 
company ' s  respons ibilit ies to t he public in the us e of its  
l ines - whe ther CSR or the pub lic should have prior right-of­
way on the narrow bridges which carried road alongs ide rail 
transpor t ;  and whether CSR could be  held responsible for 
the safe ty of  the passengers it had agreed to carry free of 
charge in return for a l ease of  nat ive land in 190 5 , the 
origin o f  the free pas senger s ervice which s till operates 
today . After b it ter discuss ions , during which the company 
feared that government had taken the f ir s t  s t ep toward 
s ecuring control of its  lines , compromise  was reached whereby 
CSR promi sed to pro tect the public ' s  safety and government 
agreed to limit its interference in the operat ion of the 
company ' s  trains . a s 
The result o f  these disagreement s  was a trial o f  
s trength between o fficials and the company over the terms 
on which native leases for tramlines sho uld b e  issued and 
existing ones renewed . The dispute revealed t he extent of  
CSR ' s  inf luence on government • .  Ins tances such as the 
company ' s  refusal to carry cotton on i ts l ines , its  opposi­
t ion to the proposed Rewa railway and i ts res is tance to 
government intervention on grounds of  public safe ty in the 
r unning of its  trains alerted government to problems that 
could arise from the s it ua t ion in which CSR (and the other 
two sugar companie s )  controlled the only rail lines in the 
colony . It was pos s ible in future tha t  CSR ' s  t ramlines 
would interfere with railway development planned by the 
government , or that officials might want to negot iate with 
the company cer tain right s for the public on its lines . To 
s trengthen its hand should the need arise , the Fij i govern­
ment proposed in 1912 that new tramline leases and the renewal 
o f  old ones should be for fif ty-year terms , with government 
having the option to b uy the line at  a valuat ion af ter the 
twenty-fi f th year . In 1 9 1 3  the Colonial Of fice went fur ther 
and propo sed that , if agreement could be reached wi th CSR , 
in all new leases or renewals there s hould b e  a c lause giving 
government the opt ion to acquire the whole o f  the company ' s  
tramway sys tem af ter twenty-f ive years . If  CSR s trongly 
oppo sed this , the power to purchase should be applied only 
to rails in the d i s t r ic t  where the par t i c ular leas e was 
located . CSR was horrif ied by the po ssibility o f  government 
taking over its  lines , for by owning the means of communica­
t ion between cane grower and miller government would have 
been abl e  to exercise sub s tant ial control over the two 
par ties . Even if government never actually acquired the 
lines , the threat to  do so would have greatly s trengthened 
its po sit ion in future relat ions wi th CSR . At s take was 
the extent to which the company ' s  inf luence in Fij i was to 
be limit ed by government , or by o ther interes t s  in the 
colony working through government . 8 6  
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CSR ' s  nego tiating position i n  the ma t ter was grea tly 
s trengthened by f ears in the Colonial Of fice about the ' out­
cry from the growers affected ' that would follow a refusal 
by the company to renew , on the t erms propos ed by government , 
tramway leases that were due to  expire . 8 7  Consequently , 
when Knox vis ited the Colonial Off ice in 19 14 , he was able 
to persuade o fficials to drop the requirement that renewals 
and new leases should contain an opt ion for government to 
purchase company l ine s af ter twenty-five years . This was 
important for CSR since it  meant that no principle had been 
sacrif iced . In any future dis cus s ions on government control 
over tramlines , t he company ' s  po sition would no t be  weakened 
by having conceded the princip le some years b efore . But Knox 
had won no more than a tac tical victory . Exis t ing leases 
which expired before 1920 wer e  to be  renewed for only twenty­
one years , and government was to deal wi th new leases on 
their merit . 8 8  CSR had no t ob tained the fifty years ' security 
i t  sough t , and o f f ic ial policy on the renewal of  leases af ter 
1920 remained open . Tho ugh CSR was no t told of the fact , the 
Colonial Office p lanned to review the whole q ue s t ion in 19 20 . 
Yet the review never o ccurred , or if it  did no deci s ion was 
taken that would hurt the company , for by then the sugar 
indus try was facing its  mos t  s erious cris is s ince the 1880s . 
In 1916 India had halted the supply o f  indentured 
labour , put ting at  risk the whole future of the sugar indus try 
which had traditionally relied on cheap labo ur . Government 
and CSR reac ted by co-operating in the sett lement o f  Indians 
on the land , no t only so that they would grow a much larger 
quant ity of cane than they had hitherto , but also to make 
conditions in Fij i s ufficiently at trac t ive to persuade India 
to permit emigrat ion , in some form ,  to be restnned af ter the 
war . This was seen as es sential to prevent the indus try 
go ing into decline and with it the level of economic act ivity 
and the size of government revenue . 8 9 So o f f icials were 
unwilling to take ac tion on tramway leases which might cause 
CSR not to renew , and thereby hinder the settlement of  
Indians . I t  would be  interes t ing to know what would have 
happened if the planned review o f  leases had occurred in 
less crit ical circtnns tances . Would the Colonial Of fice 
again have been influenced by a desire to avo id an outcry 
from the plant ers , and would CSR once more have benefited 
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from having planters invo lved in the indus try? 
The tramline ques tion illus trated very well the 
ab ility of  CSR to increase its po lit ical leverage by ident­
ifying its interes ts with those  of  the p lanters . The 
company could then use this inf luence to ob tain through 
government subsidies from o ther groups in the colony - from 
labourers who had to work longer hours and at lower wages 
than the law s t ipulated ; from the community a t  large which 
had to pay higher taxes than might otherwise  have been the 
case . By 1914 dependence on o thers for cane had yielded the 
company a handsome polit ical re turn . 
The fruits of  CSR ' s  inves tmen ts 
Dur ing the 1880s Dr T . P . Lucas claimed that sugar 
companies in Fij i were ' cont inually harves t ing money and 
sending it a.broad , draining the country ' . 9 O Want ing a 
larger s hare of  the benefits f rom sugar , many Europeans 
might have agreed . Yet in fact European interes ts had done 
well from sugar . Though many o f  the early p lanter s had 
lef t the colony , new settlers had arr ived and had generally 
prospered . Plantation over seers had b e ttered their pos i t ion 
by becoming tenant s of CSR . The example of Waring , quo ted 
by Turner in 1911 to demons trate the plight of these  tenants ,  
was excep tional . He had l eased C SR ' s  Vuci Maca e s tate in 
1904 . S ince then he had broken his agreement wi th the 
company by keep ing part of the land suitable for cane under 
gras s so as to augment his income from dairying . He had 
inves ted very lit tle in the venture , so that what he had 
los t had been mainly advances from CSR . 9 1  The company 
admitted that its  Labasa tenant s had made ' an unfortunate 
s tar t ' ,  b ut argued that under l eases to be issued in 191 3 
they should b e  able to do reasonably well . 9 2  In 1914 head 
off ice commented on ' the general improvement ' in the finances 
of plant ers on the Rewa , and no ted tha t  of eighteen con­
tractors and tenants around Rarawai eleven had been able 
to reduce their CSR deb ts in 1913  to some extent . One of 
them ,  H . G .  Carr , had made a profit  of over £4 , 000 from his 
Mataniqara e s t a t e , a r e s ul t  con s i dered ' phenomenal ' by 
CSR . 9 3 
The growing prosperity o f  p lanters provided merchants 
with an expanding marke t . In 1911  perhap s  over 10  p er cent 
of Europ eans in the colony wer e  direct ly engaged in the 
cultiva tion and processing of cane , 9 4  while o th ers  were 
65 
indirec tly dependent on s ugar . Naturally , merchant s want ed 
to increase the size of the ir market . Some were dissatis­
fied because CSR i tself import ed s upplies ,  which were of ten 
cheaper than what local merchant s could o f fer s ince the 
company ordered in bulk for i t s  Fij i and Aus tralian opera­
tions toge ther . By 1912  Henry Marks and Maynard Heds trom , 
b o th members o f  the Legislative Council , had b een annoyed 
by the company ' s  refusal to buy cer tain goods from them . 
Lautoka s torekeepers , represented in the Counc il by Charles 
Thomas , had los t  part of  their trade when CSR set up its 
own butcheries in wes tern Viti Levu . Merchant interes ts 
comb ined to seek , wi thout much success , a redis tribut ion of  
taxation away from the general public , who wo uld then have 
had more to spend locally , toward the company who se custom 
was to spend abroad . 9 5 Yet wha tever their differences with 
CSR , no one could deny that merchants had greatly benefited 
from the economic s timulus provided by its operat ions . 
C SR had also gained - but in terms of  profi ts from 
milling not by a very large amount . Table 3 . 6  summarizes 
information available on the company ' s  profits from 1 88 7  
t o  1911 . The circums tances in which , and f o r  whom , these 
figures were compil ed are not clear . They may have been 
des igned to convince officials that CSR ' s  pro fi t s  in Fij i 
were not excessive (Knox certainly quo ted them for this 
purpose) , in which case  they may unders tate the true po sition . 
Nevertheles s , taking the f igures at their face value , CSR ' s  
annual average return on capital was 3 . 38 per cent from 1887 
to 189 1 , 6 . 88 per cent from 1892 to 1901 and at leas t 8 . 4  
per cent from 1902  to 1911 ; the las t  f igure was slightly 
higher in fact , becaus e CSR ' so ld ' sugar to its  Aus tral ian 
and New Zealand ref ineries at l ess than the open market 
value - a pract ice known as t rans fer pricing . Overal l , from 
188 7  to 1910 returns averaged 7 . 65 per cent , which was below 
the average for all CSR ' s sugar milling activit ies in Aus t­
ralia and Fij i ( 10 . 45 per cent ) . Actually , re turns were 
lower s t il l  s ince the 7 . 6 5 per cent makes no allowance for 
deprecia t ion . Taking this into account , returns were around 
6 per cent . Profits sub sequently increased , however .  For 
the six months ended 30 September 1910 , the f irs t time 
comparative figures are available , CSR ' s Aus t ralian b us ines s  
(refiner ies and mills )  yielded a net profit o f  £126 , 714 : the 
profit  from its New Zealand and Fij i b us iness was £ 7 0 , 000 . 
For the six months to 30 Sep tember 1914 the respective 
profits  wer e  £121 , 360  and £135 , 000 . 9 6  Since the improvement 
in the New Zealand and Fij i bus ines s had no t been accompanied 
by extensive capital investment , percentage returns on 
Table 3 . 6  
Pro f i ts from CSR ' s Fij i nlills 1 1887-1911 
Actual prof its Pro f i t  if sugar sold on open marketa 
Year Capital Total pro f i t s
b Pro f i t s  as % Total profitsb Pro f i t s  as % Prof i t s  from 
on capital c on capital CSR '  s milling 
activities as 
a whole 
1887 6 6 7  ,OOO 2 1 ,  132 3 . 1 7  6 . 45 
1888 6 71 , 9 57 19 , 628 2 . 9 2  2 .  7 2  
1889 694 . 786 9 , 9 9 3  1 . 44 5 . 8 3  
1 890 708 , 545 30 , 194 4 . 26 11 . 99 
1891 729 , 106 36 . 226 4 .  97 7 . 84 
Annual average d 
1887-91 694 , 2 79 2 3 , 4 35 3. 38 7 . 04 
189 2 740 , 302 24 , 5 34 3. 31 11 . 4 7  
1893 75 3 , 190 20 , 119 2 . 6 7 11 . 02 
1894 9 2 3 .  30 7 9 2 .  717 10 . 04 1 5 . 01 
1895 930 , 764 35 , 708 3 . 84 6 .  28 
1 896 906 , 396 6 2 , 266 6 . 8 7 11 . 66 
189 7 911 , 32 3  59 . 949 6 . 58 10 . 9 5  
1 898 914 . 350 7 3 , 090 7 . 99 10 . 65 
1899 9 5 3 , 6 2 3  8 3 ,  221 8. 73 8 . 00 
1900 9 78 , 01 7  9 2  , 52 5  9 . 46 10 . 26 
1901 1 , 006 , 380 76 , 118 7 . 56 1 1 .  32 
Annual average d 
1892- 1901 901 , 765 6 2 , 025 6 . 88 10. 6 3  
1902 1 ,  0 7 3 , 1 2 5  4 3 , 024 4 . 01 42 , 48 3  3 . 9 6  6 .  39 
1903 1 , 5 5 9 , 5 2 3  126 . 396 8 . 10 1 2 8 , 0 7 3  8 . 21 8 . 38 
1904 1 , 614 , 129 2 4 3 , 590 1 5  .09 249 , 596 15 .46 18 .02 
1905 1 , 6 90 , 859 107 , 6 83 6. 37 112 , 04 5  6 . 6 3  1 2 .  7 7  
1906 1 , 8 30 , 546 36 , 1 71 1 . 98 4 3 , 989 2 . 4 0  5 . 85 
1907 1 , 959 , 4 19 144 . 209 7 . 36 1 9 2 , 2 2 7  9 . 81 11 . 9 3  
1908 2 , 053, 460 140, 806 6 . 86 1 7 8 , 546 8 . 69 9. 76 
1909 2 , 050 , 805 2 2 3 , 5 8 7  10 . 90 264 , 18 7  1 2 . 88 1 3 . 85 
1 9 10 2 , 0 5 2 , 953 193, 307 9 . 42 2 2 2 , 905 10 . 86 1 3 .  3oe 
1911 2. 295 , 166 245 . 708 10 . 71 N/A N/A N/A 
Annual average d Annual average 1902-10 
1902- 1 1  1 , 8 7 3 , 4 7 8  1 5 7 , 39 7  8 . 40 1 6 7 , 02 1  
A.·mual average d 
1887-1910 1 , 182 ' 244 90 , 4 7 8  
Source: C S R  A 3 . 0/ 2 / 1 9 ;  C S R  F 1 . 0/2/4 . 
Notes : aOpen market price based on price CSR paid for sugar from Penang mill . 
8 . 9 2  1 1 . 2 7  
7 . 6 5  10 . 4 5  
b lncludes pro f i t s  from plantations , and a f ter 1 9 0 1  rents received from leasing estate s :  but excludes depreciation. 
cExcludes working capital and stocks . 
dNo allowance made for changes in general price level . 
eApproximate only. 
"' "' 
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cap ital mus t have risen ( though i t  i s  impo ssible t o  say 
what the returns were because exact figures for the value 
of the New Zealand and Fij i assets are no t available) . As 
mo s t  of the capital employed was in the Fij i mills , it is 
l ikely that much of the improvement was due to be tter results 
from Fij i .  
S till , taking the f igures overall , i t  seems that CSR ' s 
profits in the colony were very mode s t . The average return 
af ter depreciat ion of around 6 per cent compared unfavourably 
with the 6-9 per cent charged on overdraf ts between 1887  and 
1910 by Aus tralian t rading banks . 9 7 Yet the risks invo lved 
in sugar produc t ion were much higher . As Knox sai d ,  6 per 
cent was well below what could have been considered a 
reasonable return . 9 8  Desp ite th i s , the company steadily 
increased its cap ital outlay in Fij i .  By 1905 it  had sunk 
more into the manufac ture of raw sugar there than it  had in 
Aus tralia . 9 9  Why was this ? The reason app ears to have been 
that the small returns from milling , caused by the low wor ld 
price o f  raw s ugar , were offset  by high returns from refining , 
due to the low cos t  of  sugar inputs . Thus overall CSR ' s 
profits  were satisfactory . The company paid a dividend o f  
7 per cent in 1888 . B y  1891 this had risen t o  1 0  per cent , 
at  which level it s tayed till after 1 914 . In addi tion , from 
1910 to 1914 a bonus was paid , the size varying . Yet with 
the price of  raw sugar so low , C SR ' s to tal prof its would 
have been higher st ill if it  had no t owned the mills . Why , 
then , did it  increase its milling capacity?  The answer 
probably l ie s  in the company ' s  desire to reduce r isks . There 
was no guarantee tha t raw sugar prices would remain depr es sed . 
If they increased (as they did during World War I) , refining 
margins wo uld b e  reduced ; by producing raw sugar , CSR could 
set against this the larger pro f i t s  from milling . So  although 
by 1914 in t erms of  the return on capital gains to CSR from 
Fij i had been quite small , the company f el t  this was out­
weighed by the advantaye of evening out profit  fluc tuations 
so as to les sen risks . 
Desp ite the gains to European interes ts , the indus try ' s  
spread effects on the Fij i economy was limited by the leakage 
abroad of much of the income created by s ugar . From 1887 
to 1910 CSR ' s  pro fi t s  ( excluding depreciat ion) totalled 
£2 , 1 71 , 4 71 , j us t  over the £2 , 05 2 , 95 3  it had inves ted in the 
colony by the end of that per io d . Mos t  of this was remit ted 
overseas . To this , of  course , mus t be added European earn­
ings which were repatriated ei ther as savings or through the 
purchase o f  import s ; for European consump tion cons is ted 
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mainly of impor ts - proce ssed food , alcohol , cer tain 
luxuries , etc . 2 Furthermore , much of th e value in the final 
pro ducts  from sugar was added o uts ide Fij i - thro ugh the 
costs  of shipping , ref ining and so on . True , a dist illery 
to pro ces s  molas ses , a by-produc t o f  raw sugar , had been 
establ ished at Nausori in 1893  but , following Aus tralian 
federation and the introduc t ion of protec t ionist  trade 
policies , it was closed in 1903  so that a much larger one 
could - be built  at Pyrmont ,  Sydney . 3 Apar t f rom ens uring 
a market for Fij i molasses , the lat ter enj oyed the economies 
of s cale afforded by proces s ing mo lasses from Queensland , 
New So uth Wales and Fij i all in the one plant , and was closer 
to the market which reduced transpor t cos t s . Proposals 
af ter World War I that  a dis tillery should again be es tab ­
lished i n  Fij i - no t necessar ily by C S R  b u t  by o ther European 
intere s t s  - were to meet with successful oppo s i ton from the 
company . It  contro lled the supply of molas ses and refused 
to wr ite off what i t  had inves ted to pro ces s  Fij i ' s  mo las ses 
in Aus tralia4 - an excellent example o f  the disadvantage of  
capital specific i ty s tressed by George Beckford and o thers . 5 
So the economy did no t gain - through the creat ion 
of j ob s  and additional government revenue , for example -
from much of  the income generated from the pro cess ing o f  
sugar . Nor were the gains a s  large a s  might have been 
expected from the infras tructure construc ted by C SR . The 
tramway sys t em was very extens ive , yet the company refus ed 
to allow its use for the promo t ion o f  divers if ied  agriculture 
in cane d is tric t s . This reduced the opportunity for Indian 
sett lers in par ticular to increase their incomes by growing 
crops whose returns were higher than cane , or who se  inputs 
were complementary to cane so that they could be  produced 
in a system o f  mixed farming . Final ly , as no ted in Chap ter 2 ,  
the indus try ' s  dependence on cheap labour meant that  rewards 
were too small to at trac t many Fij ians into sugar pro duct ion , 
while Indians suf fered from the contro l over labour co s t s  
which created condit ions that even contemporaries reali zed 
were appall ing . 6 Whatever the advantages of  CSR ' s  inves t­
ment s ,  then , it was no t surpris ing tha t  on the eve of World 
War I many fel t that Fij i was get t ing from raw sugar a raw 
deal . 
Chap t er 4 
Indian settlement , 1884-19 1 2  
A remarkable development in the Fij i sugar indus try 
was the transfer of  plantations from the hands o f  Europeans 
to those of Indian smallfarmers .  The process  occurred in 
three stages . Dur ing t he fir st , up to 1912 , Indian sett le­
ment was seen as a way to augment the supply o f  labour on 
plantat ions . Dur ing the second , from 1912 to  1923 , set t le­
ment came to be seen as a subst itu te for p lantation labour 
while in the third , from 1923  to 1939 , there were efforts 
to ensure that this subst itute was effec t ive . The impor tant 
point was that settlement was promot ed in ways that would 
benef it plantat ion ent erprise , par ticularly CSR.  The result 
was that though Indians were better off as grower s t han they 
had been as plantation lab ourers , the advantage of  settlement 
to them and to the rest of the colony was l imit ed by the 
subordinat ion of their interest s  to the needs of plantation 
enterprise . 
The first  phase began in 1884 when the original 
shipload of Indians to Fij i compl eted the ir t erms of inden­
ture , which were set at five years plus any ext ensions im­
po sed as  punishment by a court . Once their indentures had 
exp ired immigrant s were free t o  leave the plantat ions where 
they had worked and seek al t ernative employment . They could 
become free labourer s ,  trader s or farmers in their own right . 
They could re-indenture if they wished (but not af ter 1912) , 
or else they could return home at their own expense . But 
if they stayed in the colony for another f ive years , making 
t en in all , their return passages to India would be paid 
for by government . In the event , about 60 p er c ent of  
migrant s cho se to remain permanently in Fij i , and by 1911  
three-quart er s  of these were l iving on the  land a s  owners 
or t enant s ,  nearly always in d istric t s  where sugar was grown . 1 
A s imilar process of Indian settlement occurred in British 
Guiana , but there sett ler s wer e  seen as a thr eat to  planta­
t ion int erests  because they competed for scarce resources of 
land and labour . 2 In Fij i ,  on the o ther hand , though Indian 
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acquisition of land led t o  a rise  in values wh ich o f  t en 
infuriated planters who were trying t o  extend their holdings , 3 
sett lement was encouraged largely in the hope that it would 
contribut e to the development of plantat ion agricul ture . 
Indians on government settlements  
Government saw Indians mainly as a sou rce of labour 
for plantat ions . Thurston exp ected that they would cont inue 
to work for plant er s f or at least f iv e  years af ter their 
indentures exp ired . CSR had s imilar hopes , believing that 
the re-indenture of t ime-exp ired immigrant s would help over­
come the acute shortage of  lab our in the mid-1880s . 4 But 
the company was soon to be disappo inted . The Indian Immigra­
tion Report for 1886 comment ed on the reluctance of Ind ians 
to ent er in to further contrac t s  of service onc e  their inden­
tures were over . In 1892 o f  t he 2 , 400 male t ime-exp ired 
Indians in Fij i , only 2 5 0  had been re-indentur ed . This was 
s ignif icant ly fewer than in 1890  and 1 891 . 5 The r eason was 
simple . Though C SR wanted Indians to re-ind enture ,  it was 
no t willing to pay wages high enough to persuade them t o  do 
so . Indeed , it was det ermined to limit the upward pressure 
on free Ind ian wages caused by the shortage of  labour . In 
March 1887 Knox asked the Nausori manager to arrange with 
plant ers  on the Rewa for wages of free labour not to exceed 
a shilling a day , s ince ' it would never do to let the 
coolies get the id ea into their heads that they wer e  to be 
sought af ter by the masters ' .  Wit hin thr ee months such an 
agreement had apparently been reached , caus ing one or two 
plant er s to reduce wages by six pence . 6 The r esul t was that 
Ind ians began to drif t away from plantat ions as their 
indentures  exp ired . 
At f irst  they migrat ed t oward the t owns , especially 
Suva , wher e they hoped to f ind j obs . To counter f ears of 
vagrancy and of a fall in property values should Indians 
set tle near Europeans , government established in 1887 an 
Indian settlement at Vatuwaqa out side Suva , to be followed 
soon af ter by a second one at Samabula . The obj ect , Thurston 
recalled , was that Indians ' should be able to l ive near Suva 
and so form as they wished to form a not d is tant working 
community ' . 7 They wer e  to provide labour for urban , but no t 
plant at ion interest s . Yet since there were no t enough j obs  
for  everyone , as more immigrant s completed their t erms o f  
indenture a greater number began to settle o n  land around 
plantat ions . The advantage of this to plant ers was that 
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with their livel ihoods based on land , settlers might be more 
prepared to accept off-farm employment than to re-indenture 
on a full-t ime basis . The number of indentured labo urers on 
an estate could then be reduced , saving planters the cost 
of  import ing Indians and the expens e of  maintaining a large 
labour force at a time when ther e was lit tle work for it . 
They could turn to free Ind ians when they needed addit ional 
labour for the harvest ing and milling of cane . Perhaps to 
attract this labour , planters c ould even afford to pay on 
a daily bas is more than for re-indentur ed immigrants ,  s ince 
they would not have to meet labour cos t s  in the slack season 
when their men were underemployed . As the Nausori manager , 
R .  Gemmell Smith , told the Colonial Secretary in 189 3 : ' To 
work a sugar plantat ion with indentured labour solely will 
in my opinion never pay any planter , and I do not think it 
i s  done in any other country but in F ij i . ' But t he extent 
to which Ind ians would seek work l argely depended on the s ize 
of their farms , as well as on the seasonal work r equirement s 
of  their crop s . If holdings were big , farmers would no t only 
have little t ime to become wage-earners themselves :  they 
might even become employers of Indians , thereby compet ing 
with planters for labour . Already in 1893  there were 
inst ances of this . Gemmel l  Smith complained that the wages 
of free immigrants were being pushed up by Ind ian employers . 8 
Ten acres  were regarded as the absolute maximum that an 
Indian could be expected to work wi th family labour . If  the 
s ize of farms could be kept below this it was l ikely that 
set t lers would form a pool of l abour r eady to work on planta­
t ions or in the mills .  
The potential advantage o f  having Ind ians settled 
clo se to plantat ions helped overcome o f f icial reservat ions 
about government assistance for immigrant s who wanted to 
ob tain land . Anson had f eared that the immediat e  result of 
grant ing land to Indians would be ' to draw a certain propor­
tion of  Free Coolies from the Plantat ion work at the t ime 
when labour supply is scanty ' . 9 A proposal from Labasa in 
18 9 3  that government help Ind ians f ind land once they had 
completed their indentures was rej ected for thi s  r eason . 1 0 
Nevertheles s , a propo sal that government encourage Indians 
to settle near plantat ions was discussed in 188 7 , two years 
before government became liable for the repatriat ion of the 
f irst immigrant s brought to the c olony , in 18 7 9 . Government ' s  
responsib il ity for this aro se  from its commitment to pay one­
third of the total cos t of  transport ing indentured labourer s 
to and from F ij i . Of ficials were concerned because at 
exist ing rat es there would be enough in the Return Passages 
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Fund t o  pay only 6 0  per cent of  the c o s t  of returning these 
Indians . If they all exerc ised their right to a free 
pas sage , the balance of the cost would have to be met from 
general revenue , po ssibly lead ing t o  an incr ease in taxat ion 
which would be aga inst plantat ion interes t s . It was also 
argued that far from drawing labour away from plantat ions , 
Ind ian settlement s  close to t hem would be ' a  great conven­
ience to the employers of labour ' .1 1  Anson , himself ,  was 
certain that the retention of Indians in the colony was ' a  
matter o f  the highest importance , the labour supply being 
limit ed ' . 1 2  The quest ion was how to achieve this . He 
oppo sed any act ion to force a rise in the wages of free 
Indians ; though it might have encouraged them to  remain in 
Fij i ,  it would have been against  the interests  of plant er s  
who could no t af ford more than the c urrent rat e . Instead , 
Anson suggested that part of the return pas sage money be 
offered to  Ind ians if they re-engaged and stayed in the 
colony . 
Yet more than a cash inducement was needed to per suade 
immigrant s not to l eave : grants  of land were also required . 
So , in 1888 government announced that Indians who had been 
in Fij i for more than ten year s would be allowed to commute 
their right to a return pas sage in exchange for a gift of 
land and an allowance equal to the co s t  of a passage home , 
to  be paid mos tly in kind ( seed , food for six months , etc . ) . 
That the allowance was to be equal to the cost  o f  a return 
pas sage , and not less as Anson had propo sed , implies that 
the des ire to minimize drawings from the Fund was no longer 
a princ ipal aim of the scheme . Rather , as shown by the limi t 
of f ive acres on the grant s of  land , the int ention was to 
retain in Fij i a permanent supply of ca sual labo ur . 1 3  
However ,  no Indian took advantage of the scheme . At the 
t ime officials att ributed this to  the reluctanc e of immi­
grants to forgo their right of  free passage , which provided 
a form of escape should fortune turn agains t t hem . 1 4  Indeed , 
it seems that the maj ority of  the f irst  480  Indians to arrive 
in Fij i cho se to return home . From 18 7 9  to 1889 , 7 71 Indians 
left the colony . Among them were children born in Fij i who 
returned with their par ent s ,  those repat riated becaus e they 
were unf it for service , and those who travelled at their own 
expense becaus e they had been in the colony for under t en 
years but could stand it no longer . 1 5  With its  fir s t  at temp t 
to settle Ind ians a failure , in the early 1890s government 
refused to try again . 
In 189 6 , however , the mat ter was considered for a 
second t ime . The Colonial Office f eared that the conditions 
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of indentured labour , as recorded in the 1894 Indian 
Immigrat ion Report ,  were so bad that the Indian government 
might wi sh to stop further recruitment for the co lony . In 
a despatch comment ing on the report , the Secretary of State 
noted that it conta ined remarks 
as to the dif f icul ty experienced by free labourers in 
renting or purchas ing land for settlement . This is a 
matter o f  importance t o  the future of immigrat ion into 
Fij i , and you should see that every possible fac ility 
is af forded to the immigrants for this purpose . 1 6  
The despat ch coinc ided with the growing impor tance at tached 
by off icials in Fij i to settlers  as a source of labour . In 
189 7 Sir Henry Berkeley , the act ing governor , sugges ted that 
the commutat ion of  return pas sages in exchange for land should 
be t ried once more , and that government should assist those 
in India who wanted to migrate to Fij i as free settlers . He 
hoped that the lat ter would come in such numbers as event­
ually to remove the need for indentured labour , thus saving 
planters the cos t  of importat ion . 1 7  
The new governor , S ir George O ' Brien (18 9 7 -1902) , 
rej ected Berkeley ' s  propo sals on the grounds that there was 
no t enough unoccupied land near the mills on which to put 
settlers , at least on the scale propo sed by Berkeley . Though 
plenty of small plo ts  for individual farms could be found , 
it would have been more difficult to ob tain s izeable areas 
of  good cane land suitable for set tlement . Mo st  of  the f irst­
clas s land was already occupied by plantations ; the ro lling 
country ( inland of the f lat s )  on which cane is now grown was 
not regarded as po tent ial cane land t ill much la ter . The 
expense of bringing over free Indians was ano ther reason for 
rej ecting Berkeley ' s  proposal s . O ' Brien oppo sed , too , the 
idea of  commut ing return pas sages for land , since this would 
only encourage those  without capital to stay . The type o f  
person the colony should at tract , the governor argued , were 
Indians leaving Fij i with up to £30  or more in savings . So 
ins tead o f  Berkeley ' s amb i t ious scheme , he put forward the 
more modest suggestion that an Indian Settlement Fund be 
created to acquire what b locks were available for lease to 
Indians on easy t erms . The Colonial Office agreed , £5 , 000 
for this purpo se being taken from surpluses which by then had 
accumulated in the Return Pasages Fund . 1 8  CSR was told that 
' The Governor believes that the success and extension of such 
a scheme would resul t  in the cheapening of labour . 1 9  
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Settlement s were nearly always developed on lines 
which benef ited planters , partly because off icial s were 
naturally sympathe tic to plantat ion int erests  and partly 
because CSR had tremendous inf luence in the economy . If 
necessary , as when it lat er ref used to carry co t ton from 
Nacob i to the Experimental S tation at Lautoka , the company 
could use its  tramlines to hinder the cul t ivat ion of crops 
which might compete with planters for land and labour . 2 0 
One se ttlement scheme at Ba failed becaus e it did no t have 
the support of the local mill manager . In late 189 7 govern­
ment proposed to set tle Indians on a b lock of  Fij ian land 
at Nanukudrala . Since it was intended that set tlers should 
grow cane , the at t itude of CSR was crucial . The company 
itself had been trying to secur e  the lease of Nanukudrala for 
several years because land was of good quality and close  to 
the mill . It offered to buy cane from Indian set tlers  and 
help them with cul t ivat ion if i t  was g iven Nanukudrala and 
if the Indian settlement was lo cated further away from the 
mill , below Varoko , one of C SR ' s  outer es tates . I t  also 
promi sed to extend a traml ine to the set t lement , at a cos t 
o f  £75 0 if , ins tead of  be ing under government control ,  the 
settlement was supervised by the company which would l ease 
land to Indians in f ive-acre plots . The transf er of  leases 
would be permit ted so long as C SR had the r ight to approve 
incoming tenants - a provision that would have enabled the 
company to prevent t rans fers if it  wished . This in itself 
was enough to make the scheme unappealing to Indians , for 
whom one of the main at trac t ions of holding land was the 
prospect of being abl e  to sell the lease and r eturn home if 
they wanted , or else to use it for speculat ive purposes . 
By May 1899 ther e had been no applicat ions to lease , and 
off icials suspected that CSR had never int ended making the 
scheme a success . They were probably right , for though Knox 
was eager for Indian set tlement to progress , E .W .  Fenner , 
the Rarawai manager , was less enthus ias t ic ; he doub t ed if 
it would yield worthwhile results . Under the t erms of  its  
arrangement with government , CSR could take over the land 
if it had no t been sett led within three years . Fenner 
seized the opportunity to do th is and to comp lete the 
conve rs ion of  a Crown set tlement int o a company e s tate . 2 1  
This was an except ion . O ther settlement s were es tab­
lished more eas ily . The fir s t  was at Labasa , but by 1914 
there were eighteen in the colony al together , mos t ly near 
mill centres or the towns ( s ee Tab le 4 . 1) . The maj or ity 
were es tablished between 189 7  and 1906 , before the Indian 
Settlement Fund was merged into general accounts and the 
Table 4 . 1  
Government Indian settlements in F ij i ,  1 9 1 3  
Name of Year Leasehold Locality 
set tle- or 
ment Crownfreehold 
Island 
Vatuwaqa 1887 Crownfreehold 2 miles from Suva Vitilevu 
Samabula 1889 Do . Do . Do . 
Signal 1890 Do . l� miles out of Do .  
s ta t ion Suva 
Kalabo 1906 Do .  Suva-Rewa Road Do .  
Nasinu 1906 Do .  Do .  Do .  
Wainabuka 1907 
Bulileka 1899 
Boubale 1900 
Raranika- 1901 
wai 
Do . 
Do .  
Do .  
Do .  
Wainikoro 1903 Leasehold 
Navutuv- 1906 
utu 
Do .  
Naqalini 1907 Crownfreehold 
Lolotua 1910 Leasehold 
and 
Nacawa 
Do . 
Near Labasa 
Do . 
Do . 
12 miles from 
Lab as a 
8 miles from 
Labasa 
Do . 
District o f  
Dogotuki 
Tokatoka 1901 Crownfreehold Near Navua mill 
Namau 1908 
Koro No .1 1911 
Nacobi 19 1 3  
Qeledra- 1913 
dra 
Do .  
Do .  
Do .  
Do . 
10 miles up 
the Ba river 
8 miles from 
Tavua 
Nadi 
Tavua 
So urce : Cmd . 7 744-5 ( 19 14 ) , Appendix 4 3 .  
Do . 
Vanualevu 
Do .  
Do . 
Do .  
Do .  
Do . 
Do . 
Vitilevu 
Do . 
Do .  
Do .  
Do . 
Area of Area of No . of No . o f  No . o f  
settle- grazing allot- allo t- allot-
ment land ments ments ments 
occupied vacant 
161 
324 
39 
7 2 9  
5 6 9  
7 30 
4 6 2  
189 
1 5 5  
404 
61 
63 
1 32 
2 2 8  
1 4 9  
5 8 8  
3 2 1  
3 5  
5 , 349 
acres 
1 , 29 2  
1 , 070 
896 
985 
2 , 000 
(approx) 
85 
165 
21 
185 
77 
l l 7  
1 5 4  
6 5  
5 5  
1 3 7  
19 
2 1  
38 
76 
30 
4 , 000 1 1 7  
(approx) 
7 4 5  
4 7 1  
58 
1 1 , 459 1 , 37 7  
acres 
58 
1 36 
2 1  
l l 2  
6 7  
6 3  
129 
6 5  
4 1  
1 2 9  
1 8  
21 
76 
1 8  
3 4  
9 9 3  
2 7  
29 
23 
10 
54 
25 
14 
8 
38 
1 2  
8 3  
5 8  
384 
Average 
area o f  
allo t­
men t s  
7� 
Rent p e r  Annual Rent 
acre paid to 
natives for 
leasehold 
E .  s. d. E .  s. d .  
2 0 .  0 .  
15 . o .  0 
20 . 0 .  0 
3. o .  
3 .  0 .  
3 .  o .  
7 .  6 .  0 
7 . 6 .  0 
5 .  o. 0 
7 .  6 .  9 7 .  0 .  0 
7 .  6 .  0 1 5 .  5 .  
10 . o .  0 
6 .  0 .  
7 .  6 .  0 
7 .  6 .  
5 .  o .  0 
10 . o .  0 
10 . 0 .  0 
18 . 1 1 .  
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momentum to expand settlement s  was los t . 2 2  Judged on 
acreage , government ' s  contribution toward the s ettlement o f  
Indians was not great , but in terms of  the numbers involved 
it was more signif icant . In 1 909 between 882 and 9 30 Indians 
occupied up to 2 , 500 acres of Crown settlement ( excluding 
grazing land) , while 1 , 12 3  Indians were said to have leased 
11 , 9 28 acres direct from Fij ians . 2 3  The size of allo tments 
on government settlements rarely exceeded seven and a half 
acres , the norm being j us t  under four . Tenant s were forb idden 
to hold more than one block so that land would no t be con­
centrated in a few hands . This prevented the emergence on 
settlements of compara tively large-s cale farming , which by 
creating a demand for wage labour would have competed with 
plantations . In fac t , farms were so small that for parts 
of the year set t lers were likely to become wage-earners them­
selves . Planters s tood to gain in ano ther way . Rents on 
government settlement s  were lower than for l eases of Fij ian 
land . They generally ranged from 3s to 7s 6d in 1908 , agains t 
10s to 30s an acre ( plus a large premium) for land l eased 
direct  from Fij ians . Sublet ting was forbidden , preventing 
rents from rising in this way . 2 4  Consequently , because rent 
was a maj or expense for Indians , the cos t of producing cash 
crops on government settlement s  was reduced . Though the 
surp lus available for sale was l imited , competition from 
l ower cos t  producers on Crown. settlements may have encouraged 
o t her Indian farmers to minimize their expens es , especially 
aro und the turn of the century at Labasa where a large 
proportion of free innnigrants  grew rice and o ther food crops 
on government settlements . 2 5  Gradually this influence on 
price was reduced as the number of Indians outside the settle­
ments increased . Yet at  l east  for a time settlement s  may 
have helped s tabilize the cos t o f  living , perhaps even causing 
a rise in real wages at no cos t to the planters . 
Indians on European land 
The advantages o f  Indian settlement were so great tha t  
p lanters  themselves began to encourage i t  o n  land under 
their control . As well as having a supply of labour close 
to the plantation , they wanted to benefit from the frequent 
ab ility of Indians to grow crops mo re cheaply than Europeans . 
Settlers had lower capital cos ts because their cult ivation 
tools were rudimentary and they had no need to erect off ice 
buildings and the l ike . Nor did they have to make a prof it 
on top of  bo th wages and the cost of supervis ion as did 
companies like CSR , or a profit  in addi tion to wages alone 
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a s  did the smaller European planter . For the set tler who was 
no t normally an employer of  labour , profits and wages were 
indivisible . Moreover ,  s ince his money expectat ions were 
lower , the income an Indian was willing to accep t from his 
land was considerably less than a European ' s .  This was 
largely b ecaus e he had few alternative o ccupat ions . Wage 
employment , the main opt ion , was no t well  paid - say ls 6 d  
a day including a bonus if  the labourer re-indentured - and 
farming was l ikely to b e  at trac tive even if immediate returns 
were no higher than tha t . Apar t  from having the satisfac tion 
of being self-employed ,  if land was held as freehold or 
leased on reasonable terms , s e t t lers had a form of security 
against bad times ahead . As a growing numb er o f  Indians 
tried to ob tain land which was relat ively s carce , in a period 
o f  rising values the farm - however small - was also a form 
of inves tment . Speculation thro ugh the transfer of leases 
at a profit was very popular among Indians , and may have 
encouraged them to accep t a relatively low current income 
from the land in the hope of a capital gain in future . The 
resul t  was that Indians were often abl e  to s ell cane , or 
crops like maize , cowpea , rice and dhal needed as food for 
livestock and labour on p lantat ions , for less than their 
existing cos t  to the planter . 2 6  Though there was a danger 
that the quality of produce would be low , there was also the 
opportunity for planters to b enefit  by ob taining cheaper 
s upplies . In addition , they could supplement their income 
by leas ing land that was uneconomic for a European to farm 
to an Indian whose  cos ts and expectations were lower . 
Some Europeans leased the whole o f  their plantations 
to Indians . In 189 7  i t  was thought that the tenant of 
CSR ' s Tausa property on the Rewa coul d  ge t £ 30 to £40 more 
than the rent he was paying for the land . 2 7  If p lantations 
yielded only a marginal re turn , it paid their owners to 
sublet . The reduc tion in the price o f  cane in 1902 was 
expected by CSR to encourage the settl ement of  Indians by 
planters , ' some at leas t of  whom will make more money out 
of  l easing land to cool ies  than by cult ivat ing it them­
s elves ' • 2 8 The maj ority , however , s till found it profi table 
to grow cane on their own account . After all , if the whole 
of a plantat ion was settled by Indians , there was s till 
the administrative responsibility of collec ting the rent , 
resolving boundary disputes and ensuring that tenant s cared 
for the so il in a way that , by maintaining its fert ility , 
enabled i t  to continue supporting the rents being charged .  
Of ten i t  was j us t  as easy for a European to farm the es tate 
hims el f . Where this was the case , i t  was s till wor th while 
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to lease part of  the land - of ten under share-farming 
arrangements which were popular on the Rewa . Indians would 
grow cane for a planter who helped with harves ting and 
ploughing , took over the crop for sale to the mill and af ter 
deducting charges for rent , assis tance with cultivat ion and 
so for th , paid the balance of the proceeds to the grower . 2 9  
Share-farming was less common in o ther areas , wh ere i t  was 
more usual to find a European leasing isolated blocks that 
were expensive to sup ervise , or less fer t ile areas from 
which returns were low . In 1 90 1 , as indentures expired , 
planters were settling their labourers on hills surrounding 
es tates where they grew cowpea at ld  a lb . ,  mai ze and o ther 
crops needed on plantations . Sett,lers were exp ected to 
work for p lan ters as necessary . One planter at Koronubu,  
Ba , was said to  be charging 10s an acre in rent in 1905 , and 
to be expecting his tenant s to work for ls 6d a task whenever 
required . 3 0 
Indians were settled on plantations mos t  extens ively a t  
Navua . Following the closure o f  Sharpe ,  Fletcher and Co . ' s  
mill in 1884 and the failure of banana crop s due to disease 
in 1893 , large areas o f  European land became available for 
the cultivation of cane . Rather than do this thems elves 
planters , many of whom were absentee landowners , leased their 
land to free immigrants .  In 1 894 the Fij i Sugar Co . Ltd 
o ffered to contract with Indians to buy their cane for three 
years . It promis ed to supply labour for harves ting and for 
some of their cul t ivat ion work , it  provided tramline and 
trucks for the transpor t  of cane to the mill , and on o ccasions 
it made loans to time-exp ired labourers who wanted to become 
growers .  The cos t  of  these services was deducted from the 
price o f  cane , which was initially f ixed a t  13s 6d a ton , 
higher than anywhere else in the colony . The issue o f  three­
year contrac ts to Indians , unprecedented in Fij i ,  together 
with the availab ility of land , provided a tremendous spur 
to settlement , Indians coming from as far away as Labasa ,  
as well as from Ba and the Rewa . The process was encouraged 
by government which , af ter an inquiry in 189 7 ,  l egalized the 
company ' s  previously illegal prac tice of assis t ing growers 
with labour indentured to its p lantat ions . Land was usually 
leased in large blocks to Indians who sublet to o thers . The 
example of a seventy-acre na tive lease ( ' Nasasa ' )  being 
sub let by a European to two Indians who re-subleased in 
twenty-two b locks , was fairly typical . Generally , land was 
held on one-year terms and farmed as holdings of four to 
five acres . In December 189 6 the number o f  free Indian 
contrac tors was p ut at 10 7 .  By July o f  the following year 
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the to tal had risen t o  2 70 .  There were i n  the same month 
3 , 000 acres under cane , 1 , 000 being cul t ivated by the Tamanua 
Estate , 750 by Europeans and 1 , 250 by Indians . The amount o f  
cane grown by free immigrants increas ed from 1 , 700 tons in 
1894 to 32 , 500 in 1901 ( see Table 4 . 2) . 3 1  
The result was an economic boom in the district , 
European interes ts being the f irst  to benef i t . Merchants  
gained from an expansion of trade , whi ch they as s is t ed by 
making advances at high rates of interest (often over 30 
per cent ) to prospective Indian farmers  and landlords . By 
1904 A .N .  Brodziak and Co . ,  who ran the Navua Trading Co . ,  
had inves t ed £ 20 , 000 to £ 24 , 00 0  as loans in Navua . Marks and 
Co . had al so lent large amounts . The s ize o f  individual 
advances was of ten subs tant ial . Marks and Co . were said to 
have lent £ 1 , 788 to a Mr Deoki , and £ 9 80 to Nundan Singh . 
Presumably the loans were used to ob tain land for s uble tting . 
European prop er ty holders benef ited by leasing their land 
at pro f its which o ften no t only gave them a useful re turn 
but also enabled them to pay a Europ ean manager to supervise  
their tenant s .  Mes srs . Corbett  and Runt ' s  Togalika es tate 
was managed by J . H .  Nicoll , while W . J .  Robertson ' s  Kabacake 
p lantation was in the hands o f  R . D .  Trazevant . Above all , 
there were advantages to the Fij i Sugar Co . ,  which ob tained 
cane that it could no t have grown it self , either becaus e 
cos ts would have been too high or because it  could no t 
have afforded th e capital expense o f  prepar ing the land . 
The company had no t ye t made a profit , but hoped tha t the 
settlement of free immigrants would increase the mill ' s  
throughput and help it  to  s tart reducing its  debts . The 
rapid expansion of Indian-grown cane also enabled the company 
to lower the pr ice gradually ( Table 4 .  2 )  , so tha t growers 
exper ienced a fall in their s tandard of living . No t ing the 
consequent threat o f  social unre s t , in 1904 the S tipendiary 
Magis trate at Navua claimed tha t  Indians had been encouraged 
to grow cane with a promise of 12s a ton and a £ 1 bonus for 
each acre planted . The response had been so grea t that the 
company had lowered the pr ice to 10s , then 9 s  and now , with 
almost  twice as much cane as the mill could crush , Indians 
are given any price the company likes . The issue is 
ser ious for if Indians get only 5 / - or 6 / - per ton , it 
will take them 4 or 5 year s to pay off  [ their ] present 
indebtedness  . • .  [ and ] they will mo st  cer tainly s top 
working if there is no hope of anything mo re than bare 
foo d  for the next 4 or 5 years . 3 2  
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In 1904 Gemmell Smith bel ieved that  with an increas e 
in capital expenditure and with its present pol icy of b uying 
cane from Indians the mill ought to have been pro fi table . 3 3  
On the o ther hand , the Brit ish Columb ia Sugar Refining Co . 
Ltd , which bought , rebuilt and enlarged the mil l  in 190 5 , 
thought that returns wo uld be increased by relying for cane 
no t on Indians but on its own planta tions . I t s  view was 
understandable . Too many interes ts seemed to be  sharing the 
benefits  of Indian cul t ivation - traders charging high 
interes ts on loans they advanced , planters earning rent , 
Indian lessees pro f iting from the subletting o f  land . At a 
price accep tab le to the miller , therefore , cane was unlikely 
to b e  remunera tive to the grower once interes t  and rent had 
b een paid . In the short term this threatened to cause unrest 
among Indians , possibly leading to the intervent ion of 
government (as was sugges ted in 1 9 04 and 190 8) , while in the 
long term there was a danger that the supply of cane would 
drop . Moreover , it  could have been argued that the mill 
saved very little through buying cane from Indians , except 
when the price was very low ,  s ince it  s till had to bear the 
cos t o f  supervis ing some o f  their cul t ivat ion work and mos t  
o f  the harve s t ing . Agains t wha t  savings there were , the 
company had to set  the lower yields and s teadily falling 
quality of free immigrant cane tha t were not iced by ob servers . 
Might it  no t be  j us t  as economical to grow the cane itsel f ?  
Table 4 . 2  
Cultiva tion o f  cane by Indians at  Navua , 1894-1901 
Year Production Price 
( tons) ( including bonus ) 
1894 1 , 700 1 3s 6d  
1895 3 , 500 1 3s 6d 
1896 10 , 300 lls lOd 
189 7 1 2 , 200 12s 2d  
189 8 18 , 80 0  1 2s ld 
1899 19 , 600 10s 6d 
1900 2 2 , 500 9 s  lO d 
1901 3 2 , 500 9s lld 
Source : H . O .  to Nausori , 22 April 190 2 , Nausori Out , 
11 ( 1902 ) , 69- 7 3 . 
Accordingly , the Vancouver-Fij i Sugar Co . increas ed 
its own acreage under cane , and discouraged Indian cul t iva­
t ion by paying a low price and charging more for services 
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to grower s ,  who se reac tion was to switch to another crop 
(usually r ice) . Yet , because mo st settlers were no t on it s 
land , the company could no t obtain a larger cane supply 
simply by resuming properties it already owned : rather , it 
had to incur the substant ial cap ital exp ens e of acquir ing 
new , often virgin land . This , in turn , reversed the down­
ward trend in the number of  indentured labourers employed 
at Navua . To clear and cul t ivat e the new land more immi­
grant s had to be  imported , caus ing a rise in wage and super­
vision cost s . What the company had no t under stood , however ,  
was that climatic condi tions on the Navua would not enable 
it to make an adequat e prof it on top of these addit ional 
expenses . In 1911 a purchas er for the mill was being sought , 
but well before then the boom on the river had turned into 
a slump . Land was less able to support the high rent s that 
had been charged , merchant s were unable to recover their 
d ebt s . The Navua Trading Co . ,  for example , abandoned cane 
over which it had l i ens because it found that , even if it 
worked the land itself , it st il l  could not recoup the amounts  
owed . The fact was that with the dec ision of planter s to 
lease land to free immigrant s in the 1890s , so making it 
impo ssible to depend mainly on Europeans for cane , the 
success  of sugar in the d istrict rested largely on the 
ab ility of Ind ians to produce cheap supplies . The failure 
of the Vancouver-Fij i Sugar Co . to perceive this , and to 
co-operat e with o ther interest ed part ies to evolve a scheme 
to facilitat e it , greatly damaged plantat ion (and merchant ) 
int er ests  on the Navua . 3 4 
The settlement o f  Ind ians on C SR ' s  plantat ions had 
started in the early 1890s as par t  of the company ' s  wider 
pol icy of l easing es tates . At one t ime , Knox even hop ed 
that free immigrant s would grow the bulk of cane crushed at 
Nausor i . 3 5  In his view ,  sett lement would help the company 
to ' divide our r isks with o thers • . •  to go back to the system 
on which we originally started in New South Wales ' . 3 6 He 
also hoped to obtain cheap er cane . Ind ians were to be g iven 
land ' on which we canno t grow cane at anything like the price 
at which this can be purchased from the coolies ' .  At  Nausor i ,  
though not at the o ther mil l s , they were to be paid a shill ing 
a ton less than Europeans . Within a shor t t ime Knox was 
hoping that if the output of Indian cane was increased , the 
company ' s  po sition would be strengthened if it tried to 
reduce the pr ice of European suppl ies . This may well have 
proved to be the case when the price of European cane was 
reduced from 12s  6d to 10s Od p er standard ton in 1 902 . The 
following year , amid f ears that CSR would squeeze them out in 
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favour o f  Indian grower s who would accep t a lower pr ice , 
several planters advocated legislat ion to prevent Indians 
producing except  as paid labour , but no such l egislat ion was 
introduced . 3 7  
The settlement of Indians on company plantat ions pro­
ceeded mo re slowly than Knox had hoped . By 1901 lit tle 
effort had been made to encourage settlement at Rarawai or 
Lautoka , and virtually none at Labasa . Perhaps this was 
partly because cane was being grown reasonably cheaply by 
the company , so that there was little need for C SR to incur 
the administ rat ive cost of subd ivid ing plantat ions . It  was 
also f elt that the dr ier climat e  which made the soil more ' 
d if f icult to work than at Nausori would d iscourage Indians 
from growing cane in western Vit i  Levu and on Vanua Levu . 3 8  
I t  was a t  Nausori , where the cost o f  company cane was much 
higher than on the o ther sid e  of the island , that the great­
est efforts  were made to settle Indians on C SR land . The 
company began in the 1890s by placing them on ind ividual 
plot s , usually of f ive acres or f ewer . I t  would prepar e 
the land for cul t ivat ion and help with harvest ing , deduc ting 
the cost of such services - and rent - from the price paid 
for cane . Leases were for only two years , after which 
sett lers were moved on to new land leaving the old to lie 
fallow - a system of rotat ing the grower rather than the 
land . This must have r educed the appeal of CSR ' s  land to 
Indians who , in the certain knowledge that they would be 
moved after two years , would have had f ew r ight s  of owner­
ship over a part icular plot . Right of transfer , for example , 
would have been greatly curtailed . 3 9  
This may have been one of  the reasons why in 1901 C SR 
f el t  that the settlement of  free Indians was proceed ing too 
s lowly , and needed to be supplement ed by experiments with a 
new arrangement - a system of ' planting companies ' .  Each 
' company ' consisted of several Indians who had collect ively 
leased land from C SR .  Where neces sary houses were provided 
by C SR ,  which also paid one shilling a day to each member 
who did hand work - planting , weeding , cut t ing cane and 
loading on trucks - which was the ' company ' s '  responsib ility . 
Horse work was done by CSR . Af t er deduc tions for rent , 
wages and other expenses incurred by CSR , the balance of the 
proceeds from cane was paid to the ' company ' for distribut ion 
among its members . For CSR ,  which was ref erred to as ' the 
employer ' in its  contracts  with planting companies , the 
scheme offered a chance to secure a more productive labour 
force , while settler s wit h lit tle capital saw it as a half-
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way house between leaving the plantat ion and obtaining land 
which could be farmed ind ividually . They were guaranteed 
an income at least equal to that received und er indenture ,  
with the pro spec t  o f  a bonus a t  the end o f  the season . 
So at f ir st plant ing companies were  quite popular among 
Ind ians at Nausori , and realiz ed CSR ' s  hopes too . But it 
was soon found that in a co-operat ive Indians did no t have 
as much personal interest in the yield of the crop as C SR 
had hoped . Aft er a t ime the int erest of members fell and 
the cost of c ul t ivat ion to C SR increased . In 1904 it was 
not iced that the cost of  ' company ' grown cane was higher 
than if produced with indentured labour . Knox call ed for a 
review , but before this could have an effect a drought pre­
vented any bonus being paid in 1906 . Ind ians abandoned the 
company system ,  and C SR did no t try to revive it . 4 0 
Thereaf t er , the c ompany ' s  att ent ion was focused on the 
ques tion of leasing plantat ions to overseer s .  They were 
likely to achieve the co st  reduct ions that were wanted , with­
out involving C SR in the t ime and exp ens e  of set tling large 
numbers of Indians on its land . Though in the long run 
Knox s t ill hoped that settlers on c ompany land could be  
per suaded to grow cane , fo r the  immediate  future  they were 
valued for the ways in which they could help stab ilize -
perhaps even r educe - the cost  of cane on plantat ions and 
the cost of crushing it in the mills . This was clear f rom 
contract s  the Labasa manager propo sed to make in 1905 with 
immigrant s in their last  year of indenture . In return for 
a cash payment o f  £2 and the lease of three to four acres , 
the Ind ian was to reside on his allo tment with his family , 
to work for three days a week (or for the who le week if in 
the mill ) whenever required by CSR at wages 25 per cent 
higher than those  of indentured labourers , and to grow a 
certain quantity of  crops annually for sale at f ixed rat es  
to the company . The rat e for maize was to be ls 9d compared 
with 2s lld for Fij ian tax maize . Penal ty for breach of 
contract was put at between £1 and £5 - a lar ge sum for 
Indians . 4 1 
By 1912 , then , the tr end among planters in general , 
on the Navua and by CSR was away from seeing settler s on 
plantat ion land as primarily a source of cane . Ins tead , 
the emphasis was on settling immigrants so that they would 
provide a pool of casual labour and , of secondary importance , 
so that they would provide food crops needed on plantat ions . 
Except at Navua and on a few es tates elsewhere ,  settler s 
were placed at the edges of p lantat ions , on marginal land . 
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As a result , though almost  cert ainly greater than the 
number on goverrunent sett lement s ,  the number of Indians 
set tled by planters was smaller than the number which , in 
the absence of land elsewhere , was forced to occupy blocks 
leased direct from Fij ians . 
Indians on Fij ian land 
Free immigrants had leased land from Fij ians ever 
s ince the 1880s . The s iz e  of their ho ld ings was great ly 
inf luenced by the ext ent of plantation agricul ture , which 
was respons ible for bo th the number of immigrant s looking 
for land and , to a s ignif icant degree , for the scarcity of  
land available . The shortage in cane d istrict s ,  where 
Indians pref erred to settle because of proximity to markets 
and poor communicat ions elsewhere ,  was o f  course par t ly due 
to the amount of land held by Fij ians . However , it also 
owed much to  the fact that large areas - mos tly of  the best  
quality - had been taken up  by plantat ions . Compara t ively 
lit tle remained for Indians when their indentures expir ed , 
so that the int ense competit ion which resul ted encouraged 
the occupat ion of land in small plo ts . Moreover , on leaving 
the plantat ion the average immigrant could no t afford more 
than a few acres of  land - if any at all . Wages under 
indenture had been so low that the amount he co uld save was 
minimal . The exception to this were s irdars - tho se in 
charge of other Indians under the supervision of a European 
overseer . No t only were their incomes higher than o thers 
under indentur e ,  but they also received bribes - in ind ividual 
amounts of up to one shill ing a week apparent ly - from labour­
ers who wanted to receive favourable treatment . They also 
ob tained an income from Fij ians by spend ing par t of their 
wages on gambling , ' profes s ional Indian gamblers ' being 
known ' to fleece the Fij ians ' deliberately . One s irdar , 
from Wailevu es tate at Labasa , has recalled (perhaps with 
exaggera tion) that he was paid £1 ls Od a week and saved 
£100 while serving indenture . 4 2  Once free , s irdars were well 
placed to increase their wealth thro ugh trade , and to ob tain 
sizeable areas of land ; over f ifty acres was no t uncommon . 
Because of growing demand for smaller b locks by Indians who 
were less fo rtunate , these landholders began to suble t in 
allotments of  a few acres , receiving mo re in rent than they 
paid the Fij ian owners .  Frequently at tached to the sub leas e 
was the offer of credit , an extremely important provis ion 
s ince it spared those with lit tle cap ital having to re-engage 
on plantat ions t ill they had saved more . As government and 
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CSR recognized , wi thout the Indian middleman ,  the zamindar , 
sett lement would have proceeded more s lowly . Jus t as they 
had helped planter s  by maintaining order among indentured 
labour , t ime-exp ired s irdar s now s erved the same interes ts 
by has tening sett lement on small b locks . 
As par t of  o ther measures to promo te set tlement , govern­
ment ac t ion in 189 7-98 reinforced the pat tern of small hold­
ings . The procedure for leasing small plo ts  of Fij ian land 
was s implif ied . Propo sals to l ease no longer had to go 
before Provinc ial Councils , which met at s ix-monthly in­
tervals ,  but could be submit ted to Distric t  Councils which 
met every month . Legis lat ion was pas sed to save Indians wi th 
lit t le capital the cos t  of  s urveying land (and wai t ing while 
, the survey was carried out )  in order to  ob tain a lease . For 
leases of under ten acres it was no longer neces sary to employ 
a surveyor and register a plan , though a rough tracing and 
descrip t ion of the proposed lease was later required by 
Ordinance 4 of 1905 . 4 3  These measures encouraged Fij ian land 
to be leased mor e  rapidly by Indians . From thir ty Ind ians 
occupying 492  acres in 189 8 ,  t en years later the number had 
risen to 1 , 4 6 7  on 13 , 881 acres . Though set tlement init ially 
proceeded fas test  on the Navua and the Rewa , the expansion 
of C SR ' s operat ions on the wes t  of Vit i Levu led to a sub­
s tantial increase af ter the turn of  the century in the number 
of Indians occupying Fij ian land in that part  of the is land . 
In 1911 nearly half  the registered leases of Fij ian land 
held by Ind ians were in the Province of Ba , a quarter wi thin 
ten miles of the Nausori mill , an eighth on the northern coas t 
o f  Vanua Levu in the Province o f  Macua ta , and the remainder 
were scat tered in small settlement s over the rest  o f  the two 
is lands . 4 4  
From 1 9 0 7  to 1910 government tried to regulate Indian 
sett lement on Fij ian land mo re closely . Off icials were con­
cerned , for example , about the whole ho st  of informal and 
illegal leasing arrangement s that Indians entered into with 
Fij ians . Apar t from a variety of share-farming agreement s , 
there was the pract ice o f  leas ing a plo t  for several short 
per iods in succes sion . Since this was done in secret , the 
owner could evade the legal requirement that his Roko and 
Buli receive a port ion of the rent . The prob lem also had 
wider signif icance . Under inf ormal agreements tenant s had 
no security of tenure , and hence lit tle incentive to maintain 
the fer t il ity of the soil . If the land cont inued to be 
farmed by Indians , it was likely that the output of crops 
for sale to plantat ions would fall , and that in the search 
86 
for land which had no t been exhaus ted se ttler s wo uld move 
away from the centres of employment , so reducing the s upply 
of casual labour . 4 5 Following representat ions by C . V .  
Maxwell , the S t ipend iary Magis trate a t  Lautoka and then 
Macuata , the police were ins truc ted in 190 7 to prosecut e  
in cases . where land was leased informally . 4 6  
There was mount ing offic ial concern , t oo , about the 
provision that no proper survey need be ob tained for l eases 
of under ten acres . Tenants were expected t o  mark out their 
land with pegs , but it was o ften found that pegs were moved 
to increase the area of the lease , or that leases o f  tenants 
overlapped . As in the case of  inf ormal leas ing , concern 
was expressed mainly in terms of law and o rder - disputes 
might break out be tween tenant s ,  for example - but once 
again plantat ion interests  were involved .  Frequent disputes 
might involve tenants in expensive legal act ion which would 
increase cos t s , and might lead to reprisals in the form of  
the des truc tion of crops o therwise  for sale . Moreover , the 
t endency to increase the size  of leases raised the pos s ib ility 
that they would no longer be worked with family labour alone 
but would need hired workers as well , so increasing the 
competition for labour . Finally , as government acknowl edged , 
to provide the rough descr iption required under Ordinance 4 
o f  1905 , Indians of ten paid a European or half-cas te  more 
than would have been paid to a regis tered surveyor for a 
proper lease . The co s t  o f  sett lement was increased and with 
it the burden of deb t , often at high rates of interest , 
making the cheap produc t ion of cash crops more diff icul t . 
More than law and order was therefore at s take when govern­
ment enacted Ordinance 4 of 1 9 09 , which required that in 
future all applicat ions to lease , regardless of the land ' s  
size , should be accompanied by plans drawn by a regis tered 
surveyor . To prevent the extra demand driving up survey 
cos ts to prohibitive levels , fees charged by surveyors  for 
small plots  were regulated under Ordinance 4 of  1912 . 4 7  
A third area o f  government intervent ion about this 
t ime was on the quest ion of subletting land . Knox had always 
felt that rents would be  lower if Indians leased land d irect 
from Fij ians instead of through middlemen , a view that  res ted 
on the assumption that Indian landholders could drive harder 
bargains than Fij ians . This was undo ub tedly true , no t only 
because Indians who a lready held  land at f ixed rents could 
take advantage of rising values , but also because  they could 
of ten attract t enant s  at high rents through the offer of 
credit as well . In 1902 Knox had told government that 
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because the crop would have to pay several profits , sub­
let ting would increase the costs  of Ind ian cultivat ion . 
None theless , no act ion was taken by off icials - and Knox had 
even allowed his managers to exper iment with the zarnindar 
sys tem on company land - because the benefi t s  of speedy 
settlement were thought to outwe igh the disadvantages of  
sublet t ing . 4 8  By  the  end of the decade the s ituat ion had 
changed . Settlement was well advanced , and government could 
risk slowing the pro cess to ensure that the pat t ern of land­
holding was in line with its overall obj ectives . Im Thurn 
became convinced of the need for ac tion in lat e  190 9 , when 
details of numerous transfers and subletting on a forty- three 
acre lease were brought to his attent ion . In 1910 it was 
decided that in future leases would normally be issued to 
Indians in sizes of only five acres or f ewer ( or ten acres 
of  grazing land) . The hope was that the high rents being 
charged by middlemen would be reduced , and that by encourag­
ing smaller allo tments the supply of casual labour would 
be increased . The lat ter was a curious thought , for under 
the exis ting prac t ice suble t ting was so extens ive that leases 
were eventually fragmented into small plot s . However , it 
showed that  the main purpose  of set tlement in off icial eyes 
was the same as it had been in the 1890s . 4 9  
From 190 7 to 1910 , then , government intervened in 
ways that might have sub s tant ially rnodif ied the condit ions 
on which Indians leased Fij ian land . Yet this intervention 
had only a marginal effect on the pa t tern of set tlement . 
Neither Ordinance 4 of 1909  nor the five-acre limit applied 
to  leases that had been taken up over the pas t twenty-f ive 
years . Nor does it seem that they greatly altered the 
pat tern of  l easing over the next few years . The size limit 
could be over come if the owner o f  a l ease persuaded a ' dummy ' 
to apply for an adj acent plo t , to be  handed over to him once 
the applicat ion had succeeded . The requirement tha t all 
leases be properly surveyed could be eas ily evaded by corning 
to an informal arrangement with Fij ians while , from the 
extent of the pract ice in 1915 , it seems that the ins truc tion 
to pro secute in such cases had lit tle ef fec t . Informal 
leasing was so widespread that i t  was beyond the resources 
of the polic e  department to contro l . 5 0  There were o ther 
aspec t s  of sett lement that were no t sus ceptible to control 
by planter s or government - the r ise in land values , for 
example . Rent for an acre of Fij ian land at  Ra and Ba rose 
from between 7 s  6d and 20s in 1905 to from 10s to 30s in 
1908 - a subs tantial increase for a three-year period . 5 1  
Higher rents increased the amount that Indians wi th lit tle 
Table 4 . 3  ()) ()) 
Government s ta tement showing the area and value of land occu2ied bl Ind ian illllnigrants in the colonl in the lear 
1913 with the e s t imated value of buildings 2 l ive-s tock and o ther 2ro2ertl thereon 
D i s t r i c t  Land- Land Buildings Crops 
or holders 
province No . Freehold Leasehold To tal Sugar- Ri ce , Bananas , Other To tal Total 
Acres Cap i ta l  Acres Rental value o f  No . 
Value car.e , acres ac res crops , area , value 
value value 
hold ing a c r e s  a c r e s  acres 
E E £ E E 
Suva 4 64 3 2 7  2 7  , 6 4 8  1 , 828 1 , 400 35 , 92 8  5 62 11 , 8 2 7  462 1 , 6 31 
Rew a 760 5 , 0 75 7 , 045 3 , 289 8 , 364 1 ,  70 3 1 2 , 6 2 5  2 , 4 3 3  864 1 , 4 85 2 9  4 , 8 1 1  45 , 000 
Ta i l evu 34 1 ,  24 3 6 , 450 1 , 15 1  146 39 240 152 16 168 1 , 6 00 
Colo Eas t* 40 200 5 146 158 
Navua- 720 2 , 4 1 7  1 2 , 085 2 , 393 2 , 6 7 5  5 , 15 1  7 2 0  2 , 880 1 , 336 5 2 2  1 70 16 2 , 044 18 , 6 8 9  
Serua 
Ra* 229 10 , 000 1 , 021 244 804 64 3, 5 1 5  
Colo North* 60 1 , 24 2  2 9 1  2 78 690 3 7 5  641 6 36 1 , 65 2  5 , 3 50 
B a *  567 5 , 184 2 , 2 79 1 2 ,  714 2 , 080 1 , 1 36 8 34 226 2 , 1 9 6  22 , 1 36 
Lautoka* 4 2 2  4 , 26 3  61 7 3 , 294 709 8 , 289 
Nad i *  6 , 4 58 2 3 , 5 2 8  9 30 3 , 502 624 1 , 5 2 3  1 7 4 2  2 , 890 14 , 58 7  
Nadroga 312 740 303 29 7 2 , 4 72 70 600 30 2 , 806 
Bua 604 1 , 812 665 2 1 7  308 1 , 140 
Macuata* 8 31 500 1 , 500 4 , 6 86 1 , 805 5 , 69 8  2 0  3 , 844 4 , 686 14 , 034 
Savu Savu 4 2  2 2 7  32 152 4 78 
Tave uni n i l  
Levuka 
Lau 
To t a l  5 , 85 1  54 , 5 7 0  46 , 082 1 3 , 426 135 , 685 5 , 1 78 46 , 5 7 2  6 , 76 7 8 , 83 3  1 , 984 1 , 6 7 2  1 9 , 06 7  1 39 , 2 5 5  
Di s tr i c t  or L ive-stock Other property 
province 
Cattle Horses Goa t s  Sheep , p igs , Fowls Value Cutters , boats , Farm Val ue 
e t c . e tc . implements 
£ £ 
Suva 458 50 4 2  3 , 660 5 , 99 6  765 
Rew a 1 , 59 7  9 1  100 70 10 , 108 1 2 ,  7 7 7 1 7 1  4 1 2  2 , 018 
Tailevu 1 1 7  14 2 254 754 46 
Colo Eas t *  3 5  1 2 591 200 
Navua-Serua 892 25 19 2 2 2  3 , 325 4 , 982 36 not s ta ted 1 , 316 
Ra* 1 , 018 196 64 3 , 186 4 , 5 7 2  201 300 
Co lo North* 1 , 14 6  152 1 2 0  2 , 600 5 , 1 32 150 600 
Ba* 2 , 36 1  501 145 6 , 700 2 4 , 4 5 7  
Lautoka* 1 , 015 90 9 2 , 004 5 , 95 8  889 
Nadi* 2 , 5 30 2 35 82 6 , 5 1 5  14 , 709 4 ,  924 
Nadroga 881 1 36 152 3 , 910 23 14 7 5 51 
Bua 5 54 4 188 1 , 000 1 , 890 4 55 
Macua ta* 3 , 301 67 2 , 06 3  8 5  11 , 328 11 , 44 2  3 , 350 
Savu Savu 4 85 649 
Taveuni 
Levuka 
Lau 
Total 15 , 905 1 , 5 6 2  3 , 019 266 51 , 2 7 1  9 7 , 2 64 230 9 1 0  15 , 86 3  
Source : Cmd . 7 744-5 ( 1 9 14 ) ' Appendix 44 . 
Notes : The details s upplied are incomplete in respect of d i s t r i c t s  marked * ·  
The val ues are l ikely to have been exaggerated to impress the Ind ian governmen t  conun i ss ioners , McNe i l l a n d  Chinunan La l ,  for whom 
they were prepared . 
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capital had to borrow , while the shor tage of cap ital in 
the Ind ian community , toge ther with the poor secur ity that 
mo s t  borrower s had to offer , meant tha t loans could generally 
be obtained at only high rates o f  interest  - o f  ten over 30 
per cent a year . 52  Though the Fij i Sugar Co . made a few 
loans to growers ,  as did CSR af ter 1905 , t he restric t ion of  
loans to  tho se with good secur ity limited the  extent of  
advances . 5 3  Frequently , Indians on-lent Europein advances 
at  much higher rates of  interest  to compatrio t s  with less 
adequate secur ity . The resul t of high interest  rat es and 
rising land values was to increase cul t ivat ion cos ts and 
to limit the ab ility of plant ers , with their greater bargain­
ing power agains t the numerous and scattered Indian growers ,  
to reduce the price o f  crops bought from settlers . S 4 Never­
theless , in 1912  government and planters could have taken 
comfort  from the fact that Indian produce was normally cheaper 
than alterna t ive supplies , and that in the mos t  important 
respect settlement had developed on lines consistent with 
the needs o f  plantat ions - by far the maj ority o f  settlers 
were  farming small plo t s  of  land . S S  
Settlement helped Indians to improve their s tandard 
of  living sub s tantially . In 1912  they held over £ 16 , 000 in 
banks . 5 6  To this could be  added sums that were hoarded 
rather than banked , and capital which had been accumulated , 
say in the form of  lives tock ( see Tabl e  4 . 3) .  Yet economic 
development in this way was l imited by planters ' demand for 
cheap labour . Apar t from att emp t s  to get them to grow cane , 
set t ler s were seen pr imar ily as a source of  labour . Conse­
quently , planters were willing to lease them only marg inal 
land , and s ince rents seem to have not always taken the 
quality of soil fully into account , p erhaps this l imited the 
income set t lers could ob tain from their plo ts . The frequent 
stipulat ion that they work on plantat ions , or in the mil l , 
whenever required meant that  growers could be forced to l eave 
the land at t imes crit ical for  plant ing , cul t ivat ing or  
harves t ing their crops . I t  may also have helped planters 
to keep wages below what would have prevailed had there been 
perfect competition in the mar ket . In 1905 CSR ' s Labasa 
manager had hoped to  settle Indians on cond it ion that they 
work as required for ls 3d a day ; but t he free marke t wage 
of time-exp ired labourer s was of ten nearer to ls 6d , though 
it d id vary . Of par t icular s ignif icance was the encourage­
ment given to sett lement on small hold ings . Plo ts of under 
f ive acres suff ered ' incessant intens e cropp ing ' which caused 
the impover ishment of  the soil . In a report  on the condition 
of Indians in Fij i ,  C . F .  Andrews and W . W .  Pearson contras ted 
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the use o f  ' s cient ific cultivat ion ' ,  such as the ext ens ive 
us e of green manure , by the handf ul of large-scale Indian 
planters with the infer ior techniques of sma ll growers who 
overcropped the soil . 5 7  The prob lem was that to derive 
what  they cons idered to be an adequate income from th eir 
small farms , Indians failed to ro tate the land . The long­
term resul t  was reduc t ion in their incomes . So it was that 
the sugar indus try ' s  dep endence on cheap labour limited the 
contribution to economic development of Indian sett lement . 
Chap ter 5 
Crisis and change , 1912-19 2 3  
The period 1 9 1 2  t o  1 9 2 3  was a wa tershed i n  the his tory 
of the Fij i sugar indus try , for i t  was during these years 
that the supply of indentured labour came to an end . Though 
in Bri tain there had been growing oppos i t ion to it  on 
humani tarian grounds , it was na tionalis t agitation in India 
wh ich finally brought a halt to th is form of migrat ion . In 
1916 Lord Hardinge , the Viceroy , announced that the re crui t­
ment of  indentured labour would be prohib i ted when a less 
obj ect ionable scheme had been devised , but the danger of 
widespread dis turbances , and even mas s disob enience organized 
by Maha tma Gandhi , forced the Indian government the fo llowing 
year to s top all fur ther migration to the colonies for the 
durat ion o f  the war and two years af ter . The las t shipload 
of indent ured labourer s had already arrived in Fij i ,  but 
they did no t serve their full terms for , to satisfy pub lic 
op inion in India , all indentures in the colony were cancelled 
on 1 January 1920 . The sugar companies and planters reac ted 
to the threat , and then the reality of  the disrup t ion of  
their labour supply by  settling immigrants on  their es tates , 
in the hope tha t eventually their dep endence on imported 
labour might be greatly reduced . At the same t ime they tried 
to persuade India to permit a resump tion of  emigration on 
new terms , provided the conditions would no t cause a prohib­
itive rise in the co s t  of  labour . No new s cheme of immi gra­
t ion satis fying all par t ies could be devised , however ,  with 
the result  that at the end of the period , to overcome the 
shortage of lab our , CSR began to abandon the es tate form of  
product ion compl etely , in  favour o f  the cul t ivat ion o f  cane 
by Indian growers .  The preoccupat ion of  the period , then , 
was with the retent ion o f  a cheap supply of labour . 1 
Indian s e t tlement , 1 9 1 2 - 2 2  
In 1912 , several years before the f low of indentured 
immigrant s  ceased , both CSR and government had become con­
cerned about growing oppos i tion to this metho d o f  procuring 
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labour . Officials warned planters that ' the non-conformis t  
party ' in England , including s everal leading members of the 
Liberal Government , disapproved of exist ing arrangement s ,  
while CSR was well  aware of the mount ing feel ing ag ainst the 
sys tem in Ind ia following visit s by Thomas Hughes . Af ter a 
spell in Fij i ,  dur ing which - as the Labasa manager - he had 
been f ined for his treatment of Indian labour , Hughes had 
become a part-time internat ional ambas sador for CSR , and an 
expert on labour matters . In his vi ew ,  an even more serious 
and inunediate threat to the future of inunigrat ion was the 
growing demand for Indian labo ur . Although the populat ion 
of Uni ted Provinces and the Madras Pres idency , which suppl ied 
about 75 and 25 per cent respectively of Fij i ' s inunigrants , 
was put at 88 million , only a small proport ion of these were 
willing to migrate .  In 1912  Hughes estimat ed that agains t 
the requirement of  25 , 000 labourers  a year to all the sugar 
co lonies comb ined , annual migrat ion to tea districts within 
Ind ia had averaged about 350 , 000 over the previous ten years , 
while that to Ceylon had var ied f rom 150 , 000 to 1 75 , 000 . 
Migrat ion to the Malay S tates had r isen from 45 , 000 in 1909 
to 103 , 000 in 1911 . Already a shortage of labour was being 
felt in Ceylon : it could only be a mat ter of time before 
Fij i exper ienced the same . 2 To ' avo id the calamity that 
would fo llow a s toppage or ser ious cur tailment of the labour 
supply ' ,  C SR urged that new measures be adopted to set tle 
Ind ians near plantat ions . Knox wro te :  
The only means by which the position could be rendered 
r eally secure would be to make the indus try independent 
of inunigrat ion by permanent ly attachin� to it the 
people introduced for plantat ion work . 
CSR ' s  effor t s  in this direct ion were support ed by 
government , which saw improved facilities for immigrat ion 
part ly as a way to augment the co lony ' s  supply of labour 
but also , and o f  growing import ance , as necessary to persuade 
India to allow immigrat ion to cont inue . Added urgency was 
given to the quest ion by the visit in 1913  of the McNeil! and 
Chimman Lal Commission , sent from India to examine the con­
dit ions of indentured labour er s  overseas . The Commiss ion ' s  
recommendat ion that more be done to encourage settlement in 
Fij i4 met with a quick r esponse from officials , who were 
already dealing with one mat ter raised by the Commission -
the quest ion of  Indian indeb tedness . The high interes t rates 
associated wi th credit from storekeepers and money-lenders , 
occas ionally up to 120 per cent a year , made it mor e  diffi­
cul t  for intending set t lers to f inance the acquisition of  
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land . The government wondered if some fo rm of  co-operative 
cred it could be introduced to cheap en loans and facilitate 
settlement . Enquir ies about this had been made in India 
before the arr ival of McNe ill and Chimman Lal but in late 
191 3 , despite the Connnis sion ' s  concern about the problem ,  
government dec ided that the time was not yet ripe t o  intro­
duce co-operat ive credit societies . Not only would they have 
been very diff icult to supervise , but the security mos t  
Indians could offer was considered totally inadequate . The 
vas t  maj ority of set t lers held land on short tenure , even 
in government set tlements  where a s ix months ' occupat ion 
licence in st ead of a lease had become normal . I t  was resolved 
that ' the quest ion of grant ing advances to s e t tlers should 
await the f inal dec ision in r egard to the nat ive land 
question ' . 5 
Thus attent ion was focused on the leas ing of  Fij ian 
land . Following a recommendat ion by McNeill and Chimman Lal , 
the f ive-acre limit on leases of Fij ian agricul tural land 
was raised in 1914 to ten acres , with twenty acres for 
graz ing land , thereby increasing the income a new settler 
could expect to derive from his farm . Soon after , to increase 
returns to the owners , a sys t em of auct ioning leases o f  
Fij ian land was introduced , but t o  prevent this more com­
plicat ed and expensive procedure from hindering Indian set tle­
ment , leases of under t en acres of plant ing and twenty acres 
of  grazing land were made exemp t . In addit ion , secur ity of  
tenure for  Ind ians (and o ther s ) with registered leases was 
increased by Ord inance 2 3  of 1916 , under which if an owner 
refused to renew a l ease he had to compensate the outgo ing 
tenant for the value of permanent and inexhaus tible improve­
ments made during the currency of the lease . S ince Fij ians 
had d if ficul ty in rais ing cash to pay compensation , at leas t 
init ially leases were generally renewed , so increas ing the 
tenant ' s  feeling of security and reducing his need to brib e  
the owner to obtain a renewal . Y e t  the benef its o f  this 
were limited only to sett lers with registered leases . The 
maj ority o f  Fij ian land , those  with informal agreement s ,  
were unaf fected . 6 
Consequent ly , a more effective way to encourage set tle­
ment - and one that government tried - was to increase the 
amount of available land for l eas ing . The trouble was that 
it was vir tually impossible to open new government set tle­
ments because not enough Crown land was availab le , and 
Fij ians were reluctant to lease suitable blo cks for the 
purpose . For a ntnnb er o f  years off icials had been trying 
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to persuade Fij ians to hand over to government surplus land 
which would be leased on their behalf . Orig inally it had 
been hoped to throw this open to Europeans , but from 1912-1 3 
government acquisi tion of land in this way was seen in terms 
of Indian sett lement . In 1903 , 1911 and 1912  the Council o f  
Chiefs had suppor t ed proposals to make available to govern­
ment surplus land in t he colony , but despite official efforts 
to persuade Fij ians to give ef fect to the Council ' s  resolu­
t ions , especially that of 1912 , the response had been poor . 
Between 1912  and 19 14 Fij ians released land only in areas 
where for many years settlement was not likely to o ccur , or 
only on condit ions that would be unac cep table to pro spective 
tenant s .  They wanted all land that in the pas t had been , or 
might in the future be , used for p lant ing to be excluded . 
To overcome the problem , in 1914 Sir Ernes t Sweet­
Esco t t  ( governor , 191 2-18)  proposed to  establ ish Land Boards 
comprising the Dis trict Commis s ioner for the area concerned , 
the Roko and a land officer . The Boards would dis cus s with 
Fij ians what land was avai lable and t hen , on the advice of 
the Commis sioner of Lands and the Nat ive Commissioner , t he 
governor would decide what land sho uld be acquired in the 
public interes t , particular ly for Indian settlement . The 
Colonial Office refused to sanct ion the plan because of  
opposition f rom Fij ians who wanted a maj ority on  the Boards . 
Ins tead , the following year a compromise solut ion was agreed . 
Land could only be leased if it was f irst  handed over to 
government to  lease on the owner ' s  behalf . Fij ians were 
spared the fear that government would acquire land against  
their will , while government hoped t o  prevent direct 
negot iat ions between Indians and Fij ians which , by l eading 
to high premiums , was thought to have hindered the pro ces s 
of settlement ; the hope was no t in fact real ized , fo r 
Indians s t ill bribed Fij ians to  g ive their consent when 
propo sals to l ease were c onsidered by government . 7 
Mor eover , this attemp t to solve t he land ques t ion did 
not enable government to acquire large areas of  Fij ian land 
for Indian sett lement . Though under Ordinance 16  o f  190 6 
government could ob tain land compulsorily in the public 
interes t , the Colonial Off ice was aga inst any ac t ion in 
regard to Fij ian land that did not have the support of its 
owners . The only way to acquire large areas would be to 
persuade Fij ians to lease in return for high rents . I t  
was in this situat ion that off icials in 1915 welcomed CSR ' s  
offer , des igned t o  increase the company ' s  labour supply , 
to lend £100 , 000 for the acqui sition of Fij ian land , 
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improving it and sublet ting it to Indians at 5 per cent 
of the capital out lay . A trus t was set up in 1916  to 
administer the fund , but by 1918 none of the money had been 
spent and C SR withdrew the of fer . C ircumstance s had changed . 
Immigrat ion had s topped , so that  it  was no longer neces sary 
to settle the 3 , 00 0  or  so Indi ans who se  indentures would 
have expired each year . The problem now was no t so much 
to open up new land for settlement : rather , with the shor tage 
of labour to wo rk plantat ions , the need was to set tle Indians 
on exist ing estates so that they could cul t ivate cane them­
selves . Indeed , the more new areas made available the mo re 
diff icult it would be to find t enant s to oc cupy plantat ions . 
So paradoxically , though government had encouraged sett lement 
on Fij ian land largely in the interest  of plant ers , the very 
modes ty of its  achievement became , af ter the hal t  in immigra­
tion , a maj or contribut ion to meeting the immediate needs of  
the indus try . a 
S ince 1912  the Vanco uver-Fij i Sugar Co . and CSR had 
been trying to settle Indians on their estates . Though 
some were expected to take off -farm j obs as well , in an 
emphasis which had not been seen s ince 1905 it was intended 
that the maj ority should do no thing else but grow cane . In 
settling immigrants , the sugar companies  had to overcome the 
widespread tendency for yields on Indian farms to fall . In 
1912  it  was reported that some growers produced j us t  over 
eight tons an acre , compared wi th twenty-four tons or more 
under the plantation system . Because Indian methods of  
cultivat ion caused the  soil  to be exhausted ( due to  the  sho r t  
terms of  their leases ) , CSR ' s  managers i n  Fij i were  at first  
lukewarm toward head o f f  ice sugges tions that immigrants be 
set tled on company estates . There was also the problem that 
set tler s had shown a decided p reference for crops o ther than 
cane . Table 5 . 1  shows tha t between 1909 and 1913  there had 
been a decline in the output of Indian grown cane and an 
increase in the produc t ion of alt ernat ive crops . Though 
par t of the decl ine was due to the dis couragement of Indian 
cane produc tion at Navua , s ignif icantly the growth o f  the 
free Indian population had no t off  set  this dec line by an 
increase elsewhere . The importance of ensuring that tenants 
actually grew cane and that their cul t ivation pract ices were 
of a high s tandard was reinforced by Thomas Hughes ' s  examina­
t ion of the Maur itius sugar indus try in 1913 . It was re­
por ted that yields suffered because , once they had ob tained 
freeholds , many settlers were cont ent merely to exi s t  on 
the ir small plo ts . Whether the lack of incen tive was really 
due to land tenure is unclear , but CSR certainly interpreted 
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i t  in this light . Perhaps output was higher o n  leases 
because their occupant s had to meet rent obliga t ions which , 
in a per iod o f  r ising values , were likely over a numb er o f  
year s t o  exceed in to tal the freeho ld price . Moreover , 
the landlord could s t ipulate  conditions which would ensure 
that  a high output was maintained . Hughes also found that 
Indian smallholdings should have comprised about one-third 
of the total cane area in Maurit ius , but that many had gone 
out of cane while ' the Indians ' defec t ive agr icultural 
methods cons ti tute a source of grave anxiety as to the mills ' 
future supplies of cane ' . Pas t exper ience of settlement in 
Fij i and Maur i t ius , then , encouraged sugar companies to 
devise schemes that would enable them to exerc ise cons ider­
able control over their tenant s . 9 
Table 5 . 1  
Acreage of  crOES cul t ivated bl: free Ind ians , 1909-13 
Year Cane Rice Maize Bananas Beans Tobacco 
1909 7990� 7000 689� 1054 294 29 
1910 748 7� 9553  756� 9 7 9� 200 54 
1911 6630 11450!2 2221  1 3 38� 328 184 
1912  6 6 21 10008 2503  2064 559 100 
1 9 1 3  6233  13022  2 808 185 0  364 1 3 9  
Source : Indian Inunigrat ion Repor t s , 19 10-14 . 
Others To tal 
9 7� 1 7464!.2 
189� 1 9 220 
5 81 2 2 7 33 
141 � 21966� 
1056 254 7 2  
This need f o r  control was reflected i n  agreements , 
dat ing from 1912 , between the Vancouver-Fij i Sugar Co . and 
inunigrants whose indentures were due to exp ire in three to 
s ix months . In return for t he cancellat ion of his indenture , 
an Indian was obliged to  reside on a block of company land , 
to devo te the whole of his t ime to  the cul t ivat ion of cane 
unless given permiss ion by the company , to plant the varie ty 
o f  cane and do all the drainage work and cultivation required 
by the company , to deliver cane required by the company , to 
de liver cane free of  trash and of  a qual ity j udged by the 
company to be  sat isfactory , to  give no lien over hi s crop 
to third part ies wi thout the company ' s  consent , and to pay 
5 per cent inter est  on advances made by the company which 
would be a f ir s t  charge against the crop . The agreement s 
were to las t  t ill 1919 . Contrac ts with CSR ' s Indian tenants 
contained s imilar provisions , but with an addit ional one that 
forbade sublet t ing . 1 0 It  was one thing to make contrac t s  
but quite ano ther to  enforce them . Enf orcement depended on 
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the general sat isfac tion of  Indians wi th the sett lement 
schemes that were devised . Yet , even tho ugh the experiments 
up to 1922  attracted tenants , there was far from general 
cont entment wi th the conditions on which land was held . 
Dissatisfact ion s tennned largely from the s ize of  plo ts that  
were leased . 
The Vanco uver-Fij i Sugar Co . ,  for example , divided 
some of i t s  es tates into farms of about s ix acres of which 
no more than four , some t imes fewer , were suppo sed to be 
cropped in any one year . The manager in 1912 , Mr E .  Duncan , 
believed that £20 a year would cover a man ' s  l iving and 
working exp enses , and tha t the pro ceed s from a farm o f  that 
size would exceed this by a few pounds . In an ef fort to 
attract  growers , the company adop ted a policy of paying 
higher prices than elsewhere in Fij i .  At the s tart  it paid 
6d a ton for Malabar and ls 6d  for Badilla , more than was 
paid on the Rewa . It  also charged lower rent s than were 
often paid by Europeans in the d is tric t . Set tlers were 
expec ted to pay around s ix to seven shillings an acre . 
Ini t ially the company seems to have found the scheme qui te 
a success . By 191 7 the amount o f  Indian cane exceeded tha t  
grown b y  the company . Ye t ,  i n  a period o f  r is ing prices and 
of indus trial and polit ical unre s t  af ter the war , the po licy 
of  paying relatively high prices and charging mo derate rents 
was no t on its own enough to . satisfy tenants for long . What 
counted was the to tal net pro ceeds from cane , and these  were 
limited by the s ize of the farms . As was later recogniz ed 
(by CSR) , Indians were capable of farming more than s ix 
acres . Se t tl ers  a t  Navua found they had surp lus lab our 
which , under the terms of  their contracts , they could no t 
devo te to wage employment away from their farms . But the 
number o f  growers made it  dif f icult  for the company to 
enforce this provis ion , so that the likelihood of  settlers 
neglec t ing their plo t s  in search o f  s easonal wage employment 
was considerab le . I t  was likely , too , that in an attempt 
to increase their to tal income growers wo uld try to crop a 
larger area than that s t ipulated by the company , thereby 
adding to the problem of supervis ion and exhaus ting the soil . 
The se fac tors , toge ther with poor harves ts in 1918 and 1919 , 
account for the decline af ter 1917  in cane produc tion at  
Navua . By  the end o f  1921  output had fallen from a po tential 
of between 45 , 000 and 5 0 , 000 tons to 11 , 00 0 ,  and this was 
one of  the reasons given for clos ing the mill the following 
year . 1 1  
The small s ize of  farms also caused problems wi th one 
of CSR ' s  settlement .schemes , known as the ' set tlement area 
sys tem ' , which was s tar ted on the Vuci Maca plantat ion at 
Nausori in 1912 . Mo s t  o f  the farms were o f  fo ur to eight 
acres , producing dif f iculties similar to tho se at Navua . 
But there were o ther probl ems as well because , unl ike the 
Vancouver-Fij i Sugar Co . ,  CSR decided that the farms were 
too small for the growers to do th e necessary horse work 
thems elves . The company would have to do it for them . 
Init ially CSR made a fixed charge per acre for the work , 
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but i t  found that af ter mee ting this expens e plus rent , when 
yields were low the surp lus left  to growers was very small . 
So in 1916 the company switched to charging a fixed s um  per 
ton o f  cane , only to f ind tha t growers with high yields 
complained that they had to pay mo re for the same amo unt of 
horse work than those  whose farms produced less . To this was 
added ano ther difficul ty . In devis ing the s cheme , CSR had 
to ensure tha t the advantage of reducing the labour it  needed 
for cul tiva tion wo uld no t be o ff set by the need for more 
labour to plo ugh a large number of  farms , each with its own 
sys tem o f  rotation, than would have b een required to plough 
the land if worked by the company i tself . Consequently , CSR 
had allo t ted to four tenant s ,  say , an equal number of rows 
o f  cane on about sixteen acres . The s trips ran the full 
length of exis t ing es tates to enable the land to be wo rked 
as a single area - four acres p lant cane , four firs t ratoon , 
four second ratoon , four fallow . Growers owned strip s  in 
each o f  the four acres , were r espons ibl e  for hand work , and 
were to take individual care o f  their p lo t s  rather than work 
them on a co-operative basis as had th e ' share compani es ' 
b efore 190 6 . However ,  farming the s trips as a s ingle area 
enco uraged growers to gang toge ther to work the land co­
operatively under the gui dance of  a CSR overseer , the company 
advancing wages to the gang which deduc ted from the proceeds 
o f  a grower ' s  cane the cos t o f  the work done on his farm . 
The individual ' s  ident ification wi th his plo t  was reduce d ,  
while disputes arose when differences in the quality o f  land 
caused yields , and hence incomes , to vary between farms even 
though the amount o f  work done on each was the same . Planta­
tion labourers complained because growers were little mo re 
than labo urers in effect , and ye t their incomes were higher 
than if they had been employed as such . Dis putes between 
growers and the dissatisfac t ion of labourers increas ed the 
difficulty for CSR of controlling bo th groups , wi th the resul t  
that there would have been considerable risk f o r  the company 
if it  perpetua ted the s cheme ; at the same t ime , any p ro f its 
made from the land would have gone to the growers . C SR 
decided that the settlement o f  Indians on small plo t s  with 
the company doing the horse work had no t been a success , and 
the exper iment was terminated in 19 21 . 1 2 
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In 19 1 7  CSR tried a different settlement s cheme . 
Plantations , esp ecially in the wes t  of Viti Levu , were 
divided into 50- 70 acre farms which were handed over  to 
Indians , who were to be respons ible for all the horse as 
well as cultivat ion work . Some , as on its  Ma taniqara es tate 
at Ba , were fairly succes sful , but with o thers CSR had 
cons tant diff icul ty . At Lautoka it  was unab le to  p revent 
Indians on large farms sub letting the land at a pro f it . 
I t  ends always in t rouble , and our experience has b een 
thro ughout the Sigatoka d is trict  that , where large 
areas are concerned , the Indians have always par titioned 
them amongs t  themselves ,  and it is these cas es tha t 
are continually having us emb ro iled in tro uble wi th the 
Suva lawyers . We never get into l egal discus s ions or  
cour t  cas es wi th men on small areas . . . .  [ I t ]  ends in 
no thing but cont inual s trife , dissatis fac tion , squabb­
ling and quarrell ing , which makes such inroads into the 
happiness of the communi ty and the general inclination 
to work steadily . 1 3  
The company a lso had difficulty preventing its tenants from 
spending too much time away from their farms . In 19 2 3  this 
form of se t tlement was also abandoned . Once again , the 
problem had been the size of  blo cks l eased to Indians . 
A fur ther problem wi th these settlement schemes was 
that  the s ize of  farms aggravated , rather than helped so lve , 
the shortage of labour on plantat ions . If  a 50-70 acre blo ck 
was worked as a single farm by its  owner , hired labour would 
be required ; this would lead to compe t i t ion with p lanta tions 
for labour , making it more dif f icult to work the remaining 
one s  economically before they were leased . Bes ide this 
crit ical short-term problem ,  it  was doub t ful if in the long 
run large Indian-owned farms woul d overcome the labour sho rt­
age . If  all plantations were divided into fifty acres or 
so , was it l ikely that Indians wo uld work their labour so 
much mo re efficiently as to be able to farm wi th fewer men 
than Europeans ? And would Indians b e  mo re successful than 
planters in resis t ing demands for higher wages ? On the 
o ther hand , leasing in small p lo t s  of four or s ix acres , 
wi th a prohib ition on off-farm employment , added to the 
s carcity o f  labour by creat ing underemp loyment among growers .  
The numb er o f  Indians settled on a given area was greater 
than it  need have been . Moreover , the ' se t tlement area 
sys tem ' required C SR to maintain a small labour force -
about four men per one hundred acres - to do the p loughing , 
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so reducing the number o f  immig rants who could be set tled 
on the land . 1 4  In short , the sett lemen t scheme s tr ied 
be f ore 1 9 2 2  fai led  t o  ove r c ome the sho r t age of l ab our and 
to induce tenants to accept the cont rol of sugar companies 
failed because the farms we re e ither too small or too 
large . 
Plantat ions and their labour supp ly , 19 16-19 22 
When CSR b egan to set tle Indians in 1912 , Knox thought 
that eventually they might rep lace the European planter . 
His view was shared by the company ' s  Inspecto r ,  W . P . Dixon , 
a f ars igh ted  and forceful man , one of  the few senior managers 
able to s tand up to Knox,  and the person who wo uld eventually 
do mos t  to promo t e  the small-f arm sys tem in Fij i .  Af ter the 
report on Mauritius however , Kno x became less optimis tic 
than Dixon about the success  of settlement schemes . He was 
concerned no t only about the tendency for yields of Indian 
growers to fall , but also by a suggest ion that dependence 
on a large set tled populat ion in Mauritius was making it 
increas ingly di fficult for the mills to obtain labour . 
Consequently , Knox saw the set tlement o f  Indians as sub­
ordinate to the intere s ts of p lan ters . In 19 19 he gave 
c lear ins tructions to this effec t : 
We would say that  we do no t wish to do anything that 
woul d tend to prej udice the re turns of the European 
growers ,  such as cutt ing an undue propo r t ion o f  Indian 
grown cane now tha t ful l  supplies are available . 1 5  
Th ere were , then , no grounds for the fear among some Euro­
peans that CSR wanted to encourage Indian settlement at 
their expense - a fear that increased in 191 7 when the 
Nausori mill dis continued the practi ce of paying 6d  a ton 
les s  for Indian than for European cane . For Knox,  sett le­
ment was simply a precaution in case the supp ly of immigrant 
labour should fai l ;  so long as immigrat ion continue d the 
plantat ion sys t em would las t . 1 6 
The survival of  p lant er s  depended on control over 
labour cost s .  At t he beginning of the war , CSR tried t o  
cushion planters against what it real iz ed was an unavo idable 
rise in the pric e  of labour . To help t hem meet an increase 
in the minimum wage from l s  to l s  6d , in 1 9 1 5  the company 
introduc ed a war-time bonus of 2s 6d per t on of cane . I t  
also gave plant ers up to  6 d  a week p e r  man to help defray 
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the higher cos t  o f  providing rations , which by law had to 
be  supplied for the firs t six months o f  a person ' s  indenture . 1 7  
From 1916 , however , the emphas is swi tche d to helping planters 
solve the prob lem of escalating labour cos ts th emselves . A 
proposal by Knox tha t CSR mee t  par t of  the increased expens e 
to plant ers o f  impor ting immigrant s was defeated by the 
Board , thanks largely to the arguments of Dixon . I f  CSR 
promi sed to pay the extra pas sage money , there would be 
l es s  incentive for planters to economize  in their use o f  
labour . A smaller labour force , bo th o n  company es ta tes and 
on tho se  of planters , was es�ent ial if the s hor tage of labour 
was to be  overcome . 1 8 In pres sing this point , CSR could draw 
on its  experience in Queensland wh ere high labour co s ts since 
the turn of the century had led to the adop tion of labo ur­
saving devices . So the number o f  horses employed in Fij i 
was increased and mo tor trac tors intro duced , while Indian 
growers were encouraged to use bet ter farm imp lement s .  
Before 1916 an average throughout the year of thir teen to 
four teen labourers had been used  to cul t ivate one hundred 
acres . Within four y ears this had been reduced by 20 per 
cent . In addi tion , more s trenuous efforts were made to 
secure a permanent supply of lab our by set tling Indians on 
the edges of  plantations . All these measures were qui t e  
successful at  firs t ,  especially in wes tern Viti Levu and a t  
Labasa . But o n  the Rewa they failed t o  prevent CSR ' s  tenants 
from lett ing their es tates rever t to the company af ter 1915 . 1 9 
Beside the frugal use of  manpower , CSR was de termined 
to prevent the shor tage of  labour pushing wages to an un­
economic level . Before la te  1919  it  refused a further 
increase in cane prices , so l imi ting the ab ility of  planters 
to raise  wages . Pres sure was put on tenants no t to pay more 
in o rder to compete for labour , the extension o f  credit by 
CSR b eing a useful weapon to prevent t ho s e  on more pro f itable 
es tates getting out of line . 2 °  Fur thermore , on top of all 
its o ther advantages to CSR ,  th e encouragement of Indian cane 
cul t ivation was seen as a way to s trengthen res is tance to 
demands for bet ter wages . In 19 1 7  Indian growers at Lautoka 
had defeated an attemp t by labo urers to rai se mill wages by 
promis ing to work the mill thems elves . 2 1  Thereaf ter , CSR 
want ed to b ind growers s till more closely to the company . 
The resident inspe ctor  o f  immigrants at  Lautoka , S . S .  Lord , 
reported in 1920 : 
With the ingenui ty which is charac ter is t ic of  this 
company the pol icy seems to be  to create in each 
district a small number of weal thy cane planters , and 
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these will ac t as a buffer between the Co . and the 
ever-increase-demanding wage earner . The int erests  of 
these af f luent and influent ial Indian cane growers 
will be drawn towards th e company , for they become 
employers of lab our and thus wage payers . 2 2  
CSR ' s  own files show tha t this was a n  accurate descrip t ion o f  
company policy . In 1921 , however , i t  was no ticed that while 
CSR ' s cont rol over harves ting gangs enabled it to regulate 
the wages paid by growers to cut ters , wages of  Indians em­
ployed in cul t iva tion work were not so easy to control . 2 3  
No t only was the company anxious to prevent an increase 
in current wages : it was also de termined that any new scheme 
of immigration should no t be on terms that  would cause labour 
cos t s  to rise in future . Thus it was utterly opposed to a 
scheme o f  ' aided colonization ' devised in 1916 by an Inter­
Depar tmental Conference in London . The scheme would have 
entailed a mass ive rise in impor tation co sts  since a wife 
and up to two children could have been intro duced wi th each 
adult male . Immigrants would work for only three instead 
of  five y ears , so reducing the perio d  over which the expens e 
o f  introduc t ion could b e  recouped . Moreover , af ter s ix months 
in the colony the immigrant would be free to move from one 
employer to ano ther , thereby increas ing for p lant ers the 
dif ficul ty of controlling labour . The Conference sugges ted 
that the cos t of importa tion be met by a levy on each em­
p loyer , payable four t imes a year and based on the ntnnb er 
o f  recent immigrants in his service during the previous three 
months . In Fij i ,  however , in order to shif t the cos t from 
the planter to the mill er , government rej ec ted this las t 
sugges t ion in favour of  an export tax on sugar . I t  was no t 
surpris ing that CSR and the Vancouver-Fij i Sugar Co . united 
in opposition to the s cheme . 24  In  their view ,  i f  the opera­
t ion succeeded the patient would die . In 1919-20 an al terna­
tive plan for s tate-aided migrat ion was advanced by a govern­
ment-backed unofficial mis s ion to India , led by the B ishop 
of Polynesia . The plan was for immigrants to come specific­
ally to settle on the land without any obligation to work 
for a par ticular employer , their pas sages being paid from 
a common fund raised in the colony . Though Hughes di scussed 
the idea with the miss ion and made sugges t ions , the scheme 
would have been no solut ion as far as CSR was concerned . 
There was no guarantee of a con t inued supply of labour at a 
cost employers were prepared to  pay , while the like lihood of 
a spec ial tax on the indus try to cover importat ion expenses 
remained . 2 5  Though pub lic opinion in India and industrial 
unre s t  in Fij i during 1920 and 1921 were more re sponsible 
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than C SR f or the failure to intr oduce either of the se scheme s , 
it was cl ear that the terms on which the company wanted a 
re sumpt ion of immigrat ion we re t otal ly incompat ible wi th 
polit ical realities in Ind ia . Knox reacted with demand s that 
the Br itish gove rnment coerce India over the quest ion , that 
it pay as much at tent ion to bus ine ss intere s t s  in Fij i as it 
had to those  in Malaya and Ceylon who s e  supply of Indian lab­
our cont inued after the war , and that it honour Lord Hardinge ' s  
suppo s ed pledge in 1 9 1 6  that aft er the war a form o f  s tate­
aided migrat ion from India would be resumed . Although the se 
demands were totally unrealis t ic , given his opposition t o  a 
rise in labour co s t s  they were the only op t ion left t o  Knox . 2 6  
The General Manager ' s  appro ach was critici zed b y  some 
of the company ' s  senior officers like Dixon and Hughes , and 
by government . It was fel t  that Knox ' s  views were old­
fashioned , that he was insensit ive to public op inion in 
bo th India and Fij i .  The Colonial Office des cribed him as 
a ' peppery ar istocrat ' ,  and as ' an iras cible autocrat of 75 , 
no torio us for his met hods o f  dealing wi th s t r iker s  and 
bus ines s  opponent s '  • 2 7  S ince the 18 7 0s , t hrough his s ingle­
minded devo t ion to prof it and his grasp of the technicalit ies 
of  sugar produc t ion , Kno x had been largely respons ible for 
the succes s  and expansion of CSR . But now , during and af ter 
Wor ld War I ,  he was as much dominated by , as dominat ing , the 
company to which he had contributed so much . His ob s t inacy 
over wages and inunigrat ion , expressed in open at tacks on 
the Bri tish government , was no t s imply the id iosyncrasy of 
an o ld man . Rather , i t  was a reflection o f  conunercial 
real ities , of  an under standing o f  where the best interests  
of  CSR  shareholder s lay . 
And the one place they did no t lie was in the dis tribu­
t ion of windfall prof its in higher wages . S ince it was 
generally expec t ed that s ugar pr ices wo uld fall af ter the 
war , or  af ter their short-lived boom following the war , Knox 
was determined to res trict any increase in wages and cane 
pr ices to  what the indus try could support  once the world 
pr ice returned t o  ' normal ' ,  the pr e-war level . I t  would be  
easy to raise prices and wages but  much more  diff icul t  to  
reduce them later . Moreover , it  was by  no  means cer tain 
that a future supply o f  labour could be arranged . Apar t 
from the problems with India , the import o f  Chines e  and 
Japanese labour was impossible for polit ical reasons , while 
diff iculties with CSR ' s  sett lement schemes gave lit t le hope 
except to  Dixon - that Indian cane growers  wo uld provide 
an eventual solution to the shortage of labour . 2 8  There 
was , therefo re , a very real possibility tha t the industry 
would collapse . ' In such cir cumstances ' ,  Knox told Sir 
Cecil Rodwell ( governor , 1918-25 ) , 
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it behoves us to  husband , as far as prac ticable , any 
windfall der ived from high prices , so that in the 
event of a collapse , we may be in a position to re turn 
to our shareholders as large a propor tion as po ssible 
of the capital they have sunk in the colony . 2 9 
In o ther words , the indus try had become par t icularly high 
risk and correspond ingly high pro fit s were requir ed . 
CSR ' s  determinat ion to  limit the rise in labour cos t s  
increased the fric t ion between company and government that 
had existed before the war . Off icials appreciat ed the 
industry ' s  need for cheap labour , but felt tha t  if the com­
pany had spent more on improving the welfare of plantat ion 
worker s no t only would the indus trial unrest that hit the 
colony in 1920  and 1921 have been avo ided , but also the chance 
of finding an immigrat ion scheme accep table to Ind ia would 
have been increased . Although officials read ily accused 
Knox of being politically naive , they were hardly being more 
astute themselves in believing that India could be persuaded 
to allow immigrat ion to resume on terms that would have been 
economically viable for Fij i . 3 0  Nevertheless , government 
felt that CSR should do - and should have done - more to 
share its profits  with o thers in the ind us try , esp ec ially 
sinc e Rodwell estimat ed that the cos t of living for a single 
male Indian had risen from up to 7s a week before the war 
to as much as 12s  in 1919 . 3 1  At the same time , the price 
of raw sugar had risen from an average of £ 11 in 1913  to £ 16 
in 191 9 , reaching a peak of  £ 2 9  the following year ( see 
Table 5 . 2 ) . Despite CSR ' s  pro testat ions to the cont rary , 
government f el t  there was p lenty for the c ompany to dis­
tribute in higher wages ,  and in higher cane prices which 
could be passed on in bet ter wages by planters . Eyre Hut son , 
administering the government in 1916 , est imated that though 
the increase to date in sugar pr ices represent ed an extra 
prof it to CSR of  up to £5 a ton of  raw sugar , the bonus of 
2 s  6d to  planters represented a cos t to the company of under 
£ 1 . 3 2  Fur thermore , in order to minimiz e  increases in the 
price of ref ined sugar in New Zealand , the company had 
arranged to sell the bulk of Fij i ' s output during and 
immed iately af ter the war at pr ices , except in 19 21 and 1922 , 
below that on the world ' free ' market ( see Table 5 . 2 ) - an 
arrangement by which producer s in Fij i effectively subsidi zed 
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the consumer . Thi s aro us ed indignat ion among of ficials who , 
no t ent irely under s tanding the pos ition at f irs t , s uspect ed 
CSR of submi t t ing mis lead ing returns to the Cus toms Depart­
ment . In comp iling statist ics , government rel ied on CSR and 
the Vancouver-Fij i Sugar Co . for informat ion abo ut the 
_ quantity and value of sugar export s .  The value of exports 
in 1 915 , no t only to New Zealand but also to Aus tralia and 
Canada , was reported by these companies to be £1 2 a ton , 
whereas on the open market , as measured by the value of  
Java raws , they would have fet ched nearer £15 1 0s Od . Sim­
ilarly , export s  of molasses were valued by CSR at £ 1  a ton , 
although government had it ' on good authority ' that the open 
market va lue was twice that . Officials were incensed by what 
they took to be a ' monstrous unders tatement ' o f  expor t values , 
and were even more convinced that CSR could do more to improve 
the welfare of Indians . 3 3  
Year 
1913  
1914  
1915 
1916 
1917  
1 918 
1919 
1920 
1921  
1922  
1923  
Table 5 . 2  
Quant ity and value of sugar exports , 1913-2 3 
Tons exported 
94 , 710 
9 3 , 7 7 3  
85 , 5 62 
120 , 5 28 
9 7 '  3 35 
6 3 , 010 
64 , 348  
7 2 , 985 
7 2  ' 624 
71 , 7 31 
44 , 108 
a Value per ton 
( f . o . b . )  
£ 
11  
11 
12 
14 
15  
1 6  
16 
29 
28 
19  
20 
Raw sugar pr ices on 
world ' free ' marke t 
( c . i . f . London) a 
£ 
10 
19 
19 
22 
2 7  
25 
30 
66 
25  
1 6  
2 6  
Source : J . C .  Po t t s , ' The sugar industry in Fij i .  I t s  Beginn­
ings and Development ' ,  Transactions & Proceedings of 
the Fiji Society , 7 (1958 -59 ) ,  125 . A . G .  Lowndes 
( ed . ) , South Paeifie Enterprise , 443 . 
aThese are approximate  f igures per calendar year , no t 
per crushing season . The c . i . f . London price was 
rather higher than the f . o . b .  price of Java raws 
which were a better guide to the open market value 
of export s from Fij i .  
1 0 7  
Though off icials strongly disagreed wi th t h e  company ' s  
att itude , they did lit tle to force a change of heart . True , 
an expo rt tax on sugar was int roduced in 1 916 first a t  S s  a 
ton , then the next year at 10s and f inally at £1 in 192 0 .  
A tax on molas ses expo rts  o f  £ 1  a t  ton followed the year 
after . In 1920  an excess pro f i t s  tax , directed mainly at  
CSR ,  was also introduced . These measures incr eased the 
colony ' s  share of  the except ional pro f it s  be ing made but 
by t he t ime they were introduced , or increased as in the 
case of the export tax on sugar , a large proport ion of the 
pro f it s  had already accrued to the miller s . For CSR ,  though 
any taxat ion was deplored , these taxes were bet t er than 
being forced to raise wages and cane prices . When raw sugar 
prices returned to normal , it would probably be eas ier to  
per suade government to reduce taxat ion than to per suade 
labourers to accep t  lower wages . Indeed , what is str iking 
about their att itude is that though of ficial s  believed CSR 
should encourage an increase in wages ,  they did no thing to 
ensure that this was brought abo ut . Rodwell oppo sed rais ing 
the statutory minimum wage of indentur ed labourers in 1919 
lest this make the industr ies of t he colony uneconomic , 3 4  
and when in November of t h e  same year wages of unskil led 
employees of government in Suva wer e increased f rom 2s  to 
2 s  6d , of f icials made sur e that wages on the Rewa and Navua 
d id no t rise by the same amount ( s ee Table 5 . 3 ) .  Par ity 
between government urban and rural worker s was abandoned so 
as not to put pressure on wages in the sugar industry . 
Whatever off icials might say - and s ignif icantly in terms of 
what they were saying , t he 1 9 2 0  strike by labourers in Suva , 
Rewa and Navua began as a pro t est aga inst longer hour s of 
employment (for the same wages ) in the Public Works Depart ­
ment - the r eluctance of government to force u p  wages in 
the sugar indus try reinforced C SR ' s  s trategy of limit ing 
wage incr eases . 
The outcome of  this policy was a decl ine in the real 
incomes of free Indian labourers .  Table 5 . 3  shows that 
wages of non-government employees on the Rewa and Navua rose 
by 33 per cent between 1913 and 1 9 2 0 . A commission to 
inquire into the cost of living , appointed in 1920 and 
chaired by the Ac t ing Chief Justice A . K .  Young , est imated 
that in the same per iod the average price of Indian food­
stuf f s  had r isen by between 86 per cent and almo s t  100 p er 
cent , dep end ing on how items were we ight ed . 3 5  Mor eover , the 
increase in rural wages had occurred before the end of 1917 , 
whereas much of  the r ise  in pr ices had come lat er . Ther e 
was part icular distress in 1919 because mos t  of  the rice 
108 
and sharps consumed in Fij i were impor t ed f rom Aus tral ia , 
which in turn impo rted from Ind ia . The flow of trade that 
year was d isrup ted by a ban on the export  of rice from Ind ia 
fol lowing the widespread fa ilure of the crop , by a prohibi­
t ion on the expor t  of sharps from New South Wales and by a 
shipping strike in Australia . The situat ion was aggravated 
s t il l  further because merchants in Fij i used the shortage to 
prof iteer at the consumer ' s  expens e . 3 6  In early 1920 
labourers in Suva , Rewa and Navua went on s t r ike . Though the 
stoppage had important political dimensions , it was essent­
ially a protest  at the st eep rise in the cost of living . 
Table 5 . 3  
Movement s  in wage rat es of unskilled labourers in Suva , 
Rewa and Navua , 1913-20 
Government employees Non-government employees 
Year Suva Rew a & Navua Year Rew a a Navua b 
s d s d s d s d 
1913  2 0 2 0 1 9 1 3  1 6 1 6 
1919 2 6 2 0 1915 2 0 1 6 
1917  2 0 2 0 
Source : ' Commission to Inquir e into the Cos t of  Living ' ,  C . P .  
46/1920 . 
Not es : aBased on CSR wages . 
bBased on Vancouver-Fij i Sugar Co . wages .  
There  was talk of strikers demanding a wage of f ive shillings , 
and resentment was expressed aga ins t merchant s  who were held 
respons ible for price increases . The s t r ike was quickly 
brought to an end through a display of force by government 
which , in an effort to reduce the cos t  of  living , soon af t er 
began to sub s idize the sale of imported r ice and encourage 
the local cultivat ion of foodstuf f s . Sub sequently the hut 
tax , the main d irect  tax on Ind ians , was abolished as were 
customs duties on cer tain food imports . The react ion of 
official s , then , was not to increase wages which plant ers 
and o ther European employers might be unable to af ford : 
rather , it was to switch the burden of taxat ion ( thro ugh 
higher export dut ies and the excess profits  tax) away from 
Ind ians to sugar companies , who were do ing except ionally well 
from phenomenal ly high pr ices in 1 9 20 . Since the high co s t  
of living was likely to b e  short lived - prices would fall 
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when the po s t -war boom was over - it wa s natural for govern­
ment to prefer as a solut ion temporary relief from taxat ion 
rather than wage inc reases which might be diff icul t t o  
revoke lat er . This was cons i s t ent with CSR ' s  view, thou�h 
the company obj ected to paying more in taxat ion i tself . 7 
The 1920 str ike was conf ined to south and southeast 
Vit i Levu and d id no t affect  cane districts  elsewhere ,  even 
though the Indian community throughout Fij i had come on hard 
t imes following poor cane harve s t s  in 1918  and 1 9 1 9 . No t 
only were labourers in diff icul ty . Many growers were heavily 
in debt , having borrowed large sums to obtain land at values 
which had risen sharply dur ing the war . Under the leader­
ship of T.  Riaz , in 1919 Ind ian growers in west ern Vit i Levu 
proposed an ambit ious s cheme und er which CSR would take over 
their deb t s , but the company refused to become invo lved 
becaus e of the complexity of the problem - leaving , it might 
be t hought , a s ituat ion ripe for industrial act ion by growers 
as well . 3 8  Ye t out side Suva , Rewa and Navua , wher e many 
growers supported the s t r ike , none oc curred in 1920 . Why 
was this ? The main reason was that compared with o ther 
district s ,  a higher propor t ion of Indian cane farmers in Rewa 
and Navua occupied extreme ly small farms - a couple of acres 
or less . Consequently , off -farm employment and wage rat es 
were more important to them than to growers  elsewhere . Suva 
was a maj or  centre for ca sual emp loyment . There was no town 
of  equivalent s ize  in western Vit i Levu or Vanua Levu . The 
introduct ion of longer hours for the same wages in the Public 
Works Depar tment , which sparked off  the 1920 strike , repre­
sent ed an attemp t to reduce hourly rat es . Since governmen t 
was the larges t employer of unskilled labour in Suva , th is 
was bound to influence the wages for casual labour in the 
city , thereby affecting a large number of part-time growers 
on the Rewa . So they were wil l ing to make common cause wi th 
the urban labour er s  on st rike . 
In contrast , cane growers on the wes t  of  the two main 
islands were less  dependent on casual lab our as a source of 
income . This was t rue even of those on very small farms , 
s ince for clima t ic reasons yields were higher than in Rewa 
and Navua . CSR appeased these growers with a number of 
conces s ions . First , the company promised to  increase the 
bonus on cane prices for 1920  from 2s 6d to 5 s , making a 
to tal price of 15s . Under pres sure from growers ,  by mid-
1920 the bonus had been raised to lls with the off  er of an 
extra 2 0s for every acr e planted in cane . 3 9  Thus cane 
prices in 1920 wo uld be over 100 per cent higher than in 
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191 3 ,  meaning that if the general pr ice level had moved 
at the same rate as in Suva , Rewa and Navua , real cane 
prices would have been mainta ined , if  no t slightly increased . 
Grower s wo uld be less likely to suppor t  a s t r ike by labourer s 
and , indeed , might be expected to  defeat one as they had in 
1 91 7 . With growers satisf ied , CSR was able to make a less 
generous offer to  labourers ,  increas ing the bonus on wages 
by 6d to make a to tal wage of  2s  6d  a day . This represented 
a 66 per cent rise on the 1 91 3  rat e , which was almo s t  
certainly no t enough to compensate for changes i n  the cos t  
of  living . Yet witho ut the suppor t  o f  growers ,  who could 
always man the mills in the event of a s t r ike , wage-earners  
were in  no  posi tion to push for a bet ter deal . CSR had 
cap italized on divis ions within the Indian community . 
The bonus on cane prices and wages was a breach o f  
CSR ' s  policy of  limit ing wage and pr ice increases . The 
company had no t abandoned this as a long-term obj ec t ive , 
but the excep t ionally high wor ld sugar pri ces in 1920  made 
it eager to  mill as large a crop o f  cane that  year as 
pos s ible . Profits  would then be  increased , p lacing i t  in 
a stronger position should one or more of i t s  Fij i mills 
have to be closed . However , the wo rld price soon began to 
fall , as CSR had long predicted it would ,  and in lat e 1 9 20 
the company announced that the price it wo uld pay for cane 
in 1 9 21 would be 20s - no t 2ls - a ton , and that it would 
s top paying the 20s an acre bonus . 4 0 Thi s  might have b een 
accep ted by growers if government had had greater success 
in reduc ing the co s t  of  l iving , but the abolit ion of  cus toms 
dut ies on certain i tems was not passed on by merchants to 
the consumer . Merchants , who to the d isgus t of Knox s till 
charged one price to Europeans and a higher one to other s , 
reaped the benef i t . 4 1  The reduct ion in cane payments 
encouraged growers ,  par t icularly those  on small farms who 
did no t hire worker s ,  to support labour ers in wes tern Viti 
Levu so that they s t ruck in early 1 9 21 . Though it  had 
political signif icance , the s trike was caused mainly by 
economic gr ievances . In the view of T . E .  Fell , the Colonial 
Secre tary , ' There is no doubt that ther e is a poli tical 
aspect to this quest ion . . .  but the indus trial aspect is  
being made the peg on which to hand these political asp ira­
tions . '  4 2 Demands fo r improved conditions of wo rk and a 
12s wage were  made . 
The str ike lasted for six months t ill mid-Augus t ,  and 
the pr inc ipal conces sion won from the company - belatedly 
at that - was an offer to impor t essential supplies and sell 
1 1 1  
them to labourers at cost . Despite pres sure from some o f  
his co lleagues , Knox had refused to  make th is concession 
before lest CSR al ienat e the bus iness  community in Fij i . 4 3  
The company , indeed , had been so concerned about it s publ ic 
image dur ing the war that for a while i t  had f inanced the 
Fiji Times , in order to have a newspaper sympathetic to its  
po int of  view . 4 4  Evidence of  profit eering by merchant s ,  
however , especially after the tariff changes in 1920 , f inally 
per suaded Knox to try to reduce the Ind ians ' cost of  living . 
Ye t the concess ion was no t enough to induce s t r ikers to 
return to work and they stayed out for ano ther two months . 
The company was helped in defeat ing the strike by the long­
term interest of growers in having the ir cane · crushed . If  
the s tr ike was prolonged much beyond Augus t ,  harves t ing and 
milling would be d isrupted . As early as April CSR no t iced 
a rift  developing between Indian labourers and growers ,  and 
it sought to widen the breach by off ering inducements to 
leading growers . 4 5  Knox even thought that a few of the 
lat ter had encouraged a s trike early in the year so that it 
would be over by the time crushing began . 4 6  Also impor tant 
was the suppor t  that CSR could draw on from the res t of the 
community . With the support of  the chief s , the miss ions 
recruited Fij ian labour to do essential work on plantations , 
part icularly in looking af ter the livestock which represented 
a signif icant cap ital inves tment . This played some part in 
ending the strike by showing the ab ility of planters and the 
company to s i t  it  out . There was also suppor t  from govern­
ment , whose ac t ion to prevent int imidat ion encouraged a 
return to work . 4 7 So the dispute was brought to a close . 
The s trength of  CSR ' s  posi tion had been demonstrated , 
enabl ing it without ano ther s t r ike to announce in early 1922  
that , because of  a further drop  in  the wo rld price , wages 
would be reduced t o  ls 6d a day and cane pr ices to 10s . 
Al though CSR had tr ied to  prevent the shortage of 
labour leading to an increase in cos t s , no permanent solut ion 
to the shortage had been devis ed . Inst ead , the decline in 
Indian real incomes had made the problem worse by encouraging 
a substant ial number of immigrant s to return to India : 4 , 7 41 
left in 1920 . 4 8  The fall in l iving s tandards also ended 
any linger ing hopes that India would allow sys temat ic emigra­
t ion to resume . In 1922  a deputat ion from India arr ived in 
Fij i to see if cond i tions in the colony might j us t ify a 
scheme of free Indian migra t ion . The deputat ion was appalled 
by CSR ' s announced reduct ion in cane prices and wages , and 
advised aga ins t any such scheme . No t only had no resump tion 
of Ind ian immigrat ion been arranged , but by early 1 9 2 2  no 
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alternat ive supply of  cheap labo ur had been f ound . The 
various attemp t s  at Indian sett lement had no t proved much 
of a success . Consequently , planters who had no t alr eady 
abandoned their estates did so af ter the 1921  s trike , which 
had prevented plant ing and cul t ivat ion . The Melbourne Trus t 
Co . ,  which owned Penang , and the Vancouver-Fij i Sugar Co . 
announced that they would c los e . Wi th growers refus ing to 
plant cane . for 10s a ton and labourers refusing to work for 
l,s 6d , CSR threat ened to do the same . The indus try , as it 
had hitherto been run ,  appeared to be on the verge of 
collapse . 4 9  
The salvage of  the Fij i sugar indus try 
The indus try was saved by two things . 5 0  The firs t  
amounted to  sub s idies from the rest  of the community , agreed 
in 1 9 2 2  during a crisis vi sit  by Knox to the Colonial 
Office . 5 1  Export taxes on the indus try were removed , though 
several year s later a duty on s ugar exports  was again 
introduced . This t emporary relief from taxat ion affec ted 
those outs ide the indus try becaus e  government expenditure 
say on the Department of  Agriculture , which was concerned 
with other crops than sugar - was reduced as a result . More 
s ignif icant was the effect on Indians who , from 1 92 3 , were 
required to  pay a res idential tax of £1 p er male aged 
between 15 and 60 . A poll tax on Indians had been con­
s idered soon af ter the abolition of the hut tax , which had 
lef t  them as the only maj or ethnic group no t paying a direc t 
tax - a s i tuat ion , government feared , that  might lead to 
protests  part icularly from the Fij ians . Fell had originally 
hoped that the poll tax would be  graduated , £1 being a 
maximum , and that cases of hardship ranging from illness to 
hurr icane damage would be made exemp t . The tax on Fij ians 
could be reduced so that  overall they wo uld pay the same as 
Indians . The abolit ion of export dut ies , which had raised 
£44 , 000 in 1 9 2 2 , 5 2  pr evented Fell ' s  hopes from being real­
ized . The res ident ial tax - a poll tax in effect - was 
introd uced in an ungradua ted form ,  and vir t ually without 
exemp t ions . Ther e were protes t s  aga ins t it  from CSR , who 
believed (wrongly as it happened ) that the tax would lead 
to further industrial unrest , but having abo lished export 
duties on sugar , government was desperate for the £ 3 7 , 000 
the new measure would yield . I f  this had not been the case , 
the introduct ion of  the tax might well have been delay ed . 
Officials j us t if ied the new imposi t ion as a sub s t itute for 
the hut tax , but under the lat ter Indians had paid an 
1 1 3  
average of  only 1 0 s  p e r  adult male and CSR , i n  1919 , had 
paid £ 7 , 6 35  of the to tal £2 3 , 684  rai sed in this way . Under 
the new tax Indians would pay 20s a head and CSR no thing . 
In short , CSR had obtained temporary re lief from taxation 
while that given to Indians , by the aboli tion of the hut tax , 
had been removed . Since Indians were expected to benefit 
f rom a cont inuation of the sugar indus try they were , in 
effect , being asked to help pay the co s t  of their own salva­
tion as well as that  o f  CSR . 5 3  
The more important subs idy , as far as CSR was con­
cerned , was an imperial prefer ence on import s  of raw sugar 
to Br itain . This had been introduced in 1919 , but it  was 
no t till his vis it to London that Knox realized the pref er­
ence applied to Fij i ,  as well as to the Wes t  Indies and 
Mauritius . This was o f  great s ignif icance as raw sugar 
produc tion in Aus tralia had increased rapidly s ince the war . 
The dominion was about to become no t only self-suff icient 
but an exporter of raws as well . This meant that the Aus t­
ralian market , which would have been valuable because o f  
the relatively high price o f  refined sugar , was now closed 
to Fij i , forcing the colony to rely on exports to  Canada and 
New Zealand . The former granted a preference on sugar im­
ported from the Empire , but the lat t er did no t . By exporting 
mainly to Britain rather than New Zealand , the Brit ish 
preference would enable Fij i to  sell almos t entirely in 
preferential market s . Mos t  of New Zealand ' s  requirements 
could be met by low cos t impor t s  from Java , allowing the 
price of ref ined sugar to be kep t to a minimtUn . Knox cal­
cula ted that the Brit ish preference of £3 15 Od a ton was 
wor th only 35s in Fij i because of  higher transpor t cost s than 
from the Wes t  Ind ies . Nevert heless , this would enable the 
company to increase cane pr ices to 13s 6d a ton and pay a 
bonus of  6d  a day to labourers . CSR could also cont inue the 
supply of essent ial clo thing and foods tuf fs at cos t pr ice , 
so bring ing the total wage to the equivalent of j ust over 
two shillings a day . Finalize d af ter Knox ' s  return from 
London , this arrangement was enough to persuade Indians 
to plant cane and enter cash employment . The imperial 
preference is of ten said to be a sub s idy by constUners in 
Britain , but it also entailed a sub s idy by constUners in 
Fij i .  Af ter introducing the preference in 1919 , the United 
Kingdom government asked all s ugar colonies to reciprocate 
by grant ing a preference on Brit ish impor t s . In Fij i duties 
on art icles of non-Brit ish origin were ra ised by an average 
margin of 12� per cent . Hencefor th , consumers would ei ther 
have to pay more for imports , or they would have to purchase 
less pre ferred British goods . 5 4  
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The second reason for the survival of  the sugar 
indus try was the settlement of Indians as cane growers . 
Bearing in mind the general fa ilure  by 1 9 2 2  of  CSR ' s  set tle­
ment schemes , Knox had no t been very op timis tic abo ut swit ch­
ing from estate to smallholder product ion within a short  
space of  time . S S  Cons equently ,  during his  visit  to London 
he had linked his will ingnes s  to increase wages and prices 
to the renewal o f  innnigrat ion . Yet desp i te concess ions made 
by Fij i ,  the Indian government was s till not prepared to  
permit a scheme of s tate-aided migra t ion . With no  prospect 
o f  an increase in the labour supply , there arose a clear 
need to proceed as rapidly as po ssible with Indian sett lement 
in order to overcome the shortage of labour . To this was 
added the fear that wage-earners might take advantage o f  the 
s itua t ion and put pressure on the company to improve rates 
of pay . Given the exper ience o f  1920  and 1921 , head office 
thought that Indians were l ikely to be more loyal to the 
company as cane growers than as labourers .  The Labasa 
manager was tol d in 1925 , wi th referenc e to  the 30 , 000-odd 
acre s s t ill farmed by CSR :  
the fur ther we  pro gress in  the work of bringing these 
back into pro duc tivity the greater becomes our s take 
in the cult ivation , and o ur vulnerabi lity to at tack by 
labour agitators or by tho se who may desire to put 
pres sure on us by interfering wi th our labour supply 
[ Therefore ]  we mus t push on in the direction of  re­
ducing the risk in the only way possible , viz . the 
cur tailment of  area by l eas ing to farmer s - who will 
provide t heir own labour supply - as rap idly as suit­
able tenants can be f ound . 5 6  
Set tlement was seen a s  a means of  labour contro l . 
The scheme that was finally devised owed much to the 
experiment s  in Indian set t lement s ince 1912 , and much , too , 
to the effor t s  of  Dixon , who thro ughout had remained con­
fident about the f inal outcome of thes e trials . In 19 22-23 
there was discuss ion about what form Indian settlement should 
take . The Rarawai mill favoured a cont inuation o f  the 
forty-- to fif ty-acre sett lement scheme : Lautoka was agains t 
it . 5 7  The solut ion was a compromise . The pract ice o f  close 
company supervision of  growers ,  as developed at Ba , was 
adopted at all the mills . S S The ownership of farms as 
single unit s ,  rather than as four separate s trip s  under the 
sett lement area scheme , was also cont inued . But instead 
of leas ing farms of only four acres , or o f  between for ty 
and fifty acres , it was decided to l ease them in sizes of 
eight to twe lve acres . R . T .  Rutledge , CSR ' s  Inspector , 
concluded from a vis it to Fij i in 1925 , 
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Even on tho se Estates where the lab our supply is short  
I believe the leas ing o f  8-12  acre blocks will be 
found mos t  satisfac tory in the long run . . • .  For every 
8-1 2 acres so leased we reduce the labour requirements 
by one , whereas for every 4 acre block leased we lose 
one man for t he greater part of the time if no t wholly , 
and s till have 6 to  8 a cres lef t on our hand s which 
the tenant would be capable of cultivat ing for him­
self . 5 9 
Thus the main disadvantages o f  the two ear lier schemes were 
overcome - underemployment on small farms and the employment 
of wage labour on , or subdivis ion of , large farms . Settle­
ment on this basis proceeded apace , and was largely com­
pleted by the early 1930s . In the selection of  tenant s ,  head 
off  ice asked that priority be given to tho se no t currently 
employed by the company , so as no t to deplete the size of 
the labour force . 6 ° Consequently , thos e on non-company land 
tended to become t enants of CSR , while those  wo rking for the 
company in the 1 9 20s more o f ten became contrac tor s - tha t is , 
they occupied Fij ian or European land and sold cane to CSR 
by agreement . 
The result of  set tlement was that  the cost  o f  cane 
was s tab ilized at around the level in 191 7-18 , before the 
end of inunigration had had its full impact  ( see Table 5 . 4 ) , 
whereas re turns to the grower f rom days worked on his farm 
were subs tantially mo re than he would have earned as a 
labourer . Average net returns from growing cane in 1 9 30 
were estimated to be £ 9  12  Od per acre cropped . 6 1  As suming 
at mos t twenty man-days p er acre , 6 2  the average return for 
a day ' s  work would have been 9 s  7d . The equival ent wage 
rates for Indians had risen , ye t the cos t of cane to CSR 
remained s table . Why was this ? One reason probably was 
that the smallfarmer used his labo ur more ef f iciently than 
when he worked on plantat ions . With a greater interest  in 
the outcome of his work , he achieved a higher output per 
hour . He also had access  to  the labour of his family , at  
no monetary co s t . Ano ther reason was that par t of the  cos t  
o f  supervis ion on plantat ions was dis tributed as extra 
income to the grower . Ins tead of  labour gangs being super­
vised for cultivat ion work each day , the self -emp loyed 
farmer supervised himself . Though overseers paid frequent 
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visits  to  growers ,  the amount of  detailed direct ion was less 
than on p lantat ions . This was reflected in the number of 
over seers employed by CSR in the late 1 9 30s . One over seer 
looked after between 100 and 200 farms , the equivalent of 
1 , 000 to 2 , 000 acres or more . 6 3  On plantations there had 
been at leas t one European , o f ten several , per 500 to 1 , 000 
acre s . As well as the saving in supervis ion cos ts , growers 
had the benef it o f  prof its some t imes made by Europeans or 
the c ompany over and above the expense of  supervision . So 
it  was that growers could do very well from the smallf arm 
sys t em ,  while CSR would be no worse o f f . Clearly , the 
company ' s  main obj ective had b een achieved . 
Table 5 . 4  
Cos t  o f  cane to CSR,  1 9 1 3- 30 
Year 
191 3  
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917  
1918 
1919 
1920  
1921  
Cos t  
£ 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
9 
8 
of  cane 
s d 
1 0  7 
4 11 
5 9 
0 11  
5 10 
9 1 
12 2 
4 5 
11 6 
Sour ce : CSR S 2 . 0-2 , Lib rary , CSR Ltd . 
Year 
1922  
1923  
1 9 24 
1 9 25 
1926  
1 9 2 7  
1928 
1 9 29 
1 9 30 
Co s t  o f  cane 
£ s d 
7 10 3 
10 10 5 
7 16 7 
6 7 11  
7 3 7 
6 8 4 
5 15 1 
6 12 2 
6 9 0 
By keeping its  operat ions viable , CSR could derive 
full benefit  from the windfall profits  it had made in Fij i 
s ince 1913 . For mos t  of  this per iod the company ' s  Fij i and 
New Zealand b us ines s  had been run as a separate ent erpris e , 
the Colonial Sugar Ref ining Co . (Fij i and New Zealand) L t d , 
es tablished in 1915 . This was a f inancial device more than 
anything , ownership being unaffected . Shareho l ders of CSR 
held preference share s in the new company , while a small 
number of  ordinary shares (with the righ t  of cont rol) were 
held by CSR its elf . The company ' s  f inancial fo rtunes , in 
both senses of  the word ,  are shown in Table 5 . 5 .  From 1915 
to 19 2 3 ,  when it  was wound up , shareholders received at 
least  £ 4 , 131 , 5 6 2 , by far the mo s t  o f  which came from Fij i .  
The to tal was in fact higher than this , for bes ides exclud­
ing the small dividends paid to the ordinary shareholders 
( in r: )  
Share capital 
pref . shares 
ord . shares 
Value o f  assets 
at liquidation 
Liquid assets 
' F ixed and 
floating' 
assets 
Shareholders 
receipts 
Pref . Shares 
Dividend 
Repayments 
Bonus 
Total 
Ord . Shares 
Dividend 
Repayments 
Bonus 
Total 
Total receipts 
1915-23 
Lesa original 
capital 
Gains to 
shareholders 
As % original 
inve stment 
1 1 7  
Table 5 .  5 
The Colonial Sugar Refining Co . ( Fi j i  and � e «  Zea lan d )  Ltd,  1 9 1 5 - 2 3  
31 !-larch 19 1 5  t o  
3 1  March 1 9 2 0  
1 Apri l  1 9 2 0  to 
3 1  Sep tember 1920 
1 Oc tober 1920 to 
31 �larch 1 9 3 3  
31 March 1 9 2 3  to 
15 May 1 9 2 3  
31 Xarch 1 9 1 5  to 
15 Xa,· 1 92 3  
3 , 2 50 , 000 3 , 250 , 000 1 , 62 5 , 000 
250 , 000 2 5 0 , 000 250 , 000 
9 7 5 , 000 
Not known 
3 , 5 00 , 000 3 , 500 , 000 
9 7 , 500 
1 , 6 2 5 , 000 
� 
9 7 5 , 000 1 , 9 2 5 , 6 25 
Not known 
9 75 ,OOO 1 ,  925 , 625 
2 4 3 , 750 
Not known 
1 , 8 75 , OOO 
In liquidation, 
1 5  May 1923 
No t app l icable 
2, 8 7 9 ,  5 7 8  Not applicable 
1 , 607 , 609 
---
4 , 4 3 7 , 1 87 
1 2 , 18 7  1 , 32 8 , 4 3 7  
1 , 6 2 5 , 000 3 , 25 0 , 000 
--- � 
2 4 3 , 750 1 , 6 3 7 , 1 87 4 , 7 8 1 , 5 6 2  
2 4 3 ,  750 
Not known Not known 
250, OOO 250, OOO 
2 , 600,000 2 , 6 00 , 000 
2 , 850, 000 2 , 85 0 , 000 
4 , 487 , 187 7 , 631 , 5 62 
3,500,000 
4 , 131, 562 
118% <-
14 . 75% 
p . a . )  
Source: A . G .  Lowndes ( ed . ) ,  South Pacific Enterprise , 2 29 - 30 0 ;  Colonial Sugar Refining Co . Ltd ,  Half Yearly Reports ; CSR 
F 3 .0-1, CSR F3 . 0- 3 .  
Notes : 1 .  No allowances made for general price increases up to 1920 , and slight fall thereaf ter . 
2. Original share capital represented total funds available to the company. Number of preferential shares was 
162, 500, of ordinary shares 1 2 , 500 . The dividend on preferential shares was fixed at 6 per cent p . a .  
3 .  The repayment o f  preferential shares i n  1920 took place a few weeks later than 1 October. The exact date is 
not known; and 1 October has been chosen for i t s  convenience . 
4. Of the -£2 , 600, 000 received as bonuses in May 192 3 by CSR, in its capacity as holder of ordinary ahares in 
The Colonial Sugar Refining Co . (Fij i and New Zealand) L t d ,  the shareholders in the parent company received 
a distribution a s  follows: 
In cash £ 32 5 , 000 
To restore the paid-up value of their shares from £16 to £20 
each ( £4 per share had been returned to shareholders in 1920) 650 , 000 
A share issue (1 for 2) as counterpart o f  assets received back 
from the subsidiary. 1 , 625 , 000 
£ 2 , 6 00 , 000 
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for which figures are no t available , it  allows for the 
writing down of assets in Fij i to £ 1 , 1 39 , 000 . This was done 
largely for polit ical reasons . The Board had want ed the 
assets to be wr itten in at about twice that sum ,  wh ich is 
what they were wor th , but Knox persuaded it  agains t this les t 
the Co lonial Office should think that the grievances o f  
which CSR had complained had been dispelled . 6 4  The valuat ion 
of assets according to polit ical cir cumstances was to be  
repeated in  later years , and formed an impor tant aspect of  
CSR ' s  f inancial management in  Fij i .  Nevertheless , as cal­
culated in Table 5 . 5 ,  from 1915 to 1 9 2 3 the Fij i and New 
Zealand company had made a return on inves tment o f  118 per 
cent , an average of  14 . 75 per c ent a year . Since the yield 
from assets in New Zealand was less than in Fij i ,  re turns 
f rom the latter mus t have been even higher . They would 
have been greater still if the c ompany had so ld sugar to New 
Zealand at  the world price . They cer tainly compared favour­
ably wi th the maximum of 7� per cent char�ed on overdraf ts 
at the t ime by Aus tralian trading banks . 6 Since over the 
period CSR under took l i t t le new inves tment in Fij i ,  nearly 
all the prof its were to the benefit  of  people living out side 
the colony . The company had taken out more t han it  had put 
into Fij i . 
No t only was salvage of  the sugar indus try to the 
advantage of CSR : the colony al so gained . In the shor t  term 
Fij i was saved from mas s ive economic dislocation , involving 
a sharp reduc tion in Indian living s tandards and the lo ss o f  
rents t o  Fij ians . In the long run ,  given the colony ' s  
dis tance from impor tant market s for tropical products , the 
high returns to land and labour of sugar ( under preferences ) 
compared with o ther commo di t ie s , and the na ture o f  plantation 
ent erprise which , regardless of the crop , seeks to maximize 
profits  to  it self ra ther than returns to the rest  of the 
community - in other wor ds , given the real world - continua­
tion of the indus try probably meant higher incomes to Indians 
and higher rents to Fij ians than would have been possible 
if the land had been put to some o ther us e .  Moreover , the 
cont inued presenc e of CSR enab led Fij i to benefit  from the 
company ' s  exce� t ional exper t ise in marke ting and milling . 
The results  of  technical research on sugar done in Queensland , 
for example , were pas sed on to the colony . Fur ther , during 
the inter -war years , Aus tral ia b ecame the largest  export er 
o f  raw sugar in the Brit ish Commonwealth , and as agent o f  
the Queensland government CSR handled a l l  o f  the dominion ' s  
expor ts . In the proces s  the company acquired considerab le 
exp er ience and knowl edge of marke ting , and these were made 
available to Fij i as well . 
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On the o ther hand , the Fij i indus try had lost much of 
its  int ernational competitivenes s .  Hencefor th , i t  would 
continue only wi th the help of subs idies , no tably the im­
perial preference . In this respect , the colony ' s  position 
was little different from tha t of sugar producers in the 
rest o f  the world , bo th inside and outs ide the Empire , mos t  
o f  whom also depended o n  some form o f  preferential treatment . 
However , as might be argued by George Beckford and o ther s  
that Fij i was i l l  served b y  sugar preferences s ince they 
increased the economy ' s  dependence on thos e  who paid the 
s ub sidies - Britain and Canada . 6 6  One resul t  o f  th is depend­
ence was that Fij i was denied an opportunity to proce s s  sugar 
up to 9 9 °  polarisat ion , ins t ead of the s tandard 96 ° . ' Planta­
tion white ' sugar , which is  only marginally inferior to 
the re f ined product  ( 100 ° polar isat ion) , is  sui table for 
indus tries which use input s  of  sugar . I t  fetches a higher 
price than raws of lower quali ty , and leaves a larger 
quantity of molasses in the exporting country ; for as well 
as from milling , molas ses is  a by-product from refining . 
Agains t  this , the co s ts of  producing raw s ugar are les s , 
while in a g iven time a b igger quantity o f  the latter can be  
obtained . In  19 2 7  a connni ttee of  exper t s  in  Maurit ius 
decided that in exis ting circums tances it was pre ferab le 
to produce plantation white sugar of  a very high quality 
rather than raws which were less pure . But to  pro te c t  its  
ref ining interes ts , in  1928  Britain altered the imperial 
preference to make it uneconomic to export sugar of 99 ° 
polarisat ion . Together with s imilar barr iers in other 
countries , this p revented Fij i - if it  had wanted to  - f rom 
expor ting sugar o f  higher qual ity . 6 7  
Moreover , the payment o f  sub s idies enab led CSR to 
remain in the colony . During the hei ght of the crisis in 
1921-22 , o f ficials had cons idered what  would happen sho uld 
the company be forced to wi thdraw . They had dec ided that 
the mills would have had to be run on a co-operative basis , 
owned and supplied by Indian farmers . 6 8  In many ways this 
might have been a bet ter s tructure for the indus t ry than 
allowing CSR to continue , for it wo uld have avo ided the 
conflict of int eres t between miller and grower that was to 
prove so harmful to Fij i in the years ahead . Af ter payment 
of  compensat ion to CSR i t  would also have enabled pro fits  
from milling to b e  retained wi thin the colony . So  agains t 
the def ini te b enefit s f rom saving the company ' s  inves tment s  
i n  Fij i , there were  disadvantages which underlined the 
cons traints  on sugar ' s  contrib ut ion to economic development .  
Chapter 6 
The small farm sys tem ,  1924-19 3'9 
Dur ing the 1920s  and 19 30s impor tant changes o ccurred in 
the Fij i sugar indus try and in its  re la t ion to the res t o f  
CSR ' s  operat ions . The trans it ion from es tates t o  the small­
farm sys tem of pro duc t ion was completed . Closure of  the 
Tamanua mill in 1922  and the purchase of Penang four y ears 
later l ef t  C SR as the sole miller in the colony . Britain 
gradually replaced New Zealand as the chief marke t fo r Fij i ' s  
sugar ( see Table 6 . 1 ) , which meant that , with the company ' s  
Auckland ref inery swi tching to alternat ive supplies ,- the 
indus try became far less integra ted into the res t of  CSR ' s  
activit ies . At the same t ime the relative importance o f  
Fij i to the company a s  a whole decl ined . Af ter World War I 
there was a rapid expans ion of  t he Aus tralian s ugar indus try 
which was part ly financed by CSR and by 1939  this had caused 
the company , as agent of the Queens land government , to  become 
one o f  the larges t  exporters o f  raw sugar in the world . 
Fur ther , in the late 1 9 30s CSR increased the range of by­
produc ts it manufactured from raw sugar - no tably building 
mater ials . As a result i t  concentra ted cap i tal expenditure 
in Aus tralia rather than Fij i .  
Des pi te these changes , cons traints on the indus try ' s  
contribution to  economic development remained . True , the 
trans i t ion t o  smallfarming provided growers wi th higher 
incomes than if they had been wage-earners - and this was 
important . Ye t the leakage of income abroad through the 
purchase of impor ts and repatria t ion of CSR ' s  pro f its con­
t inued . The company ' s  contribut ion to income growth was 
s t ill limited by its  dependence on overseas market s  and the 
lo cat ion of refining , dis tilling and other pro ces sing facil­
it ies outs ide Fij i .  C SR ' s  obs truct ion of  agri cultural 
divers if icat ion in cane areas , o f  which there had been at 
least  one maj or example b efore 1914 , was to be  repeated 
so that the under-utilizat ion of  land and labour remained . 
Of great impor tance would be the continua tion of  company 
effo rt s  to keep down wages and the cos t  of cane , which woul d 
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lead to s trikes by cane growers in 194 3 and 19 60 . The 
conflict of  interes t between C SR and farmers was to be a 
dominant theme in the his tory of  the indus try . And as before , 
on que s t ions o f  maj or impor tance government - and at times 
the chief s  - tended to s ide wi th the company . 
C SR ' s conf lict wi th growers was exacerbated by the 
company ' s  attemp t s  to minimize the disadvantages  of small­
holder as agains t planta tion agriculture . The relative 
merits  o f  the two have been the subj ect  of academic debate , 
in which (along wi th argument s  in the o ther direction) the 
inefficiency of the former has been frequently s tressed . 1 
Compared with planta t ions , the smallholder ' s  returns per unit 
area tend to be low because of poor yields and quality . Lef t  
t o  himself , he will also lack the economies o f  scale normally 
associated with plantations and reflec ted in the sy s tematic 
organization of  cultivation , harve sting , transport and so 
on . To overcome these  problems smallholder produc t ion has 
o ften been organized so that  it embodies certain character­
is t ics of  the plantat ion - the organization of  growers so 
that they wo rk in teams , for e xamp le , or the close super­
vis ion of farmers so effectively making them lit tle dif ferent 
from plantation labourers b ecause important dec is ions are 
taken by o thers . Smallfarming in the Fij i sugar indus try 
illus trates one such a t temp t to  combine with peasant agri­
culture benefits  from the p lantat ion mode of produc tion . 
At f ir s t  sigh t , the pattern o f  smallfarming as it  had 
evolved by World War II looked very dif ferent from the 
p lantation sys tem which had preceded i t . Of the 9 1 , 812 
acres cultivat ed in cane , 9 7  p er cent were on smallho ldings . 
The total number of these was about 10 , 000 , nearly all o f  
them occupied b y  Indians . 2 Tenant s  o n  CSR land , which in­
cluded the vas t maj ority o f  fo rmer plantat ions , accounted 
for 52 per cent of the area under cane , and contractors 
for 45  per cent ( see Table 6 . 2 ) . Cont rac tors held land 
under several forms of tenure . Some posses sed it as free­
hold , o thers rented from pr ivate  owners , but mos t  held 
native leases usually for per io ds of up to twenty-one 
( la ter thir ty) years . 3 Tenants  leased land from CSR on 
ten-y ear terms . Very few l eas es - and none issued by CSR -
carried an automatic righ t  of  renewal , but i t  was normal for 
the company and mos t  Fij ians to renew . The farms of  con­
trac tors were generally smaller than tho se o f  tenants : 
8 7  per cent , agains t 31 p er cent of contrac tors , had farms 
ranging from 8 to 15 . 9  acres in size . Half the contractors 
had farms of  fewer than 8 acre s , and only 19 per cent 16 
Table 6 . 1  
Raw sugar expor t s  from Fij i ,  1 920-39 
Direct ion of exports ( tons ) 
Year Austral ia Britain Canada New Zealand Others Total Approxima te value 
p er ton ( £) a 
1 9 2 0  2 , 28 5  1 2 ' 7 7  5 5 7 , 914 11 7 2 , 985 2 9  
1 9 2 1  5 , 3 6 5  4 , 5 05 6 2 , 732 22 7 2 , 62 4  2 8  
1922  3 , 050 2 , 94 0  5 , 3 00 6 0 , 4 18 2 3  7 1 ,  731 1 9  
1 9 2 3  2 , 3 3 1  2 2 2  41 , 51 9  36 44 , 108 20 
1 924 6 , 01 3  38 , 41 9  4 0  44 , 4 7 2  1 7  
1 9 2 5  56 , 902 34 , 809 33 91 , 744 1 5  
1 9 2 6  6 , 1 65 1 4 , 4 1 5  36 , 358 53 56 , 991 14 
1 9 2 7  2 08 5 7 , 2 7 1  1 5 , 236 37 7 2 '  7 5 2  1 5  
1 9 2 8  1 2 , 3 6 5  7 9 , 48 5  28 , 781 5 2  120 , 683 15 
1 9 2 9  4 3 2  2 1 , 98 9  45 , 020 4 , 783 51 7 2 , 2 7 5  1 2  
1 9 3 0  3 , 1 65 3 9 , 4 3 0  3 8 , 6 04 9 , 7 3 9  4 1  90 , 9 7 9  9 
1931  549 7 , 12 2  54 , 340 5 , 8 9 7  2 9  6 7 , 93 7  9 
1 9 32 7 0 , 984 54 , 781 5 , 525 1 2  131 , 3 02 10 
1933 6 3 , 7 63 4 7 , 7 1 2  2 , 34 9  1 2  113 , 836 11 
1934 5 6 , 4 68 4 6 , 2 7 5  1 , 116 4 103 , 86 3  10 
1 9 3 5  8 5 , 3 53 49 , 244 1 , 031 4 135 , 6 32 1 0  
1 9 3 6  8 2 , 6 3 6  5 7 , 1 2 3  1 , 103 2 140 , 864 9 
1 9 3 7  7 1 , 4 56 5 7 , 002 1 , 191 44 129 , 6 93 11 
1 9 38 7 5 , 2 9 6  5 7 , 98 3 1 , 111 2 5  134 , 415 10 
1 9 3 9b 7 4 9 , 34 3  68 , 7 9 3  84 243 118 , 4 7 0  1 2  
Source : Government of Fij i trade report s ,  1 92 1  to 1 94 0 .  
Note s : aApproximat e average value per calendar year , not per s eason . 
b Export s to Canada exceeded those to Britain because of the effects of the outbreak of war .  
Table 6 . 2  
Develo2men t o f  cane farming . Areas cult ivated 1925-44 
To tal Cul t ivat ed by 
area European Indian and F ij ian InJian and Fij ian 
Year under Company planters t enants contractors 
cul t iva-
t ion Acres Percentage Acres Percent age Acres Percentage Acres Percentage 
o f  area o f  area o f  area o f  area 
1925 64 , 963  3 3 , 6 7 9  5 2  4 , 44 6  7 6 , 905 10 19 , 93 3  3 1  
1926 6 7 , 4 94 30 , 350 45 4 , 040 6 9 , 080 1 3  24 , 024 36 
1 9 2 7  7 0 , 526  28 , 82 8  41 3 , 6 7 7  5 11 , 448 16 2 6 , 5 7 3  38 
1928  7 5 , 007 2 3 , 7 00 32 2 ,  34 2 3 20 , 710 28 28 , 255 37  
1929  77 , 64 5 20 , 025 26 2 , 004 3 25 , 5 59 3 3  30 , 05 7  3 8  
1930 78 , 250 1 7 , 641 2 2  1 , 6 11 2 2 7 , 896 36 31 , 102 4 0  
1 9 3 1  78 , 37 3  1 2 , 61 0  1 6  1 , 1 33 l 34 , 300 44 30 , 330 39 
1932  80 , 9 39 9 , 160  11  744  l 39 , 41 2  49 31 , 62 3  39 
1933  8 3 , 6 92 7 , 450 9 64 5 l 4 3 , 07 7  5 1  32 , 520 39 
1 934 84 , 49 7  5 , 335  6 658 1 44 , 989 5 3  3 3 , 51 5  4 0  
1 9 3 5  8 7 , 7 3 8  4 , 8 74 5 661 1 45 , 6 90 52  36 , 51 3  4 2 
1936 89 , 924 4 , 532  5 653  1 46 , 031 51 38 , 708 4 3  
1 9 3 7  91 , 19 7  4 , 5 00 5 717  l 4 6 , 139  50  39 , 84 1  4 4  
1938 91 , 4 75 3 , 219  4 369 4 7 , 405 5 2  40 , 482 44 
1939 91 , 812 3 , 1 2 6  3 240 4 7 , 421  52  4 1 , 025  45  
1940  91 , 62 4  3 , 111  3 206 4 7 , 268 52 41 , 039 45 
1941 92 , 628 3 , 15 3  3 161 4 6 , 521 50 4 2 , 793  4 7  
1942 94 , 04 6  3 , 119  3 221 46 , 4 39 50 44 , 26 7  4 7  
1 94 3  90 , i;1 3  2 ,  ! 28 3 1 9 7  45 , 38 3 50 4 2 , 605 4 7  
1944 89 , 05 9  2 , 4 2 5  3 19 7 45 , 332 51 4 1 , 105 46 
Source : C . Y .  Shephard , The Sugar Industry of Fiji , 38 . 
Notes : 1 .  Penang Mill f igures are inc luded from 1928 onwards . 
2 .  The decl ine in areas cul t ivated a f t er 1942 was due to resump t ion of land for military purposes . !--" 
3 .  Records are not ava ilable for years prior to 1925 . N w 
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acres or  more . The picture  was of cons iderable divers ity 
among a large numb er of  small grower s . 4 
Yet in a mos t  impor tant way there was s imilar ity 
between the plantat ion and the smallfarm systems : they were 
both dominat ed by CSR . Indeed , after buying the Penang mill 
in 1 92 6 , the company was the only purchaser of  cane in the 
colony ; it paid the same price throughout the period - 13s  6d 
a ton for 13 per cent P . O . C . S .  ( 11 per cent at Nausor i ) , with 
a bonus of ls 3d for every 1 p er cent above the s tandard , and 
a deduc tion of  ls 8d for every 1 per cent below . Growers 
were clos ely supervised by a large staff of  company f ield 
off icers , each be ing respons ible for be tween 100 and 200  
farms . Through these officer s  the results of CSR ' s  exper i­
mental work were brought to the farmer , credit  for es sent ial 
cult ivat ion and living exp ens e s  was made available to growers 
at 6 per cent interest  a year , 5 farm implement s were hired 
out and fert iliz er sold . CSR attached great importance to 
the regulat ion of  grower s '  cul t ivat ion practices . The 
Memorandum of Purchase of Cane , a legally binding agreement 
made by CSR with each grower , s t ipulated t hat cane varieties 
should be approved by the company , that plant cane should be 
sown before 30  June , that cane would be  purchased only if 
the company considered i t  f it for manufac ture and , in a very 
sweeping clause , that ' crops mus t be tended and harvested 
to the complete sat isfaction o f  the company ' .  If any act ion 
of government or  a public authority increased CSR ' s  co s t s , 
the company reserved the r ight to reduce the cane price . 
These  agreements were  designed to enable CSR to maximiz e  
the output of sweet cane over a long per iod o f  t ime . 6 This , 
and the prevent ion of an incr ease in the pr ice of  cane , were 
the company ' s  pr inc ipal aims . But the realizat ion of  these 
obj ec t ives , partly through the enforcement of  i ts agreements 
with farmer s ,  depended on the extent of CSR ' s  influence with 
growers ,  on whether in ef fect the company could b r ing to the 
smallfarm sys tem that essential charac teris tic of the planta­
t ion - t ight control over labour .  
Company contro l  over growers 
The task was made more diff icult for C SR by the 
divergence of interest be tween farmers and the company . 
This is  no t to deny their dependenc e on each o ther - CSR 
for suppl ies of cane and growers for a market . Nor is it to 
ignore the fac t that the company ' s  interest  in high yields 
per acre in order to  obt ain the maximum cane fo r the mill 
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was shared to a large degree , b u t  f o r  different reas ons , by 
grower s .  Occupying relatively small holdings , cane farmers 
had to adop t  an int ensive rather than extensive form of agri­
culture , the effect of which was to make large returns from 
labour par t ly depend on high returns from land . Sizeable 
incomes per acre were needed to earn the equiva lent of  high 
wages . In its  revenue per acre and per ho ur worked , cane 
was a more remunerative crop than the main alternat ives open 
to an Indian farmer in Fij i .  No figures are available for 
the pro f it  per acre or returns from labour of  growing cot ton , 
but it was generally recognized that these were less than for 
cane . 7 There are , however , some estimates for the cul t iva­
t ion of rice . The Department of  Agriculture reckoned in 
1938 that the average prof it  per acre of  growing padi was 
£2  5s Od . This required about thirty man-days of work , 
making the equivalent of ls  6d a day in wages . The f igures 
were higher if the rice was milled by the grower himself . 8 
For sugar the average return for a day ' s  work would have 
been about 9 s  7d . 9 No t surprisingly , sugar came to be 
regarded as a high cas te  crop and as such , depending on the 
amount of work involved , it carried an incentive for Indians 
to increase yields per acre so that average returns from 
labour would rise too . Furthermore , growers had an incent ive 
to increase no t j us t  the output of cane but also its  sweet­
ness , because before 1940 payment was on the basis of  quality 
as well as weight , del iveries from each grower being chemic­
ally tes ted . In these ways the interes ts of  farmers were 
close to those o f  C SR .  
Yet in important respect s  the interests o f  the two 
part ies diverged . The main concern of  grower s was to 
maximize  returns from their inputs of  labour , but of ten they 
could only do this by reducing the returns to C SR from its 
input s .  Land was a good example of  this . 1 0  The company 
wanted to maximize its returns by ob taining the largest 
po ssible output of  sweet cane , ye t although returns from 
labour par tly depended on this , at t ime s the maximization 
of labour returns was incompat ible with the maximi zat ion of 
returns from land . This was par t icularly the case where 
uncertainty about the future dis couraged growers from taking 
a long-term interes t in preserving soil fertility . The 
prob lem for Indian farmers was that there was no guarantee 
of renewal when leases exp ir ed . Professor C . Y .  Shephard ,  
an agricultural exper t from the Wes t Indies who examined 
the sugar indus try in 1944 , f ound that the ten-year leases 
granted by C SR ( to maintain the company ' s  control over 
grower s )  were too short to enable the farmer to ident ify 
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his  wel fare with that  of  the land . The same applied to  
leases held by con trac tors . 1 1 Uncertainty was increased 
because , with price dependent on keeping the imperial 
pref erence , CSR was unable to f ix cane pr ices for mo re than 
three years ahead . 1 2  Given the ir lack o f  s ecurity , the 
incentive for grower s was to maximize ret'urns from labour 
in the short  term regardless of  the long-term effec t s  on 
the soil 1 3  - a situat ion diametrically opposed to the 
interes t s  of C SR . 
Moreover , al though average labour returns from cane 
were higher than from rice , if a small par t of the farm was 
planted in padi or ano ther food crop , marginal returns from 
labour were likely to be increased . A small sub s i s tence 
gar�en provided security aga ins t failure of the cane crop , 
a guarantee tha t  the labour spent on tending the farm would 
yield at least some return . The value of this s ecurity was 
thought , especially by tho se from so uth Ind ia , to b e  greater 
than the value derived f�om plant ing the addit ional area in 
cane . Furthermore , there was the saving o f  t ime that would 
otherwise have been spent in walking to the market for food , 
and perhaps f inding supplies no t available . The planting o f  
subsis tence crops threatened CSR ' s  returns from land s ince 
there was a po s s ibility that the area under cane would be 
reduced , that crops would be grown on soil which should have 
been fallowed , and that in the case of rice labour input s  
would be required at t imes whic h would interfere wi t h  the 
cul tivat ion and harves t ing of cane . 1 4 Thus the des ire o f  
growers to ob tain high returns from labour i n  the innnediate 
fut ure conf licted with the company ' s  need t o  secure the 
maximum quantity of  cane over a longer per iod . 
One part ial solut ion might have been for C SR not to 
have charged its  tenants except ionally low rent s , which was 
its  prac tice , but to have fixed rents so that they more 
accurately reflec ted the market value of the land . The 
rise in farm cos t s  would have b een off set by an increase 
in the price of cane , while CSR would have been compensated 
for the higher cane pr ice by receiving more in rent . Grow­
ers would then have had an incent ive to pay more at tention 
to the returns from land . The co s t  of  growing rice , for 
example , would have been higher so reducing , becaus e its  
wholesale price was related to the co s t  of  imports , the 
marg inal returns from plant ing padi inst ead of cane . 1 5 
However , the situa t ion in Fij i ,  where by 1939  nearly half 
the growers were on non-company land , prevented CSR from 
adopt ing this cour se .  Since it had to pay all growers the 
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same price to avoid dissatisfac tion among tho se who would 
have received less , the company would have had to increase 
the cane price to contrac tors as well  as to its tenant s .  
The result  would have been a rise  in its  to tal expenses , 
for it  could not have recouped the extra outlay thro ugh 
higher rent s from tho se on non-CSR land . Indeed ,  by paying 
more for cane the company would have encouraged other land­
lords to rai se rent s , so that ul t imately contractors wo uld 
have been little bet ter off whereas landowners o ther than 
CSR would have done rather well . The company ' s  best option 
was to keep rents as low as i t  could . It  leased its estates 
at between 7s 6d and £1 an acre depending on fertility , 1 6  
this being enough to cover the rent it paid to Fij ian owners 
and par t of  the cos t  of improvements . CSR did no t expect 
to prof it overall from these rents for it knew that its 
reward lay in having to pay less for cane , but the result 
was that the incent ive for farmers to maximize returns from 
land was reduced . 
The same was true in the use of art ificial fer tilizer 
and of certain farm implement s  provided by the company . 
CSR ' s  need was to minimize  farm co s t s  and ensure that the 
input s  it  supplied were used to  the company ' s  advantage . 
Thus i t  could either provide f ert ilizer at co s t , al lowing 
growers to benef it from its  ability to purchase in bulk , 
or it  could aim to make a pro f i t  on the sales . The advantage 
of the lat ter would be to increase the incen tive for growers 
to apply fertilizer in ways that would maximize  yields from 
the land . The higher the price the greater the opportunity 
co s t  of  inefficient application . But the d isadvantage to 
CSR would have been that  uni t  cos ts on the farm would have 
been higher than if fer t ilizer had been sold more cheaply , 
so adding to potential pressure for an increas e in the cane 
price . To have grant ed a rise would have caused a loss o f  
income to the company , s ince profits  from fert ilizer sales 
to those who needed it  would no t have of f set the higher 
price of cane all round . No t all farms required the same 
quantity o f  fert ilizer . Generally , plant cane on firs t-class 
land received no artif icial f ert ilizer , whereas that on 
third-class soil required a considerable amount . Conse­
quently , CSR adop ted the alternative of supplying fer tilizer 
at cost . 1 7 The danger from this was that  it would encourage 
was te s ince the cos t  to the farmer of inef ficient application 
was les s . He might consider the cost of  was tage outweighed 
by the saving in lab�ur from no t having to apply the f er t il­
izer more carefully . CSR could overcome this problem either 
by increas ing the to tal supply of fertil izer which would 
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add to farm co s t s  or , which it  preferred , by the exer cise 
of tight control over growers . There were s imilar diffi­
culties over the rental of farm implements , no tably disc 
p loughs , which were too expensive for growers to buy . CSR 
made them available at a rate barely s uf f icient to cover the 
cost  of maintenance ,  so that  they were cheaper than if they 
had been rented on normal commercial t erms . 1 8 The result 
was that from the company ' s  view they were used ineffic­
ient ly . Want ing to reduce its capital s to ck ,  CSR complained 
that the reluc tance of growers to co-operate in the use of  
disc ploughs meant that a larger number was requir ed . This 
was because farmers wanted to us e disc  p loughs at the same 
t ime , when conditions were mos t  sui table . If they waited , 
the weather might change , ploughing become more diff icul t 
and the amount of labour required for the work increase . 
Yet rather than charge a higher rental , the company tried to 
realize its aims by exert ing pres sure on growers . 1 9  In 
short , it  preferred to s ubstitute for economic incentives 
the paternali s t ic control of its  s taf f . 
There were , then , occas ions when the concern of 
farmers to maximize returns from their lab our conf licted 
with CSR ' s des ire to maximize returns from the input s  it 
supplied . There were also times when CSR wanted to use 
growers ' labour in ways that would secure for the company 
the op t imum use of its  inputs ,  but at the expense of, returns 
to the grower . In the pas t , plantat ion labourers had been 
organized as gangs to do weeding , harves ting , and so on . 
This had afforded cer tain economies of s cale . Co-operat ive 
labour was more produc t ive than individuals working on their 
own , and supervis ion was eas ier . Though under the smallfarm 
arrangement growers were expected to cultivate their farms 
as individuals , CSR cont inued the sys tem o f  gangs for certain 
tasks that were essent ial if  a large supply of cane was to 
be secured over a long period . Gangs were used for harvest­
ing , the upkeep of  main dra ins , the weeding of  tramlines 
and the removal of s too ls affec ted by the Fij i and Mo saic 
disease ( known as roguing) . 2 0 The company advanced wages 
to members of the gangs , and charged the co s t  on a pro Pata 
bas is to growers who benef ited from the work . Obviously 
i t  was in CSR ' s  interes t  to keep down wages and so s tab ilize 
farm co sts , but this was no t easy to achi eve . The individual­
istic nature of  Fij i-Indian society reduced the at trac tion 
of co-operation to growers and made them less willing to 
J 0 1n gangs . To this was added the acut e general shortage 
of wage labour during the 1920s  and early 1 9 30s , wi th the 
result that there was cons tant upward pres sure on wages . 
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As Dixon ob served in 1 92 3 : 
Of cours e ,  the smal ler men , and those whos e  crops are 
mortgaged to the hi lt , may be more interes ted in 
keep ing the wages up ra ther than down , but if the 
growers can be  made to work the lesser demand for 
labour from outs ide will tend to keep the rates wi thin 
reason . 2 1  
And growers were made to work . S ince the wages offered for 
casual employment were too low to attract labourers in 
suf f icient numbers , CSR had to force growers , much aga ins t 
their will , to ' volunteer ' for employment in the gangs or 
in the mills . 22  Great emphasis was placed by the company 
on the control of gangs by i t s  s taff . Till the early 1 940s , 
af ter which they were elected , s irdars in charge of  each 
gang were appoint ed by overseers and were expected to demand 
the maximum work from those under their charge . 
The confl ict  of interest between CSR and farmers made 
it both necessary , and more d ifficult , for the company to 
impose control over growers .  From it s experience with 
European plant ers , CSR well unders tood the importance of 
credit in this respect . 2 3  Advances were a mean s by which 
f ield s taff could ensure that growers worked to the sat is fac ­
t ion of  the company . A request fo r cred it from CSR had to 
be  approved by the overseer who was familiar with the farmer ' s  
work and with his financial posit ion . Cred it could be refus ed 
if a grower fa iled , say , to  apply fert il izer as directed . It  
was hard for farmers to  escape this ins trument of cont rol , 
for company credit generally at 6 per cent a year was far 
cheaper than that available from other sources . Int erest of 
up to  60 per cent was common for loans obtained from Ind ian 
storeke epers and money-lenders . 2 4 The opportunity for tenants  
to incur deb t s  from out s ide the company was mo re limited 
than for contract ors , because CSR forbade the grant of a lien 
or encumbrance over crops except to the company . Mo reover ,  
demand for cred it was large . Tenant s had t o  meet the value 
of stand ing crops when they took over the ir farms , while 
for cont ract ors there were the in itial co s t s  of prepar ing 
the land for cane and so on . Very few growers had the 
resources t o  finance their consumpt ion and cult ivat ion ex­
penses over the period from plant ing to  harves t ing the crop 
eight een months lat er . 2 5  In this s ituat ion , the company ' s  
ability to  of  fer cheap credit gave it  great leverage over 
growers .  In fact , apart from the monopoly of mill ing , this 
was it s main in st rument of control . 
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Almo s t  as impor tant was the land held by CSR . The 
threat of eviction was a means by which the company could 
force tenants to obey its  instruc t ions . Though in la ter 
years C SR would , qui te j us t if iably , emphasize its  excellent 
record as a landlord , before 19 39 there were times when it 
used its power of  evict ion . In 1 9 36 i t  ej ected four tenants 
who had led an indus trial dispute on the Ellington esta te 
near Penang . 2 6  The inf luence arising from contro l over land 
may have been one reason why the company ref used to f inance 
Europ eans who wished to buy land and lease it to Indians . 
In 1925 , N .  Chalmers and C . J .  Eas ton asked CSR to help them 
buy a proper ty near Lautoka , which they would have used for 
this purpose . The company refused , preferr ing it sel f  to 
buy the land for £10 , 000 . 2 7  Par t of the mo tive was to 
reduce the number of landlords who exploited their tenant s ,  
a maj-or preo ccupation of CSR which feared that high rents 
wo uld lead to demands for high cane pr ices . 2 8  But also 
important , perhaps , was the knowledge that if land was held 
by the company the ab ility to enforce its wi ll on growers 
would be great ly increased . The power that its landholdings 
conferred on CSR was well understood by contemporaries , who 
part ly attributed to this the higher yields on tenants ' 
farms compared with contractors ' :  the poorer soil tended 
by mos t contractors was also a fac tor . 2 9 It  would b e  wrong 
to conclude , however , that control of land affected the 
company ' s  influence with tenants alone . Its  power over 
tenants increas ed the authority o f  overseers in general , 
adding weight to their dealings wi th growers on non-company 
land . The impress ion o f  overseers today (known as f ield 
off icer s s ince 1940)  is  that the wi thdrawal of CSR in 19 7 3  
has reduced their inf luence with tenants and contrac tors 
al ike because the company ' s  successor , the Fij i Sugar 
Corpora tion Ltd ,  did no t acquire control of CSR land . 3 0 
In a phrase that has of ten been quo ted , Shephard in 
194 4  described the f ield officer as a ' guide , philo sopher 
and friend of the farmers ' . 3 1  This was how CSR liked to  
present the s ituat ion , but  it was cer tainly no t the Indian 
view before 19 39 . Growers saw the overseer as a man who 
ac ted arb itrarily , who demanded of them work which they were 
reluctant to  perform , and who used brute force at  times to 
ensure that his orders were carried out . 3 2  It was no t 
advice they received from the f ield s taff : i t  was control 
imposed from above . 
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CSR and o ther interes t s  in the colony 
This control would be  weakened if the small farm s y s t em 
were subj ect to influences which might produce dis content 
among growers . Thus if alternat ive cash crops were allowed 
to compete with sugar , labour might be drawn away from the 
mills and the cult ivation o f  cane , lead ing to a fall in 
produc t ion and a rise in wages . Or , if in the widespread 
process of currency realignment s in the early 19 30s the 
Fij i pound was al lowed to deprec iate by too large a margin ,  
import pr ices would rise , for cing up growers '  cos ts o f  
living and p erhaps produc ing demands for a higher cane price 
to  compensate . Again , if  there was no security of  tenure 
for growers on Fij ian land , farmers might be inclined no t 
only to overcrop the s oi l  but also to s tar t industrial 
agitation to obtain bett er terms , thereby j eopardiz ing the 
supply of cane . Finally , the high interes t rates on loans 
made to growers by s torekeepers and money-lenders reduced 
real farm incomes , so increas ing the po ssib ility that  
farmers would eventually pres s  fo r a rise in  the  pr ice of  
cane . All these were mat ters which were o f  great  concern 
to CSR in the 1920s and 1 9 30s . They raised very acutely 
the que s t ion o f  how far the company could maximize its  
prof it s . 
Now obviously this made it  very impor tant for CSR 
tha t it  should s t ill have a great inf luence on government 
policy . Yet in one way the replacement of  European planters 
by Indian growers had reduced i ts inf luence . Previous ly , 
the company could threaten to pass on to its  supp liers any 
increase in cos t s  ar ising from o f f ic ial act ion or inac t ion , 
but af ter 19 2 3  this was less easy as everyone knew ( follow­
ing the refusal of Indians to plant in 19 22)  that 1 3s 6d was 
the minimum price growers would accep t for their cane , and 
that if necessary Indians would be far more willing than 
Europeans to resor t to subsistence farming . In the pas t , 
the minimum pr ice for wh ich Europ eans would have grown cane 
had never been clear . On the o ther hand , because threats 
to clo s e  a t  lea s t  one o f  i t s  mills seemed to carry more 
weight in the 1920s and 1930s than before , CSR s t ill could 
have a great effec t  on policy . 3 3  At f ir s t  no one could 
be sure that the transition to the smallfarm sys tem would 
succeed , while later the fall in raw sugar pr ices because o f  
t h e  world depression made the c ont inued operat ion of the 
leas t pro fitable mills in Fij i (Nausori and Labasa) appear 
dis t inc tly uncertain . 
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In these cir cums tances , it  was unders tandab le that 
government sho uld wish to suppo rt C SR as far as it could . 
Wi th memories of the 1920  and 1921 s tr ikes s t ill vivid , 
off icials want ed to avo id the political repercus s ions o f  a 
fall in Indian living s tandards should the smallfarm system 
fail . They were supported by mos t  of  the European community 
which , in contrast to its  gene rally antagonis tic a t t itude 
before and during World War I arising from shor t-term tac t­
ical differences with the company , now identif ied its inter­
ests  more closely with CSR . The settlement of Indian farmers 
provided merchants with an excep t ionally s table market in 
the 19 30s , despite the depres sion , becaus e CSR was unable 
to off set the fall in raw sugar pr ices with a reduc t ion in 
the pr ice o f  cane . 3 4  Moreover , from at least  since the war 
the company had patronized lo cal traders where pos s ib le ,  
and had directed its cus tom specially to those with po lit ical 
influence . It  purchased farm implements , for example , no t 
from Burns Philp but from Morr is Heds trom Ltd b ecaus e J . M .  
Heds trom , who had a large s take in the f irm , was a prominent 
European and sat on the Executive Council ( as also d id H .M .  
Sco t t , CSR ' s  legal adviser i n  Fij i) . 3 5  The clo se interest  
of Hedstrom in the purchas ing power o f  the company rein­
forced the improved relations between C SR and the European 
community , with the result  that on the whole there was less 
pressure on government to oppo se the company than there 
had been in the pas t . Yet although the attent ion o f  
Europeans was focused o n  the ir long-term s trategic interest 
in the continued pro sperity o f  CSR,  differences on matters 
which did not af fec t the viab ility of the company ' s  opera­
t ions s till arose . On such occas ions , and when the interests 
of the Fij ians were involved , the views of C SR were not 
always decis ive . The company was only one o f  several par t ies 
in the alliance between Fij ian chief s , goverrunent and Euro­
pean cap ital . Nevertheless , its  op inions were lis tened to 
with respec t , and influenced to a s ignificant degree the 
o utcome of official deliberat ions . The importance that 
goverrunent at tached to CSR ' s  views was well illus trated in 
192 6 when , with the Executive Council ' s  approval , the 
proposed budget was secre tly s ubmi t ted to the company for 
its comments before being presented t o  the legislature . 
As C SR ' s  inspec tor remarked wi th glee , ' from our point o f  
view it  is  a great position t o  b e  in ' . 3 6 
C SR ' s  views were especially decis ive on the ques tion 
of  divers ifying the ec onomy. It feared that the development 
of  commercial agriculture outs ide the sugar indus try would 
increase competition for labour , so making it more  dif ficult 
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for the company to obtain manpower for wo rk in the gang s 
or in the mills . Thi s would have been par t icular ly the case 
if wage rat es for casual labour out side the industry were 
higher than for worker s wit hin . Moreover , the larger the 
supply of labour the more select ive C SR could be in its  
recru itment of  growers .  These cons iderat ions were in  direct 
conf lict with government , which wanted to divers ify agr i­
culture . Alarmed by Fij i ' s  d ependence on sugar , who se pr ice 
was subj ect to wide f luc tuat ions on the world market , 
officials hoped that d iver sif icat ion would p lac e the economy 
on a more secure foundat ion . 3 7  It would also enable id le 
land , often qu it e close to the sugar bel t , to be brought 
int o produc t ive u se . 3 8  Government was ke en to encourage 
an expansion of copra and banana exports (normally grown 
well away from sugar areas )  and to promo t e  new exports like 
pineapples and cotton . 3 9  But it was diff icul t to  get a 
remunerat ive price for exp or t s . The fall in commodity 
prices dur ing the d epression was an obvious problem ,  though 
no t the only one . The opportunity for increas ed trade wi th 
Austral ia and New Z ealand was limited by competi tion from 
producers wi thin the dominions or their dependencies . Both 
Australia and New Zealand , for examp le , placed impor t quo tas 
on bananas from Fij i .  Any hope of increasing i ts share of 
their market s  depended on the colony being able to off er 
trade concessions in r eturn . 
Yet Fij i was hand icapped in thi s by its  dependence 
on sugar , and in part icular by the vert ical int egrat ion of  
much of CSR ' s  activit ies , desp it e the smaller volume of  
sugar go ing to  Auckland . Coal , one of the colony ' s mos t  
important imp or t s , 4 0 was brought b y  C SR from Newcastle in 
Australia . The company refused to obtain it s supplies from 
t he south island o f  New Zealand , as was once suggested , 
since it transpor ted c oal in its  own s teamer s which on their 
return trip took Fij i molas ses  t o  Sydney . It  would have 
been uneconomic to divert the ves sels to New Z ealand . 
Similarly ,  because the company had its  principal workshop 
in Sydney, it refused to have it s Fij i machinery repaired 
in Auckland . So for these impor t s  the F ij i government could 
make no concessions to New Zealand and , by the same token , 
could not threaten to  diver t  trade from Australia . Fur ther­
more , Fij i could no t offer a more generous pref erence than 
it gave Br it ish impor ts s ince the pref erence on Br it ish 
good s , at least up to 193 2 , was a qu id pro quo for the im­
per ial pr ef erence on sugar . The colony could only offer 
countries which gave its  exports  favourable treatment a 
reciprocal pref erence equival ent to what was given to 
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Brit ain . The value of such an off er was correspond ingly 
reduc ed . So it  was that in nego t iations for a trade agree­
ment wit h New Zealand before 1932 , at the Ottawa Conf erence 
(1932 ) and in subsequent attemp t s  to gain access to Austral ia 
for export s of fruit and cot ton , Fij i ' s negot iating pos i t ion 
was considerably weakened . 4 1  She was f orced to  rely heavily 
on market s  in Britain and Canada where her competitors had 
the advantage of lower transport cost s .  How far this 
det ermined t he outcome of at t emp t s  to diver s ify the economy 
is hard to  say : what is certain i s  that  the sugar indus try 
d id no t help . 
On the supply s ide , too , exc ep t for copra and bananas , 
the inf luenc e of C SR was cons iderable , for it  purchased land 
to prevent it s use f or comp et i t i tve crop s . In 1925 the 
company heard that land at Yaqara , lying between Tavua and 
Ra , might be sold and put under cot ton . Fearing that this 
would damage the very bleak labour pos i t ion at Tavua , CSR 
bought Yaqara and import ed a s tock of Heref ords to be 
grazed on it . 4 2 In ano ther pre-emp t ive str ike the c ompany 
acquired t he Penang mill in 1 9 2 6 . Government was exp er iment­
ing at Vitilevu Bay to see if p ineapples c ould be grown 
commercially in Ra , 4 3  and there were rumour s that Penang 
might be purchased by a canning company . Through buying the 
mill and keeping the area under cane , CSR hoped to ' push 
p ineapples further af i eld and so make them less at trac t ive 
to Indians ' . 4 4  The co lony probably benef i ted from the 
cont inuat ion of sugar produc t ion at Penang , since  it is  
unl ikely that a crop with higher returns from land and 
labour could have been found . Yet by contro lling the land 
C SR removed the opportunity to exper iment wi th such crop s , 
and pos sibly prevented the evolut ion of a sys t em of mixed 
farming in the distric t . In terms of  the opt imum use of 
re sources , the benef it to the c olony from the company ' s  
acquisit ion of  Yaqara was less , for CSR failed to obtain 
maximum returns from the land . Fo llowing a vis i t  to  F ij i 
in 1 9 3 7  Sir Frank S to ckdale , Agricul tural Adviser to  the 
Colonial Of f ice , remarked that CSR ' s  Hereford s were the 
f ines t he had seen in the tropics , 4 5  but t he qual i ty o f  the 
herd was no t maintained . Some twenty year s later an expert 
from Aus tral ia reported t hat the cat tle were undernourished , 
and that the pasture was def icient in nit rogen . 4 6  Sp ecializa­
t ion in sugar had prevent ed C SR from paying attent ion to 
this . 
More signif icant , perhap s ,  was the company ' s  obs truc­
t ion of government at tempt s  t o  divers ify Indian smallfarming . 
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Of f ic ials want ed to encourage the production of Ind ian 
foodcrops to reduc e the demand for import s .  In particular 
J . R .  Pear son , Secretary for Indian Af fairs in the early 
1930s , pressed for the development of cash crops so that , 
should the depression force CSR to curtail produc t ion , 
Indians would have an al ternat ive to cane . CSR feared that 
if subsistence or cash crops were grown alongside cane they 
would comp et e for land and labour , making it harder for the 
company to  c ont rol farmer s ' cult ivat ion pract ices . 4 7 How­
ever , CSR did provide growers wi th small r ice plo t s  on 
marginal land , hoping in t his way t o  reduce the cost of  
l iving and effect  an increase in  the  real price  of  cane . 
These  plo t s  were  part icularly numerous at Labasa ,  wher e the 
company contro lled ext ens ive ar eas unsuited to cane . In 
1929  seasonal conditions favoured r ice and a regular boom 
set in . Even sugar farmers j o ined , to the neglect of their 
cane land , forcing the local mill manager to t ight en restric­
t ions on the  cult ivat ion of such crop s . Pearson was per­
turbed by this but was unwilling to int ervene because , as 
he put it , CSR was a large c orporation and government needed 
i t s  co-operation . 4 8 The c ompany it self did very lit tle to 
develop subsistence and cash crop s  which could be rotated , 
or grown inter-row ,  with cane . I t s  int eres t  was in prof its 
from the mills , not in mixed farming which might reduce the 
s easonal underemployment of grower s .  S tockdale lamented 
the failure to diver sify crop s  in the cane , districts - CSR ' s  
research into  this was quite inadequat e - and his complaint 
was to be echoed on numerous occas ions  in the future . 4 9  
I t  was left t o  t he inadequately funded Department of  
Agriculture to exp eriment with crops that might be  grown 
with cane . Cotton was thought to be a possibil ity . The 
co tton boom of the late 18 60s had shown that the Sea Is land 
variety flourished in Fij i , but s ince then the problem had 
been the co lony ' s  distance from the European marke t . As 
part of efforts  to  increase t he produc tion of Empire co t ton , 
af ter World War I trials had been made in Fij i and some 
cot ton had been exported to Britain . At tempts  to persuade 
Indians to grow the crop had , however , been hindered by 
CSR ' s  refusal to carry it on i t s  t ramlines . s o  The company 
feared that cotton might comp ete with sugar for Indian 
labour and that its  transport would interfere with the move­
ment of cane dur ing harves t ing . 5 1  Experiments were abandoned 
during the height of the depr ession but were resumed in the 
mid-1930s . In 1 937  Stockdale emphasized the value of co tton 
as a rotat ion crop with cane . No t only would it benef it the 
land by improving aerat ion and t he t ilth of the soil as well 
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as  by maintaining fert ility , but  it  would al so yield an 
income - j us t  under £5 an acre , gro s s  - whereas the exist ing 
ro tat ion crop , cowpea , did not . 52 Government eventually 
developed a high quality cotton for which a l imit ed market 
existed in Britain , but effo r t s  to encourage it s cult ivat ion 
were impeded by a lack of co-operation f rom CSR . There were 
f requent complaint s about this from Dr H . W .  Jack , the 
Director of Agr icul ture . The attempt was f inally abandoned 
in 1 941 , j ust before the rec eip t of a report from Mes sr s  
Dalgety and Co . L t d  which suggested that , under war t ime 
condit ions , there might be a market in Australia if Fij i 
cot ton could be sold in suf f ic ient quant i ties . ·  CSR had 
played a large part in prevent ing the required supply from 
be ing available . And more important , as Pear son commented 
in 1932 , the company ' s  opposit ion to the development of 
alternat ive crops had reduced the willingnes s  of  o f ficials 
to  try . 5 3  Jack had pushed cot ton in the 1930s in the face 
of ind ifference from many of his colleagues . When it  was 
abandoned he predic ted , with s ome truth , that the industry 
was unlikely to be revived and that Fij i as a source of 
excellent quality cotton might be overlooked in the future . 54 
Another concern of  C SR was with the rat e of exchange .  
Though it would benefit from the increased value in local 
currency of its  export earning s , it was very much in the 
interest of the company to prevent a large depreciation of 
the Fij ian pound . Devaluat ion could  cause a rise in internal 
prices , which in turn might provoke an irresi s t ible demand 
for an increase in the price of cane . The last thing the 
company wanted was a confrontation with grower s , yet if it 
granted an increase on the grounds of  a r ise in the cost 
of l iv ing , farmer s  might treat this as a preced ent for the 
future . To buy off  conf l ict in the present might make it  
harder to  control grower s later on . Before 1933 the exchange 
rate was f ixed by the two banks operat ing in Fij i ,  the Bank 
of New South Wales and the Bank of  New Zealand . The cus tom 
was to  keep the rates between Aus t ralia , New Zealand and 
F ij i at par , but to  let their rates against  sterl ing vary . 
Fij i ' s  exchange on London was quot ed at the same rat e as 
that of Aust ralia , so that when the Aus tra lian pound began 
to deprec iat e in late 1929  the Fij ian pound followed suit 
( see Table 6 . 3 ) . This arrangement was abandoned on 2 2  
January 19 31 , when the to tal Australian devaluat ion had 
reached 25 per cent . Rates be tween Aus tralia , New Zealand 
and Fij i were f ixed so that they reflec t ed differences in 
their rates  on London , and the va lue of Fij i ' s currency 
against sterling was bas ed on the New Zealand rate in London 
1 3 7  
instead of  Australia ' s .  After the revaluat ion this entailed , 
the Fij i rat e was s tab ilized f rom the end of January at 
£Stgll0 = £S tgl00 , a devaluat ion s ince 1929 of 10 per cent . 
Following the devaluat ion of the New Zealand pound two years 
later , the Fij i rate was rai sed by an equivalent amount 
making a total devaluat ion of about 25 per cent . S S  
Table 6 . 3  
Changes in the Aust ralian , New Zealand and Fij i 
exchange rates against £ s terling 
£ Stg 100 
Date  £ A  £ NZ £ F 
March 1930 106  100  106  
Apr il 1930 106 105 106 
9 Oct 1 930 109 105 1 09 
5 Jan 1931 115 105 115 
13 Jan 1931 118 105 118 
14 Jan 1931 118 107� 118 
1 7  Jan 1931 125 107� 126  
2 2  Jan 1931 125 107� 107� 
2 9  Jan 1931 1 30 110 110 
3 Dec 1 9 31 125 110 110 
20 Jan 1 9 33 125  125  1 25 
28 Mar 1933 125  125  111  
Source : R . F . Holder , Bank of New South Wales : A History , 
Vo lume II 1 894-1 9 70 ,  6 81-7 8 1 ;  also from a 
conf ident ial report . 
The banks j ustif ied the new rate on the ground s t hat 
Fij i had an adver se balance of payment s  against London . 
This arose from C SR ' s  pract ice of no t remi t t ing to the 
colony the £Stg800 , 000 it received each year from the 
expor t  of Fij i sugar . Some o f  the proceeds , but no more 
than £S tg200 , 000 , were  used to  f inance the s t erling impor t s  
needed for its  operations i n  Fij i .  The r e s t  was used to 
pay for the company ' s  imports  in Aus tralia and New Zealand . 
The result  was a large balance of payment s  def icit between 
Fij i and London . S 6 In theory this should have been offset  
by an inf low of fund s from New Zealand , becaus e CSR us ed 
the profits  from its Auckland ref inery to f inance its  
activit ies in  Fij i .  Yet , unknown to o ther s  in the  co lony , 
no such inf low occurred . Under arrangements dat ing from the 
1920s , CSR held on spec ial deposit  in Fij i over £F800 , 000 , 
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against which the banks advanced the company ' s  working 
expenses . It seems that these advances were repayab le in 
New Zealand at par , irrespective of al terat ions in the 
exchange . 5 7  Thus if the Fij i currency was left at a lower 
rat e  than New Z ealand ' s  in January 1933 , the banks could 
expect to make a loss . They would be repaid their loans 
to the company , but in a currency worth le s s  than that in 
which the advances  had been made . Agains t the banks ' des ire  
for a devaluat ion was the government ' s  hop e for a revaluation 
that would return the Fij i pound to par ity with s t erling . S S 
Able to recall the rampant inf lat ion that had accompanied 
the d epreciat ion of central European currenc ies in the mid-
19 20s , off icials were understandably concerned about the 
po ssible inf lat ionary effects of  devaluat ion in Fij i .  They 
also knew that devaluat ions in the Empire - and of course 
elsewhere - would reduce the compet itivenes s o f  Brit ish 
exports . 
Between the interests  of  the banks and of  government 
s tood tho s e  of CSR . The company wanted a l imi ted devaluat ion 
because it would increase the value in Fij i currency of its  
expor t s , but it did not want the deprec iat ion to be  much 
more than 10 per cent s ince this might l ead to a suf ficient 
r ise  in prices to cause unrest among growers .  I t  was tho ught 
a 10 per cent devaluat ion would be accep ted by farmers , 
s ince the ensuing r ise  in import prices would be  off  set  by 
the general fall in commodity pri ces asso c iated with the 
world depression . C SR ' s  desire for a 10  p er cent devaluat ion 
was shared by the maj or export / impor t  firms in the colony . 
The supply of Fij i ' s  mos t  important exports af t er sugar , 
copra and bananas , would no t have been very responsive to 
the eff ects of devaluat ion s ince copra has a long ges tat ion 
period - about seven years - while the export market for 
bananas was limited . Though in the short  term prof its  from 
expor t ing these crops would be increased by a large devalua­
tion , maj or exporters like Hedstrom were  also substant ial 
import ers and , if devaluat ion caused a large r ise in prices , 
they could expect to see these higher profits  outweighed 
by a decline in the demand for import s . A l imit ed devalua­
t ion would increase export earnings w ithout greatly damaging 
their import trade . 5 9  
These int erests  comb ined t o  put pressure on government 
to allow a limited degree of devaluat ion , but to oppose the 
rate favoured by the banks . Their view p revailed at a 
London conference , held in June 1 9 33 , at  which were repre­
sented the Colonial Office , the Fij i government , CSR , o ther 
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exporter s  in the colony and the banks . I t  was agreed , though 
with reluc tance by the banks , that government should have 
control over the exchange rate , which was to be fixed at 
£ F l l l  = £Stgl00 . To persuade the banks to accept this , CSR 
promised to make available to them £S tg400 , 000 from its  
annual Fij i earnings in London , so as to reduce the Fij i/ 
London balance of  payment s, def icit . 6 0 In other words , the 
company agreed to repay advances it r eceived in Fij i in 
s terling rather than New Zealand currency , thereby saving 
the banks from a loss on the arrangement they had made to 
f inance CSR . Thanks partly t o  the suppor t  of  o ther bus iness 
interes t s  in the co lony , CSR had achieved its  obj ective . 
It  had ob tained a 1 0  per cent devaluat ion which , as i t  told 
government ,  was an important source of profit  in the years 
of except ionally low sugar prices during the early 1 9 30s . 
I t  even went so far as to claim that this , coupled with the 
imper ial preference on sugar , was the only reason why it 
could cont inue in the colony . 6 1  This was probably an 
exaggeration , but it is at leas t likely that without the 
devaluation the company would have had to c lose its  Nausori 
mill . Equally important was that it had limit ed the devalua­
t ion to an amount which would no t ,  via the pr ice s truc ture , 
cause discontent among growers and so increase the diffic ulty 
for CSR of  maintaining contro l . 
Land tenure was an especially diff icult que s t ion 
because Fij ians have always at tached great importance to the 
owner ship of land . So whereas i t  was in the company ' s  vital 
int erest  that there be secur ity of tenure for growers ,  it 
was equally important to Fij ians that they be abl e  to resume 
leases in the no t too d is tant f uture ; o therwise  their r ights 
of ownership would exist  in name but no t in fac t . S ince 
the war it had been the pract ice of government to ref er 
to Fij ian owner s  the proposed t erms for the renewal of  
native leases when they exp ired , thereby giving them an 
opportunity not to renew . 6 2 The f ir s t  refusals occurred 
in 1 9 24 and thereaf ter , observers agreed , there was a grow­
ing tendency for landlords to oppose renewals . 6 3  The trend 
never reached large proport ions , however , because under 
Ordinance 23  of 1 9 16 landowners had to compensate the out­
go ing tenant for permanent and unexhausted improvements 
made dur ing the currency of the lease . Of t en Fij ians could 
no t afford the amount of compensat ion fixed by the Governor­
in-Council , and leases  were therefore renewed . 6 4 Yet the 
threat of non-renewal was suf f icient to create insecur ity -
a climat e  in which cases of  non-renewal were  easily exagger­
ated . This alarmed CSR ,  which feared the situat ion might 
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eventually breed indus trial unrest . In the immediat e 
future it could lead to an increase in farm cos t s , wh ich 
might produce demands for a higher cane pr ice , for Fij ians 
hoped that the threat of non-renewal would induce higher 
rents to be paid . 6 5  If its leases were affec ted , CSR would 
have to pass o� to t enant s the higher charge or else ab sorb 
the increased rent it self . For cont ractor s  the problem was 
worse since on expiry it was cus tomary , though illegal , for 
growers to pay premitnns of  one year ' s  rent or more to 
induce landlords to renew the l ease . 6 6  By threatening not 
to renew the owners could extract larger premiums , and so 
add sub s tant ially to farm cos t s . I f  the disposable income 
of  farmer s was reduced , the chance was increased that they 
would ask for higher cane prices . Yet if the company resis ted 
such a demand , there was a risk that growers would s tart 
to negl ect their farms or even take part in a s tr ike . More 
generally , CSR feared that if  insecur ity of t enure led to 
a sense of inj us t ice , 
the way will be open for agitators to sow seeds of  
discontent , which may eas ily be manifes ted in  such 
ways as refusals ' en bloc ' to pay nat ive r ent s , 
refus ing to man the sugar mills  when crushing Fij ian­
grown cane , or a general non-co-operat ive s tr ike . 6 7 
In shor t ,  the company ' s  control over growers - and p erhaps 
the very f uture of  the indus try - was at s take . 
Accordingly , CSR urged government to  take act ion . 
In Feb ruary 1934 there was a mee ting be tween S ir Philip 
Goldfinch , the company ' s  general manager , and S ir Murchison 
Fletcher , the governor , who was so sympathetic to the int er ­
ests  o f  CSR that he once made t h e  outrageous suggest ion that  
Indians were too  well off  and if pos s ible the price of  cane 
should be reduced . 6 8  The meeting was a classic examp le of 
company-government collus ion . ' We have no doub t ' ,  Goldfinch 
said , 
that the ideal set of  condit ions would be that all 
leasehold lands used for cane growing should be leased 
in the f ir s t  place by the Government to  the mill-owner 
( in this case the company) , who should in turn sub-let 
to tenants over whom the mill-owner would then be able 
to exercise a cer tain amount of control and s upervis ion 
as to the general working of their farms . 6 9  
Terms o f  renewals should b e  sett led without ref erence to 
the Fij ian owner s .  The outcome of the d iscus s ions was that 
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' His Excellency agrees and proposes to proceed on the lines 
set out ' . 7 0  But it was impo ssible for Fle tcher to act 
exactly along these lines for government , however it mi ght 
want to , could not ignore the interes ts of the Fij ians . 
I t  had not the resources to  enforce unpopular measures in 
the face o f  active oppo s i t ion . Consequently , the reform of  
land tenure devised by  Fletcher ' s  succes sors in  the late  
19 30s owed much to the inf luence of Fij ians , who had a good 
incent ive to compromis e . If  insecurity of  tenure caused 
disrup t ion in the sugar indus t ry , or  led to a deter iorat ion 
in the soil because of overcropp ing before the lease exp ired , 
the incomes they could expec t from rent would be  reduced , 
while deterioration in the quality of  soil would erode the 
capi tal value of  their land . Moreover , as Ratu J . L . V .  Sukuna 
told the Counc il of  Chief s in 1 9 36 , concessions wo uld lessen 
the r isk of government impo s ing a land tax on the large areas 
of unimproved land held by Fij ians . 7 1  Compromise , then , 
would maintain the alliance between chief s , government and 
European capital to the advantage of all par t ies . 
The r esul t  of  the init iative taken by CSR and the 
subsequent influence of the F ij ians was the Nat ive Land Trus t 
Ordinance (NLTO) , enacted in early 1940 . 7 2  I t  provided for 
the declarat ion of  reserves which were to contain suf ficient 
land for ' the use maintenance or support ' of  Fij ian owners .  
Land within the reserves was not to be alienated , nor leased 
to non-Fij ians . Land outside reserves was to b e  available 
for lease but , following Fij ian pressure , for per iods of only 
thirty years ins tead of the ninety-nine government or iginally 
had in mind . 7 3  Sukuna was appointed Commissioner to demarcate 
the reserves , so giving Fij ians a large measure of  control 
over this important exercise . 7 4  At the heart of  the Ord in­
ance was the creat ion o f  a Nat ive Land Trus t Board (NLTB) 
which , independent o f  government control , was to adminis ter 
all native land ' for the benefit  of the Fij ian owners '  - a 
far cry from earlier demands by CSR that the company sho uld 
control land l eased for cane purposes . The concep t o f  the 
NLTB ac t ing as a trus t for Fij ians was underlined by the 
rej ec t ion of a reques t from the Indian government that there 
be a Fij i-Indian on the Board . The Fij i government argued 
that if the r eque s t  were  granted it would undermine the 
confidence of Fij ians in the Board and that , in any case , 
Indians had no right to expec t  representat ion among trus tees 
who were responsible to the F ij ian race . 7 5  C learly , in the 
preparation of the NLTO the vi tal interest  of Fij ians in 
the land had been upheld . Nevertheles s , the measure  was a 
compromise under which Indians were allowed to  remain as 
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farmers ,  provided Fij ian land ownership r ights were guaran­
t eed and F ij ians cont inued to benefit  from the receip t of  
rents . CSR could hope that the payments to  Fij ians would be  
reduced s ince the creat ion of  t he NLTB was expected to 
eliminate the need for Indians to bribe owners to ob tain a 
renewal of their leases . I t  was generally thought at the 
t ime that this compromise would solve the problem of land 
tenure for good . 7 6 
A f inal ques tion involving CSR ' s  cont ro l o f  growers 
was the heavy indeb tedness of  farmer s . Many had had t o  
borrow to become growers i n  the f ir s t  place - to acquire 
land , or to f inance their household or  farm expens es till 
they received their f irst  payment for cane . Much o f  the pay­
ment was then used to pay off  existing debts , and a large 
part of expend iture dur ing periods when no income from cane 
was received was met by fur ther borrowings . Farmers ' depend­
ence on credit  was increased s ince up to 1940  the whole 
price of cane was paid on the del ivery of the crop ; mos t  
growers had no o ther cash income for the rest o f  the year . 
CSR credit was limit ed to what the company cons idered 
essent ial farm and household expenditure . This excluded a 
variety of  items , ranging from wedding ceremoni es to premiums 
on land , which growers regarded as highly desirable , if not 
essent ial . To f inance these expenses growers turned to 
Indian and ( somet imes)  Europ ean money-lenders ,  usually 
lawyers , landowners and s torekeepers all o f  whom , because of  
the poor  secur ity available , lent at high rates of  interes t .  
Leaseholds were not considered good secur ity b ecause their 
terms were too shor t , while the value of cane as a security 
was l imited because CSR advances were  treated as a f ir s t  
charge agains t the crop . Yet the payment of s teady price s 
by CSR and an inspect ion of  the borrower ' s  land enabled 
money-lenders , barr ing a natural disas ter , to make a reason­
able estimate of a grower ' s  likely income in the season ahead . 
They were , consequently , prepared to extend fa irly liberal 
credit even if the interest rates were high . Borrowing from 
outs ide the company was more ext ens ive among cont rac tors than 
tenants , because CSR ' s  tenancy agreement prohib ited the 
lat ter from grant ing any lien or encumbrance over the ir crops 
excep t  to the company . However , nearly all growers borrowed 
informally from s torekeepers ,  though how extens ive this was 
is  impossible to j udge . So it  was that par t  of the income 
o f  growers was syphoned off  in interest payments . The 
immediate beneficiaries were s torekeepers and money-lenders , 
but their gains were also to the advantage of  impor ters in 
the colony . The extens ion of credit facilitated the 
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consumpt ion o f  impor ts , including food items like rice . 
CSR was concerned because high interest rates reduced 
the real incomes of farmers .  I t  feared , too , that liberal 
credit encouraged growers to l ive beyond their means , and 
that one day they might demand an increase in the cane price 
so that their means could catch up wi th the ir s tandard of 
living . 7 7  To some extent this concern was shared by govern­
ment , which wanted to avoid unrest  among Indians . Yet any 
action to contro l credit  would damage business interes t s  
since lib eral credit helped trade . Government appeared 
sens itive to these interests  when i t  tried to regulate 
money-lending by law . In 19 32 it  intro duced legislat ion 
which empowered the courts , in any suit fo r the recovery of  
a loan , to reopen a transac tion where it  was subs tant ially 
unfair or the interest exces s ive . But it proved impos s ible 
to enforce the law because of verbal understandings and 
false book-entries , and becaus e debtors could rarely afford 
to apply to the cour t for relief . 7 8  Following representat ion 
by C SR ,  in 19 3 3  Fle t cher promis ed to int roduce fur ther 
legislation to prevent growers giving assignments over their 
crop s . Ass ignments  took the form of a writ ten ins truc tion 
from the grower to CSR that the proceeds from cane up to a 
cer tain amount , less what was already deb ited by the company , 
be paid direct to the money-lender or s torekeeper . As sign­
ment s were of ten used by contractors , and in the early 19 30s 
were increas ingly used by tenant s because of a recently 
dis covered loophole in the ir t enancy agreements . CSR hoped 
that legisla t ion wo uld clo se  this loopho le and open the way 
for the company to increase its  cont rol over the indeb ted­
nes s  of contrac tors . 7 9  But Fle tcher had second tho ughts 
about the matter and the propo s ed legislation was dropped . 
CSR under stood that he had come under pressure from Morr is 
Hedstrom Ltd and the legal pro fes s ion , whose  bus ines s  would 
have suffered if  credit to Indians had been cur tailed . 8 0 
Government again appeared responsive to these int eres ts 
when it  introduced the Moneylenders Ordinance in 19 38 . 
The l egislat ion required that money-lenders be registered , 
and s e t  a limit o f  12 per cent on interes t for loans . Ex­
cluded from the measure were lawyers when advancing sums on 
behalf of clients - so making the law ,  in CSR ' s  view , li t tle 
more than a ges t ure . 8 1  Even so , the ordinance was impo ssible 
to enforce because of the var iety o f  ways in which the 12 
per cent limit could be evaded .  
An alternat ive solut ion had been propo sed by CSR in 
1930 : the company , o ther sources o f  private capital and 
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government should j o in in es tabl ishing a Cane Growers Bank 
which would provide farmers with cheap credit . 8 2  Al though 
this was never put on paper , presumably to be effective the 
s cheme would have had to be accompanied by l egislation to 
prevent growers borrowing from o ther sources as well . An 
exp eriment at the Penang mill , whereby CSR financed the 
liquidation of growers ' debts , had recently failed because 
borrowing from outside the company had b een quickly resumed . 8 3  
CSR ' s propo sal was rej ected by off icials because government 
funds would have been needed and the scheme would have 
helped only cane growers whereas there were o ther farmers -
at Navua for example - who also required credit . 8 4 Ten 
years later , the company was again thinking of  es tablishing 
an agricul tural bank for cane farmers . I t  was willing to 
cons ider put t ing up £200 , 000 to take over the liabilities 
o f  thos e  who were in debt , but no th ing came o f  the idea , 
pos s ib ly b ecause government was no t prepared to legi slate 
for the compulsory dis closure o f  deb ts  - a prerequisite for 
the implementation of the scheme . 8 5  Though there is  no 
evidence that officials discuss ed the ques tion in these t erms , 
their lack of  support for CSR ' s  propo sals may have owed 
s omething to the knowledge that if implemented they would 
have damaged those wi th a ves ted interes t in the exis ting 
system .  
Government ' s  willingness to heed bus iness interes ts  
o ther than CSR was increased , p erhap s , by an awareness  of  the 
extraordinary complexity of the ques t ion , and do ub t s  as to 
whether legislative act ion or proposals on the lines suggested 
by CSR were capable of  providing a so lution . So long as o ther 
source s  of f inance were available , growers could use a whole 
hos t  o f  informal arrangements - way b eyond the ab ili ty o f  the 
law to control - to ob tain credit . And so long as their 
secur ity was poor , advances would always be at  high rates o f  
interes t . Maybe it  was this realization , especially af ter 
the Penang experiment , which lay behind the relatively low 
prior ity given to this ques t ion by bo th CSR and government ; 
certainly o fficials frequently s tressed the prac t ical 
diff icul ties in the way of a solut ion . 8 6  The long-term 
answer would have b een to increase farmers ' credit-wor thiness 
by raising their incomes . The higher their incomes the 
b igger the chance that loans would be repaid , and the lower 
the interes t that need be  charged . But this wo uld have 
required CSR to pay more for cane , and this the company was 
no t prepared to do . The price of  cane and the shor t terms 
on which growers held land meant that there was no alterna­
t ive to the provis ion of credit  at high rates of interes t .  
However much CSR disl iked it , the availability o f  this credit 
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brought advantages to the company which far outweighed 
the disadvantages . Wi thout it  many growers could no t have 
become farmers at all . If  they had been unable to finance 
expenditure which they considered essential , the dis content 
among growers would almo s t  cer tainly have b een greater than 
that caused by the high co st  of credi t .  The interes ts  of  
CSR and those of  money-lender s  and s torekeepers were closer 
than the company may have realized . 
The transition t o  the small farm sys tem ,  then , involved 
compromises between CSR , government , the chiefs and other 
bus iness int erests  in the colony . Only on the question of 
diversi fication did the company have its way almos t com­
pletely . Though these compromises were a prerequisite for 
the succes s  of  the smallfarm sys tem ,  they weakened CSR ' s 
exclus ive control over growers and made it eas ier for farmers 
in the future to express  their oppo sition to the company . 
For if CSR ,  by some miracle , had possessed almo st to tal 
control over the supply of credit  to farmers , and if it had 
won greater control over the l eas ing of Fij ian-owned cane 
lands , would growers have dared to s t r ike in 1943  and 196 0?  
Could they have afforded to ? The inter-war years showed 
that CSR had great influence in the economy at large , but 
its inf luence dep ended on working with o ther memb ers of  the 
elite . 
Some effects o f  the smallfarm sys t em 
Wha t  l imits  there were to CSR ' s influence were out­
weighed before World War I I  by the extent of  its control 
over growers .  Although there were occas ions , especially 
among contrac tors , when the company ' s  cultivat ion ins truc­
t ions were not carried out , the amount of  control exercised 
was very considerable , as contemporaries acknowledged . 8 7  
The resul t  was that cer tain characteris t ics o f  the plantat ion 
were perpetuated . Apart from the cont inuat ion of ganging , 
this was evident in the retent ion of certain j ob descript ions 
used on plantations . The t erm f ield officer b ecame current 
only in the late 19 30s . Before then he was known , as he had 
been on the plantat ion , as an overs eer - the name was the 
same because the j ob was the same . Growers were treated as 
if they were s t ill on plantat ions . The Labasa manager wro te 
in 1928 : 
Thus it is essent ial that after leasing our o f f icers 
must  retain that personal influence over the people , 
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which is the outcome o f  discipline under the indenture 
sys tem and may be  looked upon as a Capi tal asset no t 
to b e  dis s ipated . 8 8  
It  was a ' Cap ital asset ' tha t  the company preserved very 
well . Indians were trained no t to become decis ion makers 
and decide for themselves how t o  allo cate resources on their 
farms : rather , they were expec t ed t o  obey dec ision s  taken 
by CSR. S ince smallfarming in the Fij i sugar industry , 
then , falls wi thin that category o f  agricultural enterprise 
which is charac terized by the employment of a relatively 
large number of unskill ed workers  who se activit ies are 
closely sup ervised , George Beckford is quite right to regard 
i t  as a type of planta tion . 8 9  Growers were lit tle more than 
plantation labourers in disguis e . 9 0 
CSR regarded this control as essential if the small­
farm sys t em was to s ucceed . It enabled overseers to ens ure 
tha t on balance the s tandard o f  cul tivation by growers was 
about the same as it  had been on plantat ions . Ploughing was 
no t always so thorough , but the land was kept more clear of 
weeds . 9 1  There seems to have been no significant drop in 
the quality of cane grown , while as Table 6 . 4  shows , yields 
per acre actually increased a l i ttle , though this was partly 
due to the introduct ion of  bet t er variet ies . 9 2  There can 
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Table 6 . 4 
Annual average yields of cane p er acre 
( tons) 
Nausori Rarawai Lab as a Lautoka Penang 
18 . 61 
20 . 45 
1 7 . 4 0  
19 . 36 
16 . 5 7 
18 . 5 7  
21 . 16 
20 . 0 7 
N . A .  
20 . 1 7 
All 
Fij i 
a 
18 . 4 3  
19 . 6 1 
Source : CSR Ltd , Manufactu.re Repor ts , 1905-4 0 . 
a Excludes Penang . Makes no allowance for difference 
in to tal output between mills . 
be no doub t  that growers der ived great advantage from the 
smallfarm sys t em of producing cane . They could earn more 
than if  they had remained as labourers ,  or if they had had 
to rely exclus ively on the cult ivat ion of crops like cot ton 
and rice . Moreover , by paying the same pr ice for cane 
desp ite changes in the wo rld price of sugar , CSR shie lded 
grower s from the worst effec t s  of  the depr ess ion . The 
Co lonial Off ice was told in 1933 , wi th ref erenc e to sugar 
product ion : 
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Conf idenc e in the success  of  this industry is the 
main reason for the general optimism in commerc ial 
c ircles , which is so remarkable of  Fij i at this time 
and separat es Fij i sharply from the rest of the 
Pacif ic t erritor ies . 9 3  
And not j ust the Pacif ic . Unlike the overwhelming maj ority 
o f  peasant cash farmers in the tropics , cane growers in Fij i 
did no t experience a fall in their incomes as a resul t o f  
the depression . Their earning s remained r elatively stable , 
apart from fluctuat ions caused by weather conditions . 
On the other hand , the spread effects  of the sugar 
industry were s t il l  limit ed . Despite at tempts by CSR to 
train Fij ians as growers in the 1930s , the price of cane 
was not suf f iciently high to attract more than a few into 
the industry , with the result that they wer e unwilling to 
share ( in addit ion to rent ) more  of the prof it s from cane . 94 
C SR also repatriat ed mo st of the prof it s it earned in the 
colony . Table 6 . 5  shows an estimate of  the aggregate pro f i t , 
£1 , 904 , 111 , from its  sugar mill s  in Fij i for the year s ended 
31 March 1 9 25 to 31 March 1 94 0 , and Table 6 . 6 pr esents a 
conservat ive estimat e  of the cash surplus arising from 
milling over the same p er iod . No account  has been taken of  
transfer pricing and t he like . Aft er allowing for capital 
inf lows , CSR was in a posit ion to take out of Fij i an esti­
mat ed £ 1 , 99 2 , 9 7 1  - a very large sum in r elat ion to the 
size of the Fij i economy . Except for the amount on the 
pineapple cannery in which the company has invested £ 7 6 , 389  
by  1940 , 9 5  nearly all the  surplus was r epatriated . I t  helped 
f inance the expansion o f  the Aust ralian sugar industry in 
the 1920s and the development of ' Caneite '  produc t ion in the 
lat e 1930s . ' Caneit e '  is a low density wal lboard which was 
manufactured by CSR init ially from megass , a by-product of 
sugar . As in the case of  dist ill ing (and of  course ref ining) , 
the company found it  more economic to process megas s  in 
Aus tralia than Fij i . C SR ' s  diver s i f icat ion into the manu­
fac ture of building mater ial s and then into o ther areas 
during and af t er World War II was f inanced largely by prof its 
made in previous years . 9 6  Table 6 . 7 shows that prof its  from 
Fij i - at least in 1926 , 1927  and 1929  - were a s ignif icant , 
but not a maj or , proportion of  the company ' s  earnings . On 
top of this was the harm done by CSR ' s  obstruct ion of 
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Table 6 . 5  
Aggrega te prof it from CSR ' s  sugar mills in Fij i 
for years ended 31 March 1 9 2 5  to 31 March 1940a 
Sales of raw s ugarb 
Operat ing costs : 
E F  
19 , 684 , 7 58 
Direct co s t s  - purchase of cane , etc . 
E s t imat ed overhead co s t sc 
Add miscellaneous prof i t s  from sale of 
molasses , operati .'Jn o f  S . S .  Rani , 
sundry t rad ingd 
Gros s  prof it  
Less charge for deprec iat ion and replacemente 
Net prof it be fore tax 
Less income taxf 
�et pro f i t  after tax 
15 , 859 , 061 
506 , 880 1 6 , 365 , 941 
3 , 318 , 8 1 7  
346 , 63 7  
3 , 66 5 , 4 54 
1 , 6 2 3 , 942 
2 , 041 , 512 
1 37 , 4 01 
1 , 904 , 111 
Sources : Mill prof it and loss accoun t s ,  Chief Accountant , CSR Ltd , Sydney ; 
C . Y .  Shephard , The Sugar Industry of Fiji , 49 . 
No tes : aNo allowance has been made for changes in the general price 
level . Compared wi th the pr evious t en years and the years a f t er 
1939 , prices were rela t ively s t able dur ing the period : the fall 
in pr ices which result ed from the Great Depression was at least 
par tly o f f set by the devalua t ion o f  the Fij i pound . 
bExc ludes income from sale o f  stocks held on 31 March 1924 but 
includes income from sale of s t ocks held on 31 March 1940 . 
Because of ab sence of relevant f igures , it is assumed t hat there 
was no prof it  or loss from sale of s t ocks held on 31 March 1925 
and cred ited at current prices to re t urns for the year ended on 
that date . 
cFigures only available for year s ended 31 March 1934 to 31 March 
1 940 inc lusive . Annual overhead co s t s  for t he previous eight 
year s have been as sumed to be the average of the following seven 
years . 
dThough it is no t cer tain , the pro f it s do no t seem to include any 
gains or losses from rent s , t he Yaqara cat tle s tat ion , the 
dairies and butcher ies , and t he p ineapple cannery . Los ses from 
the cannery would have of f s e t  some if no t mos t  of the gains f rom 
the o ther ac t ivit ies . 
eThough no t absolutely certain , the charge seems to have been on a 
s t raight l ine basis - 4 per cent each year on the original cost 
of f ixed asset s . Assumed is that gains / losses f rom dispo sal of 
fixed assets are treated as capital t ransact ions and are excluded 
from mill profit and loss accounts .  
f lncome tax paid for per iod up to and includ ing year ended 31 
March 1930 has been estimat ed on bas i s  of net profit before tax 
in yearn X rate of tax in yearn . 
Table 6 . 6  
Est imat ed cash f low aris ing f rom Fij i sugar mill ing activit ies 
for years ended 31 March 1925 to 31 March 1940a 
Net prof it after tax 
Add back depreciat ion and replacement 
Less estimated cap i tal expendi t ureb 
Cash surplus 
EF 
1 , 904 , 111 
1 , 623 , 94 2  
3 , 5 28 , 05 3  
1 , 5 35 , 082 
1 ; 9 9 2 , 9 71 
1 4 9  
Sources : Table 5 . 5 ;  ' Fij i Sugar Mills ' ,  4 Apr . 1 944 , CSR F 5 . 0 / 2 / - .  
No tes : aNot all the cash flow would have occurred dur ing this per iod . 
Tax payments and certain expenses inc urred in the last year ( s )  
would have been paid a f t e r  31 March 194 0 ,  wh ile income from 
sugar stocks held on that da te would not have f lowed in till t he 
following year . S imilarly , certain expenses incurred before 1 
April 1924 would have been met after that date . 
bThe estimate is based on a statement , ' Fij i  Sugar Mil ls ' ,  pre­
pared by CSR for the Shephard enquiry in 1944 . The s tatement 
shows the value of ' Fixed Assets plus Improvement s '  for each 
year from 1930 on the basis of rep lacement values in 1 9 39 , the 
va lua t ion having been made in 1941 . The value of assets for 
each year before 1941 was calculated by substract ing the cap i tal 
expend iture for each year back to 1 9 30 . To tal capital expend­
iture for the years ended 31 March 1 9 31 to 31 March 1940 was 
£896 , 92 6 .  No f igures are available for the six years before 
1 9 30 , so i t  ha s been assumed tha t annual cap ital expenditure for 
that per iod was the same as the annual average for the years 
ended 31 March 1 9 31 to 31 March 1940 . To this has been added 
£100 , 000 to cover the purchased land and the Penang mil l  in the 
late 1920s . Ac tual capital expend i ture was almost certainly 
less than the est imate here , for t hese reasons : 
( i )  The Penang mill and subsequent addit ions to it cost only 
£25 , 000 . It is highly unl ikely t hat purchases of land amo unted 
to £75 , 000 since the book value of all land in Fij i held by CSR 
in 1941 amounted to £2 2 2 , 000 . The area o f  CSR ' s  land acqui s i­
t ions in the late 19 20s were a small par t of the total area 
owned by the company . 
( i i )  From F ij i ' s  annual trade report s ,  the average annual f . o . b .  
value o f  import s  o f  sugar-making machinery , railway mater ial 
and locomo t ives and component parts was £F45 , 5 44 for the cal­
endar years 1924 to 1939 . Even after allowing for o ther capi tal 
goods imported for the sugar indus try (e . g .  rolling stock which 
was not recorded as a separate i t em t ill 1 944 - was it  too small 
to be treated as a separate i t em before then? ) ,  costs of t rans­
port and of instal la t ion , it  is l ikely that average annual 
capital expenditure was less than £ 89 , 692 . 
( i i i )  The assump t ion that capital expenditure f o r  t he s ix years be fore 
1 9 30 averaged the same as for the ten sub sequent y ears probably 
overs tates the size o f  capital expenditure in the f ormer p er iod . 
The annual average f . o . b . value of t he impor t s  ment ioned above 
and recorded in the trade repor t s  was £F 34 , 082 f rom 1924 to 1929 , 
against £ F52 , 4 2 2  for the next ten years . 
Thus the estimate for capital expend it ure represents an upper limi t .  
Table 6 . 7  
Sources of CSR ' s prof it s  f o r  years ended 31 March 1926 , 1927  and 1929 
Year ended 3 1  March 1926 1 9 2 7  1929 
Total CSR profits  ( £ Aus tralian) 
% derived from Aus tralia 
890 , 7 32 1 , 0 7 2 , 79 7 1 , 346 , 306 
% I I  
% I I  
% I I  
" 
" 
" 
New Zealand 
F ij i 
Other sources 
5 2 . 4  64 . 0  54 . 2  
8 . 9  7 . 8 6 . 2  
32 . 3  22 . 8  28 . 6  
6 . 4  5 . 4 11 . 0  
Source : CSR Ltbk . , ' E . W . K .  Special ' ,  4 ( 19 09-37) , 122-39 . 
No tes : 1 .  ' Other sources ' include interest on various debts , debentures , temporary depos its in 
London , etc . , and ' trading income from buying and s elling sugar outside the [Aus t­
ralian ] Commonwealth and upon which income tax has not been paid ' .  ( ' E . W . K .  Spec ial ' ,  
1 5 0 . )  
' 
2 .  These f igures were produced for the Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation in 
Australia . 
3 .  In 1930 and 1931 the Fij i p ercentage of to tal profits  dropped to 3 . 9 and 6 . 8 
respect ively , but these were years o f  exceptionally small profits in Fij i and were 
no t typical of the co lony ' s  contribut ion to the total earnings of  CSR . Figures for 
1 9 28 not available . 
1--' 
Ln 
0 
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d iver sificat ion , which denied the co lony the op tion of 
develop ing new exports and lef t it  dependent on import s  for a 
signif icant proport ion of Ind ian food stuf f s . 9 7  Finally , the 
dominance of CSR in Fij i and its  treatment of farmers produced 
resentment , which would flare into open def iance of the com­
pany dur ing World War I I  and reduce the nat ional income as a 
resul t . So it was that in the s e  ways , to borrow the words of 
a Wes t  Indian writer , sugar pr oved to be a sweet male fac tor . 9 8  
Chapter 7 
CSR ' s  hegemony under attack - the 194 0s 
World War I I  s aw the f ir s t  maj or chal lenge to CSR ' s  
control o f  growers s ince the inaugurat ion of  the smallfarm 
sys tem - a challenge fue lled by the resentment o f  Indians at 
their inf er ior political and economic s tatus in the colony , 
especially vis-a-vis Europeans . 1 S tart ing in the late 19 30s 
farmers '  unions were formed , and in 194 3 growers refused to 
harves t  their cane . If one assumes a consensus model of 
society in which divergent interest s  are locked together in 
mutual support ,  these unions can be seen as voluntary 
associat ions which served as a link between the ' traditional ' 
farming community and the 'mo dern ' CSR . 2 Emerging at  a time 
o f  s truc tural ( economic )  change which had a des tab ilising 
effect on the indus t ry , they can be viewed in terms of the ir 
integrative f unc t ion , which was to channel the grievances of 
farmers in ways that would no t threaten the s tab ili ty of the 
smallfarm sys tem .  Yet to adopt such a model would be to 
overlook the dichotomy of  interes t between growers and the 
company . True , to a great extent they were both mutually 
dependent , one for a market and the o ther for s upplies , but 
they were also fundamentally opposed to  each o ther - over 
the price of cane , for example . Their oppos i t ion was in­
creased by market cons traint s on the price of raw sugar , 
which favoured the consumer but res tricted the f unds avail­
able for dis tribution among tho se engaged in the industry . 
Though s ugar proceeds were to grow cons iderably over the 
next thir ty y ears , they wo uld never be large enough to mee t 
the long-term needs of both the mil lers and the farmers .  
Obvious ly , CSR ' s ability to pay more for cane would be 
limi ted by the price it  received for raw sugar , as well as 
by its need to make a prof i t . Consequently , with market ing 
arrangement s  for Fij i sugar des igned mainly to benefit  
interes t s  over seas , growers found themselves in conf lic t 
no t j us t  with CSR, but with cons umers of  sugar abroad . The 
emergence of  unions should be seen as the beginning o f  an 
awareness by farmers o f  the contradict ion in which they were 
placed . 
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Demographic change and its  economic ef fect 
I t  was no accident that the unionizat ion of growers 
began j us t  before World War I I , when the transi t ion to the 
smallfarm sys t em was nearly complete . Many of the Indians 
who were settl ed as cane farmers in the 1920s and 19 30s had 
already experienced two maj or improvements  in their economic 
s tatus - from unemployment ,  perhaps des t i tution , in India to 
indentured labourers in Fij i , and from the indenture system 
to free workers and agricul t uralists . Now under the small­
farm sys tem they had experienced a third , perhaps the largest , 
advance in their s tandard o f  l iving . Some had been able to 
s upplement , or substit.ute ,  the p lots  they already leased 
with higher quality and lar ger areas of company land , while 
o thers had moved f rom wage- to more lucrat ive self-employment . 
Since , despi t e  the control it entailed , the treatment o f  
farmers b y  CSR compared favo urably with the iniquit ies  o f  the 
indenture sys tem and the explo itation of  tenant s by land­
lords in India ( and by a ntnnb er of Indian landlords in Fij i 3 ) ,  
the f ir s t  generat ion o f  growers did little to dispute the 
condit ions of farming laid down by the company . 4 An Indian 
Planters Associat ion , formed in 19 34 ,  had not s urvived long . 5 
By the late 1 9 30s , however , many of these farmers were 
growing old . As stnning no deaths in the meant ime , by 19 36 
about 40 per cent of the male Indian populat ion aged between 
15 and 50 in the 1920 census - thos e  mos t  likely to become 
growers under the smallfarm sys tem - had passed the age o f  
50  ( see Table 7 . 1) . In 1 9 4 1  the proport ion would have been 
about 6 7 p er cent and in 1946  about 90 per cent . Though 
these figures are for the male Indian populat ion as a whole , 
including non-farmers ,  and do not allow for tho se who were 
under 15 in 1921 and may have acquired farms when they were 
older (probably only a few) , they provide at least  a rough 
guide to the number of  original cane growers who had reached 
5 0 . Once they attained this age growers tended to l eave 
mos t  o f  the respons ib il ities o f  farm management to their 
sons . Thus cane farming was pass ing into the hands o f  a 
new generat ion , a generation that had no t served under 
indentur e  and that could not compare conditions in Fij i with 
those  their fathers  had lef t in India . This had important 
result s . The first  was that no t having been indentured to 
plantat ions , younger growers were less willing than their 
fathers to under take the very unpleasant j ob of  harves ting 
cane , preferring to pay for s ub s titutes instead . 6 In 1943  
it was es t imated that nearly half the cane cutters in  Vit i  
Levu were sub s titutes . 7 Though some were farmers '  sons , 
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not all would have been so . Some were repaying in labour 
deb ts  to money-lenders and s torekeepers ,  a ntnnber of whom 
were also cane farmers .  The wages (or equivalent ) o f  those 
who were no t sons reduced the cash surpluses from each farm , 
provoking demands that the price of cane be increased . 8 
The second cons equence was that growers were more will ing to 
challenge the smallfarm sys tem as it  had evolved . No t having 
experienced the harsh alterna t ives , they could ignore the 
pas t  in order to question the present . 
Table 7 . 1 
Age dis tribution o f  adul t male Indians in 1921 
Age Number % total 
15-20 410 1 . 88 
20-25 1 , 6 09 7 . 36 
2 5-30 4 , 381 2 0 . 05 
3 0-35 5 , 161 2 3 . 6 2 
35-40 3 , 4 7 6  1 5 . 91 
4 0-45 3 , 09 9  14 . 18 
4 5-50 1 , 33 7  6 . 12 
50-55 1 , 308 5 . 99 
5 5-60 380 1 .  74 
6 0-65 4 5 6  2 . 08 
65  and over 235  1 . 0 7  
Total 21 , 85 2  100 . 00 
Source : Census report for 1921 , C. P. 2 /1922 . 
And they found much to que s t ion . There was bitter 
resentment against CSR ' s  tight control of farmers , especially 
its res trictions on the planting o f  food crop s , the l imited 
length o f  the company ' s  l eases , the authoritarian - some t imes 
bullying - attitude of cer tain f ield of f icers and the obliga­
tion on growers , when directed by CSR , to work the mills , 
weed the tramlines and harve s t  the company ' s  es tates for 
wages too low to attrac t vo luntary labour . 9 Resentment 
agains t the company was heightened in the late 19 30s and 
early 1 940s by the rapid growth of the Indian populat ion , 
which meant that the number of dependants o f  non-working 
age - those under 15 and over 5 9 l D  - increased more rap idly 
than the number of those who had to suppor t them ( see Table 
7 . 2 ) . Women are no t counted as dependant s since before the 
war , when there was a shortage of labour , they performed 
various tasks on the farm . 1 1  The likelihood that this 
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increase would reduce per capita incomes in the sugar 
dis tricts was made greater by the limited employment oppor­
tuni ties available for members of  cane-growing fami li es who 
were capable o f  work . The number o f  Indians in rural areas , 
which included persons l iving in the vicinity o f  towns but 
no t neces sarily engaged in agriculture , increased by 50 per 
cent between 19 36 and 1946 whereas the amount of new land 
coming under cane ros e  by only 1 per cent ( see Tab le 7 . 3) . 1 2  
Even though a large proportion o f  the increase in rural 
populat ion consis ted of tho se too young to work , it is clear 
that the labour sho rtage in cane areas was being trans formed 
into a surplus - a trend tha t was recognized by CSR in 1941 . 
Tabl e  7 . 2 
Age s tructure o f  Indian population , 1936 and 1946 
Ages  19 36 194 6 % increase 
1-14 
15-59 
60 and over 
Total population 
Total under 
3 7 , 54 4  
4 2 , 620  
4 , 8 38 
85 , 00 2  
15 and over 5 9  4 2 , 382 
% to tal under 
15 and over 5 9  
t o  total population 4 9 . 9  
58 , 312 
5 3 ,  3 35 
8 , 080 
119 , 7 2 7a 
6 6 , 392  
5 5 . 5  
55 . 3  
25 . 1  
67 . 0 
40 . 9  
5 6 . 7  
11 . 2  
Source : Census reports for 19 36 and 1946 , C . P. 4 2 / 1 9 36 , 
35 /194 7 . 
aExclude s the 336 who did no t s pecify an age . 
The growing populat ion pressure on s ugar land might 
have been alleviated by the creation of new j obs in activ­
ities not d irect ly asso c ia ted wi th the cul t ivation of cane . 
Table 7 . 4 shows that the numb er o f  Indians engaged in pr imary 
indus try , apar t from cane , and in s econdary artd ter tiary 
sectors almo st  doubled between 19 36 and 1946 . Par ticular 
care is needed in int erpreting this tab le , which is based on 
census reports  for the two year s . Whereas the 194 6 census 
s tated that only those aged 12 or over were ques t ioned about 
their occupations , the 19 36 census gave no such information 
and left it  unclear whe ther the fi gures on occupat ional 
status included persons under . 12 years or no t .  This makes 
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comparison between the two dif ficul t . Moreover , a signifi­
cant number of  respondents in 1936 did no t indicate their 
occupations , wi th the result that when the tables were 
compiled it was as sumed that if Indians lived in sugar 
dis trict s ,  and had no t provided information about their 
occupations , they were engaged in the cul t ivat ion of  cane . 
But this was not necessarily the case s ince , despite CSR 
oppos ition , a number o f  cont rac tors cultiva ted food crops 
in addition to cane , while there were o thers - albeit only a 
few - in the sugar d is tricts who did no t grow cane . Conse­
quently , the 12 , 5 01 said to have been involved in the 
production of cane in 19 36 may have been an overes t imate . 
Finally , the two censuses were taken at different t imes o f  
the year - on 2 6  April in 19 36 and on 3 October in 1946 . 
In April farmers were likely to have been cul t ivating cane : 
in Oc tober they would have been harves t ing it . This  he lps 
explain why the numbers involved in producing cane in 19 36 
were higher than in 1946 . In Oc tober o f  the lat ter year 
some members of cane-growing families , who in April might  
have ass is ted with cul t ivation , wo uld have been employed in 
cas ual j obs connec t ed with the milling of cane . This  in 
turn would have swelled the figures for tho se  engaged in 
secondary indus try . In 194 6 the number of Indian males 
employed in the manufacture of s ugar was put at  1 , 20 4 : in 
1 9 36 it  was only 580 . The difference was almo st ent irely 
due to the dates on which the censuses were taken . 
Tabl e  7 . 3  
Increase in cane area and in number of  Indians in 
r ural areas , 19 36 -4 6a 
Acreage under cane 
% increase 
1936 
89 , 924 
1946 
90 , 816 
1 
No . o f  Indians in rural 
areas 6 6 , 921  100 , 94 3  
5 0  % increase 
Source : Michael Moynagh , ' Land tenur e  in Fij i ' s 
s ugar cane dis tric ts since the 1920s ' ,  
Journa.l of Pacific History , 1 3  ( 19 7 8 ) , 
Table 3 .  
aincludes Indians in the vicinity of  towns 
and not neces sarily engaged in agriculture . 
Table 7 . 4 
Occupat ional status of male Indians , 1 9 36 and 194 6  
Occupa tion 
Sugar cane farming 
Other primary indus try 
Secondary & ter t iary sec tors 
To tal employed 
No . employed 
1 9 36 1946  
12 , 5 01 
4 , 338 
7 , 505 
24 , 344 
9 , 611 
10 , 798  
11 , 4 76 
31 , 885 
Source : Census repor t s  for 19 36 and 194 6 , C. P.  
42/ 1936 , 35 / 1 94 7 . 
15 7 
Yet desp ite diff iculties in comparing the two census 
reports , it is clear that between 1936 and 194 6  non-cane 
employment oppor t uni ties for Indians increased . The number 
of new j ob s  was especially high in 1942  and 194 3 when about 
70 , 000 Allied troops were s ta tioned on the wes t  of Viti Levu , 
but mos t  of  these j ob s  were shor t term and did not outlas t 
the presence of  the troop s . 1 3  Of the permanent increase in 
j ob s  over the ten-year per iod , some were in the secondary 
and tertiary sectors but mos t  were in agriculture . There 
was a subs tantial increase in the number of  Indians involved 
in the cult ivat ion of food crops o ther than cane , part icu­
larly maize ,  r ice and other grains in which the to tal rose 
from 2 , 0 25  in 1936 to 6 , 38 7  in 1 94 6 . Over the period the 
area under r ice in the colony grew from about 1 3 , 800 to 
about 2 3 , 800 acres . 1 4 The increase in sub s is t ence crops 
was due to the relaxation of company res trictions on the 
cul t ivat ion of  such crops by cane farmers . CSR ' s  more 
flexible attitude aro se  from the immediat e need to over come 
the shortage of food during the war , as well as being a 
response to pressure from growers , and was not sub sequently 
rever sed . 1 5  Thus the fall in numb er s  cultivat ing sugar 
between 1936 and 194 6 , and t he increase in those involved 
in o ther agricul tural pursui t s , was partly the result of  a 
greater number of  families tend ing crops in add it ion to 
cane . 
The increase  in employment oppor tuni ties be tween 1 9 36 
and 1946  does no t neces sarily mean tha t , in the face o f  a 
growing number of  dependants ,  the workforce was able to  
maintain per capita incomes (or  their equivalent) among the 
Indian population . Mos t  of the non-cane occupations in 
which Indians were engaged in 1946 were les s lucrative than 
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the cul t ivat ion of  sugar . This was certainly true of the 
equivalent money returns from growing subsistence crops 
l ike rice . It was also true of much of the wage employment 
open to Indians . Table 7 . 5 shows the wages of unskilled 
government employees in 1939 , 1944 and 1 94 5  which were b roadly 
in line with the wages of unskilled workers in o ther ac t iv­
itie s . In 1 9 39 an unskilled labourer working f ive and a 
half days a week , f if ty weeks a year , would have earned 
£ 34 7s 6d . Af ter deducting farm cos t s , the es t imated income 
of a cane grower on twelve acres o f  land would have been 
about £48  10 Od . At 1944 wage rates , a labo urer in Suva 
would have earned about £55 , while the cane farmer in 194 3 
(assuming he had harves ted his cane ) would have netted 
about � 70 18 Od . 1 6  In fac t , many labourers would have earned 
considerably less than these sums becaus e they would have 
been engaged in only casual work . 
Table 7 . 5  
Daily wage rates of unskilled government emp loyees 
in 1 9 39 , 1944 , and 1945 
19 39 1944a 
s d s d 
Suva 2 6 4 0 
Country 2 6 3 10 
Source : ' Annual Report of  the Commis s ioner o f  
Labour , Fij i ,  1 94 5 ' ,  C . P .  8/194 6 . 
aincludes cos t  of  l iving bonus . 
1945a 
s d 
4 4 
4 2 
Now , given the l imited earnings from o ccupat ions 
alternative to cane , it is clear that with the increase in 
population , especially in the p roport ion o f  non-working age , 
the maintenance of per capita incomes in the sugar districts 
depended on a rise  in the net proceeds from cane . But in 
the lat e  1 9 30 s  this did not occur . There was no s ignif icant 
improvement in farm productivity ( see Table 7 . 6 )  and cane 
pr ices were not raised till 1940 . Consequently , as suming 
a constant rate of population growth between 1936 and 194 6 , 
j us t  before World War I I  per capita incomes in the cane 
areas were almo s t  certainly in decline . This was reflected 
in the demand by growers in 1939 that the size o f  their 
farms be increased , so that they could more easily suppor t  
their large families .  Dur ing the war , b u t  i n  response t o  a 
problem that mus t  have begun ear lier , growers al so pro tes ted 
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at C SR ' s  restric t ions on  the numb er of  houses tha t could be  
built on  each farm . So it  was that wi th the decline in  per 
capita incomes , coupled with long-s tanding gr ievances agains t 
CSR and the existence of a new genera tion o f  farmers willing 
to pres s  for change , condi tions in the late 1930s were ripe 
for the unionizat ion of growers .  
Table 7 . 6  
Y ields o f  cane - tons per acre cropped , 19 30-50 
Year Nausori Rarawai Labasa Lautoka Penang True 
1 9 30 
1931 
19 32 
19 33 
1934 
19 35 
19 36 
1937  
19 38 
1 9 39 
1940 
1941 
1942 
194 3 
1944 
194 5 
1946 
194 7 
194 8 
1949 
19 5 0  
20 . 3  
1 7 . 0  
24 . 2  
19 . 4  
20 . 6  
23 . 3  
1 9 . 1  
2 2 . 7  
24 . 3  
15 . 0  
21 . 4  
16 . 7  
18 . 1  
15 . 9  
16 . 4  
1 7  . 4  
18 . 0  
21 . 1  
16 . 5  
16 . 1  
10 . 8  
15 . 8  
9 . 0 
2 2 . 8  
19 . 8  
18 . 5  
21 . 5  
24 . 0  
22 . 5  
21 . 1  
20 . 7  
19 . 4  
20 . 8  
18 . 9  
18 . 7  
1 3 . 6  
15 . 5  
19 . 7  
2 2 . 3  
2 2 . 5  
25 . 7  
18 . 1  
1 3 . 7  
13 . 5  
20 . 8  
19 . 1  
18 . 7  
20 . 2  
20 . 5  
20 . 1  
21 . 5  
18 . 4  
15 . 6  
20 . 9  
21 . 8  
1 7  . 4  
14 . 7  
14 . 5  
1 7 . 0  
1 7 . 8  
19 . 4  
15 . 1  
14 . 9  
18 . 0  
16 . 3  
26 . 0  
19 . 3  
18 . 9  
2 2 . 7  
2 2 . 7  
2 1 . 5  
2 2 . 5  
18 . 8  
19 . 6  
21 . 0  
21 . 3  
20 . 2  
14 . 9  
15 . 3  
21 . 9  
22 . 0  
2 3 . 9  
2 3 . 2  
16 . 7  
19 . 2  
16 . 1  
26 . 6  
19 . 0  
1 9 . 0  
19 . 1  
2 2 . 2  
2 3 . 7  
20 . 8  
19 . 6  
1 7 . 9  
20 . 1  
18 . 8  
18 . 0  
11 . 5  
14 . 7  
1 7 . 6  
16 . 6  
21 . 8  
20 . 4  
15 . 6  
Source : C SR Ltd , Manufacture Reports , 1 9 31 to 195 1 . 
Farmers ' unions and the 194 3 strike 
average 
1 7  . 1  
13 . 6  
24 . 2  
19 . 4  
19 . 0  
21 . 9  
2'2 . 3 
21 . 9  
2 2 . 1  
18 . 9  
19 . 1  
20 . 2  
20 . 2  
18 . 2  
14 . 4  
15 . 4  
19 . 7  
21 . 0  
21 . 8  
21 . 6  
16 . 2  
The f irs t maj or union , the Kisan Sangh ( ' Farmers '  
Associat ion ' ) , was founded in late 19 37 as the result of 
efforts  by Ayodhya Prasad , its  General Secre tary who had 
originally come to Fij i as a s chool teacher in 1926 . In his 
autob iographical hi story of the Kisan Sangh , Prasad des­
cribed an argument he had had in the early 19 30s with an 
American . The latter had 
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advised not to put t he b lame on Europeans . Ins tead , 
Indians should learn to uni te , become powerful and at 
once the Europeans would be f riendly . Later , that 
night I s tarted pondering what the American had said 
and it seemed his every word was corre c t . S ince then 
I lef t hating Europ eans and thought of correc ting the 
Indians . 1 7  
Prasad believed that if  they would uni te and form,  as it 
were , a loyal opposition to the company , Indians could win 
maj or conces sions that would raise their incomes and reduce 
CSR ' s  control over them . But this s trategy of collabora tion 
ignored the basic conflict between growers  and CSR . 
The adopt ion of the strat egy refl ected farmers ' 
psychological dependence on the company ; they fel t  they 
could no t do without CSR . Prasad told A . G . Sahu Khan , Indian 
Assistant to the District  Commis s ioner (Western) in 1940 , 
that growers want ed to co-operate  with the millers 
for the good of the sugar cane indust ry in this Co lony 
in the welfare of which we are relat ively much mor e  
int erested than the cap ital is t s  who const itute the 
Company , for with us farming is the end-all of our 
existence in this Colony , whereas the cap italists  
could eas ily transf er their cap ital to  some other part 
of the world . 
In addit ion , CSR appeared so s trong that many doubted whether 
an effective union could be formed at all , let alone one that 
sought a conf rontat ion with the company . 1 8  Prasad hims elf 
was a North Ind ian , so that much of the early suppor t for 
the union came f rom this sect ion of the farming community . 
Because they had been longer in Fij i ,  Nor th Indians were  
generally more pro sperous than those from the  south , 1 9  with 
a larger stake in the exist ing order . They had mo re to lose 
than South Ind ians from a strategy of confrontat ion that 
fail ed , and yet they stood to gain from concessions won 
through co-operat ion with CSR .  
At first i t  was no t easy t o  collaborat e ,  since CSR 
refused to  recogniz e  the union . The company hoped that if it 
was ignored the associat ion would wither away . Previous 
at temp t s  to organiz e unions among the Indian populat ion had 
failed . Why should the Kisan Sangh be any exc ept ion? 
Indeed , would not recogni tion g ive l egit imacy to the union , 
increase it s prest ige with growers and transform it into an 
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organizat ion capable of launching a powerful cha llenge to 
CSR in the future?  Better , the company thought , to defeat 
the union now , while it was s t ill small , than to pile up 
trouble for the future . 2 0 This approach ran into conf lict 
with government which feared the law and order implications 
of unrest in the sugar indus try , believed that it was in 
CSR ' s own long-term bes t interest to co -op erat e with the 
Kisan Sangh and was under pressure from the Co lonial Off ice 
to legislate for the compulsory recognit ion of unions . For 
almo s t  ten years CSR had successfully s taved off such legis­
lat ion . 2 1  Informed opinion in Britain would no t allow it  
to  do  this for  much longer . S ir Harry Luke (governor , 1939-
41) , considered CSR ' s managers to be dull , unimaginat ive and 
behind the times in their tendency ' to regard the Indian , 
as in the days of  indentur e , as  a person who is no t expec ted 
to think for himsel f ' . He  thought the general manager , Gold­
f inch , was a comp lete autocra t ' . For its  part , the company 
b elieved Luke to be ' weak and indolent ' .  Its  legal adviser 
in F ij i ,  S ir Henry Scot t ,  describ ed h im in private as ' a  dirty 
little J ew '  - a remark that reflected the widespread unpopul­
arity of Luke among the Europeans . 2 2  Yet f or all this p erson­
al antagonism ,  what was in dispute was no t the company ' s  r ight 
to make profits  in Fij i but rather , how this could best  b e  done . 
Had CSR persisted in its  refusal to make concessions to 
the union , it i s  unlikely that the Kisan Sangh would have 
emerged so quickly as a powerf ul force in the indus try . 
Indeed , like its  predecessors it too might have collapsed . 
But government pressure forced the company to modify its 
approach . Off icials promised t hat i f  CSR refused to be more 
conciliatory they would introduce legislat ion for the com­
pul sory recognit ion of unions and arbitrat ion in the case 
of unresolved disputes . Rat her than have collective bargain­
ing impo sed on it , especially in a way that provided for out­
side intervent ion in the indus try , the company chose to 
dr ibble out concess ions in the hope that they would sat isfy 
government and appease the growers . In fact they did ne ither . 
Each concess ion was attribut ed by farmers to the efforts o f  
the Kisan Sangh , s o  tha t the more conc e s s ions were made the 
more the strength o f  the union increased . By July 1940 
72  per cent of growers in the Ba-Sigatoka belt were lis ted 
as members , 42  per cent of whom were f inancial . As memb er­
ship of the union grew , and as it continued to demand recogni­
tion , so pressure on CSR from government was int ens if ied . 
The resul t was defeat for the company ' s  strategy and recogni­
t ion for the Ki san Sangh . 
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Recognit ion occurred in three stages . In 1 9 39 , without 
ac tually nego tiat ing with any o f  the leader s of  the Ki san 
Sangh , CSR met a few of their demands . It  gave each farmer 
a written ac count of the proceeds from his cane , i t  r eversed 
it s po licy of discouraging grower s from planting food crop s 
even on land away from their farms , it  reduced the length 
o f  the working day in the mills from twelve to eight hours 
(effectively a 33  1/3 per cent rise in wages ) , and it in­
creased its  efforts to hire Fij ians in order to obviate the 
need to extract compulsory labour from growers . Field 
off icers were taught Hindi and ins tructed to  use less force 
and more tact  in the ir treatment of farmers .  At the end o f  
the year the company offered growers a ten-year contract t o  
govern the terms on which it  would buy cane - a n  important 
demand by the Ki san Sangh - and in response to ano ther demand 
(as well as to save the cos t  o f  analys ing each grower ' s  
cane) it promi sed to abandon the sys tem of paying for cane 
according to the quality of each farmer ' s  crop . Ins tead , the 
price was to be based on the average quality o f  cane crushed 
in each mil l , with a s cale of bonuses  once the price of sugar 
exceeded £ 11 a ton . 
Following threats  not to plant cane if modificat ions to 
the contrac t were no t made , and af ter f ur ther pressure on the 
company by government , maj or conces sions were next of fered by 
C SR on 6 April  1940 . I t  met a deputat ion of cane growers 
which , though no t a formal deputat ion of t he Kisan Sangh , 
contained six members (of  a to tal seven) nominat ed by i t . 
The company promised a few minor alterat ions to the contrac t  
i t  would try t o  improve the delivery of fert ilizer , interest 
on advances would be reduced to  4 per cent , growers  would be  
allowed a representat ive at the weighbr idge ( to check the 
weights recorded for their cane) , and the cul t ivat ion of 
second ratoons would be allowe d . More important was that for 
the f irst  t ime the company had , in effect , recognized the 
princ iple of collective bargaining . In response , the growers 
agreed to s ign the contrac ts  o f fered by C SR . The third s tage 
occurred the f ollowing year , again after government pressure . 
In March 1 94 1  the company offered three- ins tead of ten-year 
leases to seven allegedly unsat isfactory tenant s in Raki 
Raki . When they refused to sign ,  evic t ion proceedings were 
star ted by CSR and agitat ion begun by the Kisan Sangh . Luke 
urged the company to withdraw the no tices of evic tion , but 
CSR pro ceeded with the cour t  case and , having won it , then 
announced that the tenant s would be reins tated on their 
farms . Meet ings were sub sequently held with leaders of  the 
Kisan Sangh , and on 30 May the union was recogniz ed . Soon 
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af ter , on instruct ions from the Colonial Office , industrial 
legi slat ion was introduc ed and , to the dismay of CSR , brought 
into effect the following year . 
Once the Kisan Sangh had been imp lic itly recogni zed 
in 1 940 , it began to co-operate with C SR ,  and this collabora­
t ion was increased af ter formal recognit ion in 1941 . One 
area of co -operation was over the harvest ing of cane . 
Hitherto , of ten und er the inf luence of f ield off icers , gangs 
had elec ted s irdars from their midst to  superviz e the cut ting 
of cane and lo ading on trucks . But in 1940 and 1941 C SR 
gave the Kisan Sangh responsibility for the appo intment of 
sirdars , though the union ' s  nominees were usually men who 
would have been elected in any case .  The s irdars were 
allowed a greater say in det ermining the order of harves t ing , 
an important point s ince it reduc ed the opportunity for 
field off icers to punish recalc itrant growers by having their 
cane harvested when it was d isadvantageous to them . 2 3  In 
re turn , the Ki san Sangh used its  inf luence to set t le d isput es 
among farmers and increase the eff iciency of harvest ing . 2 4  
The Ki san Sangh worked with the company i n  another way . In 
1 941  part  of the output of raw sugar from · Fij i had to be  
des troyed because ,  due  t o  the  wart ime shortage o f  shipp ing , 
it could not be market ed . The result  was that growers 
received a slight ly lower price for their cane than would 
otherwise  have been the case . Yet instead of support ing 
the claim f rom some quarter s  that CSR should have paid the 
who le pric e ,  the union backed the company /government view 
that growers should bear par t of the los s . 2 5 Fur thermore , 
having won a t en-year contract in 1940 , rather than seek to 
raise the l iving s tandards of f armers by again pressing CSR 
for a higher cane price , the Ki san Sangh directed its  a t t en­
t ion toward the chronic  indebtedness  of growers . Apart 
from high int erest rates  on cash loans , the real incomes of 
farmers were reduc ed by the relat ively high prices they had 
to pay for goods bought on credit . As an att emp t to solve 
the problem ,  in 1941 the Ki san Sangh establ ished a co-opera­
t ive store to supply goods at cost  pr ice to members on a 
rat ioned bas is ( impor t s  were cont ro lled dur ing the war ) . 
Capital of about £10 , 000 was ra ised from a levy on members 
of one penny a ton of cane . 2 6  C SR gave moral suppor t to  the 
venture , and advanced money to growers who want ed to make 
cash purchases from the s tore . 2 7 The company s tood to gain 
from the Kisan Sangh ' s  concentrat ion on indebtednes s ,  sinc e 
it d ivert ed attent ion from the pr ice of cane as a means to 
raise real incomes . 
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Because the Kisan Sangh sought t o  r econcile the 
interest s of growers to CSR ,  in a s ituat ion where long-term 
reconc iliation was impossible , room was lef t  for the emerg­
ence of  a second union appeal ing to grower s '  distrus t  of the 
company . The quest ion was whether it would sup er sede the 
Ki san Sangh and unit e  the growers against CSR , or whether 
it would d ivide them .  I t  divided them . Th� Kisan Sangh ' s  
campaign aga inst storekeepers encouraged the Indian trading 
communit y ,  through a Guj erat i lawyer , A . D . Patel , to defend 
their intere st s by us ing the new union to undermine public 
support for the Kisan Sangh . So from the dat e of i ts forma­
t ion , 15 June 1941 , the Akhil Fij i Krishak Maha Sangh ( ' All 
Fij i Farmers ' Union ' )  represent ed an alliance between one 
group of farmer s ,  at first mainly South Indians l ed by their 
religious l eader in Fij i ,  Swami Rudrananda , and the Guj erati­
dominated but small Indian bus ines s community . The result 
was that , though it won support  by exploi ting the diff erences 
between growers and CSR , the Maha Sangh was unab le to win 
the alleg iance of t he who le farming c ommunity because it was 
backed by storekeepers and money-lenders who were unpopular 
with a large number of growers .  Moreover , by p laying on 
communal rivalries , union lead ers  widened the divis ions which 
already existed among farmers .  Ins tead o f  be ing uni ted , 
t hen , farmers on the west of Viti  Levu , wher e  unions were 
f ir st formed , were split between the Maha and the Kisan 
Sanghs , both of whom wanted to side  with interests  fundament­
ally oppo sed to t he growers .  To some ext ent , t he unions 
were agent s of compet it ion between C SR and Indian business­
men for a larger share of the income from cane . 
The Maha Sangh , which was fo rmed j us t  two weeks af ter 
t he Kisan Sangh had been recognized by the company , der ived 
great advant age from its  rival ' s  collaborat ion wi th C SR .  
In par t icular , i t  benef ited from Ayodhya Prasad ' s  failure 
to obtain as much help from the c ompany as he had expec ted . 
In CSR ' s  view ,  the gains from too clo sely co-operat ing with 
the Kisan Sangh were outweighed by f ears that the union 
might become so s trong as a result that it would pose a 
threat to the company in future . I t  was hoped in Sydney 
that rival unions would compete for suppor t among growers , 
so prevent ing them from launching a unit ed attack on the 
company . 2 8  Though no instruct ions to this effect have come 
to light , it is po ssible that f i eld offic er s  encouraged 
growers to j o in the Maha Sangh in order to fo ster divis ions 
wi thin the farming community . It is more c er ta in that  f ears 
of the union becoming too strong led CSR to refuse a request  
t hat it provide loan capital f or the co-op erative s tore and 
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help in it s administrat ion , wi th the  resul t that the store 
was badly managed and shor t of  funds . 2 9  Prasad later 
claimed that the manager , M . T . Khan , had been forced to use 
some of his own saving s to tide  the s tor e over when cash was 
shor t . 3 0 Whatever the truth o f  this , Khan ' s  adminis trative 
method s were highly unorthodox and the d ist inct ion between 
his income and the store ' s  no t at all clear . Allegat ions of 
corrup t ion became widespread , and were used by opponent s to 
d i scred i t  the union . 
The eff ec t s  of  collaborat ion were open t o  attack in 
o ther ways . The ld levy to f inance the store was very un­
popular with members of the union , a point that Rudrananda 
and Pat el exploited to the ful l . The ro le of the Kisan Sangh 
in the organizat ion of cane harvest ing enabled it to be 
blamed for an increase in the wages of subst itutes in 1 94 0 , 
even though this was no t its  fault but the outcome of the 
previous year ' s  reduc t ion in mill-working hours which had 
caused an increase in the demand for casual labour . 3 1  There 
was also the union ' s  failure to pr es s for the full price of 
cane in 1 941 , which prov ided further grounds for crit ici sm .  
Above all , there was the abs ence of any tangible conces s ions 
from C SR in response to collaborat ion from the Kisan Sangh . 
The union seemed to have won mos t  from the company when it  
had been in conf lict with it . Now , wi th its  leaders working 
(it  appeared ) almost  hand in glove wit h  C SR ,  it was thought 
by many that the association had abandoned farmers in favour 
of serving the int erests  of the company . It was natural that 
growers should turn to an alternative union which , in its  
ant i-CSR stand , s eemed to  have assumed the mantle of the 
Kisan Sangh . How far the emergence of the Maha Sangh was 
the outcome of  disenchantment with Ayodhya Prasad ' s  union , 
and how far it was due to communal loyalt ies which were also 
important , is hard to say . What is  c lear is that collabora­
tion by the Kisan Sangh made it much eas ier for the Maha 
Sangh to out f lank its  r ival and appeal to the opposition of 
farmers to C SR .  
Realiz ing that i t  was los ing suppor t ,  in March 1943 
the Kisan Sangh asked C SR to raise the c ontrac t  pr ic e of 
cane , but in May the company refused . Yet rather than 
abandon it s collaborative s trategy by taking industrial 
action , the union pursued an approach it had made to govern­
ment in April . To obtain higher cane pr ices it asked for 
an increase in the price of raw sugar , which was sold to 
Britain ' s  Ministry of  Food during the war under arrangements 
for the bulk purchase of all expor table sugar in the 
166 
Commonwealth . In July B . D .  Lakshman , one of t he union ' s 
off ic ials , request ed Sir Philip Mit chell ( governor , 1942-4 5 )  
t o  appoint a commission t o  inquire into the price o f  cane , 
although its  repor t would not have been binding wher eas that 
of an arbitrat ion tr ibunal wo uld . ' Our main reason ' , he 
wro te , ' in asking for a Commi ssion rather than an Arbitration 
Board is that the Imperial Government is to be guided on the 
subj ect ; for , it may perhap s turn out that the problem could 
be solved by London rather than by Sydney . '  A split within 
the Kisan Sangh now broke into the open . The so -called 
right wing fact ion , led by Ayodhya Prasad , M . T . Khan and 
B . D .  Lakshman , would cont inue , excep t for a brief per iod , to 
press for the appo intment o f  a commission . The lef t  wing 
fac t ion , led by a Punj abi Mehar S ingh , j o ined t he Maha Sangh 
in taking an init ially more popular , but also more extr eme , 
approach . They refused to give evidence before a commis s ion 
set up in July , wi th the resul t that in order no t to los e  
face Prasad ' s  fact ion boyco tted it  as  well and t he commis s ion 
was unable to produce a repor t . Later , in Sep tember , Prasad 
and Lakshman asked that the commis s ion be  recons t i tuted , 
which it was under the chairmanship o f  E . E .  Jenkins , the 
At torney-General , but i ts report r ecommended against an 
increase in the price of cane so vind icat ing the stand of  
tho se who had oppo s ed it . 3 2  Inst ead o f  a commi s s ion the 
Maha Sangh , the lef t wing of the Kis an Sangh and a new 
as sociat ion , the Rewa Cane Grower s '  Union , demanded an 
arbitration tr ibunal whose report would be b inding , and 
announced that unt il then grower s wo uld ref use to harvest 
their cane . 3 3  
In contrast to i t s  rival , now the right wing of  the 
Kisan Sangh , the Maha Sangh adop ted a strong ant i-C SR po si­
t ion , arguing t hat  al though recent advances in t he price of  
sugar had been refl ec t ed to some extent in  higher cane pr ices 
( see Table 7 . 7 ) , the company was s till able to make exorb­
itant profit s part of  which ought to be shared wit h  the 
grower s .  If neces sary , farmers should for ce C SR to do this . 
The argument had wide appeal among growers , who recalled 
that the threat of a strike in 19 39-4 0  had been followed by 
a rever sal of the company ' s  refusal to nego t iate wi th them , 
and t hat agitat ion by t he Kisan Sangh in early 1941 had led 
to  further concess ions . Compared to the moderat ion of men 
like Ayodhya Prasad and to  the Ki san Sangh s tore , which at 
best had met the needs of only a few farmer s , direc t  act ion 
against  C SR seemed to offer a quicker and more eff ec t ive 
way to raise real incomes . And this was important , for 
dur ing the war there had been an increase in essent ial farm 
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and household costs  which had reduced the real income from 
cane . The Jenkins commi s s ion found that the annual average 
cos t s  of production and of living on a twelve-acre farm had 
risen from an e s t imat ed £88 4 ll�d in 19 39 to £132  8 3d in 
194 3 ,  an increase of about 50 . 5  per c ent . Af ter comput ing 
Year 
1939  
1 94 0  
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
194 7 
1948 
194 9 
1950  
Tabl e  7 . 7  
Volume o f  sugar export s , value of  exports per ton 
and price of  cane , 19 39-50 
Tons exported 
118 , 4 7 0  
9 3 , 631  
7 0 , 328 
131 , 294 
9 2 , 528  
6 7 , 25 2  
30 , 5 04 
106 , 2 74  
112 , 4 33 
149 , 49 7  
110 , 968  
114 , 254 
Approximate 
value per ton 
£ 
12  
14  
1 3  
1 3  
1 5  
1 5  
18 
20 
25 
29 
2 9  
3 3  
Average 
pr ice of cane 
s d 
15 4 
20 1 
n . a .  
19 7 
2 3  8 
24 0 
28  10 
29 8 
32 2 
35 1 
36 5 
4 9  2 
Sour ce : J . C .  Pot t s , ' The Sugar Indus try in Fij i :  I t s  
Beginnings and Development ' , Transaations & 
Proaeedings of the Fiji Soaiety ,  7 ( 19 58-5 9 ) , 
126 ; FSC  Ltd , ' Indus trial S tatistics Summary ' , 
Table 23 . 
Note s : 1 .  Tons exported and values per t on are for each 
calendar year , whereas the average price of cane 
r elates to each s eason which normally s tarted 
midway through the year and ended during the 
following January . 
2 .  Under a new contract ,  growers received a sub­
stantial increase in price in 195 0 . 
an average value for the r ic e  it  was assumed each grower 
cultivated , total receip t s  from the farm of a cane grower 
were thought to have risen by only 39 . 8  p er cent - from 
£98 5 Od to £139 3 Od . Thus t he surp lus o f  receip t s  over 
expenditure , which provided the savings from which farmers 
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could meet socially impor tant life-cycle expenses - weddings 
and the like - had fallen from about £10 in 19 39 to £6 15 Od 
in 194 3 ,  a drop of about 32 per cent . From this the com­
mis sion came to the surprising conclus ion that no increase 
in the pr ice of  cane was j us t if ied . 
These f igures do no t tell the whole s t ory , however . 
By taking an average farm - who se size was mis takenly put at 
twelve acres instead of j us t  over eleven - the commission 
underes t imated the hardships experienced by those on smaller 
holding s . It reckoned that the cost  of living - excluding 
luxur ies - for a married man with four children rose by 66 
per cent , or abo ut £30 , over the period . Obviously a farmer 
on twelve acres , who would have seen his gross receip t s  
increase b y  about £ 4 0 , would have had l e s s  diff icul ty in 
accommodat ing this rise  than a family on s ix acre s , who s e  
gros s  income wo uld have grown b y  only £20 . Moreover , the 
commission had no t hing to say about the sharp contract ion of  
credit in  1942  when wholesaler s ,  led  by Morris Heds trom and 
Burns Philp , reacted t o  uncert ainties about the future price 
of  raw sugar , and hence of cane . 34  Doub t s  about what price 
it  would fetch reduced the value of  cane as a secur ity , and 
this specially hur t farmers who could no t rely on alterna t ive 
sources of income while they awaited payments for the ir 1942  
crop . Mos t  impor tant of  all was that the commis s ion took 
1 9 39 as  its base year , so  that the decl ine in r eal farm 
incomes between 1940 and 1943  was unders tated . Table 7 . 8 
shows the average price o f  cane from 1 9 38 to  194 3 ,  the 
annual incomes of an average farmer over the per iod and 
e s t imat ed changes in the c os t  of living . From these it can 
be  s een that cane prices rose more sharp ly between 1939  and 
1940 than they did from 194 0 to 194 3 ,  whereas the co s t  of  
living ro se more quickly over the lat ter per iod . Conse­
quently , having seen an improvement in  real incomes during 
the f ir s t  year o f  the war , growers experienced a fall in 
their real earnings from cane over the next three year s . 3 5  
O f  course , a large number o f  farmers in wes tern Vit i 
Levu were compensated by the availab ility in 194 2 and 1943  
of part-time j obs  in  laundry and o ther s ervices to Al lied 
troops or in supplying them with vegetab le s , while their 
sons (or younger bro ther s )  co uld ob tain full-time employment 
in a variety of public works . Yet al though this ra ised the 
living standards of the Indian community in this part of 
Fij i , it did little to reconci le growers to the fall in real 
incomes from the ir farms . As wages soared ( the demand for 
labour outs tripped s upply) , so relative returns from cane 
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farming compared with o ther activities declined . Since 
cane had been among the mos t  lucra tive occupat ions fo r an 
Indian , perhaps only surpass ed by certain typ es of bus iness 
and the legal profession in which a very small number of  
Indians were engaged , 3 6  it was unders tandable that growers 
should seek an increas e  in their returns so tha t cane farming 
could maintain its  occupat ional s tatus . This would have 
been particular ly impor tant because , for mos t  grower s ,  o ff­
farm employment dur ing the war provided no more than a 
supplementary income to the ir main source of livelihoo d ,  
the farm . Above all , a s  many Indians grew more prosperous , 
if only for a short time , there was a rise in the expec ta­
t ions of those who experienced , or wi tnes sed , the higher 
s tandards of living involved . C SR predicted , quit e ac cur­
ately , that from this would come demands for an increase in 
the price of cane . 3 7  
Table 7 . 8  
Average price of cane , annual incomes of a farmer on 11 acres 
of  land and changes in the co s t  of living , 19 39-43 
Year 
19 39 
1940 
1941 
1942 
194 3 
Source : 
Average price 
of cane 
s d 
15  4 
20  1 
n . a . 
19 7 
2 3  8 
Income from cane 
of  a farmer on 
11 acres 
£ s d 
7 9  1 3  1 1  
105 9 9 
n . a .  
108 15  8� 
11 9 1 2  8� 
Cos t  of living 
index for Viti 
Levu except 
Suva 
100 
109 
n . a .  
128 
156 
C SR Ltd , Manufac-tu:Pe Reports , 194 0 to 1944 ; FS C 
Ltd , ' Indus trial Statistics Summary ' , Tables 
7 ( a) , 2 3 . 
Notes : 1 .  The income from cane of  a farmer on eleven acres 
of land , approximately the average s ize of a cane 
farm , was calculated by multiplying the average 
price of  cane by the average yield of cane per 
acre for the year in que s t ion by five and a half 
acres ( the area likely to have been cropped ) . 
2 .  The dates taken by government on wh ich to base the 
co s t  of living were August 19 39 , 3 June 194 0 , 2 7  
June 1942  and 1 2  June 194 3 .  Up t o  and including 
June 1943  the f igures wer e  no more than rough 
e s t imates . 
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The farmers '  s tr ike began in July 19 4 3 ,  and coincided 
with a very s harp increase in the co s t  of living due to the 
large quantity of money put into circulation by the Allied 
troops and the limited amount o f  import s  on which i t  could 
be spent ( see Table 7 . 9 ) . The strike followed successful 
indus trial ac t ion in July by workers in the Lautoka and 
Rarawai mil ls , who were awarded a generous pay increase by 
an aribtration tr ibunal one o f  who se members , representing 
employees , was A . D . Patel . 3 8  Perhaps it was Patel ' s  exp er­
ience on this t ribunal which encouraged the  Maha Sangh to  
demand a second one t o  rule on the  cane growers '  dispute . 
The refusal to harves t  cane was confined to Viti Levu , for 
Labasa had been hardly affected by the unioniza t ion of 
growers .  Infrequent communicat ions between Fij i ' s two main 
islands was one reason for this . Another was the generally 
lower standard o f  educat ion among Indians at Labasa , which 
hindered the disseminat ion of  news from the rest  o f  the 
group . 3 9  A third was that there was less dissatis faction 
among farmers than in o ther cane dis tricts  becaus e  the cos t 
o f  living at Labasa had risen less sharply during the war . 4 0 
Not many troops were stationed and fewer public works were 
undertaken on Vanua Levu . 
Table 7 . 9  
Changes in the cost  o f  l iving2 2 7  June 194 2 to 1 AEril 1950 
( 19 39 = 100 )  
Date Cos t  of  living index 
2 7  June 1942  128a 
12 June 194 3 156a 
1 Oct . 194 3 215 
1 Jan . 1944 215 
1 Apr . 1 94 4  200 
1 Apr . 1 94 5  186 
1 Apr . 1946 187 
1 Apr . 1 94 7 211 
1 Apr . 1948 237 
1 Apr . 194 9 2 39 
1 Apr . 1950 241 
Source : FSC Ltd , ' Indus trial S tatis t ics Summary ' , Table 
7 (a) . 
aRough e s t imate only . 
Desp ite widespread refusal to harves t  a t  the o ther 
mills , C SR refused to alter the contract signed in 194 0 . 
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Yet as one of  its  future general managers , Dr R . W .  Harman , 
later admi tted , the company could have afforded to pay more 
for cane in 1942 , and had it done so the s tr ike woul d prob­
ably have been averted . 4 1  Equally , CSR could have pas sed on 
to growers the whole of an increase in the pr ice of sugar 
announced in September 194 3 ,  and to take effect on 1 January 
1944 . Hoping to bring the strike to an end , the Colonial 
Off ice asked the company if it would do this , but it re­
fus ed . 42 C SR feared , as it had during World War I ,  tha t 
s ugar prices would fall when world trade returned to normal 
af ter hos tilities ceased . It did no t want the indus try made 
uneconomic by wage and cane price increases which could no t 
b e  sustained af t er the war . The company feared , too , that 
if it gave way to grower s as a resul t  o f  indus trial ac t ion , 
it  would enco urage greater militancy in fut ure . 4 3  A third , 
but not the maj or , considerat ion was CSR ' s view that the 
higher the price of  cane the lower would be the output from 
each farm , s ince growers would be  able to real ize their 
limi ted money aspirat ions with l ess work . 4 4  
The company was well placed t o  resist the s trike . At 
l east at Lautoka , the lar ges t mill , it was expected that 
even if the whole crop was harves t ed in 194 3 the amount of 
cane crushed would be unus ually small , perhaps becaus e off­
farm employment had led to the neglect of  cane but also 
b ecause the shortage of  fer t il izer dur ing the war was likely 
to have reduced yields . 4 5  The exclus ion o f  Labasa from the 
dispute meant that even if the s toppage las ted all season , 
the company could be  as sured o f  enough income to cover many 
o f  its  overhead expenses . C SR was for tunate not only tha t 
the cos t o f  the strike was l imited in these ways , but that 
i t  had amortiz ed its  original investment s everal t imes and 
had amassed subs tantial reserves  from its  operat ions in the 
colony . Consequently , the company was not under pressure 
to repay inves tment recently undertaken in Fij i ,  and had 
the financ ial resources to s it the s trike out . Although it  
would be  a maj or blow , the los s o f  a year ' s  prof its could 
be seen by CSR as a relat ively small price to keep the 
industry viable and prevent a decline in the value o f  i t s  
assets . 
The company also benef ited from the tacit  support of 
government . Again as in 1921 , o f f icials differed with CSR 
on how the d ispute could bes t be  handled . Like many o f  his 
predecessors ,  Mitchell complained about the excessive 
secrecy of  the company , while CSR lamented government ' s  
failure to depor t  the leaders o f  the s trike - an impossib le 
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course  because of public opinion i n  Bri ta in and India . 4 6  
Yet desp ite the se diff erences ,  government acted on the 
assump t ion tha t the exis t ing bas is of the indus try - the 
ownership of the mills by a privat e  company - sho uld be 
maintained . A sugges t ion by growers that  th e mills be 
na tionalized was rej ected . C SR was technologically an 
extremely efficient mil ler : if  it  could not operate profit­
ably in the colony , then who could? Any resolution o f  the 
dispute , o fficials thought , mus t b e  on terms that would 
allow the company to continue in Fij i .  Thus , as the Colonial 
Of f ice po inted out , the price of cane could not be based on 
what was cons idered a des irable standard of living for 
growers , s ince without an appropriate  rise in the s ugar pr ice 
this would prevent CSR from making a prof i t . 4 7  The g iven 
elements in the equation were adequate  returns to the company 
and the price of s ugar : the income o f  farmers had to be 
adj us t ed to these . 
In this s ituat ion , an arb i tration tribunal would no t 
have settled the s t r ike . S ince the tribunal would have 
b een composed o f  an equal number o f  company and grower s ' 
repres entative s , the cas t ing vote would have lain with the 
government-appointed chairman . Though in the millworkers '  
dispute the chairman had favoured the labourers ,  wi th cane 
as C SR ' s maj or i tem of co s t  it was unlikely t hat  he would 
again side with those  on s tr ike . This  was made clear in 
Oc tober when the Jenkins Commis s ion advised against an 
increase in the price of  cane . The problem for government 
was that wi th C SR based in Sydney , the tribunal would have 
had no legal power to examine the company ' s  books , 4 8 and 
so would have been unable ef fectively to que s t ion CSR ' s  
arguments in favour o f  t he exi s t ing cane pr ice . Yet  i f  it  
rej ected them , there was the pos s ib ility that the company 
would go ahead with i t s  threat , made on s everal o ccas ions , 
to close one or more o f  i t s  mills . S ince there was no way 
o f  telling whether the threat was real , the chai rman could 
be expec ted to side mos tly wi th CSR,  leaving the possibility 
that growers would rej ect the tribunal ' s  report . B ecause 
an arb itration award was legally b inding , government would 
be faced with a maj or challenge to i ts authority if growers 
remained on s tr ike . 
Rather than have to deal wi th this Mit chell favoured 
an alternat ive solut ion , which was for Bri tain to raise 
the pr ice of raw sugar sub s tantially and to guaran t ee high 
prices to Commonwealth producers af ter the war by b uying 
all her s upplies from them . Growers would then get an 
increase in the price o f  cane , whi ch is what they want ed . 
Mitchell told the Colonial Off ice : 
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Farmers here are s eeing mo re and more clearly that 
real s ub s tance o f  their case is s tandard o f  living . 
Company takes its  s tand on the as sumption that world 
price level is uncontrollable and omnipot ent and 
would be a charge ranking pr ior to pro ducers s tandard 
of living . Unless  I have misunderstood the papers 
your depar tment makes the same as sumption as the 
Company . S ince officially the two concept ions are 
fundamentally oppo s i te and irreconcilable , no so lut ion 
can be expected from price fixing machinery or any 
other palliative , but only at  the bes t a success ion 
of armis tices . 4 9 
As par t o f  international market ing arrangement s which pro­
vided cheap tropical produce to the indus trialized wes t ,  
during the 1 9 30s  Fij i had sold s ugar to Bri tain and Canada 
under an imperial preference des igned to suppor t  s ugar 
indus tries in the Commonwealth , but no t at the cos t of a 
large rise in prices . In 194 3  pos t-war arrangements for 
market ing Commonwealth s ugar were being dis cus sed in London . 
It  was recognized that prices could no t be allowed to return 
to their pre-war levels , if  only b ecause the social unres t  
caused by falling living s tandards would impose o n  Britain 
an unacceptable cos t  in maintaining law and order . 
Mitchell ' s  propo sal , on the o ther hand , was equally un­
acceptable becaus e  o f  i t s  cos t  to the consumer , and i t  was 
no t seriously considered . Consequently , government had 
lit tle room fo r manoeuvre . All i t  could do was in effect 
to support  CSR by pro tecting from intimida t ion farmers 
who wanted to harves t  cane , placing Patel and Rudrananda 
under house arre s t , and trying to persuade growers to re turn 
to work and awai t  the report of  a commi s s ion of inquiry . 5 0 
The s tr ike finally ended in January 1944 , but well 
before then it had begun to crumble , as Table 7 . 10 shows . 
Grower s returned to wo rk withou t the promise of an arbi tra­
t ion tribunal and without s ecur ing an increase in the price 
of cane . Why had they b een defeated? One reason was tha t  
i n  the face o f  what growers s aw as the uni ted front o f  
government and C SR ,  they were divided . Farmers at  Ba , where 
the Musl im-dominated right wing of  the Ki san Sangh was 
strong , were among the f ir s t  to s tar t harvest ing . Divisions 
were exacerbated by difference s  in the ab ility of growers 
to withs tand a long s trike . I t  was no accident that the 
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return to work began at Penang and Rarawai , where growers 
had f ewer opportuni ties than those  elsewhere on Vi t i  Levu 
to f ind of f-farm j ob s  and were less able than CSR to forgo 
a year ' s  income from sugar . The example of  farmers harvest­
ing dis couraged o thers , so that as the season drew to an 
end there was a r ush to cut cane before the mills c lo sed . 
Finally , in January 1 94 4 , Ratu J . L . V . S ukuna at a meeting o f  
farmers in Nadi urged growers t o  harves t  their cane . He 
threatened that if they refused , those  on Fij ian land might 
have difficulty renewing their leases . 5 1  Though this 
s imply brought to an end a s tr ike that had already virtually 
collapsed , the role of the Fij ian communi ty through Sukuna 
was reminiscent o f  the part played by Fij ian labourers in 
ending the 1921  dispute . 
Table 7 . 10 
Output of  mills on Viti Levu, weeks ended 2 3  October to 
20 November 194 3  
Mills 
Nausori 
Rarawai 
Lautoka 
Penang 
Source : 
Approximate 
sugar 
producing 
capacity 
tons 
600 
1 , 800 
2 , 4 00 
400 
Proportion o f  capacity pro duced in 
week ended 
23 Oct . 30 Oct . 6 Nov . 13 Nov . 20 Nov . 
% % % � k % 
11 14 18 24 5 3  
60 81 79 79 83 
26  33  38 39 4 4  
6 9  85 75 76 74 
Watson to Cars tairs , 29  Nov . 194 3 ,  C . O .  852/ 518 , 
f ile 19666/56 . 
The 194 3 s tr ike was the mos t  significant express ion 
s ince 1921  of growers '  antagonism toward C SR . Yet although 
it demons trated a heightened awareness  among farmers o f  their 
common interes t against the company , the d ispute also re­
vealed how limited this cons ciousness was . The inter-union 
rivalry that p receded and accompanied the s tr ike showed that 
for the maj ority of Indians cultural , personal and religio us 
differences were more important . I t  was evident , too , that 
farmers s t il l  accepted the existing order of  so ciety . They 
were willing to co-operate wi th thos e  whose  economic inter­
ests  were in direct conflict wi th their own . The demand 
for nationaliza t ion , though made by a few growers ,  was no t 
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one o f  their priorities . The concern of Patel and Rudrananda 
was to make CSR more accountable to the public of Fij i ,  no t 
to get rid o f  it . They obj ected no t to the company making 
pro f its , but to the repatriat ion o f  what they believed to 
be exces s ive profits - def ined by them as a re turn on assets 
o f  over 7 . 5 p er cent . Though the Maha Sangh was decidedly 
more anti-CSR than the right wing of the Kisan , like its 
rival it  sought reforms wi th in the sys tem rather than a 
radical change in the sys t em itsel f . So i t  was natural that 
many growers should hail  as a victory the immediate out come 
of the s tr ike , which was the appo intment to inquire into the 
economics of the indus try o f  C . Y .  Shephard ,  Pro fes sor o f  
Economics at the Institute of  Tropical Agriculture , Trinidad . 
Without j eopardizing the company ' s  operations , Shephard ' s  
report was designed to reconcile growers to the continued 
presence of CSR in Fij i .  
The Shephard repor t  
The appointment o f  Professo r  Shephard followed pro­
posals by Mi tchell in late 194 3 that to settle  the strike , 
even if the s olution was only one in a ' succes s ion o f  
armis tices ' ,  either the Minis try o f  Foo d  should s end an 
off icial to inves t igate the prof its  being made by C SR o r  
some permanent machinery b e  es tablished to f ix the price o f  
cane . 5 2 The Minis try of  Food refused to be invo lved in a 
quest ion that  was the respons ibility of  the Fij i government , 
so in December the Colonial Off ice sugges ted tha t  Shephard , 
who had made a similar enquiry into the Trinidad s ugar 
indus try , be asked to advise on the price of cane and the 
creat ion of price fixing machinery in Fij i . 5 3  Acting through 
the company ' s  representative in Fij i ,  H . R . F .  Watson , 
officials persuaded CSR to provide Shephard with informat ion 
about its cos ts and profits  in the colony . This was the 
first t ime the company had made such a concession , and it  
arose  perhaps from the need to maintain good relat ions with 
the Brit ish government . With arrangement s  for the marketing 
of Commonwealth sugar af ter the war b eing dis cussed in London , 
CSR was lobbying hard to prevent the interests  o f  Aus tralia , 
whose  sugar it sol d ,  and those  o f  Fij i being sacrificed to 
tho se  of  the Wes t Indie s and Mauritius . Co-operation wi th 
Shephard might help the company achieve this . 5 4  
Having made this concession ,  CSR was dismayed to 
learn that Shephard no t only wanted to know what  prof its it 
had b een making , but intended to base the pr ice of cane on 
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these . The company felt he should also take into account 
the returns from growing cane . 5 5  Moreover ,  s ince the bulk 
of farmers '  demand s were designed to raise their incomes , 
unless Shephard was convinced its  pro f its  were small CSR 
might be asked to  pay more for cane as a way to  sat is fy grow­
ers . Apart from a s ign ificant increase in pr ice , the demands 
put to Shephard in June 1944 by farmers ' un ions , which had 
agreed to co-operat e dur ing the inqu iry , inc luded request s  
that the value o f  molasses and begas se ( a  by-product o f  sugar 
manufacture ) be added to  that of sugar when calculat ing the 
price of  cane ; that C SR be obl iged to  extract the maximum 
sugar from cane , in order to  ensure the highes t  pos s ible 
returns to  growers if the cane pr ice was relat ed to the value 
of sugar sold ; that farmers should control the variet ies of 
cane planted , thereby enabling them to choose ones that were 
heavy but not necessarily sweet (so maximiz ing the ir returns 
but not C SR ' s ) ; that the cult ivat ion of foodcrops be p er­
mit ted on one quarter of  the farm ' s  area so that land not 
current ly under cane could be put to  product ive use ; that to 
police CSR ' s  contrac t with growers a Board of  one represena­
t ive each from farmers and government be establ ished with 
full access to CSR ' s books . 56 
To avoid being forced t o  concede these demands ,  all of 
which it opposed , CSR comp iled figures to  show that it had 
made n egligible profits  in F ij i ( see Table 7 . 11 ) . The per iod 
taken was 1930 to 1943 , long enough for the company to claim 
t�at the f igures  reflected t he prof itab ility of its  mills .  
But although the period included the worst  years of  the 
depression , which were except ionally bad , i t  excluded the 
rather b et t er years of  the lat e  1 920s . The year 194 1 was 
omit ted on the grounds that part of the c rop had been des­
t royed , t hough C SR was compen sat ed for this by the Brit ish 
government and made a substant ial pro f it that year . A los s 
was recorded for 1943 , whereas the int ernal prof it and loss 
account s for the Fij i mills showed that the company earned 
a modes t return that year ; in any case the strike made 1943 
a poor gu ide to what CSR could expect t o  earn in t he colony , 
so if anything it should have been excluded . In add it ion , 
CSR based the value of it s fixed asset s ( except land ) on 
the ir replacement cost in 193 9 , wit h  allowances for cap ital 
expend iture over the previous t en and following four years . 5 7  
Since mos t  of the mill equipment was over twenty-five year s 
old , the valuat ions given to  Shephard were considerably more 
than the asset s were worth . The company just if ied this on 
the ground s that differences between f igures given to 
Shephard and t he his tor ical cos t  values less deprec iat ion 
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represented the value o f  it s replacement and deprec iat ion 
reserves , which it could either use as working cap ital or 
invest in ways which increased its  profit s . 5 8  But there is 
no ind icat ion from the int ernal accounts  that interest from 
the res erves was added to  prof i t s  of the Fij i mills . In 
fact , it is more likely the reserves were used to f inance the 
expans ion of CSR ' s Aus t ral ian act ivit ies during the lat e 1930s 
and 1940s , returns from which were kept in s eparat e account s .  
Nor apparently were the res erves used as working cap ital , for 
the company included an addit ional figure o f  £ 5 00 , 000 for 
this when estimating the to tal funds tied up in its Fij i 
bus iness . 5 9 By placing a high value on its  as sets  CSR 
could show larger amounts  for depreciat ion , so reducing its 
ne t pro fi t s . And of course , as  a percentage return on 
investment these profits  appeared lower s till . 
Table 7 . 11  
CSR ' s  Erofi t s  and ( losses ) � 1930-4 3 ,  as Eresented 
to C . Y .  SheEhard 
Year Pro f  it or Income Net pro fits To tal Profit or 
( lo s s )  a tax or (los s )  asset s  ( lo s s )  on 
to tal assets 
£ £ £ f ' OOO % 
19 30-34 ( 298 , 05 2 )  7 , 954 ( 306 , 006 ) 4 , 85 7  ( 1 . 3) 
1935 52 , 101 7 , 016 4 5 , 085 5 , 0 78 0 . 9  
19 36 6 1 , 615 6 , 8 21 5 4 , 794 5 , 205 1 . 1  
1937  1 18 , 2 35 1 3 , 4 3 3 104 , 802 5 , 4 24 1 . 9  
1 9 38 32 , 019 7 , 84 7  24 , 1 7 2  5 , 5 23 0 . 4  
1 9 39 196 , 894 24 , 6 4 1  1 7 2 ' 25 3 5 , 681 3 . 0  
1 94 0  26 5 , 100 31 , 6 59 233 , 441 5 , 840 4 . 0 
194 2  390 , 864 102 , 29 7  288 , 5 6 7  6 , 00 8  4 . 8  
194 3 ( 85 , 555)  nil ( 85 , 5 5 5 )  5 ,  7 75 ( 1 . 5 )  
Source : C . Y .  Shephard , The Sugar Industry of Fiji , 49 . 
aAf ter depreciat ion , calculated at  4 p er cent of 
f ixed assets ( except land) . 
Shephard concluded that  the company had over-valued 
its assets  and was charging too much fo r depreciat ion . 6 0 
The value o f  machinery and transpor t  for a mill in Fij i had 
been put at almo s t  twice that for a mill of equivalent s ize 
in Trinidad , while the amounts  charged to depreciat ion were 
cons iderably higher too . 6 1  He gues s ed tha t  s ince 1930 C SR 
had earned an average return before income tax o f  about 
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3 per cent a year , which was an unat trac tive yield on inves t­
ment . 6 2  In fact , returns were probably higher than Shephard 
believed . By relating figures from confident ial pro f i t  and 
loss acco unts to the value of assets  in Fij i as shown in the 
company ' s  HaZf-Year Zy Reports ( plus the e s t imated value o f  
working capital and s to cks ) , average annual returns before 
tax can be put at  about 5 . 6  per cent for the per iod 1 9 24 to 
19 39 , while those af ter 19 39 were about 12 . 6  per cent , or 
14 per cent if 194 3  is excluded becaus e  of the s tr ike . For 
the whole p er iod returns averaged 7 . 3 p er cent . 
Now it  might be said tha t  this is mi sleading , s ince 
pro f its  are being related to the hi stor ical co s t  o f  ass e ts 
which were expressed no t in contempo rary money terms , so 
allowing for price changes , but in currency values a t  the 
time the inves tment occurred . I f  account is taken of  pr ice 
increases s ince the assets were ins tall ed , as CSR argued 
it should , then the real value of capital would make returns 
on investment appear les s . Ye t it mus t be remembered tha t  
i n  May 1923  C S R  had ' bought ' the fixed assets  i n  Fij i from 
its whol ly owned sub s idiary , the Colonial Sugar Refining Co . 
(Fij i and New Zealand) L t d ,  for £ 1 , 1 39 , 000 . Though the price 
was £1 , 625 , 00 0  less than the book val ue o f  the assets - the 
company had writ ten this off  to reinforce a political point 
at the Colonial Off ice - it represent ed the then co s t  to CSR 
of its  fixed assets in Fij i .  As prices rose by a negligible 
amount before 1939 , though they did r is e  s ignificant ly 
thereaf ter , the figure s  in the Half-Yearly Reports reflected 
quite  accurately - at leas t up to 19 39 - the value o f  the 
company ' s  inves tments . By pres enting Shephard with f igures 
based on a revaluat ion of  its  assets , CSR sought to avoid 
the consequences of having reduced in 19 2 3  the apparent 
pro f i t s  it  had made in Fij i dur ing and af ter World War I .  
The annual average return of  7 . 3  per cent was only 
s lightly above the Aus t ralian b ank overdraf t rates for the 
per iod . 6 3  Since sugar investments are more risky and more 
illiquid than bank overdraf ts , it  is likely tha t  a re turn 
of at least  10 per cent would have been needed to attract 
cap ital into the indus try . However ,  as CSR ' s  profits in 
Fij i had already paid (several t imes over) for its  original 
inves tment in the colony , the company wo uld probably have 
been content wi th a re turn of less than 7 . 3  p er cent , though 
this would have reduced the incentive to expand its opera­
t ions . Af ter all , if CSR withdrew on the grounds that its  
assets were no longer prof itable , it  would be hard to real­
ize their book values by selling them . I t  was be t ter to 
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earn modest profits than to make a loss on the sale of  its 
inve stments . Room for increas ing the contract price of  cane 
was even grea ter because of the relatively high sugar prices 
paid since 1 9 39 ; they had enabled the company to make an 
average annual re turn on capital s ince then of 12 . 3  per cent 
despite the strike . Shephard acknowledged that if the war­
t ime price of sugar continued CSR co uld af ford to pay more 
for cane , but argued that by cur tailing output the s trike 
had made it uneconomic to do this . Perhaps , like th e company , 
he also doub ted if  high pr ices would las t af ter the war , and 
feared that if  farmers were given a bet ter price now they 
would refuse to accep t a lower one when circumstances had 
changed . Still , whatever the reason , Shephard re commended 
agains t an inc.rease in the contrac t pr ice o f  cane , though he 
did suggest - and this was reluc tantly accep ted by the 
company - tha t the value of molasses be credi ted to the 
pro ceeds from sugar when calculating the cane pr ice . 6 4  The 
growers '  demand that the value of begas se also be added was 
rej ected , even though begasse was wor th something since i t  
was used a s  fuel i n  the mills . S o  i t  was that C S R  won 
the first round in a f ight to reta in exclus ive control of 
its  operat ions in Fij i .  
Unwilling to raise the cane pr ice by much , Shephard 
tried to improve the farmers '  lo t in o ther ways . One of  
his  maj or reconunenda t ions , reminis cent of  S to ckdale ' s  
report in 19 3 7 , was that a system of  mixed farming be intro­
duced in cane areas . Growers should be enco uraged to use 
their lives tock for the manufac ture of manure ; a bigger 
ef fort should be made to f ind cash or subsis tence crops 
which could be grown on land under long fallow . A Scientific 
Investigat ion Commi ttee with representat ives o f  growers ,  
company and government should be es tablished to supervise 
experimental work along these lines . Shephard hoped that 
this would increase farm incomes , as also might alterations 
to the sys tem o f  land tenure . He sugges ted that the Nat ive 
Land Trus t Board (NLTB ) should encourage better soil conserva­
t ion by sugar contractors on its  land ; specula tion J n  NLTB 
leases sho uld be p rohib i ted , so pr event ing the payment of  
large premiums which saddled incoming farmers with big deb ts 
at  high rates o f  interes t ;  there should be greater security 
o f  tenure for farmers on NLTB and also company land , to make 
them more willing to inves t in long-term improvements to 
the soil . Finally , Shephard reconunended the appo intment o f  
a Sugar Board with three government representatives and two 
each of the farmers and CSR . I t  would protect and develop 
the welfare of  the industry , advise the governor on 
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important matters , cer t ify the price payable for cane and 
expend any ces s  it might levy on the industry . Shephard ' s  
recommendat ions were designed to improve company-grower 
relat ions by rais ing farm incomes without maj or cos t to 
CSR ,  and by increasing growers ' involvement in the organiza­
tion o f  the indus try wi thout reducing CSR ' s  overall contro l . 6 5  
The company was s trongly opposed to these  ideas , except 
those  relating to the NLTB , and did all in its  power to 
prevent their implementat ion . It felt its position in Fij i 
had already been weakened by the emergence of  unions , and 
that its contro l over growers  would be further reduced if  
they were allowed to  share in  the management o f  the indus try , 
or if its  l eases were to be for twenty-one years - instead 
of the exis ting ten - renewable af ter eleven , as Shephard 
proposed . Head o f f ice feared the lat ter sugges t ion would 
leave f i eld officers with less influence over farmers becaus e 
the threat o f  evic t ion would no t b e  so great . 6 6  Only 
recently CSR had threatened fifty-s ix tenants and contracto rs 
wi th eviction or immediate cancellation o f  contracts to pur­
chas e  cane following their invo lvement in the 194 3  s tr ike , 
b ut fearing renewed trouble in the indus try government had 
intervened to prevent this . 6 7  With this in mind , officials 
were eager for the company to amend its tenancy agreement 
on the lines sugges ted by Shephard ,  but CSR refus ed . A 
compromise was eventually reached whereby the company 
publicly undertook to renew leases when they expired provided 
their conditions had been fulfilled , which was no more than 
a statement o f  the existing posit ion . 6 8  
Discus s ions on the Scientific Invest igation Commi ttee 
were more pro tracted . Seeing it as a vehicle for outs ide 
intervention in the industry and fearing reques ts  fo r the 
company to undertake experiments with which it dis agreed , 
CSR was ut terly opposed to the commit tee and threatened to 
boyco tt  its meetings if it  was more than j us t  an advisory 
body . 6 9  Having b een reassured on this last po int the company 
then asked for , and received , an undertaking that government 
representatives would no t s ide wi th growers in asking for 
exper iments which CSR was aga inst . 7 0 During discus s ions the 
purpose  of the committee was also changed . Ins tead o f  
promo ting mixed farming , it was t o  be a Cane Consul tative 
Commit tee who se  main f unc tion would be to receive reports 
on CSR ' s  research into cane breeding and the like . CSR 
won these conces s ions partly b ecause off icials felt the 
Depar tment of Agricul ture was so  overworked already that it 
sho uld not assume a new , maj or role in connect ion with the 
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sugar indus try , which official representat ion on a Sc ientific 
Inve s tigation Conunittee wo uld have involved . 7 1  Since the 
company was well equipped to do re search the answer , offi­
cials thought , was for government to rely on CSR and try to 
inf luence the type o f  work done . It wo uld no t b e  ab le to 
exert such influence if good relat ions wi th the company were 
damaged by differences over the Shephard repor t .  Ye t by 
conceding CSR ' s  mos t  impor tant demands officials were left 
with a commit tee which , in the v iew o f  cane growers ,  could 
serve no us eful purpos e .  Mo t ions to this effect were passed 
at meet ings of  farmers in mid-194 7 , and as a result the 
proposal was dropped . 7 2  CSR continued to allow growers to 
plant cer tain food crops like dhal on fallow land , but i t  
did no t give priority t o  research into mixed farming , a 
matter in which the company felt it had little dire ct 
interes t .  This was to be lamented in the 1950s by agri­
cultural experts  who visited Fij i . 7 3  
An advisory Sugar Board was Shephard ' s  third maj or 
proposal , and this too was opposed by C SR . The company 
feared it would become a forl.llll in which r ival unions would 
try to increase their support  among growers . The result 
would be extreme demands which , in its  own interests , CSR 
would have to refus e . This , in t urn , might b r ing the company 
into renewed conflict with farmers ,  so that the net ef fect  
of the Board would be to worsen rather than improve relations 
in the indus try thereby , p erhap s � providing a pretext for 
fur ther government intervention . 1 4  I n  advancing its view 
CSR was helped by the Kisan Sangh , which on this question 
was once again , if unwitt ingly , collaborat ing with the 
company . As part of  a campaign to discredit the Maha Sangh 
by claiming there had b een no gains from the strike , the 
Kisan Sangh (whos e  two wings had reunit ed in 1944)  refus ed 
to co-operat e with the proposed Sugar Board on the grounds 
tha t , because of the need to p ro t ect  C SR ' s  int erest s , it 
would be powerless  and would achieve nothing . Faced with 
oppos it ion from CSR , this divis ion among grower s  and also 
the difficulty o f  finding an acceptab l e  method o f  selecting 
far mers ' representa t ives , government shelved the idea of a 
Sugar Board in late 1947 , though the scheme was r evived -
only to b e  rej ected - on several occasions theraft er . 7 5 
Thus CSR,  had survived the 194 3 strike , the Shephard inquiry 
and d iscussion s  on the Shephard report without making any 
maj or conc ess ions to gr�wers . From the company ' s  view ,  it  
was a remarkab le achievement . 
Yet C SR could not avoid conces s ions indef initely . 
This was largely because the ef f ects of the war had caus ed 
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a steady rise in sugar prices so that by 1950 the price was 
almost three times what it had been in the 1930s ( Table 7 . 7 ) .  
To replace wart ime arrangements for the pur chase of Common­
wealth sugar by the British government and to ensure s table 
prices for exporter s , the Commonweal th Sugar Agreement ( CSA) 
was negotiat ed in London between la te 1949 and late 1951 . 
The CSA provided for specified quantit i es of  Commonweal th 
sugar to be bought by Britain and New Zealand at a pr ice 
' reasonably remunerat ive to eff icient producer s ' ,  to be 
negotiated each year , and for maximum quantit ies to  be ex­
ported to Britain , Canada and New Zealand under p ref er ential 
tarif f s .  Amounts in excess of this could be sold on the 
world ' free ' market . Fij i ' s  quota for preferential markets  
was 1 7 0 , 000 long t ons , of  which 1 2 5 , 000 would be sold at the 
nego tiat ed price . 7 6  The agreement was to run till the end 
of 1974 , when it lapsed as a resul t of  Britain ' s  entry to 
the European Economic Community . In eff ect , the CSA was 
des igned to  prevent private s ugar companies going out of  
business because of  rising labour costs ; it  did this  by , 
increas ing the consumer subs idy on sugar . But though no t a 
formal condi tion of the agreement , as with the introduction 
of the imperial prefer ence in 1919 , it  was expected that 
the subsidy would be reciprocated . Britain ' s  Board o f  Trade 
apparently saw the CSA as an opportunity to gain concessions 
for Bri tish export s , and it is r easonable to suppose that -
at least initially - removal o f  the pref erence on British 
import s  would have been out of  the question for a Fij i 
governor who wanted to reduce the burden of  imports in. this 
way . 7 7  
Even before the CSA nego t iat ions began , CSR knew there 
would be some kind of arrangement to s tabilize sugar pr ices 
in the 1950s . It also knew that s inc e the Colonial Off ice 
intended the agreement , wi thin limits , to enable higher 
wages and cane pr ices to be paid , if the company had another 
dispute wi th growers before significantly raising the 
contract price of cane , government int ervention in the 
industry would be almo s t  certain . Indeed , CSR f eared that 
if negot iat ions for a contract to replace that s igned in 
1940 broke down , Shephard ' s  propos ed Sugar Board would be 
set up . 7 8  This encouraged the company to make substant ial 
concess ions over the price of cane during negot iat ions with 
growers in 1949-5 0 ,  in the course of which the Kisan Sangh 
threatened to call a str ike - the one period in its his tory 
when it took a more extreme stand than the Maha Sangh . 7 9  
The higher cane price raised farmer s ' shares o f  the proceeds 
from sugar f rom an average of about 45  per cent in the 194 0s 
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to an average of j us t  over 60  per cent over the next 
decade . 8 0 CSR followed this in 1952  with a new tenancy 
agreement under which its tenant s  were given twenty-one year 
leases renewable at the end of t en year s , bas ically what 
Shephard had propo sed . 8 1  By making these concess ions CSR 
hoped to forestall out s ide int ervent ion in the industry , and 
to placate farmer s  so that they would no t challenge the 
company ' s  control over them . 
To retain absolute contro l o f  the indus try had been 
the maj or preoccupation of  CSR in the 1940s . Although the 
threat of government int ervention remained , by the end of 
the decade the company appeared to have had considerable 
succes s .  It had defeated the 1943  strike , the plan by 
Shephard to relat e  the pr ice of cane to prof its  from mil ling 
and the implementation of the Shephard repor t . No doubt CSR 
would have argued that it  had acted in the int erests  of the 
indus try as a whole , and that this was to the advantage of 
Fij i .  Yet there wer e  d isadvantages to the colony in what 
the company had done . There was the loss of  sugar produc t ion 
caused by the strike - a strike which , as Dr Harman had 
admitted , CSR could have avo ided s ince it c ould have paid 
more for cane . Shephard believed that because of i ts effect 
on output , over the three years 1943 to 1945 the dispute 
would cos t  farmers well over £ 1  million in los t  income . 8 2  
T o  this must  be added lo sses arising f rom CSR ' s  refusal to 
raise the contract price of  cane till 1950 . If i t  had 
improved the c ontract price , the increase in cane pr ices 
dur ing the 1 940s (because of higher raw sugar prices) would 
have been much greater . 
Yet , following a dramat ic rise in raw sugar prices in 
the lat e 1940s , the company was able to increase its ne t 
prof its in Fij i to over twice their 194 2-4 3 level . I f  
f igures from conf ident ial prof it and l o s s  accounts are 
related to  the value of assets in Fij i as shown in CSR ' s  
Ha tf-Yearly Reports (plus the es t imated value o f  working 
capital and s to cks ) , CSR ' s  average annual return on invest­
ment from 31 March 1940 to 31 March 1950 comes to  14 . 7 3 per 
cent . The p ercentage would have been slight ly larger if 
in 1949  the company had no t increased the book value of its  
Fij i assets by £1 , 62 5 , 000 , the amount by which they had been 
wr itten down in 1 9 2 3 . Compar ed with bank overdraf t rates , 
which ranged from 4 . 5  p er cent to 5 . 7 5 p er cent , 8 3  C SR 
could have been well satisf ied wit h  i ts result s .  Equally 
s ignif icant was the income it  was able to repatriate from 
the colony . Table 7 . 12 shows estimat ed ne t profit s  af ter 
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tax from CSR ' s  Fij i mills for the years ended 31 March 1941 
to 31  March 1950 . The ne t pro fit  of £1 , 8 96 , 7 67  is exp ressed 
in 1939  prices to take account of changes in the general 
price level . No allowance has been made for factors like 
transfer pricing which might affec t  pro fits . Unfortunately , 
it is impo ssib le to calculate very accurat ely cap ital 
expenditure over the per iod . From f igures in the c ompany ' s  
Half-Year ly Reports , the value o f  CSR ' s  fixed assets in 
Fij i increased by only £ 3 7 3 , 6 2 3  (at  approximate 1939  prices ) 8 4  
from 3 1  March 1940 t o  31 March 1950 . ( This exc ludes the 
revaluat ion of the Fij i assets in 194 9 . )  Capital expenditure  
would have been greater than this because as an asset  was 
replaced , on the straight line me thod of depreciat ion which 
the company seems to have used , the book value of  f ixed 
assets would have been written down by the original co s t  of  
the asset  before being writ ten up  by  the cost of the replace­
ment . Since there is no informat ion on the historical cost 
value of the assets replaced during these year s , i t  is 
impossible to infer f rom change s  in the value of fixed assets 
exac tly what capital expenditur e  occurred . However , if we 
assume , to be generous to CSR , that it  was twice the increase 
in the value of  f ixed assets , capital expendit ur e  would have 
totalled £7 4 7 , 24 6  - say £ 750 , 000 . Adding back to net pro fit 
after tax the charge for deprecia t ion and replacement , 
£ 609 , 3 7 7 ,  and deduc t ing the £ 7 50 , 000 , we are lef t with a ne t 
surplus from milling operat ions of £ 1 , 756 , 144 at 19 39 prices 
( see Table 7 . 13 ) . This is the surplus arising f rom milling 
during the years ended 31 March 1941 to 31 March 1950 : not 
all the surplus would have b een ac tually available dur ing 
this p er iod ( see no te a to Table 6 . 6 ) . As mo s t  of the 
surplus was repatr iated , it  did no t generat e economic act iv­
ity by boosting incomes in the colony . 
The third disadvantage was the def eat of  Shephard ' s  
propo sals . The failure to appoint a Scientific Inves tigation 
Commit tee left research on mat t er s  affect ing cane farmers 
almos t exc lus ively in the hands of  C SR ,  which concentrated 
on ways to improve the yields and sugar content of  cane . 
S ince comparat ively little work was done to develop mixed 
farming , growers were  perhap s denied one means of raising 
their incomes . Furthermore , without this committee and the 
Sugar Board , the involvement of farmers in the decision 
making process of the industry was limited . True , union 
r epresentatives cont inued to me-e t with company off icer s , but 
the degree of participat ion by growers was less than it 
wo uld have been if Shephard ' s  recommendations had borne 
fruit . The r esult was that the company cont inued to be seen 
Table 7 . 12 
Aggregate prof i t s  from CSR ' s  s ugar mill s  in Fij i  for years 
ended 31 March 1941 to 31 March 1950 (at 1939 prices) a 
Sales of raw s ugarb 
Opera t ing cos t s : 
Direct cos ts  - purchase of cane , e t c . 
Overhead costs  
Add miscellaneous p ro f it s  f rom sale  o f  molasses , 
operat ion of one of CSR ' s  s teamships ,  etc . c 
Gross  pro f i t  
Less charge f o r  depreciat ion and replacementd 
Net pro f it before tax 
Less income tax 
Net prof it  after tax 
8 , 54 5 , 09 2  
278 , 850 
£ F 
11 , 801 , 482 
8 , 82 3 , 94 2  
2 , 9 77 , 540 
1 75 , 7 9 7  
3 , 15 3 , 3 3 7  
609 , 37 7  
2 , 54 3 , 960  
6 4 7 , 19 3  
1 , 896 , 7 6 7  
1 8 5  
Sources : Mil l  pro f i t  and loss account s ,  Chief Accountant , CSR Ltd , 
Sydney ; ' Profit  on company ' s  Fij i mil l  ac t ivities - Years 19 39-
1955 ' ,  CSR F 5 . 0/ 2/ - . 
No tes : aChanges  in the general price l evel wer e  measured by the cost  o f  
l iving index f o r  V i t i  Levu except Suva . I t  provides only an 
approxima te guide , however . Firs t , the C . O . L . figures up t o  
and includ ing 1 June 1 94 3  were only r ough es t imat es ; secondly , 
the dat es  on which the C . O . L .  was based changed f rom in August  
1 9 39 to in  June 1940 , 1942 and 194 3 ,  and  1 Apr il  of each year 
thereaf t er (the C . O . L .  for June 1941 has been assumed to be 
halfway be tween tha t o f  June 1940 and June 194 2 ) ; thirdly , the 
sample of goods and servi ces on which the C . O . L .  was based 
became increas ingly inaccurate as a guide to price changes of 
all goods and servi ces in the colony . In 1960 it was abandoned 
in f avo ur of a more accurat e  one . For all its defec t s , t he 
index is bet ter than no thing . As sumed is that all outgoings and 
receipts  were paid at the end of the company ' s  financial years , 
when the price levels  have been taken . 
bExcludes income from sale of s t oc ks held on 31 March 1940 but 
inc ludes income f rom sale o f  s tocks held on 31 March 1950 . 
cProf i t s  seem to exclude ga ins / losses from rent s , the Yaqara 
cattle  stat ion , the dair ies and but cheries , and the pineapple  
cannery . 
d The charge appears to have been on a s traight l ine basis - 4 per 
cent each year on the original cost o f  f ixed assets . Assumed 
is that gains / lo s s e s  f rom d isposal o f  f ixed a s s e t s  are treated 
as cap i tal t ransac t ions and are excluded f rom mill profi t  and 
loss accounts .  
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as authoritarian and paternalistic , an image that was to 
become increasingly repugnant to farmers and add bit ternes s  
to ano ther strike b y  them i n  1960 . The 194 3 dispute had 
shown that growers were becoming increas ingly aware of how 
their interests conf licted with CSR . The Shephard inquiry 
and discuss ions on the Shephard report showed how great these 
differences were . 
Table 7 . 13 
Estimated cash flow arising from sugar milling activit ies for 
years ended 31 March 1941 to 31 March 1 9 50 (at  1939 prices ) a 
Net pro f  it after tax 
Add back depreciation and replacement 
To tal cash surplus 
Les s  e s t imated cap ital expendi tureb 
Cash surplus 
£ F 
1 , 896 , 767  
609 , 37 7  
2 , 506 , 144 
750 , 000 
1 , 75 6 , 144 
Sources : Table 7 . 12 ; Colonial Sugar Refining Co . Ltd , Half­
Yearly Reports , 194 0  to 1 950 . 
Notes : 
aNo t all the cash flow would have occurred during 
this period ( see no t e  a to Tab le 6 . 6 ) .  
bCapital expenditure is assumed to be twice the 
increase in the value of f ixed as sets  shown in the 
company ' s  Ha lf-Yearly Reports (but excl uding the 
amount by which the assets were revalued in 1 94 9 ) . 
From Trade Reports  (which were no t published dur ing 
the war except for an abbreviated and unhelpf ul 
report in 1941) , imports of  capital equipment con­
nec ted with sugar produc tion (milling machinery , 
railway materials , locomotives and spare part s , 
rolling s tock and spare parts)  totalled £6 76 , 038 
( f  . o . b . )  for the calendar y ears 1 944 , 1945 , 194 7 ,  
1948 , 1949 ( the Trade Report for 194 6  was no t 
available) . Increments in the value of  fixed 
assets at current prices for per iods 31 Mar . 1944 
to 31 Mar . 1946 , and 31 Mar . 194 7  to 31 Mar . 
1950  totalled £ 5 7 9 , 2 32 . When do ubled this is 
£ 1 , 158 , 464 - well in excess of  the value of  capital 
impor ts . So it is fair to assume that the es t imate 
of  capital expendit ure is being generous to the 
company . 
Chapt er 8 
The Eve Commis s ion ,  1961 
The conflic t o f  interest between growers and CSR 
remained after 1950 , even though in some ways i t  appears 
that cane farmers were  mo re pro sperous than they had ever 
been before . Table 8 . 1 shows that yields of cane were 
slightly higher in 1 951-55 than during the 1 94 0s , and 
signif icantly higher over the next five years following the 
introduct ion of new hybrid vari eties which raised yields 
and increased the area of the farm cropped each year from 
about 54 per cent of the land under cane in 1954 to 64 per 
c ent in 195 9 . 1 There  was also a big rise in the price of 
cane , thanks to the c ontract s igned in 1950 and to an in­
crease in the price of raw sugar ( see Table 8 . 2 ) . In real 
Table 8 . 1  
Yields o f  cane ( tons of  cane p er acre) 
Averages for periods of f ive seasons : 
1941/5a 1946 / 5 0  1951/55  1956/60b 
Nausori 1 7 . 0  1 6 . 9  17 . 1  18 . 7  
Rarawai 17 . 9  2 1 . 6  21 . 6  22 . 7  
La bas a 18 . 1  1 6 . 9  1 7  . 4  18 . 4  
Lautoka 1 9 . l  2 1 . 5  21 . 8  24 . o  
Penang 1 7 . 0  18 . 4  1 8 . 3  20 . 6  
True average 18 . 2  20 . 1  20 . 2  21 . 6  
Sources : FSC Ltd , ' Indus trial Statistics Summary ' , Table 
18 (a) ; CSR Ltd , ' General Report on Cane , 1 9 72 ' , 
Tab le 6 .  
Notes : al 94 3  strike depressed yields . 
bExcludes 1960 f igures which were unavailable 
because of  industrial trouble . 
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Table 8 . 2  
Average price o f  raw sugar expo r t s  and o f  cane , and 
pr ice o f  cane as a % of price o f  raw sugar , 19 5 0 - 5 9  
Pr ice of s ugar Price o f  Tons o f  cane Price o f  
Season expor t s  cane to make one cane as 
( £F per ton) ton of  94 N .  T .  o f  raw 
sugar sugar 
s d 
1 9 5 0  3 2 . 3  4 9  2 7 . 3  5 5 . 7  
19 5 1  3 6 . 5  5 8  7 7 . 0 5 6 . 2  
1 9 5 2  3 9 . 7  6 5  1 0  7 . 3  6 0 . 5  
19 5 3  4 1 .  7 7 1  6 7 . 3  6 2 . 6  
1 9 5 4  4 2 . 5  7 1  6 7 . 8  6 5 . 6  
1 9 5 5  4 1 . 7 7 0  1 0  7 . 7  6 5 . 4  
19 5 6  4 3 . 3  7Lf 9 7 . 2  6 2 . 1  
1 9 5 7  4 5 . 2  7 9  1 7 . 4 64 . 7  
1 9 5 8  4 0 . 9  6 9  1 7 . 6 6 4 . 2  
1 9 5 9  3 9 . 5  6 4  4 8 . 5 6 9 . 2  
% 
Source : ' Average price per ton of 94 N . T .  sugar and average 
price paid per t on of cane . Fij i mill s including 
Nausor i ' ,  CSR U 3 . 0 / 3 ;  Transcripts of the puhlic 
hearings of the Fiji Sugar Inquiry Corronission , 1 9 6 1 , 
Season 
1 9 5 0  
19 5 1  
19 5 2  
1 9 5 3  
1 9 5 4  
1 9 5 5  
1 9 5 6  
1 9 5 7  
1 9 5 8  
1 9 5 9  
1 0 7 . 
Table 8 . 3  
Annual average income per supplier o f  cane 
Average income 
per supplier 
( to neare s t  £ F ) 
2 2 3  
28 7 
34 2 
504 
35 0 
4 1 1  
3 3 3  
4 7 8 
380 
5 4 0  
Average income 
at 1950 pr icesa 
( to ne are s t  £ )  
2 2 3  
24 7 
2 8 3  
4 00 
2 8 5  
334 
258 
3 7 3  
2 9 9  
4 2 5 
Change 
1 9 5 0  
1 00 
111 
1 2 7 
1 79 
1 2 8  
1 5 0  
116 
1 6 7  
1 34 
1 9 1  
Source : FSC L t d , ' Indus t rial S ta t i s t ic s  Summary ' , Tab les 
7 ( a ) , 19 ( c ) , 23 . 
No t e : aGeneral price level measur ed by Co s t  o f  Living 
on 
Index for V i t i Levu e xcept Suva at t he end of each 
year . 
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terms , as measured by the cost of  living ind ex for Viti Levu 
except Suva , average farm incomes rose by 79 per cent from 
1950 to 195 3 ,  and then fluc tuat ed at lower levels but con­
siderably above those in the late 1940s , before rising 
sharply in 1959  ( see Table 8 . 3 ) . Populat ion pres sure was 
eased by an areal expans ion of the indus try which helped 
increase the number of  growers f rom 7 , 742 in 1950 to 14 , 200 
in 1959 . 2 The expansion was made possible by the guarantee 
of a market for Fij i under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement 
for 1 70 , 00 0  long tons aga ins t exports  in 1950  of 114 , 254 
tons 3 - and by the development of  cane varieties  which could 
be grown on marg inal land . 4 I t  might seem ,  then , that 
farmers had little cause to be dissatisfied wi th the ir 
position in the indus try . 
Opposit ion to CSR 
Yet higher incomes and t he bringing o f  new land under 
cane were not enough to reconcile growers to the company . 
The Indian community was becoming steadily more frus trated 
with its economic and political s tatus in the colony , 5 and 
the particular problems faced by cane farmers added greatly 
to the discontent . At Penang the involvement o f  new growers 
was at the expense of  o thers in the indus try . In the late 
1 950s a geographer , R . M .  Frazer , f ound tha t expans ion into 
wet ter areas on the wes t  and south of Viti Levu Bay had meant 
that a crop of lower sugar content had been milled , so reduc­
ing the average qual ity of  cane a t  Penang to the same as the 
o ther mill s . This caused resentment among old-es tablished 
growers because  Ra cane was no longer purchased at a special 
rate to compensate for bet ter-than-average quality . They 
felt they were  subsidizin� newcomer s  who should have been 
paid less for their crop . On the other hand , to the dismay 
of  CSR , new farmers o f  ten settled on plo ts which were smaller 
than those of growers who had b een longer in the indus try . 
The proport ion o f  c ont rac tors ' farms under eight acres rose 
from 40 per cent in 1944 to 52  per cent in 1960 , while that 
of tenant s went up from 3 p e r  cent t o  2 2  per cent . 7  S ince 
these smaller holdings were f requently loca ted on marginal 
land which gave lower yields , the incomes of  new growers 
were  usually well below many o f  their longer establ ished 
friends and rela t ives . 
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Also , recent entrants were no t normally s erved by 
CSR ' s  tramlines and had to pay more for transport than those 
who were . All the lat ter had to mee t  were the wages of  men 
who ran portable line into the f ields , and the cost of 
bullocks or tractors used to haul the cane to the main line 
(and of ten even the bullo cks or tractors were the farmers ' 
own) . Growers not c lose to a t ramline had to face the 
capital expense of cons tructing roads and the cos t of having 
their cane transported by lorry . In 1952  C SR estimat ed that 
the average co s t  of harves t ing and lorry transpor t  to the 
nearest  tramline was 7 s  6d to 12s ld per ton . Usually it 
was cheaper for cane to be taken direct to the mill s ince it 
saved the expense of transloading on to trucks . For growers 
at Barotu , who were fifteen miles from the Penang mill , the 
cost  was as high as 18s a ton . 8 Frazer reckoned that in 
1959  a farmer near the maximum dis tance from Penang and 
transporting his cane direct to the mill by lorry would make 
a profit  of  about 1 7s a ton from a crop of 159 tons , a net 
return j us t  over hal f  tha t  o f  a grower with s imilar cos ts  
but adj acent to the traml ine . 9 It ' was not surprising that 
lorry suppliers should s tart making unfavourable comparisons 
between their incomes and thos e  of more es tab lished farmers , 
and that by the end o f  t he decade there sho uld be demands 
for CSR to pay a subsidy to cover the additional cos t  o f  
transpor t . I D  S ince over a third o f  all growers delivered 
by lorry in 19 60 , the number of discontented farmers was 
considerable . I I  
Moreover , populat ion pressure on cane land int ens if ied . 
Table 8 . 4  shows that from 1946  t o  1966  the Indian rural 
populat ion grew at a faster ra t,e than the 77 p er cent increase 
in land under cane . Yet employment opportunit ies were s t ill 
limit ed . As Table 8 . 5  ind icat es , the number of  adult male 
Indians engaged in act ivit ies other than the cul t ivat ion 
of cane ro se by only 3 7 . 3  per c ent , while those  employed 
on farms where cane was the pr inc ipal crop went up by 133 . 2  
per c ent . Even af ter allowing for dif f icul ties of compar i­
son - the 1946  f igures , for example , include persons aged 
over 11 whereas the 1966  ones relate to tho se over 14 ( so 
tend ing to underest imate the g eneral trend ) - it is clear 
that those engaged in cane farming had increased by a 
larger percentage than new land brought under cane . Under­
employment among male Indians had increased , e sp ec ially on 
cane farms . It has been e s t imat ed on a conservat ive basis 
that in 1 9 6 6  about a third of the labour emp loyed in cane 
farming was surplus . 1 2  And the problem of und eremp loyment 
in sugar d istricts  was highl ight ed by the Burns Commiss ion , 
Year 
1946 
1956 
1966 
Table 8 . 4  
Increase in cane area and in number o f  Indians 
l iv ing in rural areas , 1 946-66 
Acreage under cane No . o f  Indians in rural 
Total % increase on Total % increase on 
areas 
1 0  years before 10 years before 
90 , 816 1 00 , 94 3  
115 , 654 2 7 . 3  136 , 826 35 . 5  
160, 732 3 9 . 0  1 9 3 , 464 4 1 . 4  
% increase 1946-66 7 7 . 0  9 1 . 7 
1 9 1 
a 
Source : Michael Moynagh , ' Land tenure in Fij i ' s sugar cane districts  
s ince the 1920s ' ,  Joz.a>na Z o f  Paaifia History , 13 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Table 3 .  
Note :  aincludes Indians in the vicinity o f  towns and not necessar ily 
engaged in agricul ture . 
Table 8 . 5  
Employment of adult mal e  Indians , a 1946-6 6 
No . of male Indians engaged in : 
Cultivat ing sugar cane as 
principal crop 
Primary industry ( except where 
cane a princ ipal crop) 
Secondary & tert iary sectors 
Unemployed 
1956 
9 , 611 16 , 88 3  
1 0 , 798 6 , 08 2  
1 1 2 4 76 15 2 9 1 7  
2 2 , 2 74 21 , 999 
Comparable f igures 
no t available 
1966 
22 , 415 
7 , 24 2  
2 3 2 310 
30 , 552 
2 , 9 78 
% increase 
1946-66 
1 33 . 2  
37 . 3  
Source : Census report s  for 1946 , 1956 and 196 6 ,  C . P. 3 5 / 1 94 7 ;  1 / 1958 ; 
9 / 1968 . 
No te : aDef ined as those aged over 11 in 1946 Census report , and over 14 
in 1956 and 1966 reports . Excluded are those at s chool , etc . 
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which in  1960  report ed on  the natural resources and popula­
t ion trends of Fij i . 1 3  
The ext ent o f  the problem owed much to the limit ed 
spread ef fects  of  C SR ' s  act ivities . The repatriation of 
prof its meant that mos t  of the cash surplus from milling 
was no t invest ed locally in ways which might have created 
j ob s . In the past , too , the company had pos i t ively ob·­
struct ed at temp ts  to divers ify cane farming , so p erhaps 
denying Indians an opportunity to grow additional crops 
which could have absorbed some of the excess labour avail­
able . In the 1950s CSR was far less opposed to diversif ica­
t ion , rice and dhal being grown by many farmers . But b ecause 
government l ef t  agricultural research relat ing to cane 
d istrict s to t he company , befo re 1960 virtually no sy stemat ic 
effort was made to develop a form of mixed farming mos t  
suited t o  the sugar belt ; research was concentrated on 
matters which would yield a d irect return to C SR ,  like in­
creas ing the supply and sugar content of cane . The company 
also tied up land , such as the Yaqara cat tle ranch , which 
might otherwis e  have been farmed by Indians . In addit ion , 
there was the deliberately caut ious program o f  sugar ex­
pans ion undertaken by CSR in the early 1950s . The company 
wanted to concentrate on a s imil ar but overall more expens ive 
program in Australia , and to l eave room for increased output 
in Fij i following productivity improvements . 1 4  The resul t  
was that areas suited to cane , no tably the Seaqaqa region 
near Labasa , were not develop ed t il l  much l at er . They w�re 
unable to absorb in the 1950s part o f  the growing Indian 
work force . 
The lack of employment oppor tunit ies for those  aged 
15 and over encouraged relat ives to create j obs for them . 
They were  somet imes paid to help with cultivation , so 
reduc ing the �eed f or women and younger children to do the 
work . 1 5  There was an increase in the number of farmers ' 
substitutes in harvest ing gangs from 55 per cent of  the 
total gang strength in 1950 to 71 per cent in 195 9 ;  over a 
third of the subs t itutes in 1959  were growers '  sons . 1 6  
Despite  the labour surplus in cane d istrict s ,  wages of  farm 
employees rose during the 1950s , as was reflected on t he 
handful o f  C SR estates where the rates for cut ters who 
harvested twenty to twenty-five tons of  cane p er acre went 
up by nearly 300 p er cent , from 2s 6�d per t on in 1950 to 
7 s  Od in 19 5 9 . 1 7  Part o f  the pressure on wage levels may 
have come from trade union ac t ivity in other sectors o f  
the economy , b u t  part  may a l s o  have been d u e  to rising 
1 9 3  
expec tat ions which encouraged growers t o  share more o f  
their wealth with rel3t ives on the farm . There was also a 
boom in the number ot �ractors bought by growers ,  many of 
whom wanted to provide bus iness  opportuni ties for under­
employed relatives . 1 8  Beside using a t ractor rather than 
bullo cks t o  plough , say , his father ' s  land , it was hoped 
a son could earn an income f rom ploughing o ther people ' s  
farms . But Frazer estimated that at the us ual contrac t rate 
of  £2 an acre , to cover running cos t s  and depreciation each 
tractor would need to plough at least one hundred acres a 
year . 1 9  So in 195 9 , 72 , 400 acres would have had to be 
ploughed if all the tractor s in cane areas were  at leas t to 
break even . With cane land to talling 1 34 , 126  acres , 2 0 this 
was impossible . Since 3 3  per cent ro tat ions had become 
common , 2 1  little more  than a third of the area would have 
been ploughed that year and a lar ge part of i t , lying on 
hills ide for example , would not have been suitable for 
trac tor work . Although trac tor owners had the great 
advantage of being able to plough their farms (or those  of  
relations ) when the weather was mos t favourable and to do 
the work more  thoroughly and under more pleasant condit ions 
than by tradit ional met hods , 2 2  it is hard to s ee how more  
than a few owner s  could have made a prof it . The cos t of  
tractor purchases mus t have been a cont inuing drain on farm 
incomes - but one that appealed because i t  lightened the 
work of cultiva t ion . Whereas tractors had originally been 
purchased to provide employment for growers ' sons (or  
relatives ) ,  they had now become a means by which farmers 
could distrib ute some of  the prof its f rom cane in a way 
that eased the b urden of farm labour . 
One of  the mechanisms , t hen , for support ing a growing 
populat ion was for farmers to pay o thers to do much o f  the 
work they had previously done themselves ;  at the same time , 
to sat isfy r ising expectations they increased wages and made 
work more  pleasant by inves t ing in trac tors . The result 
was that growers assumed a distinct manager ial/ inves tor 
role - a tendency which was apparent in the 194 0s and which 
had become of maj or  importance by the late 1950s . No 
figures are available for 194 6 , but in 195 6 , 9 , 003 people 
engaged in the cultivation of cane as a principal crop con­
s idered themselves to be managers and propr ietors :  8 , 086 
were lis t ed in the census as ' other worker s ' .  In 1966  the 
respective f igures had r isen to 10 , 07 2  and 1 2 , 649 . 2 3  ' Other 
workers '  had moved from a minority to a maj ority of those  
labouring on cane farms . This threatened the foundat ion of  
the smallfarm sys t em which rested on the premise that 
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prof its from cane and the cost of labour should be indivis­
ible - that one should be counted as zero . As CSR readily 
admit ted , the existing price of cane was not enough bo th 
to pay s eparate incomes to labourers and managers and 
sat isfy their rising expectat ions . 24 
In addition there wer e  problems connected with land 
t enure . Population growth and better cane prices l ed to a 
rise in land values which was reflec t ed in higher r ents . 
As early as 1954 the NLTB increased the scale it  had intro­
duced in  1952  ( see Table 8 . 6 )  and which had b een higher than 
the rents paid before then . When C SR is sued new leases in 
195 3 , the rents of company tenants were  also raised so that 
they would be in line with NLTB rates . But b ecause these  
r ents could not be a ltered t il l  af ter the f ir s t  ten years of  
the lease , the  revis ion of the NLTB scale in  1954 did not 
affect C SR ' s  tenant s until the early 1960s . 2 5  Nor , t ill 
Table 8 . 6  
NLTB and CSR r ent s cales 
1952 scale 1954 s calea 
£ s d £ s d 
Soil classificat ion : 
l s t  class land lA superior 2 15 0 5 0 0 
lB l s t  class 2 10 0 4 10 0 
lC l s t  class 2 5 0 4 0 0 
2nd class land 2A 2nd class 2 0 0 3 10 0 
2B 2nd class 1 15 0 3 0 0 
2C 2nd c lass 1 10 0 2 10 0 
3rd class land 3A 3rd c las s 1 5 0 2 0 0 
3B 3rd c lass 1 0 0 1 10  0 
3C exceptionally 15 0 1 0 0 
poor 
Source : Eve Inq_uiray , 8 7 . 
Not e : 
aCSR did not introduce its revised scale till 1955 . 
these leases expired , d id the NLTB scales affect contrac tors 
on leases which dated from y ears back and contained no 
provision for the regular revis ion of rent . So more  s ignif i-
cant were the cases , involving up to 7 . 5  per cent of cane 
farmers ,  where Indian and European land lords charged rents 
wel l  above those on Crown , CSR or  NLTB land . Some t imes over 
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a third o f  a grower ' s  income - a lo t compared wi th mos t  other 
growers - was paid in rent for a farm whi ch could be held 
on one of several tenurial arrangement s . 2 6  The r i s e  in land 
values also caused an increase in the pr emiums paid when 
farms were trans ferred , which apparently was quite often .  
CSR tried t o  prevent transfers but received little effective 
support from the NLTB . In 1960 it was claimed that premiums 
of  around £2 , 000 were no t uncommon , and since they were 
us ually f inanced by loans at high interest this represented 
a significant expense . 2 7  
O f  wider impact was the failure of  the Nat ive Land 
Trust Ordinance to provide farmers with security o f  tenure . 2 8  
I n  1940 it had been hoped tha t  the procedur e f o r  demarcating 
reserves would form a solution to the problem of land 
tenure . Reserves would guarantee Fij ians enough land for 
the ir exis t ing and future  needs so enab ling Indians , it 
was thought , to lease land outside r es erves for an almo s t  
unlimited per iod . The Colonial Off ice exp ec ted that the 
declaration of  reserves would take about two years and that 
cane lands would no t be affected . 2 9  Yet far from no t touch­
ing sugar dis trict s , when the proclamat ion of reserves was 
complete in 1967  the acreage o f  leases affec ted in ' Old 
Tikinas ' where cane was grown e ither in part or throughout 
was 2 2 , 35 1 3 0 - about 10 per c ent of the 2 20 , 000 acre s , 
roughly e s t imated in 1963 , used for  all types of  farming 
but located within the boundaries of cane areas . In 1963  
the  NLTB reckoned that the number of growers affected by 
reserves would be 10 per cent of all cane farmers on Fij ian 
land . Once reserves had been published tenants were  
expected to vacate their plo t s  as leases expired . They 
were paid no compensat ion for improvements but , though they 
did no t have the l egal r ight , they wer e  allowed to remain 
on the land t il l  they had harves ted all growing crops up to 
and including first  ratoon cane - a maximtml period o f  two 
and a hal f  years . 3 1  In 1949 when the f ir s t  reserves were  
published , government became concerned about the fate  of 
tenants and e stablished Rese ttlement Commit tees to help 
them f ind alterna t ive land . These committees operated t ill 
the early 1 960s and helped a ntnnber of farmers . Others 
already had land or found it  on their own accord . Thanks 
to the expansion of sugar production , mos t  displaced 
tenants acquired l eases on new land coming into the industry , 
so that resettlement did no t present the difficult ies origin­
ally expected . 
Yet , although the ac tual cane area going into 
reserves was no t large and the number of farmers made 
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landless was negligible , the demarcation of reserves had 
an immense adverse effect on Indian opinion . Farmers 
resented ej ect ion from leases they had o ccup ied for many 
years . Those with land outside as well as ins ide reserves 
received no help in finding new farms to compensate for what 
they had los t , while tho se who obtained new land , o f ten on 
surrounding hillsides , usually found it was less fertile 
than the rich areas they had l ef t . Moreover , from vantage 
points on the hills they could of ten see their former 
leases being le ss ef f iciently tended , and in many cas es 
no t cultivated at all , by their new occup ants . Due to 
population pressure on the land , the number of  Fij ians in 
the indus try increased significantly , f rom 6 . 8  per cent of 
all growers in 1950 to b2 . 2  per cent in 19 5 9 , 3 2  but many 
o f  them tended cane for only short p eriods so that the s ight 
o f  reserved land going out o f  use became high ly provocative 
to Indians . More s ignificant was the delay in finalizing 
reserves ; it tQok twenty-s ix years instead of the two 
originally envisaged . This was par tly due to the amount 
of work involved . Recommendat ions by the Commis sioner o f  
Reserves , initially Ratu J . L . V . Sukuna , were based on the 
population trends of each landowning unit (mataqa Zi) over 
as long a period as po ssible , the amount of land owned by 
each unit , and the quality as well as the locat ion of the 
land owned . 3 3  Especially with a shor tage of  s taf f , collec­
t ion of  this data took considerable time , but by 1 9 5 9  the 
Commis sioner had completed work on the whole of  Viti Levu 
and par t  of Vanua Levu . Yet the NLTB had publis hed or 
proclaimed as reserves only 186 , 32 7  acres , agains t the 
1 , 41 2 , 149  which would lie in reserves when demarcation was 
complete in 196 7 . 3 4  As leases expired in districts where 
reserves had no t been f inalized , farmers were given shor t­
term leases or tenanc ies-at-will , which could not be  re­
placed by thirty-year leases till it  was certain the land 
would lie outside reserves . Consequently , no t only were 
d isplaced farmers and their relat ives affected by reserves : 
involved were all occupants of  na t ive land , whether CSR 
or NLTB tenants ,  whose l eases had expired or were about to . 
The result was a widespread f eeling of insecurity which 
d iscouraged long-term inves tment in the land and produced 
a des ire for higher returns from cane as compensation for 
the risk that l eases might no t be renewed . 
During the 1950s , then , t he admis s ion of  new farmers 
to the indus try , population growth and insecur ity o f  tenure 
led to demands for a continuing increase in farm incomes . 
Unfortunately , the lack of  appropriate s tatis t ical data adds 
19 7 
to the diff icul ty o f  knowing whether returns from cane rose 
enough to meet these demands .  Still , on the informat ion 
ava ilable it is plain that from 1950  to 1 9 5 3  there was a 
very substant ial improvement in the standard o f  living o f  
growers , and that this was i n  fact the economic heyday o f  
Indians i n  Fij i .  Never again would average real farm 
incomes rise by 7 9  per cent over a four-year per iod . This 
was quite suff ic ient to absorb any r ise in farm cos t s  and 
any population growth that was likely to have occurred a t  
tha t  time . I t  was also enough t o  allow farmers t o  meet many 
of their higher expectations - indeed , it  produced higher 
expectations . Yet , as Table 8 . 3  showed , average real farm 
incomes over the next f ive years were below ,  somet imes 
cons iderably below , the peak they had reached in 195 3 . 
Moreover , the very high incomes obta ined in that year led 
no t only to the repayment of  existing deb ts , but to the 
accumulat ion of even larger new ones as growers sought to 
maximize their expenditure . C SR no ticed that indeb tedness 
rose af ter the except ionally good s eason of  195 3 , 3 5  and this 
was hardly s urpri sing s ince the greater prosperity of  farmers 
increased their apparent credit-worthiness . The burden o f  
deb t mus t have caused problems when r eal incomes fell . 
Growers had relatively high levels of  deb t but smaller real 
incomes from which to service i t . Then in 19 5 7  and 1958 
there was a severe credit squeeze which hur t the many farmers 
who depended on credit . 3 6  Perhaps it  was no accident that 
at this t ime the Ki san Sangh revived i ts idea of  a co­
operative store , though the venture made lit tle headway . 3 7  
Lower real incomes plus the burden of  debt would have made 
it very diff icult for the average grower to enj oy the 
s tandard of living he had experienced in 195 3 . Yet the 
population continued to r ise and o ther problems l ike 
insecurity of land tenure remained . Fur ther , to talk o f  
the average farmer i s  misleading . Growers who delivered 
by lorry , or occupied marginal land , or had part icularly 
small farms , o r  leased from Indian landlords at high rents , 
or held Fij ian land which might be reserved , were likely 
to be in a worse position than , say , well  es tablished 
tenants on CSR freeholds . 3 8  Thus in the mid-1950s even if 
some farmers had grounds to be satisfied - and there were 
probably only a relat ively few in that posi tion - a large 
number must have had considerab le dif f iculty in meeting 
the various demands placed on their resources and in 
satisfying the higher expectat ions caused by the big rise 
in farm incomes earl ier in the decade . 
Agains t this background it  was no wonder that there 
was mounting resentment agains t CSR , reflected in the 
1 9 8  
sugges t ion that mills be  taken over b y  an Indian firm . 3 9  
S ince the company was foreign owned and thought t o  repatriate 
the bulk of its pro f its , i t  was natural that the discontent 
of growers should focus on CSR . Nor was it surprising that 
when in 1959 the company suggested measures to reduce the 
contract price of cane , and to control farm output so as to 
prevent export s  exceeding Fij i ' s quota under the recently 
nego t iated Internat ional Sugar Agreement , the proposals 
should meet with s trong oppos i tion f rom farmers . 4 0  Dur ing 
1959  growers benefited from a sharp rise in farm incomes 
due to a bumper harves t  of 2 , 35 3 , 080 t ons of cane , the 
highes t  on record . 4 1  If produc tion were cur ta iled and the 
price of cane not increased , there would be no repeat o f  
the large income achieved that year . Y e t  wi thout earnings 
of  at  least that l evel , growers could hardly hope to realize 
their material expectat ions , meet the costs of  lorry trans­
port , hired labour and rent increases , as well as receive 
compensat ion for insecurity of tenure . Many , therefore , 
were in no mood t o  compromise with C SR when negot iations 
for a new contrac t began . 
CSR ' s  response 
During these talks CSR felt unable to o f fer maj or 
concess ions as i t  had in 1949-50 . Consi s tent with the 
general movement of wage levels in the colony , which had 
been largely due to the unionizat ion of mill workers and the 
desire of C SR and government to avoid a maj or conf lict with 
their employees , there had been a b ig r ise in labour costs  
which , the company claimed , had squeezed its  pro f it s . The 
average cos t  of a non-salaried mill worker had gone up f rom 
Bs 8d a day in 1950 to 19s 7d in 1959 , an increase o f  about 
126 per cent . 4 2  Wages had r is en particularly sharply in 
19 59 , following the Honeyman inquiry into a disput e between 
CSR and the Fij i Sugar Indus try Employees As sociat ion , the 
mill workers ' union . 4 3  The company feared that the recom­
mendat ions of the inquiry might set  the pat tern for fur ther 
wage increases in fut ure , espec ially s ince widespread 
industrial unrest in Fij i dur ing 1959  seemed to herald a 
new period o f  union mili tancy . 4 4 The labour-intens ive 
nature of  its operat ions made CSR particularly vulnerable 
to the effect s of  a large rise in wage levels . I t  employed 
four times as many people per unit of output in its Fij i 
mills as it  did in its  Queensland mills . 4 5  
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The company ' s  ab il ity to absorb these higher cos t s  was 
limit ed by market ing arrangements  for sugar . Uncertaint ies 
about the future of  the Internat ional Sugar Agreement en­
couraged CSR not to exceed Fij i ' s  quota und er the Commonwealth 
agreement . It was expected that the lat ter ' s  overall agree­
ment quot as would form the bas is for restrictions under a re­
negot iated ISA ,  and in fact when an agreement was signed in 
1959  the quota for total Commonwealth exports  was only 
125 , 000 long tons above the 2 , 5 00 , 000 tons overall agreement 
quota .  Fij i ' s  exports  under the I SA were limited to about 
179 , 000 long t ons in 1959 , and about 184 , 000 in 1960 and 
196 1 . 4 6 The I SA was needed because of the depressive ef fect 
on the internat ional ' free ' pric e of  world over-product ion , 
which in part was due to prot ect ion in north America of cane 
and in Europe of domestic beet industries which were unable 
to compet e  on open market terms with producers in many les s  
developed areas ; also protect ed unde r  spec ial market ing 
arrangement s  were c ommerc ial interests  engaged in uncompet i­
t ive sugar mill ing in the third wor ld but with po lit ical 
influence in Washingt on and London . The Fij i industry was 
probably more efficient  than a number of Britain ' s  colonial 
supplier s . 4 7 With over 15 , 00 0  addit ional acres in 195 9 
suitable for cane near the Labasa , Rarawai , Lautoka and 
Penang mills , 4 8  it i s  pos s ible that had less effic ient pro­
ducers not been p rotected , Fij i ' s  compet it ive advantage would 
have allowed CSR to increase out put  more than it d id in the 
1950s , and so  reduce unit cos t s . 
At least to some extent , however , the inab ility to do 
this was offset by the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement , under 
which Fij i sold 125 , 000 long tons a year of negot iat ed price 
sugar at a pric e which covered the cost s  of less effic ient 
producers in the West  Ind ies . 4 9 Yet the benef it s  of  this 
were limited because pricing arrangement s under the CSA were 
des igned ma inly with Brit ish interest s in mind . Though there 
had been altruis t ic concern in the Colon ial Of f ice about the 
low incomes of labourers and grower s in the colonial sugar 
industries , the cont inuation of the imperial preference 
and the int roduc t ion o f  the negot iat ed p rice had almost  
cert ainly been agreed to by  the Treasury largely to prevent 
a fall in real incomes lead ing to soc ial unrest in the sugar 
islands . The cost  to the consumer of the CSA was expected 
to be les s  than the cost to the taxpayer of maint aining 
order in the fac e of wid espread economic dist ress . The 
negot iat ed price was f ixed with this polit ical obj ect ive 
in view , bu t also at a level that would minimiz e  it s ·expense 
to the consumer - a cons iderat ion which served as a break 
on inc reases in the price ; nevertheless , it ros e  from 
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£32  17s 6d a long ton in 1 9 5 1  to £55 Bs  lOd in 196 0 . Not 
all sugar could be sold at the negot iat ed price , however -
indeed , Canada refused to buy any on these terms - becau se 
it was exp ected that in the long run the pr ice would be 
substant ially higher than the world ' free ' price . The con­
sumer would then suffer . Consequent ly , under the CSA ,  
Commonwealth exporters t o  Britain and Canada were t o  sell 
some of their sugar - 45 , 000 tons in the case of Fij i � at 
the ' free ' price plus the pre-war imper ial preference . 
But as a resul t  of  increa sed world output the ' free ' price 
fell from about £49 1 2s Od in 1951 to about £2 8 10s Od in 
1960 , so nega ting par t  of the gains from the higher nego­
tiated price and helping to prevent the average annual price 
of Fij i ' s exports rising at a rate commensurate  with wage 
increases in the sugar indus try . Against the 126 p er cent 
rise in wages , the price of t he colony ' s sugar exports went 
up by only 2 2 . 7  per cent , from about £32 4s Od a ton in 1950 
to about £39 10s Od in 195 9 . 5 ° Clearly the internat ional 
market for sugar , which was arranged largely to s erve the 
interests of industrial nat ions , made it harder for CSR 
to absorb the rise in mill labour cos ts . 
Yet t here were a number of things the company coul d ,  
and did , d o  to meet  the s itua t ion . One was t o  reduce the 
cost of expatriate s taff , who received the much higher 
Australian wages than those  paid to non-Europeans in Fij i .  
In the early 1950s CSR began to replace some of its t echnical 
s taff in the mills  with part-Europeans , and at the end of 
the decade it s tarted to train Indians and Fij ians who were 
even less expensive . 5 1  To reduce the s ize  o f  i ts Australian 
field s taff , in the late 1950s the number of farms for 
which each o fficer was responsible was increased from b e tween 
100 and 200 to between 400 and 6 00 . Field officers were to 
be assist ed by Indian and Fij ian extens ion workers ,  init ially 
respons ibl e  to the Agricul tural Experimental Station in 
Lautoka . The mob ility of field p ersonnel was enhanced by 
the sub s titution of motor transport for horses , though this 
had the unexpected effect of reducing contact between growers 
and off icers while the lat t er were travelling . 5 2  Apart 
from lo calizat ion of s taff , mos t  o f  whose effects were no t 
felt t,ill the 1960s , CSR sought to limit cost increases by 
rationalizing its operations in the colony . I t  began to 
get rid of its non-sugar interests . The un�rofitable pine­
apple cannery near Nadi was closed in 1956 . 3 Butcheries 
at the mills , which had supplied meat to the company ' s 
s taff , were gradually sold off . 
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Mo re important was the deci s ion to clo se Nausori af ter 
the 1959  season , and to concentrate production on the o ther 
more pro fitable mills . Table 8 . 7  shows the losses made a t  
Nausori f rom 1940 t o  1958 . Pro f its  had always been com­
paratively small because too much rain and not enough light 
affected ripening , so  that the sugar content of  cane was 
low . But s ince the early 1940s there had been ano ther 
problem :  the supply of cane had dropped . From 19 30 to 1939 
the annual average quantity o f  cane crushed had been 1 32 , 290 
tons ; from 1940 to 1949 this fell to 9 1 , 689 tons and from 
1950 to 1956 , af ter which i t  was decided t o  close the mill , 
the average was down to as low as 83 , 9 24 tons . 54 Many of 
the company ' s  s taf f blamed this on o ff-farm employment in 
Table 8 . 7  
Results  of ac tivitiesa at Nausori mill , 1940-58b 
Prof it  Profit  Prof  it  
Season or los s  Season or  los s  Season or loss 
£ £ £ 
1940 5 ,  74 3 194 7 5 5 , 66 7  1954 -15 , 585 
1941 7 , 51 7  1948 5 , 9 2 2 1955  - 75 , 2 30 
1942 22 , 3 34 1949 -10 , 8 37  1956  -11 3 , 85 8  
194 3  -2 7 , 5 6 3  19 50  - 76 , 06 2  195 7 -101 , 24 6  
1944 -1 7 , 004 1951 -25 , 36 9  1958  -20 , 3 7 7  
1945 -10 , 7 9 7  1952  -85 , 799 c 
1946  26 , 24 9 19 5 3  -7 3 , 6 8 1  Total -529 , 9 76 
Sources : Tables in CSR F 1 . 0/ 3/ 24 ; F 1 . 0/ 3/ 26 ; F 2 . 0/ 4 / 19 . 
No tes : alncludes non-sugar activities and molasses . 
bComparable f igures for 1959 no t available . For 
the remaining years , no allowance made for 
changes in the general price level . 
cAnticipa ted rather than ac tual los s .  
Suva and the Nausori township , whi ch caused farms to be 
neglected . It is  s till  frequently said in Fij i that this 
was an important reason for the mill ' s  closure . Yet a 
s urvey done by CSR in 1956  showed that of  the 1 , 800 grower s 
on the Rewa , only 300 had o ther employment and 2 30 of  these 
had made sat is factory arrangements  for the cul t ivat ion of  
their farms . Only about 4 per  cent of  growers were neglec t­
ing their land . CSR conc luded that two factors were mainly 
respons ible for the fall in pro duc t ion . One was that 
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drainage had de teriorated s ince the early 1940s , largely 
because growers had refused to co-operate wi th the company 
in keeping drains clean . In 1946 the Rewa unions had 
ins is ted on doing the work themselves , but had then neglected 
it presumably because , given inter -union rivalry , they were 
unwilling to levy members for the cos t - a situat ion which 
pointed to the need for a single s tatutory association to 
look a fter the interes t s  of  farmers in such ma t ters . The 
other reason was that to ob tain cane wit h  a high sugar 
content , CSR had encouraged the cultivation of Galba and 
Argus varieties in s oils which should have grown Malabar . 
As the general manager ,  Dr Vernon , remarked in 1956 , ' This 
has been to our int eres t under the present cane agreement 
but there is little doub t  tha t it has had the effect of  
worsening the already depressed yields s tennning f rom poor 
drainage ' - an excellent example of how confl ict of interest  
in  the indus try could work to the di sadvant age o f  growers . S S  
I t  was out o f  the ques t ion for CSR to con tinue su&tain­
ing losses at Nausori when i t  knew that , because little had 
been recently spent on improvement s compared with the o ther 
mill s , substant ial new inves tment was needed by 196 0 .  I t  
seemed mos t  unlikely there would b e  a return f rom the 
r equired expenditure of up to £ 400 , 000 , including £250 , 00 0  
for a new boiler . S 6 Yet wit hout this inves tment the mill 
co uld hardly be operated at all . There were various possi­
b ilities . The company could increase the cane supply by 
i tself repairing the drains , but this might set  a precedent 
for the o ther mills and CSR was no t prepared to be saddled 
with the expense of maintaining drains in all the cane 
dis tricts . Or it could reduce the price of cane on the 
Rewa , but this would invi te opposition from the growers . 5 7  
Ins tead , CSR decided t o  dismantle Nausori and transfer 
usable machinery to its o ther mills . S teps were taken to 
increase product ion elsewhere in Fij i in order to reduce 
the unit costs  of milling . The company was particularly 
anxious that this expansion o ccur before Nausori was clo sed , 
lest par t of  Fij i ' s  export quo ta under the CSA remain 
unf illed and growers demand tha t  to meet the def icit they 
be allowed to run Nausori as a co-operative . This would 
have deprived CSR of the opportunity to in crease output at 
its  o ther mills , and might have encouraged demands that the 
lat ter also be made into co-operatives . Fear o f  this was 
one reason for the c ompany ' s  de termina tion to find ano ther 
crop for farmers af ter it  had withdrawn from the Rewa . If  
they had an alternative source o f  income growers would be 
less likely to want Nausori kep t  open . S S So a wholly owned 
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subs idiary o f  CSR ,  the Rewa Rice Co . ,  was es tabl ished to  
provide milling fac ilit ies for growers who switched from 
cane to padi . I t  was planned tha t after taxation an d an 
allowance for depreciation , this new company would make an 
8 p er cent return on inves tment . To ens ure this CSR ins is ted 
that compe tition be limi ted by raising duties on imported 
rice , and government ,  which feared so c ial unres t in the 
d is trict if the r ice scheme failed , readily agreed . 5 9 Thus 
apar t from reducing incomes on the Rewa because rice was 
less profitable than cane , closure of Nausori entailed a 
cos t  to the rest  of  the Indian communi ty whi ch had to pay 
more for rice . Tho se who gained were Indians able to enter 
the sugar indus try following expansion on the wes t of Vi ti 
Levu and of  Vanua Levu , while the main beneficiary - of 
course  - was CSR . 
In the company ' s  view these attempt s  to reduce co sts  
were no t enough to  ens ure adequate profits , though wha t  
return CSR would have regarded a s  satisfactory is hard to 
say . The company wanted to negotiate a more favourable cane 
contrac t when the exi s t ing one expired ,  but it knew that 
this might lead to a dispute with growers . As early as 1956 
head o ffice had become apprehens ive about the possib ility 
of  a farmers '  s trike . To make its pro fits as a percentage 
return on inves tment appear les s , in 19 5 7  the company re­
valued its Fij i as sets - but no t those  in Aus tralia - from 
£ 5 , 895 , 521  to £ 1 3 , 0 30 , 370 . The Chief Manager was told : 
For your informat ion , our main reason for acquiring 
this valuation is the ever-present possib ility that 
some situation co uld arise in Fij i which would lead to 
an inves tigation , or some form of arb itration , in 
which it could be neces sary to produce informa t ion 
regarding our assets , profits  and relevant information . 
An up- to-date valuat ion would also be a considerable 
advantage to us in f uture negot iat ions in connect ion 
with the Commonweal th Sugar Agreement . 6 0 
Int eres t ingly , the company had revalued its  F ij i but no t 
Aus tralian assets in 1949 , when nego t iat ions for the 1950-59 
contrac t were about to begin . 6 1 CSR also tried to appease 
growers by adopting a lower profile in the colony , this 
being one of the obj ec ts of its  s taff locali zat ion policy . 
In 1959  harvest ing gangs were allowed to determine for 
thems elves the order of cutt ing , ins tead of this  being left 
to the field s taff , and in keeping with the company ' s  new 
approach one o f  the effects  o f  reduc ing the rat io of  field 
2 04 
off icers to farmers was that the use o f  credit to control 
grower s decl ined . Having les s con tact with each farmer , 
o ff icers found it  harder to relate advances to the quality 
of husbandry . 6 2  To meet criticism ,  echoed in the Honeyman 
report , of  Sydney ' s  remo te control over the company ' s  Fij i 
activities , in 195 9-60 CSR considered forming a wholly owned 
subsidiary to run its  milling operat ions in the colony . 6 3 
But no f inal decis ion was taken until 1961 . Meanwhile , CSR 
b egan to reduce the extent of  its landholdings in F ij i .  I t  
refused t o  renew a handful o f  NLTB leases which expired in 
the la te 1950s , and in 1959  i t  o ffered to s ell its  freeholds 
to the Crown - an offer t hat was refus ed . I t  was thought 
that the ref usal might have been due to a reluc tance in the 
Colonial Office to f inance wha t  was imagined to be the s tart 
of the company ' s  withdrawal from the colony . 6 4 Yet if this 
was so , it  was based on a complete misreading o f  the s itua-
• tion . There is  no evidence that at this date CSR was 
p lanning to leave . Rather , the company was trying to 
s trengthen its pos ition by rationali zing its activities and 
making its  presence less provocative . 
While embarking on this s trategy , in February 1959  
CSR  informed growers o f  its  propos ed changes to  the cane 
contrac t .  First , given recent expansion o f  the indus try and 
the renegot ia t ion o f  the ISA , the company wanted farmers to 
b ear the risk o f  over-product ion . The need for res triction 
became a mat ter of urgency during the y ear . Output should 
have been l imited to 21 7 , 00 0  tons of  raw sugar , whi ch would 
have been made up of 1 79 , 00 0  tons for export  under the ISA , 
15 , 000 for sale within Fij i and to o ther Pacific Islands , 
and 23 , 000 to br ing its maximum s tock tonnage under the ISA 
to 37 , 000 tons ( there were 14 , 000 tons left from the 1958  
season) . Yet  because of  excep t ionally good weather , 28 3 , 000 
tons o f  raw sugar were produced , making severe restriction 
necessary the fo llowing year . CSR favoured control by means 
of a tonnage quo ta on each farm , s ince responsibility would 
then l ie with the individual grower to produce no more than 
the agreed amount . The alternative was to impose quo tas on 
an acreage bas is , the company buying all cane grown on a 
specif ied area . But this would mean that i f  y ields - were 
unusually high CSR would have to buy more cane than it  
needed , whereas if  yields wer e  low there might be  a short­
fall . The company ' s  o ther proposals were des igned to boo s t  
profits  from milling . Higher penalties were suggested for 
burnt and inferior cane in order to raise the average sugar 
content and lower cos t s . Certain expenses , l ike that of  
s torage , were to be deducted f rom the proceeds o f  sugar 
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sales before the la tter were used to cal culate the price of  
cane . The company reques ted , too , a reduc t ion in the growers ' 
share of  proceeds when the price o f  sugar was high . I t  
claimed that in 1950 no one had expected raw sugar prices 
to reach the levels they were now at , and that the exis ting 
contract was unduly favourable to farmers at high prices . 6 5 
Needless to say , these sugges t ions ·were not likely to please 
the growers . 
The s trike and its  aftermath 
Af ter CSR had presented growers with its  proposed 
contrac t ,  negot iat ions were pos tponed till elec t ions for 
the Legislative Council were over , so avoiding the possib il­
ity that Indian politicians would compete for votes by making 
steadily more extreme counter-demands . Once the elect ions 
were f inished the Federation of Cane Growers , which included 
representatives of  all the farmers ' unions , prepared a draft  
contrac t o f  its  own which was submit ted to CSR la ter in  the 
year . I t s  terms were very different from those s ugges ted 
by the company . Agains t the average 6 2 . 6  per cent of 
proceeds ob tained from 19 5 0  to 1959 ( s ee Table 8 . 2 ) , growers 
demanded 70 per cent of the sugar proceeds wit hout any pr ior 
deductions for s torage and the like . They oppo sed increases 
in penal ties for burnt or inf erior cane , and demanded the 
right to select their own varieties ( so they could grow 
heavier rather than sweet cane) . They reluctantly acknow­
ledged the need for production control , but claimed that 
CSR had a moral obligat ion to buy all the cane harvested 
in 1960 since in 1 9 5 7 and 1958 it  had urged farmers to 
increase the area planted . Af ter 196 0 they wanted restric­
t ions to be on an acreage and no t a tonnage basis , so placing 
the ult imate responsibility for control on CSR . 6 6  Nego tia­
tions between the company and growers were protracted , and 
when by March 19 60 it had become clear tha t no breakthrough 
was likely , CSR collaborated with government to ob tain a 
resolut ion of  the dispute  on terms acceptable to the company . 
On 11 April 19 60 CSR ' s head o ffice remarked :  ' I t is gratify­
ing that our views on the s ituation and method of handling 
it seem to be f inding accep tance by Government . ' 6 7  
Following discus s ions in Sydney between S ir Kenne th 
Maddocks ( governor , 19 58-6 4 )  and the company , in late  May 
government intervened in the dispute . At the sugges t ion o f  
CSR , 6 8  Maddocks propos ed that there be a wide-ranging 
economic inquiry into the indus try , but this was rej ected 
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by grower s on the grounds that a commis s ion would be unable 
to get at  the fac t s . A month later the governor sugges ted 
a compromise : that C SR buy the 1960 crop up to the q uo ta 
level at a price based on scales in the 1950-59 contract , 
and that nego tiations for the 1961  harves t  s tart irrnnediately . 
I f  within a reasonable time no agreement had been reached , 
government would ' take such s teps as it  may then consider 
necessary ' .  This was accepted by the company , but growers 
wanted cer tain points clarif ied - espe cially whether quo tas 
for 1 9 60 were to be on an area or tonnage basis . On 24 
July the Kisan Sangh and representat ives of  the Fij ian 
farmers ,  who were assi sted by J . N .  Falvey , reached a separate 
agreement wi th C SR .  Enough cane was to be harves ted in 1 9 60 
to make 199 , 000 tons o f  raw sugar , and cane left s tanding 
was to be added to the tonnage quo ta for 1961 . Under a 
compromise arrangement for det ermining quo tas , half the area 
of s tanding cane would be cut on the fir s t  round , whereas 
the second would be based on tonnage . Mills  would close on 
2 2  January 19 6 1 . O ther unions in the Federation , led by 
A . D .  Patel and S . M .  Koya ( later to be leader of the 
Oppo sition in independent Fij i ) , .  opposed the agreement . 
They wanted the s econd ro und based on acreage , and the mills 
to keep crushing t ill an equal propor t ion o f  every farmer ' s  
cane had been cut . Growers were urged not to harvest  before 
these demands had b een met . 6 9  
I t  has been alleged that a s  a prominent Guj erati , Patel 
was eager to provoke a s trike in order to increase farmers ' 
indeb tedness to Guj erat i  s torekeepers , so enhancing the 
lat ter ' s  economic and political inf luence by enabling them 
to fur ther b ind cus tomers through deb t . But s inc e the real 
interest  of s torekeepers lay in the continuation of t rade , 
which would be disrup t ed by a s tr ike , this seems a p erverse 
exp lanation of  Patel ' s  mo tives . Al terna t ively , i t  has been 
sugges ted tha t  Patel adopted a more extreme s tand than the 
Kisan Sangh because on pas t  exp erience this could be expected 
to win popular s upport and thereby aid his polit ical career . 
I t  is , indeed , hard to believe that the desire to avo id 
accusa t ions of betraying growers '  int eres ts was no t a 
cons ideration . Yet i t  mus t also be noted that differences 
between Ayodhya Prasad and Patel af ter 24 July were cons i s t­
ent wi th the traditions of  the unions they led . Excep t 
br iefly around 1950 , the Kisan Sangh has always tended to 
be  more moderate than the Maha Sangh and its allies . P rasad 
bel ieved no t only that farmers could bes t be served by co­
operat ing with CSR ,  but that their interest s  were as much 
threatened by s torekeepers and money-lenders as by the 
company . According to CSR , al though they represented only 
about 12 per cent of all growers , the mo derate stance of 
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the Fij ian associations i n  July fur ther increased the 
willingness o f  Prasad to compromise . 7 0 In contras t  was the 
Patel group which , perhaps recalling the experience o f  the 
Kisan Sangh f rom 1 9 3 7  to 194 2 , believed that through direct 
action more concess ions could be extrac ted from the company . 
It  would be interesting to know whether these conflicting 
outlooks reflected socio-economic differences between the 
farmers to whom each union appealed . 7 1  
With the failure o f  subsequent attemp ts to bring about 
a reconcilliat ion between grower s ' leaders , supporters o f  
Patel went on s trike . Yet their act ion achieved no thing . 
Af ter a meet ing with the Und er-Secretary of  State for the 
Colonies , Julian Amery , who was in F ij i as par t  of a world 
tour , on 15 October Patel and Kaya advised grower s  to harvest  
the 1960  crop under p rot est , but to p lough in ratoons and 
harvest no more cane t ill a long-term agreement with CSR 
had been r eached . Harves t ing thereaf ter cont inued as normal , 
though the advice to plough in ratoons was largely ignored . 
No concessions had been won on the tonnage quest ion nor 
on the f inal date of harvest ing . 7 2  Why , then , had the 
strike failed ?  The reason . was that CSR was in an except ion­
ally strong posi tion to wi thstand a s toppage . The previous 
year ' s harvest meant that at the end of the 1959 s eason the 
company had accumulated s tocks of 89 , 000 tons of raw sugar , 
52 , 000 more than was permitted under the ISA .  CSR had 
p lanned to ask for special p ermis s ion from the International 
Sugar Council to reduce s tocks gradually over a number of  
year s , 7 3  but the strike prov ided an opportunity to  do  this 
at once . Of course , if a large number of  grower s  was 
involved and the d ispute  lasted all season , the company 
would make a lo s s  because exist ing stocks were not enough 
to meet the whole of Fij i ' s export quota . Yet CSR was 
p repared to acc ept  thi s  to avoid conceding Patel ' s  demand 
for tonnage quo tas in 1 9 60 , which by set t ing a precedent 
might force the company s ome t ime in the futur e ,  if no t in 
1 9 6 0 , to buy more cane than it c ould mill . C SR also knew 
that it had the suppor t of government , which on 9 August  
called out  the terr itor ial army to maintain order . In  a 
brief for Amery , off icials claimed that security forces had 
l imited the burning of non-str iker s '  farms and that ' tho s e  
f ew act s  which have occurred have done very l i t t l e  damage ' .  
Though government denied it , farmer s saw the t roop s  as 
evidence of off icial backing f or the company . Moreover , 
the Gr eat Counc il of Chief s urged government to do all it 
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could to start the mills crushing , and offered Fij ian help 
to maintain law and order if neces sary . With these int erest s 
arrayed against them and the Kisan Sangh and F ij ian growers 
eager to harvest cane , it seemed to farmers that the strike 
was bound to fail and that it s only eff ect would be to reduce 
earning s f rom the 1960 crop . Consequent ly , al though Patel ' s  
extreme stand was widely respec ted ( in 1963 he won a seat in 
the Legislat ive Council ) , the posit ion of the moderates was 
strengthened by the cons iderable number of grower s  who began 
to harvest their cane . On 11 Augus t  the Labasa mill opened , 
by 9 Sep tember the other three mills had started to crush , 
and by mid-October it was clear that mo st  grower s  were 
beginning to harvest . 7 4  Amery ' s  vis it , which the Pat el 
fact ion wrongly claimed was de s igned to settle the dispute , 
provided an oppor tunity to call off  the strike with a 
minimum lo ss of  face . So it was that once again , as in 1921 
and 1943 , the strong posit ion of  C SR suppor ted in eff ec t  by 
government and the Fij ian chief s ,  cont rasted with the d is ­
unit y of farmers .  And onc e  again , a strike b y  Indian cane 
grower s was def eat ed . 
The d ispute was followed by the appointment of an 
inquiry to report on the organiza t ion of the industry , and 
to recommend how relat ions between all those engaged in it 
could be improved and how proceeds c ould be distributed in 
a fair and equitable way .  When the need f or a commis s ion 
had been first discussed with government in early 1960 , C SR 
had urged that the inquiry be headed by an economist  who 
would be qual if ied to est imate  futur e cos t s  and profits  
rather than an accountant who by training could j udge only 
past results . The company suggested Prof es sor  E . H .  Phelps 
Brown and J . R .  Hicks , academic s of high repute who were 
thought likely to be sympathetic to its  case . 7 5  I t  seems 
that CSR ' s  proposals were welcomed by the Fij i government , 
but that the Colonial Off ice was embarrassed by the forward­
nes s of the company in sugges ting names . 7 6  Off icials wanted 
an inquiry which would not greatly damage CSR ' s  interest s , 
but which would have the appearance of fairness - which 
might even dec ide aga ins t the company on mat ters of r elat ive 
detail , l ike the value of molas ses credited to the proceed s  
of sugar and the appo intment of a sugar board . A change 
in the ownership of the mills , on co-operat ive lines as 
suggested by the Patel group or through nat ionalizat ion , was 
out of the quest ion because of the co st of reimburs ing CSR7 7  
and also , one suspect s, because government found i t  convenient 
to keep the company as a buf f er between the Ind ians and 
it self . In March 1 961 one of C SR ' s  senior off icers , J .M .  
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Dixon , had a di scus sion with Maddo cks dur ing which this very 
point was made . They di scus sed the company ' s  des ire to stay 
in Fij i and , in Dixon ' s  words ,  
what the balance of power position would be if we had 
to withdraw . • •  includ ing threat of communism ,  Ind ian 
dominat ion , l it tle Cubas and Congos etc . I said we 
were a power block that many people had an int erest 
in sustaining , and we d id no t mind absorbing some of  
the  shocks that would come from both sides in such a 
situat ion , but there were limits  to what we could 
sustain , and we needed help and support . 7 8  
Bas ically , government needed a commission whose report would 
enable CSR to cont inue in the colony , but which by having 
the appearance of impart iality would be accepted by the 
growers .  The appointment of someone suggested by the company 
might def eat the second of the two aims . 
The Colonial Off ice asked S ir Malcolm Trustam Eve , 
lat er Lord Silso e , to head the inquiry . I t  is  hard t o  
imagine a p er son more representative of  t h e  English ' es tab­
lishment ' than Eve . He was a Queen ' s  Counsel , the First  
Church Estates Commi ss ioner of  the Church of England , a 
member of the Prime Minister ' s  Committee on the administra­
t ion of  Crown lands , 1955 , the Independent Chairman of the 
Cement Makers '  Federat ion , a director of the Yorkshire 
Insurance Co . Ltd , and so on . 7 9 Soon after his arrival in 
Fij i ,  Eve was ' at pains ' to tell CSR that j ust  before coming 
to the colony he had had to defend the Cement Makers ' 
Federat ion , which was a monopoly , before the Monopolies 
Commission , and that the Federat ion had revalued it s assets 
j ust before proceeding s  started . s o  Signif icantly , the 
revaluat ion of i ts assets by CSR , which also was a monopoly , 
and the eff ect of this on apparent profitab il ity were expected 
to be a maj or is sue during the f orthcoming inquiry in Fij i .  
Further , Eve gave C SR to understand that the company i tself 
was not on trial - a point with which mo st growers would have 
disagreed - and that his task was s imply to ' remove the bees 
from the bonnet s ' .  The inquiry was to be a public r elat ions 
exercise designed to improve r elat ions between the growers 
and CSR . 8 1  Apart from J . S .  Wheatley from the Colonial 
Office , Eve was assisted by an accountant , J .M .  Bennett , who 
was a partner in the London f irm o f  Barton , Mayhew and Co . 
When Bennett ' s  appointment was made , it  was not realized 
in the Colonial Of f ice that he was also a par tner in the 
Australian o f f shoo t of Barton , Mayhew and Co . ,  and that 
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among his  o ther par tners in  that f irm were some of the 
partner s in Hungerford , Spooner and Kirkhope which was 
advis ing CSR on mater ial to be presented to the Eve Commis ·­
s ion . As soon as this was discovered there was great 
consternat ion in the Colonial Office , as  also in the compan­
ies concerned , but by then it was too late to revoke the 
appo intment . 8 2  In fact , Benne tt ' s profes s ional associat ion 
with C SR was so ind ir ec t that it seems no t to have affec ted 
his att itude to the evidence present ed by the company . But 
had the associat ion become public knowledge , it would have 
undermined off icial argument s that the commis s ion was 
impart ial , and so a spec ial effort was made in Fij i to keep 
the informat ion secret . One can imagine the r eaction of  
Indians to the inquiry had the se effor t s  failed . L ike Eve , 
Bennett saw the commis s ion ' s  role as one of reconciling 
growers to C SR by p er suading the company t o  grant tho se 
demand s which would not greatly reduce its prof it s .  He 
' nodded vigorously ' when told privately by D ixon that what­
ever happened the r esult of  the  inquiry mus t  no t be to let  
Patel ' come out  on top ' 8 3  - though this was the  eventual 
resul t . However impartial they tried to be , then , the 
natural incl inat ion of Eve and Bennet t  would be to f avour 
CSR . And this they d id . 
The Eve r epor t8 4  
The commis s ion p roposed ways o f  consol idating the 
smallf arm system ,  hoping t hat this would benefi t  farmers 
but also realiz ing , no doubt , that by reducing discontent 
among grower s this would reinforce  CSR ' s  po s i tion in the 
colony . I t  recommended that smaller holding s  should be 
gradually reorganized into farms of ten to twelve acr es , 
while the amalgamat ion of t en to twelve acre units  should 
be s topped by preventing a grower from cul t ivat ing cane on 
more than one farm .  Stabil iz ing the s ize of holdings should 
enable them to serve their or iginal purpo se of supporting a 
grower and his family . It  was no t for t he sugar industry to 
solve the d if f icul t ies caused by populat ion pressur e , though 
ther e was room for a diver s if icat ion of crops in cane 
districts which might help . As the commission noted , ' Ther e 
is little mixed farming and every expert says there should 
be more . ' It  was sugges ted t hat sugar lands be planned , 
graded and licensed by government t o  remove least f er t ile 
areas from the indus try . This  would reduce demand s f rom 
those on marginal land for an increase in the price of cane . 
Then there was the quest ion o f  land tenure . The commiss ion 
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recommended that if CSR decided to sell its freeholds , they 
should no t be sold to the occupants lest grower s pledge 
their farms as secur ity aga ins t debt . Land would be accu­
mulated by creditors , who would be likely to sub-let to 
farmer s on highly unfavourable terms . The need for security 
of t enure was emphasized . Inst ead of leases being for f ixed 
t erms which mus� eventually end , the English system of annual 
tenancies was commended since it gave strong statutory pro­
tec t ion for rent and tenure to the normally good farmer 
throughout his lif e .  
This last recommendation was rej ec ted by government 
because Fij ians would have opposed any arrangement which did 
not give them an automat ic right t o  resume land after a fixed 
period , whil e  annual l eases would no t have met Indian demands 
for security of tenure . So al so , af ter some d iscus sion , the 
idea of  planning , grading and licensing cane lands was 
rej ec ted , presumably because this would have threatened the 
livelihoods of growers on marginal soil . 8 5  Enough ins ecurity 
had been caused among Indians by the sys tem of land tenure : 
the last thing anyone wanted was for t his to be increased as 
a resul t of  the program suggested by Eve . The plan to 
stab il iz e the s ize of hold ings was partly implemented . Up 
to 1973  new entrants were admit ted to the indus try only if 
they had cane growing contract s  of between ten and fifteen 
acres ; control was subsequently relaxed to encourage an 
increase in cane product ion . 8 6  CSR also began to experiment 
with crops that might be grown with cane , hoping that this 
would make control over cane produc t ion more accep table to 
farmers . Land made idle because of output restrictions might 
be able to support another crop . Yet the urgency with which 
CSR tackled the quest ion dec lined after it  became clear in 
the early 1960s , when I SA quo tas were susp ended , that 
restrictions were no longer needed . 8 7 
Ther e wer e  more direct benef its to the c ompany f rom 
o ther recommendat ions . The commission strongly advised 
against the introduct ion of  co-operative mills . I t  endor sed 
the idea being cons id ered by CSR o f  trans f erring the company ' s  
Fij i act ivities from the sugar division in Sydney to a wholly 
owned subs idiary based in Suva or Lautoka . It  sugges ted that 
eventually shares in the new c ompany should be sold to Fij i 
res idents , but not on a scale that would remove ul timate 
control from CSR . Following the commis s ion ' s  report , in 1962 
the South Pacific Sugar Mills Ltd ( SPSM) was formed with 
respons ibility for  all CSR ' s  assets in Fij i excep t land . An 
attemp t during the mid-1960s to sell shares in SPSM was not 
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a �uc cess because demand was small . 8 8  Pro spective buyers 
expected shares to yield 7� p er cent , which was considerably 
less than could be earned by lending money to members o f  
the Indian community , though of  course  risks were very 
different . The commission also recommended that the miller s ' 
power to prevent the delivery of  burnt , stale or dirty cane 
be increased . Del ivery of cane burnt without permission , 
or stale or dirty , was to be a breach o f  contract , punishable 
by loss of contrac t . There was t o  be a price reduc tion for 
burnt cane deliver ed two to seven days after harves ting , all 
burnt cane thereaf ter being r ej ec ted . As in the past , power 
would lie with the millers to determine what cane was f it 
for crushing . Desp ite oppo si tion from growers , these 
recommendat ions were incorporated in the 1961-70 contrac t .  
The po si tion of CSR was further strengthened by the 
commission ' s  support of product ion control on a tonnage 
rather than acreage basis . I t  felt that tonnage quo tas 
would be easier to enforce , noted that this was the pract ice 
of other sugar producers and po inted out that ' while growers 
are d ivided in the ir views both the mil lers and the mill 
workers strongly favour a tonnage system ' ; dur ing the 
inquiry ' s  public hear ings in Fij i the Kisan Sangh and the 
Fij ian growers had reluc tantly agreed to tonnage quo tas , 
while the Federat ion of Cane Growers had continued to argue 
for an acreage sys tem .  The commission proposed a nat ional 
basic allo tment of cane for the who le colony of 1 , 5 32 , 300 
tons , to  be d ivided among farmers according to past perform­
ance . Thi s would g ive each grower his farm basic allo tment . 
On or before 1 April each year the millers were to announce 
the national harvest quo ta o f  cane for the coming season , 
this being represented as a p ercentage o f  the nat ional basic 
allotment . The announcement was to  be approved by a Sugar 
Board created for the purpo se and composed of an Indep endent 
Chairman , Independent Vice-Cha irman and Independent Account­
ant . Af ter the announcement the nat ional harves t quo ta 
was to be divided among growers according to their farm 
basic allotments .  So if the nat ional harvest quota was 
25� per cent above the national basic allo tment , as it was 
in 1961 under provisional arrangement s agreed for that year , 
each farmer would be allowed to produce 2 5� per cent more 
cane than his farm basic allotment . Later in the year , say 
dur ing harves t ing when the size of  the crop could be 
predicted more accurately , the nat ional harvest quo ta could 
be varied so long as the Sugar Board gave consent ; but the 
commis s ion s trongly advised aga ins t reducing the quo ta 
unless there were very exceptional circums tances . This 
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rather complicated procedur e was des igned to reconc ile 
grower s to a tonnage bas is of control - the Sugar Board 
would be an independent check on the millers - and so help 
Fij i no t to exceed her expor t  quotas . But in 1961 the ISA 
quo tas were  lifted because o f  a world sugar shor tage due to 
a fall in Cuba ' s  product ion , wi th the result that the 
machinery devised by Eve was no longer required . Yet 
nat ional harvest quotas each year have cont inued to be 
declared , largely so that if p roduction controls are again 
needed a well tried sys tem will exist to enforce them . 
The commission also sugges t ed ways to set tle general 
disput es between the miller s  and the grower s . In particular 
it recommended the appo intment of a Sugar Advisory Council 
composed of the three members of the Sugar Board , two 
representatives of  government , three representatives of  the 
mill workers and f ive r epresentatives each of the millers 
and the growers ; farmers ' representatives were to be elect ed 
by the gang sirdar s . As a forum for discus sion with power 
to advise - either government or the indus try - on any mat ter 
of importanc e ,  the Council was reminiscent of the sugar 
board proposed by Shephard in 1944 . Though it s t ill opposed 
a board o f  this kind , CSR ' s  attitude had so ftened by the 
early 1960s 8 9  since it recognized that continued strong 
resistance to such a body would only alienate the growers 
and government . The commission tried to accommodate the 
company ' s  views . I t  rej ected suggest ions by the Pat el group 
and the mill worker s ' union that a sugar board have power 
to impose a solut ion if no voluntary agreement to a dispute 
could be reached . 9 0 By going for an advisory counc il instead , 
the commission ensured that if , f rom CSR ' s  view ,  the wors t  
came t o  the worst  the company would no t be  bound b y  the 
council ' s  decisions . The Sugar Advisory Council was set up 
in 1961 . It has met regularly ever since , and though there 
have been disagreements ,  apart from one mee ting 9 1  discussions 
have been of a remarkably cordial nature . It has done much 
to improve r elat ions in the industry . Coupled wi th o ther 
provisions in the Eve report for the set tlement of disput es , 
this was one reason why disagreement over the terms of a 
new contract in 1969 did not lead to another strike . The 
interes t s  of CSR were well s erved by the reduc t ion of t ension . 
There was less chanc e of production being disrup t ed by 
fric t ion between the miller s  and the growers , though differ­
ences have cont inued t o  exis t . 
The mos t  important quest ion before the commis sion was 
how to divide proceeds from the sale o f  raw sugar - an is sue 
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which has always been controversial . The commis sion was 
anxious to ob tain , as far as i t  could , an accurate estimate  
of CSR ' s prof its in  Fij i .  I t  knew that CSR , as any company , 
would try to minimize its returns so as to s trengthen its  
case  for a larger share of the  proceeds . Yet the commission 
wanted to award grower s the highest  pos s ible cane price 
consi stent with reasonable profits  for CSR . This  would help 
reduce conflic t in the indus try and be to the long-term 
advantage of the company . The diff iculty was to discover 
what profits  CSR had made and whether they were reasonable . 
Growers alleged tha t  the company had been making hidden 
profits  in Fij i ,  notably f rom tranfer pricing arrangements 
over the sale of molasses . Molasses was sold to CSR ' s  
Austral ian 4ist iller ies for conversion to indus trial alcohol . 
By selling to itself the company could arrange the transf er 
at a price below that on the open market ,  so reducing the 
sum which had to be added to the proceeds of sugar sales for 
divis ion with the grower s . I t  was claimed that the value of 
West  Indian molas ses expor t s  in 1959  were £F7 10s Od a ton , 
whereas the amount credit ed t o  Fij i under the 1950-59 
contrac t had been only 2 2 s  6d . 9 2  While no t doubt ing that 
CSR had acted in accord with the old contract , the commission 
recommended tha t  the price of molasses be raised to £2  10s Od 
a ton , as o ffered by the company during the inquiry ; but thi s  
was only half of  what the farmers had demanded . Another 
question was the amount charged by C SR for dep reciat ion . 
The company ' s  practice was to charge 4 per cent on the orig­
inal cost of f ixed assets to cover both deprec iat ion and a 
contribut ion to the cost of replacement . The argument 
centred on whe ther this was an excessive amount . Since i t  
was treated as a co st , b y  maximiz ing the charge f o r  deprecia­
t ion and replacement C SR could r educe its apparent pro fits . 
After persistent quest ioning in Sydney and some argument 
with the company , the commission decided that only 3 per 
cent should be charged to depreciat ion and the provision for 
replacement should be made af t er and not before arriving at 
pro fit s .  This was s tandard prac tice in the United Kingdom 
and best pract ice in Aus tralia . Dur ing the inquiry CSR 
had been privat ely urged by its c onsultants ,  Hungerford , 
Spooner and Kirkhope , to  adopt this cour se , and in Fij i it 
did so . 9 3 
The mat ter of depreciat ion was connected with the 
r evaluat ion in 1957  of the company ' s  f ixed assets in Fij i ,  
which grower s  rightly believed was des igned to reduce its 
percentage returns on inves tment . During the public hear­
ings , one of  the colony ' s  leading accountants who was later 
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to be the indus try ' s  Independent Accountant , R . S .  Kay , 
appeared on behalf of  the Kisan Sangh to argue agains t the 
revaluat ion . He pointed out that whereas three-fif ths o f  
a l l  the raw sugar produced b y  CSR came from i t s  Aus tralian 
mills , s ince 19 5 7  these mills had represent ed only two-f if ths 
of the cap ital tied up in the product ion of raws . If the 
Fij i mills had no t been revalued , in 1959 they would have 
been worth about one-sixth of the company ' s  total assets 
and they would have contributed j us t  over one-s ixth to the 
company ' s  total prof it s . On f igures presented to the com­
mission , Kay estimated that if CSR had paid £5 a ton for 
molasses as the Ki san Sangh demanded in future it should , 
in 1959  the company could have afforded to pay 6 4  per cent 
of the sugar proceeds to growers and charge to depreciat ion 
and replacement £5 60 , 000 , the annual amount CSR thought 
would be neces sary to cover replacement expenditure of  
£5 , 600 , 000 over the  next ten year s . Enough would have re­
mained for CSR to make a profit  before tax of about 9 per 
cent on cap ital , assuming i ts assets had no t been r evalued . 
This was being generous to the company , since Kay felt that 
£5 60 , 000 a year for depreciat ion and replacement was too 
high . 94 The argument was rej ected by the commiss ion , which 
accepted the princ iple of  the revalua t ion , though it  seems 
that Eve had some doubt as to the r eliab ility of the new 
values . He appears to have thought they were a good guide 
to replacement values , but that were probably ' much too high ' 
for deprec ia t ed present value s . In other words , the f igures 
showed what it  would cost to replace the as set s , but no t what 
the assets were wor th at current values af ter allowing for 
wear and tear . Yet as CSR ' s  consultants privately admitted , 
it would have been extraordinar ily diff icult for Eve to 
rej ect the valuat ion on these grounds because he would then 
have been setting himself up as a better exper t  than the 
Brisbane firm , A . E . Axon and As sociates , which had done the 
work . 9 5  Eve was no t prepared to do this ; nor did he have 
t ime to call for another valua t ion . 
On the bas is of the revaluation , the commission j udged 
that the 1950-5 9 price formula gave CSR an unaccep tably low 
return on inves tment . The company should be given a larger 
share of the proceeds . This conclusion was reached without 
making an independent survey of grower s ' costs . The com­
miss ion had neither the time nor the resources to do this , 
and in any case seems no t to have cons idered i t  very im­
portant . CSR was given the impres sion that the inquiry was 
more interested in the company ' s  returns than in the grow­
ers ' . 9 6  It was assumed that the industry ' s  efficiency 
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depended on CSR . Farmers would best be  served by preventing 
the company from carrying out its  veiled threat to wind down 
its operat ions in Fij i if the commission produced an un­
favourable report . 9 7  And aft er all , i t  was much easier for 
CSR to pull out o f  the indus try than it  was for the grower s .  
If  proceeds from cane were no t enough to sat isfy both parties , 
preference should be given to the millers . The commission 
devised a formula which favoured C SR . Instead o f  the com­
pany ' s  proposal that before split t ing the sugar proceeds a 
f ew cos t s  like s torage expens es be deduc ted , 30 p er cent of  
net proceeds (gross  proceeds less market ing and a few other 
expenses)  were to be allo cated to CSR to cover its  ' basic 
sugar making cos t s ' .  The balance was to be  divided , 82� per 
cent to the growers and 1 7� per cent to the millers . I t  
was suggested that approved sugar making cos t s  be  cer tified 
by the Independent Accountant each year . The formula con­
tained incentives to reduce expens es , but also provided that 
if they should exceed 30 per cent half the excess would be 
deducted from the growers '  share and half from the millers ' .  
This gave CSR some pro t ect ion agains t a rise in costs , 
s ince its overall percentage o f  net pro ceeds  would be in­
creased . So , for example , if  cos ts  were 3 0  p er cent o f  net 
proceeds the company ' s  share wo uld be 4 2 . 2  per cent , but 
if co sts  went up to 35 per cent its share would rise to 
about 44 . 3  per cent . The price formula was widely misunder­
stood by farmers who thought it  guaranteed CSR against loss . 
This was not s trictly true . The company was protected to 
a large extent but not completely . The growers ' basic share 
of 5 7 . 5 7  per cent was closer to CSR ' s  o ffer of 5 5 . 1  per cent 
of net pro ceeds than to the 64 per cent requested by the 
Ki san Sangh and the 66  2 / 3  per cent of gro s s  proceeds 
demanded by the Federat ion . I t  was also less than the 
average of 6 2 . 6  per cent of gross  proceeds farmers had 
received during the 1950-5 9 contrac t .  Moreover , though the 
formula gave C SR some pro tection against rising co sts , i t  
provided n o  such pro tect ion f o r  the growers . Understandably , 
many farmers felt aggrieved . 
The Eve inquiry had been an as tute political exercise . 
Under the guise o f  impart iality , a report which was dis­
t inctly favourable to CSR had been produced . Des pi te 
opposition from leaders of the Federation , in early 1962  
growers signed a new contract based on  the commiss ion ' s  
f indings . Later there were to be comp laints that farmers 
had been forced to do this because there was no alternative . 9 8  
Growers were f inanc ially drained and thoroughly disheart ened 
from the s tr ike two years before , which had cos t  them an 
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es timated £85 0 , 000 to £900 , 000 in lo st  income . 9 9 (CSR had 
also suffered , making a lo ss on the 1960 season . )  They were 
in no mood to s tart indus trial ac tion again . The position 
of CSR , supported by governmen t and the Fij ians , seemed 
unassailable . The implementat ion of mos t  of the Eve report  
was extremely impor tant for the sugar indus try . The method 
o f  production control , the Sugar Board and the Sugar Advis­
ory Council s t ill  exist  today . CSR ' s  continued pres ence in 
the colony - for at leas t ano ther ten years - was as sured . 
Together with the Eve repor t ,  the company ' s  efforts 
to keep its operat ions profi table brought cer ta in benef its 
to Fij i .  CSR was encouraged to increase milling capaci ty in 
the 1960s , and to use its  excep tional marke ting resour ces 
to secure for the colony acce s s  to the lucrative United 
S tates marke t ,  following the U . S .  ban on impor t s  of  Cuban 
sugar . In 1961 the company ' s  agent in Washing ton , Charles 
Brown , enlis ted the support  of Senator Hubert Hmnphrey , who 
told the Secre tary of  Agriculture that Fij i wo uld purchase 
Amer ican wheat f lour i f  it  c ould sell 15 , 000 short  tons 
of raw sugar under the U . S .  Sugar Ac t .  ' This seems to make 
sense . What ' s  being done about it? ' 1 In the event , Fij i 
was allocated a quo ta of  10 , 00 0  short  tons , though this 
was subsequently raised . At the end of  19 74 it s tood at 
51 , 82 0  shor t  tons , so that as meas ured by the volume o f  
sales tha t y ear the U . S .  was Fij i ' s  next mos t  impor tant 
market af ter Britain . 2 Yet though this enabled o ther 
people  to enter the indus try the benefits  were limi ted , for 
the colony ' s  high propensity to impor t  goods meant that 
there was li t tle spread effect in the economy f rom the 
higher earnings of the sugar indus try . There was also some 
advantage f rom the lo calizat ion of  s taf f which was continued 
by SPSM in the 1 9 60s , and which reduced the outflow of  
income from the colony ( in the form o f  savings ) .  Agains t 
this , SPSM relied heavily on adminis trative services from 
Sydney , the co s t  of which had to be met by Fij i .  The exac t 
size o f  the co s t  is no t known , but i t  is likely to have 
been a s ign ificant proport ion of the 10 per cent  of sugar 
making costs  allowed under the Eve contract for ' head 
offices ' expenses ' . 3 
Offsetting the benefi ts f rom CSR ' s defence of its  
operations were some dis t inct disadvantages . For example , 
there was the reduct ion in the number o f  field s taff  which 
was continued by SPSM .  Though one resul t  was that growers 
became more independent of field o f ficer s , ano ther was 
that the quality of extens ion work suffered . This may 
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have been one reason for the trend toward mul tiple ratooning 
and poor fertilizer applicat ion which became apparent in the 
1960s and depressed yields . And then , coming on top o f  
the division of  the indus try b etween growers and the millers , 
CSR ' s  desire to minimize expendi ture made i t  refuse to 
as sume the co s t  o f  maintaining the dra ins . 4 Drains which 
had begun to silt up in the 1950s continued to do so , so 
that by the early 1 9 70s this had become a - maj or factor 
behind the fall in cane product ion which has recently been 
o f  such concern to tho se conne cted with the indus try . Funds 
which might have been available for expenditure on drains 
if the mills had not been foreign owned were remit ted abroad . 
The loss of this income also deprived the colony of  cap i tal 
for use in a program of public works des igned to alleviate 
the problems of underemployment and growing unemployment . 
The need for many villages to have bet ter communicat ions 
with the outside world , bet ter schools , housing and so on 
to encourage a higher rate of Fij ian par tic ipat ion in the 
economy has been stressed by Fisk . 5 The spread ef fec ts o f  
this  would benefit  the Indian populat ion as wel l . 
The size of  the income CSR took out o f  Fij i as the 
result  o f  its  milling operat ions between 1 Apr il 1950 and 
31 March 196 0 is shown , if only approximately , in Tables 8 . 8  
and 8 . 9 .  Again no allowance has been made for the effects 
of transfer pricing arrangements . In particular , ' head 
office ' and ' general ' expenses , at £35 2 , 654 for the year 
ended 31 March 1960 , seem to have b een rather high ; they 
had risen by 113  per cent s ince the 1955 s eason . 6 The 
es t imate for capital expenditure is l iable to a signif icant 
margin o f  error . With these reservat ions , af ter operating 
cos ts , the payment of taxes and cap ital expenditure , the 
cash s urplus from milling was probably around £ 3 , 03 7 , 39 7 . 
If the cos t o f  l iving index for Viti Levu except Suva is  
taken as a guide , and it is as sumed that the annual rate 
of  capi tal expenditure was constant and that all outgo ings  
and receipts  were paid at the end of  the company ' s  f inancial 
years when the pr ice levels have been taken , at 1950  prices 
this was £2 , 451 , 325 . Mos t  of  this was repatria ted . So 
apart from 19 6 0  when the strike dis tor ted results  and for 
which complete figures are no t available , i t  is clear that 
in relat ion to CSR ' s  capital expendi ture and to the size of  
the economy the sums remit ted were subs tantial . 
When related to the value of  assets shown in the 
company ' s  published reports ( p lus an allowance for working 
capital and s tocks ) , f igures in conf idential profit  and 
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Table 8 . 8 
Aggregate profit from CSR ' s  sugar mills in Fij i for 
years ended 31 March 1 9 5 1  to 31 Mar ch 1960 
a Sales o f  raw sugar 
£ F 
68 , 4 35 , 14 7  
Operating cos t s : 
Direct  costs (purchase o f  cane , 
labour , e tc . )  
Overhead co stsb 
5 8 , 9 68 , 338 
2 ,  06 9 ,  9 6 2  61 , 038 , 300 
' 7 '  39 6 '  84 7 
Add mis cellaneous profits  from 
sale of molas ses , etc . c 82 0 , 1 79 
8 , 21 7 , 026 Gross  prof its  
Les s charge for depreciat ion 
and replacementd 2 , 488 , 000 
5 , 7 2 9 , 026  
1 , 8 79 , 629  
Net  profit before tax 
Less income tax 
Net profit after tax 3 , 849 ' 39 7 
Sources :  
No tes : 
Mill p rofit  and loss  accounts , Chief Acco untant , 
CSR Ltd , Sydney ; Tables in CSR F 5 . 0/ 2  and CSR 
u 3 . 0/ 3 .  
a Excludes income from the sale of s tocks held on 
31 March 1950  but includes income from sale o f  
s to cks held o n  3 1  March 1960 . Also excludes 
payment s to the Price S tab ilizat ion Fund . 
blnc ludes hurricane and earthquake damage from 
1952  to 1955 . 
cSeems also to have inc luded profits from the CSR 
s teamship operat ing between Fij i and Aus tralia . 
Excluded are profi t s  from the r ent of land , etc . 
d At 4 per cent on the value of  fixed assets , on a 
s traight line basis . Ass tlllled  is that gains / 
los ses from disposal of fixed assets are treated 
as cap ital transac tions and are excluded from 
mill prof i t  and los s  accounts . 
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loss accounts indicate that from 1950 to 1959 CSR ' s average 
annual re turn from its Fij i mills was about 7 . 5 per cent . 
This compared with the maximum of  4 . 5  per cent to 6 . 0 per 
cent charged on overdrafts by Aus tralian trading banks . 7 
Table 8 . 9 
Estimated cash f low aris ing from Fij i s ugar milling 
ac t ivities , years ended 31 March 1951  to 
31 March 196oa 
Net prof it af ter tax 
Add back allowance for depreciat ion 
and replacement 
To tal cash surplus 
Less es t imated capital exp enditureb 
Flow of  cash f rom Fij i 
£ F  
3 , 84 9 , 39 7  
2 , 488 , 000 
6 , 33 7 , 39 7  
3 , 300 , 000 
3 , 0 3 7 , 39 7  
Source s : Table 8 . 8 ;  CSR Memo . , ' Sugar in the Fij i Economy ' ,  
19 5 9 , CSR Library , 8 .  
Notes : �o t  all the cash f low would have o ccurred during 
this p er iod .  
bE s timate is based on C SR ' s  s tatement to Burns 
Commiss ion that from January 1949 to early 1959  
the company had spent £F3 . 3  million on replacing 
equipment and increasing the capacity o f  the 
mills . It is assumed that capi tal expenditure 
for the calendar years 19 49-58 was the same as 
for the financial years ended 31 March 1951 to 
31 Mar ch 1960 . The margin o f  error entailed in 
the assump t ion is unl ikely to be  grea t . Annual 
trade report s  show that f rom 1950 to 1959  the 
f . o . b .  value of import s of rail s  and acces sories , 
locomo tives and par ts , rolling s tock and par t s  
and milling equipment was £ 3 , 086 , 5 02 . Of course 
t his doe s  no t inc lude all capital imports con­
nected with s ugar , nor does it cover the co s t  of 
ins tall ing equipment . On the o ther hand , the 
category ' Milling machinery o ther than timber ' 
in the trade reports seems to include machinery 
for rice as well as sugar milling . So an es t i­
mate for capital expendi ture of £ 3 . 3m does not 
seem too unrealistic . 
2 2 1 
Expres sed in this way , the pro f it s  do not seem pa rt icularly 
large , but this was partly because the revaluat ion of asse t s  
made returns from 1957  on look unreal ist ical ly small . As 
R . S .  Kay had pointed out , if the asset s were wr itten down by 
the amount they had been revalued , in relat ion t o  CSR ' s  
other act ivit ies earnings from the colony in 1959 had made 
a reasonable contribut ion to the prof its of the company as a 
whole . Moreover ,  the c losure of Nausor i and other economy 
measures made it likely t hat CSR  would con t inue t o  obtain 
sat is fact ory result s ,  even without the Eve repor t . There 
was no need to have reduced t he farmers ' share of gross 
proceeds from sugar . Yet under the Eve con t ract CSR would 
cont inue t o  do well in Fij i ,  while growers would receive 
a smaller share of the proceed s . The int eres t s  of  the 
company had t r iumphed over those of  the farmer . 
Chapter 9 
The withdrawal o f  CSR 
In 19 7 3  CSR sold i ts sugar int erests to the newly 
independent government o f  Fij i ,  so ending a p erio d o f  over 
ninety years during which the company had played a maj or 
role in the colonial his tory o f  the country . I t  had 
dominated· the economy , wielded immense political inf luence 
and done much to shape the evolution of Fij i-Indian society . 
The decision to wi thdraw was greeted with disbe lief a t  
firs t , f o r  it  was hard t o  visualize a Fij i wi thout C SR .  
Then a s  people go t used t o  the idea , some alleged that in 
fact the decision had been taken as early as the late 19 5 0s 
when the end of  British rule in the colony was in s ight . 
I t  was sugges ted that rather than face the uncertainties o f  
dealing with a n  independent government , C S R  wanted i f  
possib le t o  dispose o f  its  assets . The problem was t o  do 
this wi thout los s  of face , in a way that would enhance its 
reputation for concern about the social responsibilities of 
bus iness . The company had to await the r ight moment , and 
this f inally came in 19 70 with the findings of an arbitra tor , 
the Rt . Hon . Lord Denning , into a dispute between SPSM and 
growers about the t erms o f  a new contrac t .  The award was so 
generous to farmers that CSR could argue - quite plausibly -
that if  i t  remained in Fij i i t  would make a loss . So , it  
has b een said , the s tage was set  for the company to announce 
the withdrawal it had p lanned for the past t en y ears . 1 The 
argument , however , does no t f i t  the facts . Between 19 61 
and 1969  SPSM invested about £7 , 000 , 000 in the colony . Mos t  
of  this was t o  replace assets , b ut a considerable amount was 
also used to increase milling capaci ty . 2 Following the 
lifting of ISA quotas , the colony ' s  expor ts ros e  from 
2 20 , 000 tons of sugar in 1962  to a record 34 3 , 000 tons in 
1968 . 3 This hardly suggests that CSR wanted to leave . 
Moreover , it  is clear from correspondence that s enior 
officers who prepared the company ' s cas e  for the Denning 
inquiry were determined to convince the commiss ion that i t  
should make an award which would enable C S R  t o  s tay in 
Fij i . 4 For the truth was that under the Eve contrac t SP SM 
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had done very well , and i f  it c ould secure a new contrac t on 
similar lines CSR had no intention of wi thdrawing . 
Discontent among farmers 
The real problem for the company was that a large 
sec t ion of the growers ,  represented by the Federa t ion , re ­
mained ut terly opposed to the Eve contract . This was not 
surprising , for during the 1960s there was little sus tained 
improvement in the economic pos i tion of farmers . It is clear 
from data in the previous chap t er that up to 1966  under­
employment in cane areas increased , and this probably con­
tinued through the res t of  the decade . The repor t of  the 
1976  census was not available at the t ime of wr it ing , 5 but 
in 1971  the Internat ional Labor Office predicted that between 
1965  and 1 9 75 the labour force in Fij i would grow by an 
average of at leas t 5 , 000 persons a year . It is unlikely 
that more than half found j ob s  in the late 1960s . The 
expansion of employment opportunit ies  was greates t in the 
public sec tor , in service indus tries and in building and 
related indus tries . Yet between 1966 and 1 9 7 2  the number 
engaged in these  act ivit ies ro se  by an annual average of 
only 1 , 881 , 6 making it almos t  certain that no t enough j obs  
were being created to absorb the  underemployed in  cane 
dis tricts . If anything , underemployment go t worse . Mean­
while , population cont inued to grow desp ite a reduct ion in 
the crude birth rate among Indians from 4 3 . 75 b irths per 
1 , 000 persons in 1960 to 30 . 4 7 ten years la ter . 7 
To some degree the problem was eased by the higher 
yields of cane obtained since the mid-1950s , which lifted 
the annual average income o f  growers  from about £ 381 between 
1950 and 1960 to around £ 54 3  over the following nine years . 
The increase , o f  course ,  would have been great er s t ill  if  
there had b een a larger rise in the price of cane . In fac t ,  
the average pr ice f rom 1961 t o  196 9 was only 2 s  2 d  a ton 
more than the average price of 68s from 1950 to 1960 . I f  
the very except ional 19 6 3  price o f  9 8 s  i s  excluded , the 
average was actually ls 4d below that paid under the previous 
contrac t . 8 With an increase in the cos t  of  living over 
the per iod o f  almost  30 per cent , in real terms the differ­
ence was even greater . 9 So i t  was easy to b lame Eve for 
not allowing growers to real ize the full b enefits of higher 
yields . More signif icant was that as a resul t of low sugar 
prices and poor weather condit ions , there was a s teady fall 
in average real farm incomes be tween 1963 and 1968 ( s ee 
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Table 9 . 1) .  Though real earnings s ub sequently recovered 
they did no t reach their 196 2 and 19 6 3  levels , so that 
except for 196 3 there was virtually no improvement in real 
incomes from cane over the period 1962  to 1969 as a whole . l o 
Yet the average real wage o f  agricultural workers had risen 
from abo ut 12s  7d a day to 1 3s lOd , an increase of  j us t  
under 1 0  per cent . Real wage rates overall had gone up by 
an average of about 9 per cent . 1 1  Consequently , by the end 
of the decade no t only did farmers s till have t he prob lem 
of suppor ting a growing populat ion , but s ince 196 3 in real 
t erms their gross  receipts from cane had declined in relation 
to the incomes of wage earners . 
Table 9 . 1 
Average annual income 2er su22l ier o f  cane , 1961-69 
Av . tonnage of  Av . price Av . income Av . income 
cane harves ted per ton per s upplier at 1961 
Season per supplier cane ( to neares t £) pr ices 
( to near-
e s t £ )  
s d 
1961 91  64  1 29 2 292  
1962 148 69  11 5 1 7  502 
1963 179 98  0 8 7 7  851 
1964 1 74 7 2  0 6 26 564  
1965  15 5 6 7  0 519 4 4 7  
1966  149  64  10 4 8 3  4 24 
196 7 14 3 6 3  4 453 384 
1968 186 65 2 6 0 6  5 01 
1969  154 6 7  3 518 402 
Source : FSC Ltd , ' Indus trial Statis t ics Summary ' , Tables 
19 (c) , 2 3 ,  55 , 61 . 
Efforts were made by government to reduce the dis­
content of  farmers . The obj ective was no t s imply to prevent 
another strike : it was also to maintain political s tab ili ty 
as the colony prepared for independence ,  which came in 19 70 . 
Two areas of maj or concern to growers were tackl ed ,  and the 
first was land tenure . 1 2  Off icials were greatly perturbed 
by the widespread insecurity among Indians caused by the 
declaration of reserve s , ye t they knew that any solut ion 
to the prob lem of land tenure mus t be accepted by the 
Fij ians . Po litical s tab ility ,  wh ich was a prerequisite for 
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economic deve lopment , depended as it always had on govern­
ment retaining the support of the Fij ian chiefs . Th is ruled 
out CSR' s suggestion that the Crown take over all nat ive 
leases in cane areas and l ease them to growers on secure 
terms . 1 3  The company would have gained by an increase in 
the general contentment of  farmers , but its long-term 
interes ts would have suf fered from the polit ical ins tability 
caused by Fij ian resentment at such a move . Wha t was needed 
was a compromise . The Burns Commission,  appointed in 19 59 
' to recommend how the development of the Colony and its 
resources should pro ceed ' ,  sugges ted that to remove Indian 
fears of displacement reserves should be declared as soon as 
po ssible . The length o f  the normal agricul tural lease 
should be increased from thirty to sixty years , while leases 
for tree crops should be for ninety-nine years ; rents should 
be revised regularly . 1 4 
Following the Burns Report , the NLTB hastened the 
declarat ion of reserves and dec ided in general to forgo its 
right under the NLTO to declare addit ional res erves as new 
needs of the Fij ian owners  aro s e . Instead , to meet its  
obligations as a trust  by ensuring tha t  suf f icient land was 
available for the rapidly growing Fij ian population , the 
Board decided to ac t under Sec t ion Nine of the Ordinance 
which empowered it  not to is s ue new leases or renew old ones 
if the land was likely ' to be required by the Fij ian owners  
for  the ir use , maintenance or support ' . 1 5  The focus of  
Indian at tention accordingly swi tched from land go ing into 
reserves to security of tenure for land lying outs ide . 
Throughout the 1950s tenants  had been concerned about the 
terms of their leases even though this had been overshadowed 
by the question of  reserves , b ut once it  was realized tha t  
the NLTB planned t o  rely o n  Section Nine where neces sary , 
though the problem of reserves remained , 1 6  the leng th of 
leases became the overriding is sue . I t  became c lear that , 
contrary to hopes expressed in 1940 , reserves would not 
necessarily ensur e  security o f  tenure on unreserved land . 
A number o f  leases were due to exp ire in the 1960s , and the 
new policy of the NLTB raised very acutely the ques t ion of 
whe ther they would be r enewed . 
Aft er consideration of the Burns Report , government 
appointed in 1961 an Agricul t ural Landlord and Tenant 
Commit tee to advise on what new legis lat ion was needed . The 
Committee discussed the recommendat ion of the Burns Connnis­
s ion that the length of  new leases be for s ixty or ninety­
nine years - a propo sal accepted by government in 196 0 and 
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suppor ted in principle by the NLTB provided the land was no t 
required for the suppor t of its  owners . The problem was 
that -the di sadvantage of a terminat ion date , however far 
off , would s till remain . To overcome this , the Commit tee 
suggested that agr icultural leases should normally be for 
thirty-year terms , with ten years as a s tatutory minimum . 
But they should also carry the automatic right o f  renewal 
unless ,  if the land was needed by the owner for his own use ,  
greater hardship would resul t  i f  the lease was renewed than 
if it was not , or unless there were grounds relat ing to the 
quality of husbandry , the needs o f  good estate management , 
etc . Tenants would have the r ight o f  appeal agains t 
decis ions no t to renew . These conditions were , however ,  
to apply only to new leases and not to exis ting ones . 1 7  
The Committee reported in 1962 . Despite dissatisfac­
t ion with some points , notably the recommendat ion that 
tribunals be appointed t o  arbitrate in disputes aris ing from 
the issue of  non-renewal no tice s , its  report was accep ted 
in principle by the NLTB . Since the recommendat ions were 
to apply merely to new l eases , the Board wo uld be lef t wi th 
ample opportunity to protect the interest s  of landowners  as 
exi s t ing leases expired . An example of the need to do this 
occurred in 1963 when land owners  at Koronubu , Ba , asked 
for the addit ional reservation of large areas lying outs ide 
reserves declared in the 1950s . The Board decided that 
its  policy o f  demarcating no new reserves , b ut app lying 
Section Nine o f  NLTO ins tead , should s tand . Two l eases 
Koronubu and Veisaru - to talling about 5 , 000 acre s and held 
by CSR which had sublet to Indian growers ,  were due to 
expire at the end of 196 5 . In co-operation wi th SPSM , the 
NLTB decided to reparcel the irregular holdings of exis ting 
tenants to make room for 187 members of the landowning unit s  
who wanted to grow cane themselves . Great care was taken to 
minimize the number of Indian growers who would have to be 
d isplaced . In the event about 7 7  of  the 287  original tenants 
could no t be accommodated on Koronubu/Veisaru though alterna­
t ive , alb eit inf erior land was found for them . 1 8 Desp ite 
the care that was taken ( according to the NLTB ) , the 
Koronubu/Veisaru scheme aroused intense Indian mis trus t . 
This was virtually the first applicat ion o f  the NLTB ' s  
dec is ion to use Section Nine where necessary . A feel ing 
of insecurity spread throughout the Ind ian community as 
tenant s wondered how many more cases like Koronubu/Veisaru 
lay in the future , how many more Indian growers would los e  
their farms . 
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Faced with this f eel ing , and concerned lest it be 
expressed in polit ical or indus trial agitation , government 
concluded that the report of the Agricultural Landlord and 
Tenant Commi ttee did no t go far enough . Its  recommendations 
should be made applicable to exist ing as well as new leases . 
Accordingly , in 1966  the Agr icultural Landlord and Tenant 
Ordinance (ALTO) was introduced and has tily pushed thro ugh 
the Legis lative Council . 1 9  Its  main effect was to override 
Section Nine of  the NLTO by giving tenants the right to two 
ten-year extensions of  their lease , unless the owner could 
prove before a tr ibunal greater hardship if the lease was 
renewed than the tenant would suffer if it was no t .  Compensa­
tion for unexhaus ted improvements made in accordance wi th 
the Ordinance had to be paid on the reversion of a lease . 
As a concession to landowners ,  the NLTB was ent itled to 
reassess rents every f ive year s . ALTO was designed to 
provide greater security for lessees who , it was hoped , 
could look forward to an effective f if ty-year term - thirty 
years plus two ten-year extensions . But this increas ed 
security was not to be at the expense of owners who genuinely 
needed the land for their own use .  Government thought that 
the Ordinance , which came into ef fect on 29  December 196 7 ,  
would provide an acceptable compromise to the seemingly 
intrac table problem of land tenur e  in Fij i .  
But government was wrong . Fij ians resented the 
Ordinance because they found it extremely difficult to prove 
greater hardship . Indians disliked it because the NLTB , 
which had no t been consulted about ALTO , reacted to the 
legislation by reducing the length of new leases on cane 
land from thirty to ten years . 2 0  The Board argued that if 
thirty-year terms were granted and tenants managed to 
obtain two ten-year extensions , it  would be fif ty years 
before a lease could revert to its  owner . ALTO stipulated 
that the minimum leng th of  new leases should be ten years . 
If  two extensions were then given , the to tal length of  the 
lease would remain as before - thirty years . This defeated 
the main obj ect ive of ALTO - to give tenants greater security 
o f  tenure . Indeed , tenant s  now had less s ecur i ty than 
before ALTO was introduced . As exist ing leases expired , 
instead of being able to hope for new ones of thirty years , 
tenant s could anticipat e terms o f  only ten years , while 
under the hardship clause there was no guarantee they would 
ge t the f irs t , let alone a second extension . They also 
had to face the prospect of rent revisions every f ive years . 
Rents for some of the o lder leases had never been reasses sed 
and had remained at r idiculously low levels . New rents , 
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fixed at a maximum of 6 p e r  cent of  the Fair Market Value 
of the land , o f ten represented a substant ial increase on 
the previous rent . On one lease - admit tedly unusual - r ent 
was raised in one j ump from £4 2  7 s  6d to £5 04 2 s  Od a year . 
I t  was not surprising that Indians were very critical of  
the new law . 2 1  
Government was also concerned about the indeb tedness  
of  cane growers . Following a visit to Fij i by B . J .  Surridge , 
an Adviser on co-opera tives in the Colonial Off ice , a survey 
of the problem was conducted in 1961 . From interviews with 
533 farmers , Shardha Nand f ound that on average they were 
indebted to the tune of 6 7 . 1  p er cent of  their gro s s  annual 
farm incomes ; the percentage was higher if he excluded the 
1 4 . 8  per cent o f  growers who were also lenders . 2 2  Comment­
ing on the s urvey , V . D .  S tace o f  the South Pacific Commission 
told the Regis trar of Co-operatives , F . E . M .  Warner , 
I cannot help wondering whe ther hopeless indebt edness 
of  a peasant farming community could be an important 
factor in turning natural ' conserva t ives ' into 
willing ' revolutionaries ' when provocat ion o ccurs  as 
it did in Fij i dur ing the campaign f in 1960] agains t 
the CSR Company . 
The desir e  to maintain s tab ility in the s ugar industry was 
a maj or reason for official interest  in Indian indebtedness . 
I t  was tho ught that if money-lenders and s torekeepers co uld 
be replaced by a cheaper source of credit the real incomes 
of growers would rise , so increasing their sense of well­
being . 
The long-term obj ective of  the Co-operat ives Department 
was to introduce a Debtors Relief Ordinance on the lines of 
l egislat ion in Cyprus . This would involve the creation of 
a Debt Settlement Tribunal to dec ide the amount s  owed by 
each debtor and to recommend the per io d  over which deb ts  
be repaid . The Tribunal would be able to  arrange for  a 
f ixed percentage of a grower ' s  proceeds to be spent on farm 
and household requirements , the balance accruing to his 
creditors . Farmers would then have a procedure by which to 
escape from high cos t debts . Yet before doing this , an 
alternative and cheaper supply of credit  had to be made 
available to prevent farmers again turning to traditional 
sources .  So in the early 19 60s co-operat ive credit  so c ie ties 
were formed to encourage thrift  among their members and to 
make advances to thos e  who had saved . At f ir s t  members 
had unlimited liability and were expec ted to build up 
savings by regular monthly ' recurr ing ' depos its , but this 
was hopeless for cane growers who were paid in three or 
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four ins talments at widely spaced intervals during the year . 
Inst ead , the Department encouraged credit societ ies  of  
l imit ed liab ility with savings based on shares rather than 
deposits . In 1968 legislat ion was passed to encourage 
farmers to make regular ass ignments of up to £20 a year for 
the purchase  o f  shares .  Excep t  for sums owed to government 
or a landlord for rent , these ass ignment s were to have 
pr iority over any o ther securities  which might have existed 
at the t ime of  making the assignment . By 19 69 , 129 credit 
societies had been formed wi th 1 , 50 0  members , and at their 
apex had been estab lished the Agricultural Credi t Co-opera­
t ive Associat ion Ltd (ACCA) . Beside supervising the 
societ ies , the ACCA was to ob tain funds from outside ins ti­
tutions and on-lend to the co-operatives , using as security 
par t o f  their members ' assignments . However , credit 
societies alone were no t enough . The provi sion o f  cheap 
credit had to go hand in hand with the provis ion of  cheap 
goods , o therwise its  benefits  would be was ted . Consequently , 
in the late 1 96 0s the f ormat ion of  consumer co-operatives 
was encouraged , the idea being that they would sell goods 
on credit advanced from the ACCA . It  was expected that 
prices would be lower than at o ther re tailers b ecause credit 
would be cheaper . Prof its  would be dis tribut ed among 
members , who would also belong to credit societies . 2 3 
In 1969 Vij ay R .  S ingh , Minis ter o f  Commerce , Indus­
tries and Co-operat ives , proposed a major assault  on Indian 
indebtedness . As a member o f  the Alliance Par ty , which 
sought to win Indian support through the Kisan Sangh , it  
was na tural that he  should take up the ques t ion ; for  years 
the Kisan Sangh had blamed Guj erati  s torekeepers for the 
f inanc ial plight of growers .  S ingh propos ed that the 
capital available to the ACCA be increased by trans ferring 
the ass ets  of the Sugar Price S tabi lizat ion Fund Board , 
which had accumulated s ince 194 7 and had never been used 
for their orig inal purpose of s tabiliz ing the pr ice of 
sugar . Though af ter 1962  par t of the f und had been dis­
tributed in the form o f  capital grants to farmers and CSR , 
at  the end o f  1968 the Board ' s  assets totalled £3 , 242 , 4 7 3 . 24 
At the same t ime as these  assets were trans ferred to the 
ACCA , Deb tors Rel ief legislat ion would be introduced to help 
growers repay their existing debts . S ingh argued tha t  low 
incomes between 196 3 and 1968 had forced growers to reduce 
their expenditure . Now , with the price of s ugar ris ing , 
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the price of cane would go up too . If they could be 
persuaded to limit their outgoings to levels in the mid-
1960s , farmers would be able to liquidate their deb ts with 
relative ease . They could then turn to an expanded ACCA 
for cheaper credit and to consumer co-operat ives for goods . 
In November 1969  the Council o f  Minis ters authorized Singh 
to approach the Secretary of S tate on these lines , but before 
discus sions could reach an advanced s tage the report of the 
Denning arbitration was published and accepted . It contained 
a recommendat ion that the Sugar Price Stabilizat ion Fund be 
used to s tabilize the price of cane . 2 5  With this so urce 
of f inance no longer available , Singh ' s  plan for dealing with 
Indian indeb tedness was dropped . 
It  is mos t  unlikely that the s cheme would have 
succeeded . The parochialism o f  credit societies was a b ig 
problem .  They of  ten wanted to use ass ignments for the ir 
own purposes rather than make them over to the ACCA . More 
important was the threat posed to vest ed interes ts . S to re­
keepers and the like , who were well qualified f rom their 
business experience to assume po sit ions of leadership in 
the co-operative movement ,  were those who would suffer mo s t  
if the movement succeeded . Their lack of  invo lvement meant 
that co-operatives were hams trung by a sho rtage o f  goo d  
leaders ,  and were often badly managed . The failure o f  many 
credit  societies was attributed to poor leadership as much as 
to anything . In addition , there were cases - i t  is  diffi­
cult to know how many - of storekeepers threatening to 
foreclos e  on deb ts if their clients j oined co-operatives . 
Even if there was no overt threat , heavily indebted farmers 
were unlikely to r isk antagonizing their creditors . The 
maj or problem ,  though , was that credit and consumer 
soc ieties did not mee t  the needs of ' f inancially ineff icient ' 
farmers - tho s e  who were leas t able to convert the f inancial 
resources available to t hem (mainly from cane) into a cash 
surplus at the end of the year ; they were normally growers 
whos e  annual receipt s  were low . 2 6 There is some evidence 
that high income farmer s tended to belong to credit co­
operatives , whereas those  on low incomes did not . 2 7  The 
real problem was not so much to increase the s upply o f  
credit , which was already quite plentiful , a s  t o  improve 
the credit-worthiness o f  the f inancially inefficient farmer . 
A reduct ion in the cos t  of  his credit would increase his 
cash surplus at the end of  the year . In 19 70 Barry Shaw 
found , not surprisingly , that the cos t  o f  credit to the 
f inancially eff icient grower was cons iderably lower than 
for the one who was less efficient and therefore les s  able 
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to repay . Thus the financ ially inefficient farme r was 
f ac e d  with the rather vicious c ircle whereby the expens e 
of  borrowing reduced his annual cash surplus from cane , 
which reduced his credit-worthiness s t ill fur ther , so in­
creasing the co s t  of credit for the following year , reducing 
his annual cash surplus and so on . 2 8  Shaw sugges ted ways 
to minimize  the expenditure of such persons so as to increase 
the ir surplus . They should be encouraged , for example , to 
grow more food instead of  relying on purchases at the market 
or the s to re . 2 9  He might also have added , as growers have 
o ften argued , that an increase in the real price of cane 
would be likely to help farmers heavily in debt . 3 0  In 
other words , by concentrat ing on the supply of credit the 
Co-operat ives Department was ignoring the main problem ,  
which was the price paid for cane . 
By the late 1960s , then , government effor ts to appease 
growers by tackling the ques t ions of  land tenure and indeb ted­
ness had failed . And s ince 19 6 3  there had been little over­
all improvement , if any , in the economic position of farmers . 
So as nego tiat ions began for a new contrac t to run from 19 70 
to 19 79 , it  seemed that once again there might be a confronta­
tion between the growers and the miller s . 
The withdrawal of  CSR 
Yet though eager as ever to win concessions for th eir 
members , union l eaders were reluctant to call a s trike . 
Perhaps one reason for this was the failure o f  pas t  s toppages . 
Growers had won virtually no thing from their act ions in 194 3 
and 1960 . A . D .  Pa tel had been involved on bo th o ccas ions , 
and it is possible that this inf luenced him in 1968-69 . 
True , the adoption of a rela t ively extreme position in the 
pas t had advanced his political career , but the situat ion 
in the late 1960s was different . Patel was now a mature , 
well es tablished polit ician ,  and widely respec ted . The 
Federation Par ty , headed by him and based on the Federation 
of  Cane Growers minus the Ki san Sangh and the Fij ian farmers , 
had won a victory in the 1968 by-elec t ions fo r nine Indian 
communal seat s . I t  had won all the seats against its 
Alliance opponents with an increased share o f  the vote . 
With the party ' s  ascendancy in the Indian community b eyond 
doub t ,  there was li ttle political  mileage to be gained 
from a militant approach to nego tiations for a new cane 
contract .  Indeed , given its inuned iate political obj ec t ives , 
such an approach would have been counter-productive . The 
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Federation was campaigning for  a rap id transfer of power 
with one man one vo te on a �ommon elec toral ro ll . Fearing 
Indian dominat ion , many Fij ians were opposed to ear ly inde­
pendence on any terms , while the overwhelming maj ority o f  
them, a s  well a s  o f  E uropeans , wa n t e d  th e re t e n tion o f  t he 
communal vo t ing sys tem .  In three centres the outcome o f  
the by-elec tions had led to mas s  meetings at  which Fij ians 
had called for the depor tat ion of Indians and the use of 
violence to pro tect Fij ian rights . In one area , twenty-one 
Fij ians had been charged with rio t ing and assaulting Indians . 
If the Federat ion was to get independence soon and a common 
roll system ,  it needed to allay the fears of the Fij ian and 
European communi tie s . A s trike in the sugar indus try would 
have had the exac t opposite effect . 3 1  
The Sugar Indus try Ordinance o f  196 1 ,  based on the 
Eve Report , had laid down a pro cedure for nego tiating a new 
contrac t when the existing one expired . Accordingly , in 
1968 dis cuss ions began under the auspices  of the Sugar 
Advisory Counc il . The Kisan Sangh and the Federat ion sub ­
mit t ed separate draf t contracts which , though different in 
impor tant respect s , were mainly des igned to increase growers ' 
income from cane . The key ques t ion was the pric e . The Kisan 
Sangh sugges ted that gros s  pro ceeds from sugar be split 
7 0 : 30 per cent in favour of  the growers .  The Federation 
came up with a more radical propo sal - that farmers be  
guaranteed £5 a ton of  cane with a bonus of 2s  6d for  every 
£1 by which the average pr ice of  raw sugar ( including 
mo lasses)  exceeded £49 ; the average cane price from 1961 
to 1969  had been £ 3 10s 2d . 3 2  Talks cont inued into 1969 
but without much progress . Then in lat e  Mar ch or early 
April the Independent Chairman , Mr Jus tice C . C .  Marsack , 
was approached by two representatives o f  the growers qui te 
separately and apparently without prior contact between 
them . They said that what  worried farmers was the nature of 
the Eve price formula , which seemed to guarantee the millers 
agains t loss but no t the growers . If the formula could be 
reduced to simple terms , say a s traight percen tage split 
of the proceeds , and a few minor conc es s ions be  made on 
o ther points , it might be pos s ible to produce a cont rac t 
acceptable to farmers . Marsack urged SPSM to cons i der a 
percentage arrangement based on the results  of  the Eve 
formula s ince 196 2 , which had worked out at about 60 per 
cent to the growers and 40 per cent to the millers . Because 
of the growers ' ins istence that provis ion be made for the 
payment of their expenses , the split might have to b e  
' camouf laged ' b y  giving the millers , say , 3 0  per cent o f  the 
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proceeds to cover their expenses , growers 30 per cent to 
cover theirs , and dividing the res t 75 per cent to farmers 
and 2 5  per cent to SPSM . ' The very positive individual 
opinions expressed by the two growers ' repre sentatives ' 
convinced Marsack that this was an idea wor th pursuing . 3 3  
The suggest ion was rej ected by SPSM ,  which refused to 
make any maj or concessions during the nego tiat ions . Apar t 
from incent ives to reduce cos ts  built into the Eve contrac t ,  
under the price formula an increase in certified sugar 
making co sts  above 30 per cent of sugar pro ceeds was to 
be deduc ted equally from the millers ' income and the growers ' ,  
so giving the company some insurance aga inst a rise in co sts . 
The s traight percentage sp lit sugges ted by Marsack,  however 
well disguised , would have removed this insurance at a t ime 
when its  impor tance to the company was greater than ever . 
Labour co sts  had gone up considerab ly , from a daily average 
of 19s  4d per employee in 1 9 61 to 2 7 s  7d in 196 8 . 3 4 Only 
par t of the increase was off  set by an expansion of output 
which might o therwise have reduced unit co sts . 3 5  Wi th 
the s igning of a new Int ernational Sugar Agreement in 1968 , 
there was no guarantee that another s imilar expans ion would 
be pos s ible in future . , Yet it seemed likely that wages would 
continue to rise , especially if an ind epend ent government 
had to use higher wages to maintain po li tical stability . 
Uni t cos ts  might es calate more sharply than ever before . 
In shor t ,  uncertainty about the future increased the r isks 
of op erat ing in Fij i , and the Eve formula provided a measure 
of s ecurity against these  risks . 
The rigid s tand of S PSM , ac ting on ins truc t ions from 
CSR , ruled out a nego tia ted settlement . The alternat ive 
was to go to arb itration , as provided for in the 1961 
Ordinance . The resul t  of  arbitration wo uld be considered 
a triumph for the growers . This was because government did 
no t keep control of the situat ion as it  had in 19 60-61 . 
Ins tead of  appointing a man l ike Eve , who could be rel ied 
upon to produce a repor t  reasonab ly favo urable to the 
company , the Rt . Hon . Lord Denning , Mas t er of the Ro lls , 
was asked to adj udicate . Now Denning ' s  reputat ion is that 
of a j udge who is more willing to create law , perhaps almo st 
irrespec tive of  precedent , than are many of  his colleagues . 
In a collec t ion of addresses delivered in 1954 and 1955 , 
Denning criticised j udges and advocates who were ' no t  
concerned with the mo rali ty or j ustice of the law but only 
with the int erpretation of it and its  enfor cement ' .  He 
pointed out : 
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It is the lawyers  who have made the law what i t  is . 
Mos t  of our law ,  as they wi ll tell you ,  is j udge-made 
law . The res t of it is S ta tute law but that is 
draf ted by lawyers and interpreted by lawyers , and , 
as of ten as no t ,  it  is in the lawyers ' part of i t  
that inj ustices occur . They canno t therefore escape 
their respons ibility . The legal pro fes sion , by its  
exponents in days pas t o r  in days present , mus t account 
for every inj ustice done in the name of the law . Yet 
they do not let it  tro uble them over-much . 3 6  
Exc ep t  f o r  a few matter s  of  detail , the sugar industry 
dispute did not entail ques t ions o f  law . But Denning ' s  
inclinat ion as a j udge to give priority to j ustice over legal 
precedent made it likely that in draf ting his award he would 
no t feel bound by the results o f  previous inquiries . If  
he  felt  it  was unfair , he  would be more willing , perhaps , 
than many o ther lawyers to abandon the Eve contract . 
And his understanding o f  what was j us t  in the Fij i 
context was not l ikely to b e  sympathetic to CSR . In the 
same collect ion of addre s ses , Denning gave examp les of  the 
way that freedom of contrac t had come to be abused . ' The 
thing to not ice in all these cases is that it is all a very 
one-s ided affair . The companies impose terms which the 
cus tomer has no opportunity of accep t ing or rej ect ing . He 
is b ound whether he likes i t  o r  not .  ' 3 7  Despi te s uperficial 
differences - growers were s uppliers rath er than cus t omers 
o f  SPSM - the examples were similar t o  the s itua t ion in 
Fij i .  If  growers wanted to sell cane , they had to accep t 
the condit ions laid down by SPSM ;  there was no o ther mil ler 
to whom they could turn . Denning also dis cussed freedom o f  
association . Though he emphas ized that trade unions o ught 
no t to infr inge fundamental right s of  the individual , he 
said : 
If  men are ever to be abl e  to break the bonds o f  
oppress ion or s ervi tude , they must b e  free t o  meet 
and dis cus s their grievances and to work out in 
unison a plan o f  action to set things right • • •  men 
mus t be able to form themselves into trade unions to 
protect  their working condit ions . 3 8  
Employers should also have the r ight o f  assoc iation , but 
this r ight was o f ten abused . Denning highlighted ways in 
which companies combine to manipulat e  pr ices to their 
advantage b ut no t to that of  the public . He was more severe 
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in his cr iticism of  such prac t ices than of  the public ill 
effects of trade union ac tivi ties , though some of his 
j udgments in the 1 9 70s indicate a great er and more recent 
concern about the latter . 3 9  So it  was clear that if Denning 
came to Fij i his sympathies wo uld no t automat ically lie 
with CSR ,  which had a monopoly of  milling in the colony . 
His outlook was in s tark contras t to Eve who , as chairman o f  
the Cement Makers '  Federation , was involved i n  a type o f  
organization that Denning dis liked . 
Why , then , was Denning s elected? Af ter all , his views 
were well known in legal circles , and under the Ordinance 
the appo intment of  an arb itrator was in the hands of  th e 
Chief Justice . Some have said tha t CSR engineered Denning ' s  
select ion , knowing that he would be likely to decide agains t 
the company and so provide the long awai ted chance to 
withdraw . The sugges t ion would have delighted Machiavel li , 
but is hard to square with the time and money SP SM spent on 
trying to p ersuade Denning to accep t it s case . What actually 
happened was that the Chief Justice o ffered growers a selec­
t ion of name s and A . D .  Patel , in the belief tha t  Denning 
would be the mos t  sympathetic to farmers ,  chose him . 4 0 SPSM 
could hardly have opposed the choice , for what more p res tig­
ious person was there to arb itrate than the Mas ter of th e 
Rolls ? The decision to o f fer growers a cho ice , inc luding 
Denning , was in some ways surpris ing , as the las t thing 
officials wanted was that the award of the arib trator should 
force CSR to leave the colony . Government was trying to 
promo te economic development through the at tract ion of 
private capital ; 4 1 the depar t ure of CSR would work in the 
exact opposite direct ion . Ye t it seems that officials mis­
j udged the posi tion . They overrated the possib ility of 
disrupt ion in the indus try , and in an attemp t to prevent it 
by persuading growers to accep t arbitration , decided to offer 
them a cho ice of  names . It  wo uld be hard for growers to 
rej ect the award of their own nominee . But in do ing this , 
and including Denning on the li st , government took a risk . 
Though no one could have predicted it for sure , there was 
the possib ility that Denning woul d s ide with the growers .  
In allowing this risk to be taken , government made a b ig 
political mi stake . 
Perhaps officials hoped that the appo intment of Mr 
Rob ert McNe il , former President of  the Inst itute o f  Char tered 
Accountants , as the accountant advising Denning would help 
prevent the j udge from making an award which would be un­
acceptable to C SR . McNeil ' s  role - or lack o f  it - may 
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have b een crucial , for Denning does not seem to have had t ime 
to examine in detail the extensive financ ial evidence pre­
sented by SP SM . Af ter arriving in Fij i ,  Denning told 
advocates of the main parties to the disput e tha t he was in 
the colony during his holidays , and that he wanted to 
complete the hearings in abo ut three weeks because he had 
to get back to London where work was piling up . 4 2  He lef t 
much of the de tailed dis cus s ions on the company ' s  financial 
s tatements to McNeil , who produced two provis ional reports , 
dated 11 and 13 September , while s t ill in Fij i .  The f inal 
repor t was to be prepared when he returned home . But within 
a month of leaving the colony , McNe il died . In his award 
Denning said o f  McNeil , ' Before his death he made a f ull 
report which has been of great value to me . ' 4 3 Yet i t  is 
hard to know how McNeil could have had time to do this . 
Before his depart ure he told s everal people in Fij i that 
as soon as he reached Europe he had about one week ' s  work to 
do in Brus sels , fo llowed by ' some days ' work ' in Sussex,  
af ter which he would be working for a for tnight on the 
cont inent . It was at the end of this fortnight that he died . 
There was very lit tle t ime for him to have produced a f inal 
repor t for Denning . The ' full repor t ' mus t have been 
McNeil ' s  two provis ional s tatements . 
The errors contained in the award , which were more 
numerous than one would expect from a j udge of such s tanding , 
sugges t that Denning was handicapped by not being able to 
discus s more fully his conclus ions wi th McNeil . For examp le , 
Denning s tated that in certifying sugar making cos t s  the 
Independent Accountant had made ' no check on whether a 
par ticular item of work was entered as s lack season mainten­
ance , or as capital expansion ' .  The result was tha t ' co s t s  
were cer tif ied at a higher figure than they should have 
been ' . 4 4  This was wrong . The Independent Accountant had 
paid clo se  attent ion to this very ques t ion . He had b een 
told by McNeil that the miller s ' books were admirably kep t  
and were not open t o  ques t ion . No crit icism o f  the way 
sugar making cos t s  had been certif ied had been made in 
McNeil ' s  provisional reports to Denning . 4 5  Denning made 
o ther mi stakes , and they have been fully set out by CSR . 4 6  
They might no t have been made if McNeil had been alive when 
Denning wro te his award .  More impor tant , the award might 
no t have been so generous to growers . From what he said 
in Fij i ,  C SR is  convinced that McNeil was far more sympath­
etic to the company than Denning proved to be . 
Unlike the Eve Report , Denning ' s  award was no t 
designed to help the exist ing struc ture of the indus try 
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foreign-owned mills versus grower s - work more smoothly . 
Rather , it was an exp re ssion of his view of j ustice as it 
applied to Fij i .  Toward the end of  his award Denning wrote : 
If I have erred at a ll , I think it wil l be because I 
have been too favourable to the growers . So much so 
that the millers  may say that their share does no t 
leave them enough to  maint ain and modernise the mills 
and the transport system as they ought , or to give a 
reasonable return upon capital . But I would remind 
them that they have had a good inning s over the last 
eight years . • .  they have had a good reward . They 
have not gone shor t .  But the growers have . 4 7  
Denning sensed t hat growers had had a raw deal , and he 
want ed to right the situat ion desp it e  CSR ' s  pred ict ion , 
which formed the bulk of i ts evidence ,  that  it would be 
unable to op erat e prof itably in Fij i if he did . This 
contrasted with Eve , who had f elt  that CSR wa s having a bad 
t ime and had tried to do j u st ic e to the miller s  despi te 
growers '  claims that they would suff er an inj ust ice as a 
result . Evident ly there was not enough room t o  accommodat e 
the interest s of both part ies . Denning may have realized 
this , as some off ic ials later susp ec t ed . Instead of  adding 
another shor t -t erm answer to the ones that had gone before , 
p erhaps Denning p ref erred to  promote  the conf lict in order 
to hast en a long-t erm solut ion . 4 8  What ever t he mot ivat ion , 
j us t  as the Eve Report had been an expression of suppor t  
f o r  privat e ent erprise , s o  Denning ' s  award reflected a 
sympathy f or the ind iv idual when faced by powerful monopoly 
concerns . 
Denning had been appo inted on 2 2  July 1969 , and had 
held public hearing s  dur ing Augus t  and September . Apart 
from the mill er s , the Federat ion of Cane Growers had 
appeared before him , as had the Alliance Cane Contract 
Commit tee represent ing the Kisan Sangh and the Fij ian farmers .  
The Alliance had wanted a bet t er deal for grower s , but no t 
one that would be unfair to SPSM . The Federat ion , which was 
less concerned about the futur e of SPSM , had demanded an 
even great er improvement in t he farmer s '  lot than had the 
All ianc e . The award was published in January 1 9 7 0 .  I t s  
chief provision was t hat the gross proceeds of sugar should 
be divided 65 : 35 in favour of the grower s .  This was about 
5 p er cent more than the weight ed average split from the 
operat ion of the Eve formula over the p er iod 1 9 62 to  1968 . 
Denning also declared t hat the miller s  should guarant ee 
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farmer s a minimum price of $ 7 . 7 5 ( £3 17 s 6d ) per ton of 
cane . The weight ed average pric e  for the 1962  to 1969  
seasons had been $7 . 08 (about £3  10s lOs) . 4 9 If in a 
particul ar year the d ivi sion of proceeds meant that grower s 
would receive less than $ 7 . 7 5 ,  assets of the Sugar Price 
Stab il iz at ion Fund Board should be us ed to make up the 
differenc e .  Ultimat ely , however , it was the miller s who 
would guarantee the minimum p rice . 5 0  C SR was dismayed by 
the award - no t only by the pr ic e  formula , but by critic isms 
of the company contained in it . CSR j udged that on the 
basis  of  the award and the exist ing pr ice of raw sugar , 
SP SM would no t be able to make a prof it . The sharp rise in 
sugar prices in the early 1 9 7 0 s  was not expect ed . The 
c ompany had var ious alternat ives . It  could refuse to accept 
the award , but this might l ead to a maj o r  c onfrontat ion with 
grower s and sour it s relat ionship with them for year s to 
come . 5 1  Or SPSM could accept the award and apply immed iat ely 
under the 1961 Ordinance for a var iat ion in the contrac t .  
But under the t erms of the Ord inance , SP SM would need to 
show that there had been a mat er ial change in c ircumstances 
sinc e the award had been made . This would be very dif f i­
cult to prove . 52  Inst ead , C SR adopt ed the third course .  
It accepted the award , but announced that af t er two year s 
it would dispose of SPSM ' s asset s . 
Sinc e no private int eres t s  were willing to buy , it  
was up to the newly indep endent government of Fij i to 
acquire SPSM . Aft er prolonged negotiat ions , government 
agreed to take over all C SR ' s  sugar assets in Fij i ,  includ ing 
land , on 1 April 1973 , af ter which C SR would supply manager­
ial and technical staff pend ing local izat ion and arrange 
the sale of sugar and molas ses t ill Fij i took this over 
her s elf . The cost of these services , which represent ed a 
cont inuing though probably a r elat ively small income drain 
on the country , was to be met by SP SM ' s  succes sor . Mo st  
have now been phased out . 53  The  st icking point in  negot ia­
t ions was the price to be paid for the mills and transpor t 
equ ipment . C SR was at a disadvantage . Having said i t  could 
no t make an adequat e pr of it in Fij i ,  and in the absence 
of a second-hand market for most of its  assets , it was hard 
to show that they were wo rth more than their scrap value . 
On the other hand , government was also at a disadvantage .  
Since it was seeking privat e capital from abroad , it dared 
not r isk scaring investors by an arrangement that CSR 
might lat er dub as unfair . Eventually i t  was agreed that 
SPSM should be bought for $ 10 million (£ 5 million) . and 
CSR ' s  landholdings for $3� million ( £1 3/4  mill ion) . Half 
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the cost was to be f inanced by a loan from CSR in the f orm 
of debentures which were lat er sold to some of the Aus t ­
ralian banks , and half was paid for out of general revenue . 
At one po int Fij i asked the Aust ralian government for a 
loan , but this was refused on the gr ounds tha t  it might set 
a prec edent if an independent Papua New Guinea were to 
acquire the assets of Austral ian companies . 
The $ 10 million for fixed assets except land was 
much less than the $ 18 mill ion CSR had originally asked for . 
It was also less than the $11 to $12  million valuation put 
on the assets by Naha Singh Jain , an indep end ent asses sor 
hired by the Fij i government . 5 4  Stil l , it was more than 
the company might have received if there had been less 
concern about the eff ect of the nego tiat ions on pr ivate 
inves tors . CSR did not do too badly . In fact , when taken 
with the resul t s  of it s milling operat ions in Fij i s ince 
1960 , the company had done quite well . Its ant ic ipated 
losses in the early 1 9 7 0s did no t mater ialize becaus e raw 
sugar prices were higher than exp ected . From SPSM ' s  Annual 
Reports ,  for the years ended 31 December 1962  to 31 March 
1 9 7 0  the company ' s  net pro f it s  af ter tax represented an 
annual average return of  11 . 02 per cent on the paid up 
value of i ts shares . Over the next thr ee years , when the 
Denning award was in force , t he return fell to 6 . 19 per cent . 
Overall ,  from 1 962  to 1 9 7 3 , annual returns averaged 9 . 7  
per cent . This was mor e than the Aus tralian banks ' over­
draft rate , which averaged around 7 . 5 per cent . S S  Table 9 . 2  
shows that C SR ' s  surplus of  receipts  over exp enditure for 
the year s ended 31 December 1961  to 31 March 1 9 7 3  was an 
estima ted £10 , 6 72 , 4 86 (about $ 21 million) . Assuming away 
the 1969  change in the method of calculat ing the consumer 
price index , and assuming that the annual rate of capital 
expenditure from 1962  to 1967  was constant 5 6  and that all 
outgoings and receip t s  were paid at the end of the company ' s  
financ ial year s when price levels have been taken , at March 
1960  prices this was £7 , 3 7 2 , 55 4  (about $15  million) . No 
allowance has been made for any trans fer pr icing arrangement s ,  
nor for the prof i t s  - which appar ent ly were qui te large -
on non sugar activit ies . But j ust taking the cash surplus 
from sugar product ion and from the sale of f ixed assets 
except land , it is c lear that CSR ' s  net receip ts were 
cons iderable . Though the size of  i ts returns in the early 
19 60s encouraged an expansion of milling capac ity to the 
benefit of tho s e  who became farmers for the f irst t ime , 
the repatr iat ion of prof its meant that the surplus was 
not available for investment locally . 
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Table 9 . 2  
Estimated cash flow ar is ing from Fij i sugar mill ing 
act ivit ies for year s end ed 31  December 1961 
\ b Net prof  its  after tax 
Add back depreciat ionc 
to 31 March 1 9 7 3a 
Total income d Add proceeds from sale of assets  exc ep t land 
£ F  
9 , 94 3 , 2 94 
5 , 61 3 , 3 74 
1 5 , 55 6 , 6 68 
5 , 000 , 000 
L · 1 d .  e ess cap ita expen 1ture 
2 0 , 5 5 6 , 668 
9 , 884 , 182 
Cash surplus available for repatr iat ion 10 , 6 7 2 , 486  
Sources :  Colonial Sugar Ref ining Co . Ltd , Fiji Sugar Mi ll­
ing Division , Profit & Loss Statement for year 
ended 31 December , 1 961 , South Pac if ic Sugar Mills , 
Annual Report of Directors for year ended 31  Decem­
ber 1 962 ; South Pac ifi� Sugar Mills _ Ltd , Directors ' 
Reports for years ended 31 March 1964 to 31 March 
1973 ; Schedule 1 ,  Docwnents submitted by SPSM , 
vol . 4 ;  Uni ted Nat ions Development Advisory Team , 
Report to The Independent Chairman on a study of 
the Fiji Sugar Indus try 1 9 74 , 128 . 
No tes : aNo t all the cash flow would have occurred dur ing 
this per iod . 
bBecause of changes in method s of presenting SP SM ' s  
accounts , it is impos sible to show manufactur ing 
co st s , etc . as separate items . No allowance has 
been made for any transfer pric ing arrangement s .  
cCalculat ed at 3 per cent of fixed as sets  ( less  
land ) shown in the company ' s  annual statement s .  
dLand is excluded because prof  its  from the leas ing 
of land , yaqara , etc . are excluded . 
e
Cap ital exp endit ur e in the year ended 31 December 
1961 is est imat ed at the average of cap ital 
expenditure over the rest of the period for which 
figur es are availab le . 
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The Eve and Denning reports could not have been more 
diff erent . Yet both had advantages for CSR . Eve enab led 
the company to accumulate a large surplus from Fij i :  
Denning prec ipitated a wi thdrawal that proved to be on 
quite favourable terms . It is likely that had CSR stayed 
in Fij i the polit ical climate would have made life increas ­
ingly hard for t he company , that it would have found it self 
in conflict no t only with the growers but more frequently 
than in the past also with government ,  and that eventually 
it would have been forced to leave on terms less favourable 
than those obtained in 1 9 7 3 . Many in CSR now look back wi th 
r elief , mixed with some regret , that the company pulled out 
when it did , enabl ing proceeds from the sale to be inves ted 
in Aus tralia where risks are less . From CSR ' s  view ,  there 
could have been f ew better moments to leave . 
The Fij i Sugar Corporation 
SPSM was replaced by the Fij i Sugar Corporation (FSC) , 
whose  first Chief Execut ive was Mr Gwyn Bowen-Jones ,  former 
Managing Director of Bookers McConnell Ltd in Guyana . 
Naturally there are contras t s  between SPSM and FSC . The 
local izat ion of staff has been sp eeded up despite a shortage 
of exper ienced men , and management t echniques current in 
Europe and Nor th Amer ica have been introduced . Bowen-Jones ' s  
experience in overseas management was valued by CSR , which 
on several occasions sought his advice on the administrative 
r eorganizat ion of the company ini tiat ed by its General 
Manager , Mr Go rdon Jackson 5 7  - a neat rever sal of Fij i ' s  
normally dependent relat ionship wi th Aus tralia . The 
inf luence of Bowen-Jones was espec ially apparent in the 
dec ision taken in late 19 7 3  to embark on a maj or expansion 
of sugar product ion at Labasa , which required an extens ion 
of cane cultivation into the S eaqaqa region . It was hoped 
that by 1979  an additional 200 , 000 tons of cane would be  
harvested - an aim likely to b e  achieved - making this the 
largest  s ingle attempt to incr ease sugar production since 
before World War r . 5 8 Though he has no t always been credit ed 
with it , the decis ion was taken very much on the init iat ive 
of Bowen-Jones ,  who saw the expansion as a means to reduce 
unit costs  at Labasa and rever se the overall decline in 
Fij i ' s  output of  sugar , a decline which it was feared might 
lead to a los s  o f  overseas markets . It  was expec ted that 
the proj ect would enable more Fij ians to become cane growers ,  
with impor tant socio-polit ical advantages . Many in Fij i 
bel ieved that had CSR remained there would have been no 
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development a t  Seaqaqa , o r  e l s e  that the expans ion would 
have been on a much smaller sc ale . 5 9  
Yet what ever the differ enc es be tween SP SM and FSC , i t  
i s  the similar it ies between the two that are mos t  str iking . 
There was a del iberate attemp t by government and leaders o f  
the Federat ion o f  Can� Growers to maintain continuity , lest 
the tran�it ion from one organization to ano ther ' ' rock the 
boat ' and lead to inef f ic iencies . This may have been due to 
the premium placed on exper ien ce by CSR which , as Bowen-Jones 
found , influenced others in Fij i to think likewise ;  past 
experience should be preserved . Ther e was also the wide­
spr ead des ire for stability , seen as a prerequi site for more 
rapid economic development than had previously been achieved . 
The general attitude was reinforced by the exi stence of an 
Alliance government drawing support from the Fij ians and 
only a minority of Indians , wher eas the oppo sition National 
Federat ion Party obtained it s support almos t exc lus ively 
from Indians . Ref lecting its  political bas e , government has 
regarded sugar as a nat ional industry who se benef it s s hould 
not be l imi ted to the Indian c ommunity . This  meant that 
even if it had had the resources , it was out o f  the que s t ion 
for government to provide growers  wi th funds to buy a 
maj ority of shares in the mill s . Yet without such help it 
is unlikely that , if a share o f f er had been made in the 
early 1970s , it would have had more success than i t  had had 
in the mid-196 0s ; the anticipated return on FSC shares 
would have been less than could normally be earned from 
advance s to fellow Indians . So it was that no moves were 
made to introduce co-operat ive ownership of the mill s . 
There was some talk in the Federat ion of pushing for this . 
Swami Rudrananda was par t icularly keen on the idea , but 
in the interests of stabil ity he was dis suaded from making 
it an immediate issue . 6 0  Ins t ead , fo llowing repor t s  of 
experts  from London , 6 1  FSC was set up as an almo s t  wholly­
owned government corporation r egistered under the Companies 
Act . It  was to operate on the lines of  a privat e  company . 
Recogniz ing this , in its  f ir s t  four years of operat ion FSC 
has paid 7� per cent on the value o f  the cap ital in its 
books , $ 18� million . 6 2 This r epresent ed about 13� per cent 
on the or iginal purchase price of $ 10 million - a very 
respectable return . Had ther e  been co-operative ownership 
and the dividend been dis tributed to the 1 6 , 300-odd growers 
in the indus try , it  would have been worth an average of 
about $85 (�40 2 s  6d)  to each farmer a year - j ust under 5 
per c ent of the average profits  from cane in the exc ep tion­
ally good season of 1974 . 6 3 Given the high propens ity to 
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impor t consumer goods , this would have been unlikely to 
contribute as much to the economy as the availability of the 
dividend to f inance certain development proj ec ts . 
The important  point is that the divis ion of  interest 
between growers and the millers has remained . This causes 
disputes between farmers and the FSC on quest ions like the 
burning of cane and t he availability of trucks to transport 
the cane . It  encourages FSC t o  concentrate research on 
areas that will increase i t s  profit s ,  rather than on such 
areas as the development of mixed farming ( though some work 
has been done on this ) which will almo st exclusively benefit 
the growers .  I t  encourages FSC to ins is t  that farm advi sers 
( extension workers )  b e  responsible to field of f icers , ins tead 
of the Agricultural Exper imental S tation as was recommended 
in the UNDAT report on the sugar industry in 19 74 . FSC 
argues that apart from milling its main activity is organ­
iz ing the harvest ing and transport of cane ; its  subordinate 
funct ion is  to improve cane cul t ivat ion . Since field 
off icers manage the harvesting and transport processes , they 
should occupy a more senior posi tion than farm advisers . If 
the lat ter were responsible to the Experimental Station 
there would be two lines of management and divided control . 6 4  
The trouble with this  is that growers have a high regard 
for the work of the Experimental S tat ion , and would be more 
likely to accept advice on mat ter s  like f er t ilizer applica­
t ion if it came through men responsible to the s tation 
rather than through f ield off icers  who are les s  respected ; 
the lat ter are somet ime s  - unj ust if iably - identif ied with 
officers  who treated growers har shly in CSR ' s  day . Govern­
ment ownership also reduces the interest of farmers in the 
prof itability of the mills , so that as growers seek to 
increase their incomes there is less of a check on demands 
for a larger share of the proceeds . Following a request  by 
farmer s for a revis ion of the Denning contract to give them 
an 80 p er cent instead of  6 5  p er cent share , on the recom­
mendat ion of the UNDAT team they were awarded about 70 per 
cent . 6 5  In 1 9 78 growers ' representatives and the FSC agreed 
to modify this formula to allow a larger share o f  proceeds 
for grower s if produc tion exceeds 325 , 000 tons of cane p er 
season . The new formula is due to take eff ec t  in 1980 . 
Some wonder if FSC ' s  share of proceeds  will leave i t  wi th 
a suf f ic ient margin to maintain desired capital expenditure . 
Were  the mills co-operatively owned ,  it  is  likely that 
grower s ' leaders would be more sensi t ive to such mat ters . 
Conflict within the industry , then , no t only between growers 
and the millers but also - and of great importance - between 
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millworker s and FSC , 6 6  limit s the po tential contribut ion 
the indus try can make to economic development in Fij i .  
In the absence o f  co-operat ive ownership , discus sions 
have been held on how to rationalize the exis t ing s truc ture 
of  the industry . A statutory cane growers ' associat ion to 
which all farmers  would belong has b een suggested ,  but 
Ministers believe that this should come through the voluntary 
efforts of  growers rather than through government imposed 
legislation . A cane grower s ' as sociation , possibly financed 
at f ir s t  by the Sugar Price S tabilizat ion Fund , might be 
in a po sition to assume responsibility for the provi sion of 
growers ' s ervices , research into areas of concern to farmers ,  
and the organizat ion of the harvest ing and transport of cane . 
This would leave FSC in the more economically rational 
posi tion of being respons ible solely for milling , which is 
where its  main exp ertise lies . If growers organi zed 
extension work , the transport sys tem ,  etc . , it might be 
easier to solve the many niggling arguments whi ch o ccur 
during harvesting . Farmers would have a direct interes t in 
improving the eff iciency of the transport sys t em and farm 
advisory services ; they have f requently comp lained that the 
millers do not spend enough on these . Coming from their 
own organizat ion , grower s might be more willing to listen 
to advice on farm management , especially on mul t iple 
ratooning and burning . If they were more respons ible for 
research and the application of  its  results , more attent ion 
might be paid to mixed farming , which is standard practice 
in many o ther producing countries . 6 7  All this would require 
that , ins tead of arguing among themselves , growers work 
together in such an organizat ion . Many doub t  that this is  
pos s ible . The harmonious relat ions that have usually exis ted 
in the Sugar Advisory Council suggest that it is . Yet how­
ever successful , such a scheme would no t eliminate the bas ic 
conflict between growers and FSC . It  might actually increase 
it , since differences between the farmers  and the millers 
could take the f orm of an open struggle between the Alliance­
owned ( in ef f ec t )  FSC ,  and a Federation-dominat ed growers '  
as sociat ion . Polit ical and p erhap s  racial con flict in Fij i 
might then be increased , adding to the insecurity which 
already exi s t s  among Indians , and so deterr ing capital 
inves tment . 
FSC ' s  potent ial contribution to economic deve lopment 
is further limit ed by its dependence on overseas marke ts . 
The minute size of  her exports  in r elat ion to the wor ld 
supply of sugar means that Fij i has little control over 
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prices . She can co llaborate with other producers , but even 
acting together their room for  manoeuvre is limi ted . If 
prices reach very high levels , as they did in 19 74 , it can 
be expected tha t  demand will drop , the substitut ion of 
artif ic ial sweeteners in place of  sugar will occur and new 
producers will enter world trade ; the world pr ice will then 
fall , as happened in 19 75 and 1976 . And if the fall is  
sus tained , prices under long-term agreements could be 
affected . Of special importance is the recent development 
of fructose glucose syrup s which are manufactured from 
s tarch (almo s t  exclusively maize) . The syrups have compar­
able sweetness to sucrose and are co s t  comp etititve when 
the price of raw sugar is high . Modern technology makes 
it pos s ible to produce starch sweetener at short no tice , 
if neces sary . In the medium t erm the availab ility of this 
subs titute limits  the po tential rise in the price of  raw 
s ugar , though in the long term the posit ion is not so clear 
since cane sugar proces s ing meets many of i ts energy needs 
by us ing fibre in the cane . It is comparatively le s s  
energy int ens ive than the manufac ture of  starch sweeteners ,  
and this would be of  advantage if energy cos ts continue to 
rise in real terms . Never theless , the long-term level of 
demand for sugar is expec t ed to rise at a slower rate than 
in the past , largely b ecause the world ' s  largest import ers 
are the indus trialized countr ies where per capita consump t ion 
is tending to f all as a result of health fac tors and 
increased competition from substitutes . The market in 
developing countr ies is not growing suf f iciently fas t to 
create a rap id growth in world demand overall . 68 
Besides access to the Uni ted S ta tes and Canadian 
markets , Fij i has long-term agreements for the sale o f  sugar 
to New Zealand , Malaysia and S ingapore . By far the mos t  
impor tant agreement i s  with the European Economic Community . 
Under the Lome Convention , the sugar provi sions of  which 
superseded those of the CSA and which came into force on 
1 Apr il 1 9 75 , Fij i can sell to the EEC for an indefini te 
per iod about 166 , 000 metric tons o f  raw sugar a year , at  an 
annually nego tiated price in the range of that paid to EEC 
beet produc ers . This is very different from the nego t iated 
price formula under the C SA ,  which for specif ied quantities 
of  sugar virtually allowed automatic price rises in line 
with increases in produc t ion co sts . Since 19 7 5  pr ices under 
the Lome Convent ion have gone up by much less than the 
production cos t s  of ACP - African , Caribbean and Pac ific -
exporters covered by i t . This has par t ly b een because 
inflat ion rates in ACP countr ies have generally b een higher 
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than in the EEC . But it  has also been b ecaus e the Community 
has become a maj or exporter of raw sugar , following the 
world shortage �n 19 74-7 5 . This has meant that the ' natural ' 
market in Britain for Commonwealth producers has disappeared . 
Under the CSA Britain reserved about two-thirds of her marke t 
for Commonwealth s ugar . This  market can now b e  supp lied 
ent irely from wi thin the EEC , wi th the Community s till 
having a surplus for expor t .  The Lame Convention ' s  obliga­
t ion on the EEC to impor t each year 1 . 4  million metric t ons 
from ACP producers has forced the Community to export large 
quantit i tes of dome s t ic beet sugar . In gross t erms , the 
EEC is now the larges t exporter of raw sugar in the world . 
The presence of a sugar 'mountain ' has encouraged the EEC 
to grant minimal price rises to beet growers ,  and hence ACP 
producers , while the end of the natural British market for 
Commonwealth exporters has weakened their bargaining posi tion . 
Moreover , with the EEC now a large exporter , it s  par ticipation 
is probably essential if the Internat ional Sugar Agreement , 
negotiated in 19 7 7 ,  is to s tab ilize at higher levels the 
c urrent world free price of sugar . And given the def icienc ies 
of the Lome Convention ( in the view of ACP producer s ) , an 
effective ISA is especially important for Fij i as well as 
for o ther ACP countries . Yet because of its s ugar surplus 
the EEC has refused to sign the ISA . 6 9  
Dependence on overseas marke ts  brings o ther problems . 7 0 
Tariff barriers deny Fij i the opportunity to increase its  
earnings by  export ing high quality sugar - say p lantat ion 
whi te of  99 ° polarizat ion . Industrializ ed nations have al so 
impo sed t arif f s  to keep out imports  of ref ined sugar . Per­
hap s F ij i c ould produc e  industrial alcohol . But again the 
country would be at a disadvantage because , with par t  of the 
mo las se s  from sugar being extracted during the ref ining stage , 
it would b e  more d ifficult to provid e  the distil lery with a 
large enough supply to obtain economies of  scale . Further­
more , t o  be viable the p lant would need to produce for 
export as  well as f or the home market . Yet potential market s  
overseas are dominated by d is t illing companies which have an 
interest  in prevent ing the import of a competit ive produc t .  
In any case , t heir e conomies f rom produc ing on a larger 
scale make it unlikely that Fij i could comp et e .  In 1974  a 
Japanese  company cons idered building a d istill ery in Fij i ,  
because Japan was t ight ening up on anti-pollut ion laws and 
the company wanted to export pollut ion to Fij i instead . 
Negotiat ions wi th government broke down on this issue and 
partly because the bot tom fell out of t he industrial alcoho l  
market . I f  the market improves , it s t ill seems unlikely 
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that a distillery would b e  built  in the count ry unless the 
was te-disposal probl em were so lved . Yet if techno logy were 
to make a solut ion possible the incent ive for the Japane se 
t o  invest in Fij i would be reduced ; they would be likely 
to pref er the economies of scale from produc ing industrial 
alcohol in Japan . The amount of value , then , which Fij i 
can add to the sugar she already makes is limit ed .  And so , 
although the industry will cont inue to  earn valuable foreign 
exchange and will provide a livelihood for a large number 
of peop le in the c ount ry , there ar e severe restric t ions on 
it s potent ial contribut ion to economic development in Fij i .  
Chapter 10 
Conclus ion 
C SR ' s  contribut ion or ot herwise t o  economic develop­
ment has always been a cont rovers ial mat t er in Fij i .  Sir 
John Thurston , who did so much to encourage the company t o  
bu ild Nausori , soon had doub t s  about how f a r  t h e  co lony 
would actual ly benefit from CSR ' s act ivit ies . S ince then 
others have had similar reservat ions . In the 1950s and 
1960s the quest ion of C SR ' s  contribut ion to the economy 
became a maj or issue . 
In fact the gains to Fij i from the sugar industry have 
been quit e cons iderable . The establishment of  p lantat ions 
led to the creat ion of substant ial soc ial and overhead 
cap ital in the form of transport fac il it ies , telecommun ica­
t ions , electric ity and water supplies , school s ,  clin ic s , 
etc . 1 Previously id le land was brought into product ive use , 
and employment - albeit under dreadful cond it ions  - was pro­
vided for Ind ians , many of whom were dest itut e before they 
migrat ed . To some degree these benef it s  wou ld have ex­
isted irrespect ive of the plantat ion crop . But the fact 
that sugar was grown was of great advantage t o  Fij i ,  since 
sugar is thought to give higher net returns to land and 
labour than many other trop ical crop s .  
The long-t erm survival o f  the industry d epended on 
a substant ial inf low of cap ital . This might have been 
supplied by Aus tral ian and New Zealand banks , which in the 
lat e ninet eenth century were f inancing some of  the smaller 
mills in Fij i .  Instead , large-scale investment was under­
taken by C SR ,  which already had expert ise in sugar and was 
developing a large milling capac ity in Aust ralia . This 
benefited Fij i .  The number and size of CSR ' s  mills reduced 
the un it costs  of research , perhaps help ing the company to 
be mor e innovat ive than if it  had been operat ing in Fij i 
alone . Gradually , C SR acquired an exp ert ise in the manu­
facturing proces s which has pu t it at the fore front o f  
mill ing technology . Though it s cult ivat ion work was not 
always advanced , 2 the company ' s  research int o  cane 
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breed ing , disease cont ro l and the like was helped by the 
exchange of results  between its  Fij i and Queensland estab­
lishment s .  In 1 9 7 3  the company bequeathed to FSC an ex­
tensive collect ion of cane seedling s  which ar e invaluable 
for research , and which apparently have been the envy of 
places like Hawaii . 3 The high quality of Fij i ' s  sugar has 
been one reason why she has ob tained a foo thold in the 
important United S tates market , as well as being able to 
s ell elsewhere . Ano ther has been the ext ent of CSR ' s  market­
ing resources . Beside selling Fij i ' s  sugar , as agent of the 
Queensland government since 192 3 the company has marketed 
all the sugar produced in Australia . By World War II  
Australia had become the largest single expor ter of raw 
sugar in the Commonwealth and one of the largest in the 
world . The resul t was e conomies of scale in market ing which 
had advantages for Fij i .  The unit cost of paying relatively 
high salar ies to  at tract top quality staff was lower , while 
the acquis it ion of market s  for Fij i owed something to the 
exp erienc e gained , and the ext ensive ne twork of contact s  
made , b y  the company from market ing excep tionally large 
quant ities of  sugar . Thus one of the legacies of CSR has 
been an industry capable of produc ing excellent sugar with 
market s  in which to sell that sugar . It is  possible that 
one or several companies operat ing exclus ively in Fij i 
would not have done so well . 
The structure of the sugar industry sinc e the 19 20s 
has brought part icular benef it s t o  Fij i .  Indeed , the 
introduc t ion of the smallfarm sys t em  has been regarded as 
one of CSR ' s  maj or achievement s .  The scheme ' s  success 
depended on the company provid ing grower s with certain 
ext ernal economies of sup ervis ion , r esearch , etc . As a 
resul t , at virtually no cost to CSR , growers received 
higher incomes than if they had remained as labourers ,  and 
to some ext ent these incomes have had a mul t iplier eff ec t  
through the r e s t  of the economy . Moreover , i t  seems that 
s ince the 1930s cost s of  product ion have r isen les s rap idly 
under the smallf arm sys t em than they would if cane had 
been grown on estat es  with wage labour . Between 1939  and 
1 9 7 3 average cane prices went up by 64 7 per cent : in the 
same per iod the average unit cost of non-salaried mill 
workers rose by almo st twice that - by over 1 , 163 per c ent . 4 
The slower rise in cane pr ices can be par t ly attributed 
to the relat ion s ince 1940  between the price of cane and 
that of sugar . Movements in the wages of millwo rkers on 
the other hand have been much l es s  af f ected by changes in 
the sugar pric e . It  is likely that if cane had been grown 
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on estates , as in the mills there would have been st rong 
pres sure for the wages of labourers to increase at a faster 
rat e  before 1973 than did the earnings of  cane farmers .  
This is because estate workers are mor e eas ily mobiliz ed 
by union leaders than scat tered , and relat ively conservat ive , 
peasan t  farmers . The brake on labour cost increases which 
has been imposed under the smallf arm system is one reason 
why the cost of produc ing raw sugar in Fij i ,  e st imated at 
about £ 50 a ton in 1974 , was well und er half the average 
cost in the Commonwealth Car ibbean where cane is grown 
mostly on estates . 5 This cost -compet it ivenes s  has not only 
made poss ib le an expansion of sugar product ion but gives the 
Fij i indus try a relat ively secure long-term fu ture at a t ime 
when the world market for sugar is unc ertain . 
Clearly , the sugar indu stry has had an important 
impact on the development of the economy . Yet in view of 
Fij i ' s  concern with the prob lems of  economic development , 
the quest ion is why this impact has not been great er . 
Apart from price constraints impo sed by the nature of the 
world market , one reason is that most of the value in the 
f inal product has been added out s id e  Fij i .  George Beckford 
has emphas ized how plantat ion ent erprise is often vert ically 
int egrat ed into the rest of a company ' s  operat ions . 6 This 
was not so much the case with CSR ' s  int ere s t s  in Fij i af ter 
the 1920s , for apart from the sale of molasses t o  its 
-
Aust ralian dist illeries and sugar to it s Auckland refinery , 
most of it s Fij i output was tran sported in non-CSR ships  to 
non-CSR refineries . It  was le ft to other firms t o  pro f it 
f rom handling and processing su gar onc e  CSR had f in ished 
with it . Yet these companies were fore ign owned , so that 
as far as Fij i was concerned t he effect was the same as if 
the industry had been more closely integrated int o CSR ' s  
other act ivit ies . Pro f it s  from transport ing sugar t o  market s 
in Europe , North America and elsewhere have been made by 
Elder Smith Goldsbrough Mort Ltd , the Austral ian shipping 
brokers used by C SR ; they are s t ill used by the Fij i Sugar 
Marketing Co . Ltd , which has been respons ible for selling 
Fij i ' s  sugar s ince 1 Apr il 197 7 . Then , of course , returns 
from ref ining sugar and produc ing confect ionary , et c . , as 
well as the gains to CSR from d istilling molasses , have not 
accrued to Fij i either . S imilarly , input s of machinery ,  
fert ilizer and , to some degree , fuel for the mills have come 
from abroad . Thus , as is so of ten the case with plantat ion 
enterpr ise , many of the forward and backward l inkages from 
sugar product ion have occurred largely out s ide the Fij i 
economy . 
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Also important have been o ther l imit s placed o n  the 
amount of income created wi thin Fij i by the sugar indus try . 
They includ e ef fort s by millers  and plantation owners to 
keep down labour cos t s  in order to  maximiz e pr of it s . The 
need for cheap lab our explains largely the main developments 
in the history of  the indus try - the introduct ion of in­
dentured labour , the transit ion to smallfarming and the 
disputes between growers and CSR . The indenture system 
enabled planter s to keep wages below their free market rate . 
On plenty of  occasions , esp ecially in the 1920s and 1930s , 
CSR used its  dominant posi tion in the labour market  to 
hold down the wages of free Indian labourers ; before 1940 
it extracted forced labour at wages below the market level . 
The company tried to pay the minimum price for cane , doubt­
less thinking this was neces sary for  the  success of i ts 
operat ions , but it seems that " in the 1940s CSR could have 
afforded a higher price . One resul t of  low wages and cane 
prices was that , till fairly recently , there was lit tle 
incentive for Fij ians to become involved in the cash economy 
ei ther as plantat ion labourers or cane growers . Many were 
l ef t  on the per iphery of a p er ipheral economy . Ano ther was 
that the purchas ing power of Indian s , and hence the general 
level of  economic activity , was limited . The conflict o f  
interest be tween CSR , which wanted t o  maximize its  earning s ,  
and growers who wanted to maximiz e  theirs , caused income 
to be lo st through strikes and the many small disputes which 
impeded the eff icient harvesting and transport of cane . 
Finally , the size of  t he Indian populat ion today s tems 
ultimat ely from the industry ' s  demand for cheap l abour . Yet 
the condit ions on which plantat ion agr icul ture was allowed 
to f lourish in Fij i - namely , that Fij ians retain control 
of mos t  of the land - has made it  mor e dif ficul t  for Indians 
to f eel they belong to the country which is now their home . 
The insecurity which resul t s  has encouraged many , espec ially 
Guj erat i s torekeepers , to  repatriate  some of their incomes 
to India or (of  recent importance)  to rela t ives in Canada . 
The amount available for expend iture wi thin Fij i has been 
correspondingly reduced . Ther e is the possib ility , too , 
of  mounting tension between the F ij ians and Indians . I f  
t h i s  happens , it wil l  undermine t h e  polit ical s tability 
which is necessary for economic development . 
Sugar ' s  contribution to income growth has been further 
limited by Fij i ' s  dependence on impor t s , which has been 
partly due to the unequal distribut ion of income . 7 The 
sugar indus try ha s contribut ed to this by minimiz ing the 
cost of labour while at the same time , especially before 
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the 1960s , it rel ied on skil led expat riat e staff who were 
attracted to Fij i at salar ies comparabl e  to the high rates 
in Aus tralia . In 1936 about 1 2 . 5  per cent of Europeans 
employed in the colony were direc t ly engaged in the sugar 
industry ; in 1956 the proport ion was about 10 per cent . 8 
To this should be add ed the Europ eans employed in such 
o ther act ivit ies as wholesaling and re tail ing , which depended 
heavily on the income creat ed by the sugar industry . 
Accus tomed to consumer art icles produced abroad , the European 
elite (which is now outnumbered by well-to-do Indians and 
Fij ians ) import ed foodstuf f s  and clothing , for example , 
inst ead of buying i tems produced lo cally . The demonstrat ion 
ef f ect of import s may have increased resis tanc e among 
Fij ians and Indians to goods o f  lower qua li ty but produced 
within Fij i . The fairly recent development of import sub­
stitute industries , such as beer and cigare ttes , might have 
occurred sooner if income had been more equally dis tribut ed . 
The demand for high quality impor t s  might then have been 
less , while that for lower quality domestic produc t s  might 
have been greater . In o ther words , wi th its high incomes 
eat ing a large s lice of the nat ional cake , the elite creat ed 
by the sugar industry dropped f ew crumb s  for the local 
populat ion . 
No t only has there been a leakage of  funds abroad 
through the purchase of impor t s ,  but there has also been 
leakage caused by the repatr iat ion of C SR ' s  pro f its . From 
188 7 to 1 910 the c ompany ' s  annual average r eturn before tax 
in Fij i was 6 per cent which c ompared unfavourably with the 
6 t o  9 p er cent charged on overdraft s  by Australian trading 
banks in the period . From 1915  to 1 9 2 3  the Colonial Sugar 
Ref ining Co . (Fij i and New Zealand ) Ltd yielded an annual 
average return of 14 . 7  per cent , twice the Aus tralian over­
draf t rates . As suming no revaluation of C SR ' s  assets  in 
194 1 , from 1 9 24 to 1943 returns before tax averaged about 
7 . 3 per cent a year , compared wi th the int erest on Aust­
ralian bank overdraf t s  of between 4 . 25 and 8 per  cent . 
From 1939  to 1950  average annual returns before tax were 
14 . 7 3 per cent , whereas Aus tralia� overdraf t rates ranged 
from 4 . 25 to 5 per cent . Between 1950 and 1 9 6 0  returns 
averaged about 7 . 5 per cent and Aus tralian overdraf t rates 
wer e  between 4 . 5 and 6 per cent . From 1962 to 1 9 7 0  average 
returns after tax on paid up capital in SPSM were 11 . 02 per 
cent , well above the maximum overdraf t  rat e in Aus tralia . 
But because of  the effect of the Denning award , from 1971  
to 1 9 7 3  the average return fell to 6 . 19 per  cent , which was 
sl ight ly below the maximum overdraf t rat e . 
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However , the figures have to  be  treat ed wi th care . 
Prof its  since 1923  have been measured aga inst the value of 
asset s (plus an allowance for working capital and s tocks ) 
shown in C SR ' s  half -yearly reports to 1960 , and aga ins t the 
paid-up value of SPSM ' s  shares af ter 19 6 2 . In j udging how 
accurate these asset valuat ions were , ideally the his torian 
would calculate the amount C SR invested in the indus try each 
year , and convert this into real values by us ing a price 
index . But no price index exists  for the years before 1 9 39 
( though one could be cons tructed) , while f igures for C SR ' s  
inves tment in Fij i before 1 94 3  are incomplete . Thereafter , 
t rade report$ show the value of  impor t s  of sugar mill ing 
machinery , rails , lo como t ives and part s , and rolling s tock 
and parts , though the values are expressed in f . o . b . terms 
which underes t imate total capital exp endi ture . Before 1943 
f igures for s ome of the year s are unavailable , while ther e 
are no f igures for rolling s tock and par t s  (which were 
important component s of t otal inves tment ) .  Thus CSR ' s  
annual capital expenditur e can only b e  estimat ed very 
approximately , and this makes it impos sible to calculate 
accurately the value of  assets at the end of each f inancial 
year . Moreover , the prof it figures do not allow for t ransfer 
pricing arrangements . For a long period Fij i ' s  molas ses was 
sold for less than i t s  value on the open market , so reduc ing 
the returns f rom milling . At t imes , head office expenses 
may have been too high . Fur thermore , C SR ' s  allowance for 
depreciat ion and r�placement seems to have been exces sive . 
Though total capital expenditur e  since 1940  appear s to have 
exceeded the sums charged t o  depreciat ion , much of the 
expend iture was designed to increase the capacity o f  the 
mills . Expenditur e  on replacing old machinery was probably 
about equal to , or less than , amount s put aside over the 
per iod to  cover depreciat ion . From 1924 to 1940 the deprecia­
t ion allowance was more  than total cap ital expend i ture , which 
included the purchase and the enlargement of the Penang mil l . 
No doubt  before 1 924 , when machinery was relatively new , 
deprec iat ion charges would have exceeded replacement expend­
iture  by an even larger amount . I t  may well be , then , that 
prof its were bigger than the quo ted figures suggest . 
In terms of their signif icance for the Fij i economy , 
what count s is no t prof its  shown as a percentage re turn on 
inves tment but the to tal cash surpluses which CSR could 
remit abroad . The surpluses were  considerable . By 1911 
the company had been able to repatriate  in prof its  at least  
as  much as  it had invested in  the  colony . The return of 
over 118 per cent from 1915 to 1923 implies that dur ing 
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those years C SR again could have repatriated an amount 
equal to , or more than , it s original investment in Fij i .  
Thereaf ter , as Tables 6 . 6 ,  7 . 13 ,  8 . 9  and 9 . 2 have shown , 
CSR was able to take out of Fij i in profits  over twice as 
much as it put in as investment .  If anything , the surplus 
was larger s t ill , since estimat es of capital expenditure 
before 1950  have been des igned to over- rather than under­
s tate the true posi tion . In r elat ion to the s iz e  of  the Fij i 
economy , the amounts available for repatr iat ion were pret ty 
large . They might have added sub s tant ially to na tional 
income if they had been reinvest ed in Fij i .  
The sugar indus try ' s  contribution t o  economic develop­
ment was f ur ther limit ed by CSR ' s  failure to encourage the 
maximum use of land - a fa ilure which st emmed from the 
company ' s  spec ializat ion in sugar . In 1959  the Burns 
commission no ticed large areas of C SR-contro lled graz ing 
land lying adj acent to Indian cane farms , par ticularly in 
the provinces of Ba and Ra . Much of the land was over­
s tocked with growers '  cat tle , a tendency of  lit tle concern 
to C SR s ince it was not ref lected in the company ' s  profit 
and loss account s . CSR was cri ticized for taking less care 
of these areas than land which it had leased for cane farm­
ing . The commission also no ted that S tockdale in 19 36 , 
Shephard in 1945 and Sir Geoffrey Clay in 1954 had all 
emphasized the need for r esearch into ways that cane might 
be int egrated into a sys t em of mixed farming which would 
increase growers ' incomes ; yet nothing had been done about 
it . 9 In the 1930s CSR had f eared that the development of 
alternative crops would draw labour away f rom the sugar 
indus try : but it  made little ef fort to see if crops whose 
labour inputs were complementary to cane could be grown . 
As underemployment increased af t er the 19 30s , the danger 
that new crops would compete for labour was much less . 
There was every reason to think that Indians would adopt a 
system of  mixed farming if it could be devised . Depending 
on labour requirements , the opportunity cost  to the farmer 
of growing additional crops would be low since for much of 
the year cane demands relatively lit tle attention . Markets 
were not necessarily a constraint ; in 194 7 there were 
complaints from New Zealand that Fij i ' s  supply of p eanut s ,  
which can be grown with cane , was no t large and reliable 
enough . 1 0 Many Indians grow rice and dhal , among o ther 
crops , on plo ts adj acent to their farms , or on their farms . 
What was needed was to extend the opportunit ies for mixed 
farming , but CSR ' s  dominant posi tion in the economy en­
couraged government to l eave research on such quest ions to 
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the company . And CSR gave it  low priority sinc e mixed 
farming would no t have contr ibuted direc tly to profits 
( though it might have increased the sens e of wellbeing among 
growers which would have been to the company ' s  advantage ) .  
Consequently , Indians were deprived of the opportunity to 
employ some of their surplus labour . 
Finally , the industry which has always been risky has 
been made even more high risk by the current uncertainties 
over the future markets for sugar . Unlike the CSA ,  the Lome 
Convent ion does not off er the prospect of automatic price 
rises to meet increases in the average unit product ion co s t s  
of  sugar exporter s  covered b y  the agreement . And wi th the 
end of a ' natural market ' in Britain for Fij i ' s  sugar , the 
indus try is more dependent than ever on polit ical force s 
overseas . Moreover , now that  the EEC has become a large 
exporter o f  sugar and has no t signed the Internat ional Sugar 
Agreement , the medium-t erm outlook f or the free world market 
is not bright . If the market remains depr essed , when the 
t ime comes it will be hard to nego tiate with New Zealand , 
Malaysia and Singapore new long-term marketing arrangement s 
as favourable to Fij i as the exis ting ones . Together with 
l imit s  on the contribution of sugar to economic development , 
this could create a si tuat ion where it would have been 
desirable to shif t reso urces - to a greater or lesser 
extent - away f rom sugar to the production of exports whose  
market s  are more  secure and p erhaps more remunerative , or  
to  the product ion of goods for domestic consump tion . Yet 
the co s t  of  this would be high because of  the amount of 
capital committed to sugar production . Sinc e  the plant 
(apart from the rail sys tem) is highly specif ic to the 
indus try , for the mos t  part  it canno t be used for the 
product ion of other goods ; nor can it  be easily sold . Thus 
mos t  of the inves tment in mill machinery , for example , would 
have to be writ ten off , thereby largely - or totally -
negat ing the gains from diver ting resources away from sugar . 
So it is that there are few choices open to Fij i on how to 
comb ine factors  of product ion pr esently engaged in sugar . 
There is l it tle alternative but to allow a large sector of 
the economy to remain dependent on a crop which is high risk , 
and whose potential to contribute fur ther to economic develop­
ment is relat ively small .  
I t  is clear , then , that al though sugar has helped to 
develop the Fij i economy , the very nature of product ion has 
imposed severe limit s  on the extent of its contribution . 
The question remains of  how benefits from sugar have been 
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dis tributed within Fij i .  This is diff icult t o  answer , yet 
a tentat ive as sessment can be made . What count s is no t 
total gains , but net gains - i . e .  total ga ins less any co s t s . 
Now there can be no doub t  that the owner s  of capital have 
done well . Even if CSR did not make super pro f it s , the 
earnings it could repatriat e from Fij i were pretty large 
at leas t , they were large enough to persuade the company to 
inves t  periodically in an expansion of the indus try . 
Repatriated profits  were available for inves tment in the 
Aus tralian sugar indus try , and since the 19 30s in the 
diver sificat ion of CSR ' s ac tivi ties . Merchant capital also 
benefited s ince the income generated by the indus try through 
salaries , wages and payments for cane creat ed a demand for 
merchandise . Money-lender s made pro fits  on advances to 
growers . Though the limit ed spread effec t s  of the indus try 
placed re s trict ions on the expans ion of trade , the net ga ins 
to merchant capital - as well as  to CSR - were very consider­
able . 
Government benef ited from the revenue contributed 
by sugar no t only d irectly but indirect ly ,  through the 
indus try ' s  s t imulus to trade . Customs duties accounted for 
58 per cent of total revenue in 19 13 , 54 per cent in 1 9 39 
and 44 per cent in 1 9 74 . 1 1  Though the indus try created new 
problems for officials , especially in governing the Indian 
population , it  also helped the adminis trat ion maintain 
poli tical contro l . Inves tment by sugar companies in the 
late  nineteenth century s trengthened government ' s  hand 
agains t crit ics who thought the native policy was hinder ing 
trade . Much later CSR acted as a buffer between the admin­
is tration and Indians , def lecting some of the lat ter ' s  
ant i-European sentiment away from government towards the 
company . The chiefs in cane districts  have obtained a large 
share of the rents from land . Thir ty per cent of rent s from 
areas under their authority are paid to the heads o f  the 
vanua (or confederat ion of yavusa ) , the heads of the yavusa 
and the heads o f  the mataqa Zi , the land-owning uni ts who 
comprise the yavusa . In 1959 i t  was no t uncommon for the 
head of the vanua to receive £ 200 to £300 a year in rent . 1 2  
The sums would have been larger if the terms on which land 
was or iginally leased had permi t ted reassessment s  of rent , 
in order to main tain its  real value . Reasses sments during 
the lease have occurred only s ince the late 1960s . Never­
theless for the chief s , and also for government ,  gains from 
the s ugar indus try have far outweighed the cos t s . 
For the great maj ority of  Indians and for Fij ian 
commoners net ga ins were probably no t so large . True , they 
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have benefited from goverrunent expendi ture financed by the 
revenue ra ised as a re sul t of the sugar indus try . Expend­
iture on heal th , for example , has led to a sharp fall in 
the infant mortality rate from thirty-nine deaths per 1 , 000 
in 1958 to twenty-f ive in 1967 . 1 3  It would be inter esting 
to examine the distribut ion of government exp enditure be tween 
Ind ians and Fij ians on the one hand , and Europeans on the 
o ther : the distribut ion between Indians and Fij ians would 
also be  interesting . I t  is l ikely that for many years per 
capita expend iture favoured Europeans . Gillion no tes that 
in 1 9 28 over all tho se aged 5 to 14 , government sp ent £8 
per head on educat ing Europeans , 12s  on Fij ians and 5s on 
Indians . 1 4  Yet even if it was found tha t in general Indians 
benefi ted least from government exp end iture , no one can deny 
that mater ially mo st are far be tter off  now than if their 
parents or grandparents had s tayed in India . But this higher 
standard of l iving has been at taine d at cons id erable co s t . 
The humiliat ing circumstances under which indentured 
labourers were brought to F ij i is s till a source of resent­
ment today . Of course , a ntllllber of  Indian bus inessmen are 
also descended from indentured labourers ,  but the maj ority 
are either ' free ' migrants themselves or  the descendants of 
free migrant s .  Thus , mo s t  of  the cos t of  the indenture 
sys tem has to be  set aga ins t the gains of Indian farmers 
rather than against the gains to merchant capital . More­
over , instead of owning the land , growers are tenants 
occupying leases whose t erms have never exceeded thirty 
years . Insecur ity of t enure has made it very difficult for 
farmers to feel that they belong to Fij i :  ye t unlike Guj erat i 
migrants  who dominat e much of bus iness and have close t ies  
with Ind ia , they have no  other home . And then there is  
the  underut ilizat ion of  land and labour assoc iat ed with 
the spread of plantat ion enterpr ise , which prevent s the 
sugar industry making a b igger contribution to solving the 
problem of underemployment in cane areas . Although the 
gains from sugar production outweigh these co s ts , it is 
likely that attent ion will fo cus increasingly on the ways 
the sugar indus try has l imited - and s t il l  limits - Indian 
economic advancement . 
Fij ian connnoner s  have also benef ited from sugar . Some 
have obtained casual and off-farm employment in the sugar 
mills  and cane harves t ing gangs . A growing ntllllb er are 
becoming cane farmers as well . At the 1966 census 5 , 2 6 9  
Fij ians were engaged i n  the sugar indus try , mo stly i n  the 
cultivat ion of cane . 1 5 Tho se in sugar d is tricts have 
received rents which would not have been availab le but for 
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plantation agr iculture . Yet the size of this income has 
been small , par tly because of the failure to reas sess rents 
t ill recently , and par tly because o f  the 30 per cent share 
paid to the chief s and the further 25 per cent which goes 
to the NLTB to cover its  expenses . Af ter these deduct ions , 
in 1958 the average annual rent received per head of  the 
Fij ian populat ion in Ba and Macuata ,  both cane proy inces , 
was only £1 . 78 and £1 . 81 respec t ively . Nor has the chief s ' 
port ion us ually been inves ted so as to increase village 
incomes . As Spate put it in 1959 , ' the chief s , the natural 
leaders of society , have often in sober truth been debauched 
by easy money , while mos t  people receive a pit tance scarcely 
wor th saving ' • 1 6  Like Indians , many Fij ians are also suffer­
ing from the l imit ed spread ef fects  of sugar which make it 
harder to f ind j ob s . As the populat ion grows and the s pread 
effects of the indus try (and o ther sectors of the economy ) 1 7  
remain comparat ively small , the shor tage o f  land already 
evident in some distric t s  wil l  become s t eadily mo re acute . 
Yet the price Fij ians mus t pay to reoccupy areas which are 
leased is rac ial conf l ic t  on a s cale that the vas t  maj ority 
wish to avo id . To many Fij ians , it  mus t seem that the 
problems connected with land outweigh much of the benef its  
received from sugar . 
So it  is  that while the owners of capital , government 
and many of the Fij ian chief s  have done qui te well from 
sugar , net gains to the mass of the Indian population have 
not been so great , while for c onnnoners ne t gains have been 
relat ively small . In 1879  Thurs ton had promised Gordon 
with ref erence to po tential sugar inves tors , ' I  shall do all 
I can to induce them to embark their money without making 
any sacrif ices . '  After nearly one hundred years , i t  seems 
that  Fij i has made larger sacrif ices than Thurs ton expec ted . 1 8  
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